s God
dead?
asked
Time
magazine
in
its
issue
of
April
8
1960.
Yes
"God
is
dead'%
responded
three
American
scholars.
These
were
Thomas
Altizer
of
Emory
University
in
Atlanta;
William
Hamilton
of
Colgate-Rochester
Divinity
School,
and
Paul
Van
Buren
of
Temple
University.
'
This
bold
response
to
a
very
extraordinary
question
proved
to
be
the
birth
of
"The
Death
of
God"
school
and
one
culmination
of
centuries
of
curiosities,
research,
and
inquiry
concerning
the
"Transcendent
God"
of
theism.
These
claims
about
the
death
of
God
were
neither
unusual
nor
new.
It
had
been
implied
in
the
writings
of
many
a
philosophers
and
scientists.
But
to
speak
of
"the
death
of
God"
in
its
modem
grab
is
to
invoke
the
name
of
Friedrich
Nietzsche
(1844-1900),
'
who
raised
his
cry
in
these
very
words
at
the
end
of
last
century.
Writing
about
the
stages
in
the
process
of
God's
death,
Nietzsche
observed,
that
ancient
people
had
many
gods.
First,
the
many
gods
gave
way
to
"an
old
grim-beard".
"a
jealous"
God
when
"the
ungodliest
utterance
came
from
a
God
himself
"  He
declared
that
"There
is
but
one
God!
Thou
shalt
have
no
other
gods
before
me!
"
Then
all
other
gods,
as
Nietzsche
puts
it,
laughing
and
shaking
upon
their
thrones
exclaimed
the
interesting
secret:
"Is
it
not
just
divinity
that
there
are
Gods
but
no
God?
",
and
expired
from
their
laughter.
'
The
old
multiple
deities,
according
to
Nietzsche,
were
energetic
and
useful
as
they
were
connected
with
some
human
needs
or
some
forces
in
the
nature.
The
one
God
who
replaced
them
was
so
transcendent
that
he
was
beyond
humans
creating
Will.
4
On
the
other
hand,
he
was
too
much
intrusive,
disturbing,
and
involved
in
human
affairs.
"The
God
who
beheld
every
thing,
and
also
man:
that
God
had
to
die!
Man
cannot
endure
that
such
a witness
should
live.
"'  Commenting
on
Nietzsche's
observations,
Paul
Ramsey
explains
that
such
a
God
"was
too
much
God-with
us,
God
in
human,
all-too-human
form.
He
mixed
too
much
in
human
affkirs,
even
manifesting
himself
in
this
miserable
flesh.
In
a
sense,
God's
fellow-humanity
killed
him.
"' He
further
observes,
that
"After
the
gods
made
in
man's
image,
the
God
who
proposed
to
make
and
remake
man
in his
own
image,
that
God
too
had
to
die.
0
The
"death
of
God"
was
necessary
to
liberate
man
from
the
unlimited
restrictions
or
so-called
religious
interpretations
of
man
and
the
universe
that
were
imposed
in
the
name
of
God
upon
the
cultural
products
of
men.
This
death,
writes
Karl
Lowith,
"demands
of
the
man
who
wills
himself,
to
whom
no
God
says
what
he
must
do,
that
he
transcends
man
at
the
same
time
as
he
is
freed
from
God.
"'
Men
were
to
be
autonomous
and
unlimited
creators
of
their
cultures
and
destinies.
They
used
to
accomplish
this
task
by
projecting
into
cosmos
their
fears
and
aspirations,
by
creating
their
gods,
but
now
they
could
achieve
this
autonomy
through
science
and
philosophy.
I
So.
Nietzsche
observes,
"God
is
dead
in
the
hearts
of
men,
science
and
rationalism
have
killed
him.
"'
Livingston,
observes,
that
the
outcome
of
this
development
is
"the
death
of
the
ultimate
ground
and
support
of
all
traditional
values.
For
over
two
thousand
years
men
have
derived
their
"thou
shalt"
and
"thou
shalt
not"
from
God,
but
that
is
now
coming
to
an
end.
""
By
this
"half-poetic,
half-prophetic"
"phrase
Nietzsche
meant
to
represent
those
great
many
critics
of
theistic
understanding
of
God
who
had
asserted
for
the
past
many
centuries
that
the
traditional,
official,
and
transcendent
God
of
theism
has
lost
His
authority
over
and
usefulness
to
the
world.
This
phrase
implies
that
"In
man
the
consciousness
of
an
ultimate
in
the
traditional
sense
has
died.
""
The
God
who
used
to
be
worshipped
as
Creator
of
the
universe,
is
no
more
accepted
as
the
creator
of
man
and
his
surroundings.
In
fact,
it
is
the
other
way
around.
It
is
man
who
created
God
in
his
own
image
in himself
The
projection
theories
or
claims
about
the
human
source
of
notions
of
the
divine
are
not
recent.
It
could
be
traced
back
to
Xenophanes
(BC
570-470),
as
old
as
six
hundred
years
before
Jesus
Christ.
Xenophanes,
criticizing
the
anthropomorphism
of
Homer
and
Hesiod
in
their
portrayal
of
gods,
pointed
out
that
"if
oxen
(and
horses)
and
lions
...
could
draw
with
hands
and
create
works
of
art
like
those
made
by
men,
horses
would
draw
pictures
of
gods
like
horses,
and
oxen
of
gods
like
oxen
...
Aethiopians
have
gods
with
snub
noses
and
black
hair,
Thracians
have
gods
with
grey
eyes
and
red
hair,
""
It
has
also
long
been
claimed
that
nature
of
religions
and
of
gods
is
the
product
of
man's
attempts
to
understand
and
desire
to
control
disturbingly
puzzling
natural
phenomena
around
him.
In
the
presence
of
hundreds
of
these
religions
and
gods,
or
in
the
words
of
Cicero,
"in
this
medley
of
conflicting
opinions,
one
thing
is
certain.
Though
it  is
possible
that
they
are
all
of
them
false,
it  is impossible
that
more
than
one
of
them
is
true.
"
14
It
is
the
"Awe".
according
to
Cicero,
evoked
by
terrifýing
natural
phenomena
and
attempts
to
comprehend
the
power
behind
them,
which
has
helped
to
produce
conflicting
religious
opinions
and
the
images
of
divine.
"
In
the
fifteenth
century,
Francis
Bacon
(1561-1626)
virtually
substantiated
Cicero's
observations
by
noting
that
human
beings
in
their
understanding
of
things
rely
upon
causes
that
"have
relation
clearly
to
the
nature
of
man
rather
than
to
the
nature
of
the
universe.
""
These
significant
observations
werýe
hallmark
of
a
new
era,
the
era
of
science.
Bacon
is
regarded
by
great
many
as
the
philosopher
of
modem
science
and
the
"prophet
of
empiricism.
""
William
Wotton
long
ago
wrote:
"My
Lord
Bacon
was
the
first
Great
man
who
took
much
pains
to
convince
the
World
that
they
had
hitherto
been
in
a
wrong
Path,
and
that
Nature
herself,
rather
than
her
Secretaries,
was
to
be
addressed
to
by
those
who
were
desirous
to
know
much
of
her
mind.
""
S.
E.
Guthrie
pays
his
homage
to
Bacon
with
the
following
words:
"No
clear
beginning
can
be
found
for
science
in
the
modem
sense,
but
most
historians
of
science
regard
Bacon
as
the
prophet
of
empiricism
and
hence
of
the
separation
of
science
from
philosophy.
Bacon
also
sounds
the
first
clear
warning
against
anthropomorphism.
He
rejects
Aristotle,
for
example,
largely
for
the
latter's
anthropomorphism.
Bacon's
waming
has
become
a
hallmark
of
subsequent
science.
"19
Bacon
maintained,
that
man
anthropomorphizes.
He
finds
the
source
of
anthropomorphism
in
his
famous
four
sets
of
"idols
and
false
notions",
20
namely
the
idols
of
the
tribe,
cave,
marketplace,
and
theater.
Bacon
observes
that
"The
Idols
of
the
Tribe
have
their
foundations
in
human
nature
itself,
and
in
the
tribe
or
race
of
men.
For
it
is
a
false
assumption
that
the
sense
of
man
is
the
measure
of
2
things.
On
contrary,
all
perceptions
as
well
of
the
sense
as
of
the
mind
are
according
to
the
measure
of
the
individual
and
not
according
to
the
measure
of
the
universe.
And
human
understanding
is
like
a
false
mirror,
which,
receiving
rays
irregularly,
distorts
and
discolors
the
nature
of
things
by
mingling
its
own
nature
with
it.
""
He
farther
held,
that
the
human
perceptions
are
dependent
upon
human
feelings
and
are
motivated
by
them:
"The
human
understanding
is
no
dry
light,
but
receives
an
infusion
from
the
will
and
affections.
"
"Numberless,
in
short,
are
the
"
22
ways,
and
sometimes
imperceptible,
in
which
the
affections
color
and
infect
the
understanding.
Bacon
pinpointed
the
fundamental
weakness
of
the
human
thought
and
its
major
stumbling
block
i.
e.,
the
human
tendency
to
anthrpomorphize.
Joseph
Aggasi,
a modem
philosopher
of
science,
rates
Bacon
as
the
"locus
classicus"
of
the
critique
of anthropomorphism.
'
In
the
sixteenth
century,
Bernard
Fontenelle
(1657-1757)
renewed
the
old
Cicerian
approach
by
proposing
a
"universal
evolutionary
framework"'
for
the
development
of
human
thought
and
culture.
Fontenelle
himself
was
quite
aware
of
the
revolutionary
nature
of
his
observations:
"Will
what
I
am
going
to
say
be
believed?
There
was
philosophy
even
in
those
crude
centuries,
and
it
greatly
assisted
the
growth
of
myths.
Men
whose
intelligence
is
more
acute
than
most
are
naturally
inclined
to
seek
the
cause
of
what
they
see...
""
These
ancient
philosophers
used
the
same
method
as
that
of
ours
to
explain
the
unseen
and
unknown
phenomena,
that
"the
unknown
cannot
be
entirely
different
from
what
is known
to
us
at
present.
"6The
ancient
rnind
worked
out
the
myth,
the
earliest
form
of
science
and
philosophy,
the
same
way
as
our
mind
works
it
out.
Although
they
used
crude
images
and
metaphors
vastly
different
from
our
sophisticated
technological
symbols
and
images.
Fontenelle
argued,
that
"This
philosophy
of
the
first
centuries
revolved
on
a
principle
so
natural
that
even
today
our
philosophy
has
none
other;
that
is
to
say,
that
we
explain
...
unknown
natural
things
by
those
which
we
have
before
our
eyes,
and
that
we
carry
over
to
-natural
science
...
those
things
ffirnished
us
by
experience.
""
The
natural
forces
beyond
human
control
lead
people
to
imagine
beings
"more
powerful
than
themselves,
capable
of
producing
these
grand
effects.
"
28
The
diversity
of
natural
forces
explains
the
multitude
of
primitive
divinities,
"Nothing
proves
the
great
antiquity
of
these
divinities
better
or
marks
more
clearly
the
route
the
imagination
took
...
in
shaping
them.
The
first
man
knew
of no
better
quality
than
physical
force;
wisdom
and
justice
had
not
even
a  name
in
the
ancient
languages,
as
they
still
do
not
today
among
the
savages
of
America.
""
Therefore,
"It
was
quite
necessary
that
the
gods
reflect
...
both
the
times
at
which
they
were
created
and
the
circumstances
which
brought
them
into
existence.
"'O
Hence
Cicero,
in
the
opinion
of
Fontenelle,
was
mistaken
and
unfair
in
calling
the
anthropomorphic
gods
of
Homer
as
crude:
"what
he
in
his
time
saw
as
qualities
befitting
gods
were
not
at all
known
in
the
time
of
Homer.
01
It
goes
without
saying
that
the
gods
are
anthropomorphic
in
nature
as
they
are
the
products
of
human
thoughts
and
circumstances,
and
that
the
nature,
qualities,
and
attributes
of
gods
change
with
the
change
of
human
thought
patterns
and
cultures.
The
seventeenth
century
philosopher
Benedict
de
Spinoza
(1632-1677)
follows
Bacon
in
criticizing
human
tendency
of anthropocentrism
and
anthropomorphiSM.
3'
To
him,
our
perceptions
of
the
world
are
nothing
but
the
extension
of
our
views
regarding
ourselves.
As
we
do
things
for
certain
ends,
likewise,
we
perceive
the
nature
working
for
specific
ends.
But
when
the
humans
"cannot
learn
such
causes
from
external
causes,
they
are
compelled
to
turn
to
considering
3
themselves,
and
reflecting
what
end
would
have
induced
them
personally
to
bring
about
the
given
event,
and
thus
they
necessarily
judge
other
natures
by
their
own.
""
They
further
look
"on
the
whole
of
nature
as
a
means
for
obtaining
such
conveniences.
Now
as
they
are
aware,
that
they
found
these
conveniences
and
did
not
make
them,
they
think
they
have
cause
for
believing,
that
some
other
being
has
made
them
for
their
use.
As
they
look
upon
things
as
means,
they
cannot
believe
them
to
be
self-created;
but,
judging
from
the
means
which
they
are
accustomed
to
prepare
for
themselves,
they
are
bound
to
believe
in
some
ruler
or
rulers
of
the
universe
...
who
have
arranged
and
adapted
everything
for
human
use.
"'
David
Hume
(1711-76),
"the
fine
flower
of
the
English
...
eighteenth
century
mind",
and
a
staunch
"defender
of
Nature
against
Reason",
35
pioneered
this
line
of
approach
in
our
modem
times.
He
gave
a
more
detailed
account
of
anthropomorphic
nature
of
the
divine.
To
him,
the
notions
about
the
divine
did
not
spring
"from
reason
but
from
the
natural
uncertainties
of
life
and
out
of
fear
of
the
future;
it
functioned
in
giving
the
individual
confidence
and
hope
in
his
or
her
"anxious
concern
for
happiness".
It
was
a
means
of
overcoming
the
"disordered
scene"
of
human
life-`6
Looking
at
the
idea
of
God
in
an
evolutionary
perspective,
Hume
disposed
of
the
theory
of
an
original
monotheism,
and
considered
the
earliest
form
of
religion
to
be
that
of
idolatry
or
polytheism.
To
Hume
the
origin
of
the
idea
of
God
turned
out,
as
Basil
Willey
puts
it,
to
be
"much
less
respectable
than
an
eighteenth
century
theist
might
have
hoped.
It
was
not
by
contemplating
the
spacious
firmament
on
high
that
primitive
man
arrived
at
his
notions
of
a
divine
original.
He
simply
personified
his
own
hopes
and
fears,
and
then
proceeded
to
worship
and
placate
the
gods
he
made
in his
own
image.
""
A
fl.
Aner
putting
the
world
of
ideas
in
the
realm
of
human
experience,
"'our
ideas
reach
no
farther
than
our
experience",
38
and
that
"all
our
ideas...
are
copies
of
our
impressions",
39
Hume
argued,
that
even
refined
and
abstract
ideas
like
that
of
the
divine
or
God
sprang
only
from
"the
materials
afforded
us
by
the
senses
and
experience.
"'
Therefore,
according
to
Hume,
"the
first
idea
of
religion
arose
not
from
a contemplation
of
the
works
of
nature,
but
from
a
concern
with
regard
to
the
events
of
life,
and
from
incessant
hopes
and
fears,
which
actuate
the
human
mind.
""
Man
is
worried
about
the
"future
causes".
he
has
"the
anxious
concern
for
happiness,
the
dread
of
future
misery,
the
terror
of
death,
the
thirst
for
revenge,
the
appetite
for
food
and
other
necessaries.
Agitated
by
hopes
and
fears
of
this
nature,
especially
the
latter,
men
scrutinize,
with
trembling
curiosity,
the
course
of
future
causes,
and
examine
the
various
and
contrary
events
of
human
life.
it42
This
sheer
anxiety
leads
man
to
imagine
and
formulate
ideas
about
these
powers:
"These
unknown
causes,
then,
become
the
constant
object
of
our
hope
and
fear;
and
while
the
passions
are
kept
in
perpetual
alarm
by
an
anxious
expectation
of
the
events,
the
imagination
is
equally
employed
in
forming
ideas
of
those
powers,
on
which
we
have
so
entire
a
dependence.
03
Such
an
imagination
leads
man
to
personification.
Hume
argues
that
there
is
a universal
tendency
among
mankind
"to
conceive
all
beings
like
themselves,
and
to
transfer
to
every
object,
those
qualities,
with
which
they
are
familiarly
acquainted,
and
of
which
they
are
intimately
conscious.
We
find
human
faces
in
the
moon,
armies
in
the
clouds;
and
by
a
natural
propensity,
if
not
corrected
by
experience
and
reflection,
ascribe
malice
or
good-will
to
every
thing,
that
hurts
or
pleases
us.
"'
He
brings
a number
of
examples
of
this
"propensity"
and
further
argues,
that
"No
wonder,
then,
that
mankind
placed
in
such
an
absolute
ignorance
of
causes,
and
being
at
the
same
4
time
so
anxious
concerning
their
future
fortune,
should
immediately
acknowledge
a
dependence
on
invisible
powers.,
possessed
of
sentiment
and
intelligence.
The
unknown
causes
which
continually
employ
their
thought
...
are
all
apprehended
to
be
of
the
same
kind
or
species.
Nor
is
it
long
before
we
ascribe
to
them
thought
and
reason
and
passion,
and
sometimes
even
the
limbs
and
figures
of
men,
in
order
to
bring
them
nearer
to
a
resemblance
with
ourselves.
""
This
anthropomorphic
tendency
of
modeling
all
unknown
powers
after
our
familiar
human
categories,
is
the
foundation
of
our
belief
in
the
divine.
Such
was
the
case
not
only
with
the
primitive
man,
"Even
at
this
day,
and
in
Europe,
ask
any
of
the
vulgar,
why
he
believes
in
an
omnipotent
creator
of
the
world;
he
will
never
mention
the
beauty
of
final
causes,
of
which
he
is
wholly
ignorant:
He
will
not
hold
out
his
hand,
and
bid
you
contemplate
the
suppleness
and
variety
of
joints
in
his
fingers,
their
bending
all
one
way
...
To
these
he
has
been
long
accustomed;
and
he
beholds
them
with
listlessness
and
unconcern.
He
will
tell
you
of
the
sudden
and
unexpected
death
of
such
a
one:
The
fall
and
bruise
of
such
another:
The
excessive
drought
of
this
season:
The
cold
and
rains
of
another.
This
he
ascribes
to
the
immediate
operation
of
providence:
And
such
events,
as,
with
good
reasoners,
are
the
chief
difficulties
in
admitting
a supreme
intelligence,
are
with
him
the
sole
arguments
for
it