National Self-Determination and Justice in Multinational States

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Chapter 3
A Definition of Nationhood[1]

Actors in conflicts of self-determination employ the notion of nationhood to identify themselves. Yet the fact that they claim national identity does not necessarily place them in the class of nations, nor does it immediately entitle them to self-determination. Judging the legitimacy of granting a particular group the right to self-determination requires determining first whether it qualifies in principle to advance the claim. We need to evaluate the various claims to nationhood and self-determination made by minority groups and to verify the status of various groups presently referred to as “national.” Generating a commonly accepted definition of nationhood and clarifying how nationhood relates to self-determination could introduce much-needed conceptual clarity to the assessment of substate groups’ entitlements and to the definition of the subjects of the right to self-determination. In the previous chapter, I distinguished between two types of group rights and established that a moral right to self-determination is primary, belonging to group agents constituted so as to be capable of exercising equal freedom with other similarly constituted agents. In this chapter, I define nations as groups organized around the shared collective good of self-determination and defend this definition as providing the conceptual ground to determine the status of and norms for relations between national groups in multinational states.

The notion of national self-determination is widely used now, and by introducing my definition of nationhood I hope to clarify the meaning of national self-determination and clearly distinguish nations from groups that are organized around other types of shared goods. Settling conflicting self-determination claims or designing arrangements for a federal state requires some prescriptive ordering of the notions of self-determination, nationhood, and statehood. I do not yet defend any set of normative principles designed to regulate relations of self-determination among national groups.[2] Rather, I first introduce two criteria that any definition of “nation” has to satisfy to be better at conceptualizing nationhood than the status quo, and I explain how rival conceptions of nationhood fail to satisfy the criteria. Then I put forward and defend my definition of a nation: a collective agent characterized by a political culture of self-determination with which its members self-identify.

Finally, I restate what constitutes the moral foundation of the right to national self-determination and justify my understanding of self-determination as it pertains

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to the definition of nationhood in political and territorial terms. It should be noted that a group can be constituted as a nation (that is, it can be constituted around the shared good of self-determination) and thereby qualify for the right to self-determination in principle but be prevented from being granted the right. This restriction applies, for example, when the form in which the group persistently tries to exercise self-determination is harmful to others.

A General Methodological Approach to Defining Nationhood

The notion of "nation" presently has multiple meanings, including "people," "national minority," "the population of a state," "ethnic group," and "title nation" or "majority." As we have seen, the UN Charter declares the right of all peoples to self-determination, but "people" is not clearly defined and does not in principle exclude substate national groups from the entitlement. In current international practice and law, the terms "nation" and "state" are often used interchangeably. The European Framework Convention, for example, recognizes states as the undersigning parties and emphasizes its signatories' respect for those states' territorial integrity and *national* sovereignty.[3] Although the special nature of national minorities is implicit in the very fact that such a document was adopted, the convention introduces a confusion between statehood and nationhood by both calling state sovereignty "national" and failing to provide an explanation of why states are entitled to national government while minorities are entitled only to cultural, linguistic, and religious rights. International law overall does not define the status or the powers that non-state groups that claim to be nations in multinational states should have in relation to other groups, their citizens, and their own national minorities. The meaning of "national," especially in light of terms like "national sovereignty," needs to be clarified.

The use of the notion of nationhood in the context of formulating norms for the resolution of conflicts of self-determination does not make sense to everyone. Buchanan, for example, suggests regulating secession on the basis of respect for human rights, allowing national groups to secede if the host state is engaged in gross violations of the human rights of the national minority. But the fact that states that do not violate human rights are considered basically legitimate is a point of contention for those groups that demand that their right to national self-determination be respected. Liberal arguments about the neutrality of human rights both acknowledge that state assignment is a result of historical contingencies and presuppose that one can disassociate self-determination and nationhood from statehood by treating individuals equally with respect to their national identity. As I have already pointed out, such arguments are not adequate, because the equal treatment of each individual with respect to his or her nationhood falls short of adequately addressing the claims collective agents advance to control their future political status. Therefore, it is vital to consider rather than skim over the terms of national membership if we are to find norms for conflict resolution, because the notion of nationhood in the context

of multinational states describes the mutual definition and self-definition of substate groups that advance self-determination claims in such states.

In this section, I will introduce two criteria that are required for a definition of nationhood to be both principled and effective. Group agents make claims concerning their status and mobilize from an actively maintained "internal" perspective, regardless of whether the identity they construct is perceived as politically valid or historically accurate by outside observers. The vague condition of international law is not helpful when it comes to the problem of the status of substate nationhood in the political landscape of states. For a definition of nationhood to be better than the status quo in dealing with this problem, it needs to be attuned to groups' constitution as they presently relate to one another. The two criteria below, both of which an adequate definition ought to satisfy, reflect this goal.

The Two Criteria

We cannot properly decide whether the differential treatment of national groups is justified on the basis of a definition that presupposes differential treatment. Defining nationhood as having a necessary connection to statehood, for example—what I call the "nation-state approach"—prejudges the outcome of the discussion in favor of the very difference between state-endowed and non-state national groups that is being questioned.[4] Given that it is impossible for every national group to have its own state, when such a definition is used to formulate international legal principles and the domestic policies of multinational states, it disadvantages groups without state institutions that reside within the territory of a multinational state; it cannot be the basis for addressing their claims, as the claims challenge this very contingent distribution of political power associated with statehood. Thus, a definition that gives preference to state-endowed groups based on historically contingent facts is not acceptable.[5]

Criterion 1 (hereafter referred to as "**C1**") grows out of the necessity for a definition of "nation" not to be normative:

C1: A definition should not determine the normative content of the principles designed to regulate relations among national groups with respect to their self-determination claims or any other entitlements. Thus, group rights or entitlements should not be part of the definition.

A definition that pertains to multiple perspectives without privileging any of them captures what is shared by national groups of different kinds and is capable of reflecting their view of their standing in relation to all other national groups they consider appropriate. This allows the definition to account for group agency and avoids identifying national groups based on characteristics perceived as defining only by outside observers. One example of an externally imposed criterion would involve assessing the standing of groups with respect to one another based on the

comprehensive idea that language is a major characteristic of nationhood. Romantic thinkers considered relations of national groups with respect to this criterion, not with respect to how the groups perceived themselves in relation to language or to other groups. Johann Gottlieb Fichte ranked nations according to the degree to which their languages were "alive" and "connected to the force of nature."[6] As I argued in the previous chapter, the shared good of language alone does not allow collective agents to relate to others. The nature of a linguistic community's relations with other groups is defined by the political community of which the linguistic group is a part.

Nationhood is a complex phenomenon that includes aspects of personal and group identity, history, culture, and political preferences. All of these features are shared by several kinds of groups, not only by national groups. We need to be able to tell what distinguishes ethnic or administrative units from national groups, what the similarity is between multi- and mono-ethnic national groups, and what differentiates groups with very similar "national" cultures that form different national communities.

Criterion 2 (**C2**) grows out of this need, requiring the construction of a notion of nationhood that maintains the complexity of the phenomenon relative to the context of its use:

C2: A definition should be pragmatic: it should provide sufficient guidance in determining whether a group qualifies as a nation for the purpose of the regulation of relations among the subjects of multinational states and be able to account for changing group identities.

I share Rogers Brubaker's caution concerning the scope and the aims of the idea of "nation."[7] He claims: "Nationalism can and should be understood without invoking 'nations' as substantial entities; 'nation' is a category of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of analysis. We have to understand the practical uses of the category 'nation,' the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action."[8] Like Brubaker, I appreciate the dynamic aspect of nationhood. National allegiances are contingent; identity categories, however—especially translated in the form of group members' beliefs and intentions—do structure the world through collective action. Brubaker states that "Nationness is an event that suddenly crystallizes rather than gradually develops."[9] Yet something constitutes this nationness, for how else can we declare that crystallization has occurred? Identifying its features is the task of a definition of nationhood. If nation-related categories designate something dynamic, this does not mean that they do not designate something real. My theory supports the idea that a national group may be created where no long-lived national group—defined, perhaps, in Romantic and primordial terms—has existed, but it does not diminish the reality of national group agency. National identity is likely to be, as Craig Calhoun argues, a "changeable product of collective action."[10] If a group agent does not have what a metaphysician would call a "strict" identity, however, a national group will still possess a degree of continuity that provides a basis for reference.

We want to know how to regulate the collective actions of groups, even if their identity is changeable. Thus, considering a nation as a special type of collective agent allows us to introduce a category of analysis of practice that accounts for changes while helping to establish a principled basis for the regulation of relations among national groups. A pragmatic, nonessentialist approach should yield a definition that can serve as a situated description:[11] the definition helps us to evaluate the various claims of minority national groups. It should be mentioned, however, that qualifying as a national group is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a group to receive equal entitlement to other similar groups: if a group does not satisfy the definition, it is in principle not capable of entitlement; if the group satisfies the definition, it may be disqualified on other counts.

We could produce a definition by listing the constitutive features of those groups that are now considered nations (namely, state-endowed groups) and asking which among these features are shared by non-state groups claiming a right to self-determination. Or we could start with a broader sample and define what characterizes all those agents that claim to be "peoples" with the right to self-determination. Given that we are looking for a set of constitutive characteristics that allows groups to be compared, we will come up with a similar list of constitutive features regardless of what method we use. If we define as nations a number of stateless groups that share the constitutive features of their state-endowed counterparts, the definition itself has neither "uncovered" a hidden entitlement of substate groups to self-determination nor created such an entitlement.

Say that group A1, which shares state S1 with group B1, claims as one of its constitutive characteristics its superiority to B1, whose members those of A1 regard as essentially non-As. Although this particular feature of A1's self-understanding is important in the context of the regulation of relations between A1 and B1, and although A1 may have something in common with another group A2 in state S2 that similarly defines itself as superior to B2, defining nationhood in terms of superiority to another nation nonetheless would not help to regulate relations among substate groups in the states S1 and S2, because B1 and B2 have to be included in this regulation as well. B1 and B2, moreover, may share a trait in common, such as being victimized by A1 and A2, that is different from what A1 and A2 share; if so, it would provide an alternative—but still not helpful—definition of nationhood.

If in defining what "nationhood" means, moreover, we prioritize A1's and A2's self-understanding and ignore what B1 and B2 think of themselves, we will have failed to create a definition that allows us to regulate relations with respect to self-determination among substate groups in S1 and S2. B1 and B2, assuming they are or aspire to be collective agents with group identity organized around the goal of self-determination and mobilized around plans of action designed to bring their collective goal about, are not going to acquiesce to norms that discriminate against them, because those norms are based on a definition that downgrades the B groups' status. Such a definition would fail at least Criterion 2—that is, it would not be pragmatic, given the likelihood that B1 and B2 would reject it. Now, B1 and B2 may be agents of an entirely different type from those claiming self-determination but may try to advance strategic self-determination claims. In such a case, while they should

not be identified as national groups, this exclusion will be due to their failure to satisfy a properly identified set of conditions, not to a definition that generalizes from what is common to A1 and A2. If B1 and B2 do advance self-determination claims in earnest, though, what is relevant to the regulation of relations among the groups in S1 and S2 is that they all advance claims to self-determination: that A1 and A2 do it as well as B1 and B2, and that all of them can obtain self-determination only along with and in relation to the other groups. To evaluate, for example, whether either one of two autonomous groups in the territory of the former Soviet republic of Georgia—Abkhazia, which wants to secede, and Adjaria, which does not want to secede—is treated fairly, we need to establish first whether the Georgians and the Adjarians, the Adjarians and the Abkhazians, and the Abkhazians and the Georgians are different kinds of groups.

Some Definitions

In this section, I will consider current leading types of definitions of nationhood and explain why they do not satisfy either **C1** or **C2**, and thus why they are incapable of providing the foundation for a framework of legal regulations that will be better than the status quo.

The Nation-State Approach

What I call the nation-state approach is formulated in different ways based on how the relation between nationhood and statehood is interpreted. States can simply be defined as nations. Anthony Giddens argues that a nation exists only when "a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed."[12] In this view, units that do not have corresponding states are referred to as nations only mistakenly. To discuss their political situation, Giddens argues, some other category of description should be used.

When states are not defined as nations, the correspondence between the two may nonetheless be presented as either an inevitable or a desirable outcome of political development. A *functionalist account* suggests that the successful functioning of a state leads to the formation of national identity within its borders. Margaret Canovan argues that most democracies are nation-states of one nation. For a state to function properly, she explains, there has to be a sufficient sense of solidarity among its citizens, and nationhood is the best candidate for creating and maintaining such solidarity; in fact, it *is* this solidarity.[13] Other forms of solidarity, like constitutional patriotism or shared political values, are either too weak to keep together a liberal state or are just as particularistic as nationhood and have a tendency to be expressed in national terms.[14]

A *nationalist account* claims that nations ought to have states of their own.[15] According to Ernest Gellner, a state is necessary to maintain a nation's official language, which supports a culture of a homogenized, impersonal, industrialized

society with a high level of division of labor. Thus, a nation-building process, if it is successful, results in the formation of a nation that corresponds to a state. In Gellner's view, to resolve an unstable situation in which several national groups reside within the territory of one state, either the state's boundaries have to change or some national groups have to be assimilated. Even if several nations come together to form one state, they will have to create a high culture for this new state, and this culture will correspond to a new nation. Gellner writes that in the "Age of Nationalism," multinationalism was felt to be uncomfortable, and "men then had two options, if they were to diminish such discomfort: they could change their own culture, or they could change the nature of the political unit."[16]

The nation-state approach, therefore, perceives the world as a combination of the real and potential one-to-one correspondence of states and nations. Canovan and Gellner would agree that a regional structure that has several nations within it will either become a new nation-state or will fall apart to form several nation-states, to which it may remain a supranational structure that coordinates interstate matters or takes over some of the functions of each state without significant changes to the state. If a regional structure like the European Union, for example, creates a regional identity, it comes to replace the nation-states that initially composed it. Until this happens, the constitutive states remain nations united by a supranational structure.

The nation-state approaches of Giddens, Canovan, and Gellner provide, first, an accurate account of how collective agency forms when a group is able to control its political space and its boundaries, as well as how it functions. Canovan's and Gellner's positions provide an account of the institutional completion of a collective agent by means of the agent's functioning or mobilizing in pursuit of its identity. Second, the nation-state approach documents how the relations of several communities in one territory have historically led to the crystallization of one overarching national culture, which then became the nation of a nation-state. The approach points to the contingent nature of national identity, which is nevertheless actively created. A third important feature, which in my account of nationhood pertains to groups' entitlements in relation to one another, is introduced by Giddens's emphasis on the relational property of nationhood. Giddens maintains that the plurality of nations is a key to the internal formation of nation-states, for it requires the fixing of borders, and this, in turn, helps to better shape and centralize state domination within these borders. Therefore, nation-states exist only in a complex of other nation-states and are defined as "a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries."[17] In sum, the nation-state approach highlights three important features of nationhood: the coincidence of political and national units, the historical contingency of nationhood, and the relational nature of entitlement to control a political space.

Despite these positive features, however, the nation-state approach associates statehood with both nationhood and self-determination. Since international order is understood as being based on states, and since not all minority groups presently possess or can feasibly obtain a state of their own, this approach explicitly acknowledges the entitlements of only certain groups and thereby violates **C1**. Defining nationhood to imply a necessary connection between nations and states leads to (1)

the impossibility of accommodating claims to self-determination made by national minorities or substate national groups, for which international regulation and proper inclusion in the institutional structures of multinational states are especially necessary, and (2) a disregard for conceptions of self-determination that do not fit the mold of nation-state accounts. In this, the nation-state approach mirrors current practices of international politics and law, which acknowledge strong ties between self-determination and statehood. According to these practices and the nation-state approach, nations without states of their own have to belong to some state, and the successful design of a multinational state is possible only at the price of subordinating the national identities of different national groups under the a general national identity of one nation-state. Although the nation-state approach is right to connect the political to the national, its equation of nationhood and self-determination with statehood limits its relevance to the problem of self-determination.

It may perhaps be argued that the nation-state approach is designed only to project what states may become in the future or what they ought to be, not to provide a basis for settling self-determination claims. The nation-state approach concludes that for a multinational state to function, it is necessary to create a political climate and institutions within the state that support an encompassing national identity.[18] Interpreted as an "ideal-world solution" and not a theory of what nations are, however, such an approach would still need to specify the strategies required to achieve or, rather, to approximate the ideal kind of state. In its present form, the nation-state approach does not offer recommendations for successful nation building in a multinational state. Hence, even in its ideal-world version, the nation-state approach is incomplete. When the nation-state account merely predicts (or expresses the desirability of) a multinational state's eventual dismantling or transformation into a one-nation state, moreover, the approach makes itself irrelevant to the relations of national groups in multinational states *before* these changes take place, violating the pragmatic requirement of **C2.**

In fact, even if the nation-state approach is taken as simply an account of how nations have formed historically, it is still incomplete, because it does not address those national groups that have not been completely assimilated and that make self-determination claims to this day.[19] In my account of nationhood, I retain the three important features of the nation-state approach but disassociate statehood from nationhood, on the one hand, and from self-determination, on the other.

David Miller's Definition

One definition that does not introduce normative ranking and hence satisfies **C1** is David Miller's. Miller describes a nation as "a group of people who recognize one another as belonging to the same community, who acknowledge special obligations to one another, and who aspire to political autonomy—this by virtue of characteristics that they believe they share, typically a common history, attachment to a geographical place, and a public culture that differentiates them from their

neighbors."[20] The meaning of "public culture" here needs qualification. Federal units of the United States possess a degree of political autonomy; while their citizens perceive them to be political communities with their own governing bodies, most of them think of their states not as nations but as parts of a bigger nation. Members of an ethnic minority also share a public culture, and often they have a degree of autonomy in the formulation and administration of political measures designed to safeguard their culture and language. However, the public culture of an ethnic group is very different from that of a national group. They place different demands on political actors and require different degrees of political autonomy. What is more, states may encompass several separate ethnic identities but only one nationality. Finally, different nations may have similar public cultures: Romania and Moldova share many essential elements of culture, but they certainly have two different public cultures—not as ethnically different groups but as different nations. "Public culture" and "political autonomy" hence can be used as elements in defining not only national groups but other kinds of groups as well. When Miller wants to distinguish between national and ethnic groups, he points out that national groups make a claim to self-determination and create the appropriate organizations and institutions to fulfill the claim.[21] Hence it makes sense to refocus his definition to clarify that the public culture of national groups and their actual or desired political autonomy have to do with self-determination. In the next section, I provide an altered definition that follows Miller's in important ways but focuses it by spelling out the features of nations from the point of view of their constitution as collective agents, which allows us to distinguish them from other kinds of groups.

Subjective Definitions

Several authors use what I characterize as subjective definitions of "nation." Margaret Moore, for example, stresses that there are good reasons to understand "nation" as subjectively defined.[22] She says that "the term 'nation' refers to a group of people who identify themselves as belonging to a particular national group, who are usually enclosed on a particular historical territory, and who have a sense of affinity to people sharing that identity."[23] But if a nation is said to exist when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one, then this begs the question, for one has to define what a nation is in order to describe their concept of a nation.[24] One can try to avoid circularity by avoiding using "nation" in describing the group's self-identification. Alfred Cobban, for example, considers that "any territorial community, the members of which are conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of their community, is a nation."[25] In this case, however, the definition does not help us distinguish between nations and populations of cities or ethnic or national minorities, and hence it fails to meet **C2**. The content of self-identification has to be specified.

Walker Connor states that in case of national groups it is not *what is,* but *what people believe is* that has behavioral consequences. The nation is a self-defined

rather than an other-defined grouping, he explains, so the facts of origin seldom conform with factual data.[26] While I appreciate that he considers national groups from the "insider" point of view, I disagree with how he fleshes out the content of group members' beliefs. Connor defines a nation as a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. A nation, he explains, is the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family. But the definition of nationhood he provides fails to shed light on what precisely in the myth of ancestry distinguishes between ethnic or religious minorities on the one hand and national minorities on the other, thus failing to satisfy **C2**. In this chapter I demonstrate that a particular type of political culture is necessary and sufficient to deal with cases of this sort. One important aspect of Connor's treatment of nationhood is his awareness that conventional scholarly approaches cannot be applied to transitional and non-democratic societies due to the attention the dominant group commands and consequent uncertainty concerning the group identities of non-dominant groups. In the case of Montenegro, he points out, there are Montenegrins as well as Serbs who consider Montenegrins a part of the Serbian nation.[27] Based on this consideration, he argues, we do not know if a nation has emerged there. A definition that pays attention to the political culture of a group is better situated to pronounce on the formation of a nation in cases of this sort. Connor clearly pays attention to the constitution of group agents, but the set of shared beliefs with which he identifies nations is too broad and does not allow him to propose a criterion by which to identify national groups in transitional societies. I share his caution concerning these kinds of societies and deal with them in Chapter 4.

Max Weber suggests the concept of "nation" cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. Nation, he writes, is a "specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups," and "thus the concept belongs in the sphere of values."[28] Members of a nation share a conviction of "the irreplaceability of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group."[29] I support Weber's emphasis on intersubjective awareness, which can account for the active and dynamic aspects of nationhood, but this definition does not allow us to distinguish between national and other contexts in which intersubjective awareness might arise (unless it is circular and takes what a nation is for granted prior to defining it). Therefore, to satisfy **C2**, we need to reveal the constitution of the group in a definition of nationhood.[30]

A New Definition of Nationhood

I use the perspective on collective agency I discussed in the previous chapter to define nations as collective agents organized around self-determination. Nations are groups whose members share and identify with a particular kind of political culture, or a set of beliefs and attitudes concerning politics.[31] A group of people is a

national community only if its members believe that they share the end of being a collective agent. Basic to the political culture associated with self-determination, as I explained in Chapter 1, is the belief that membership in a group defines the bounds within which political authority can originate meaningfully for those it governs. That is, political power exercised over the group is authoritative only if it derives from the group as a whole. In addition, the members of the group share the corresponding collective end of establishing or maintaining effective agency. Thus, members perceive their national group as a *primary political community*: there is no larger or smaller political community to which they relate that can represent their agency. Members of a religious community, by contrast, normally consider the larger society to be their primary political community, while citizens of a multinational state consider their national units to be their primary political communities.[32]

The political culture of nationhood defines for co-nationals the conditions under which a political authority is capable of governing them on the basis of dependent reasons—reasons that apply to them.[33] These reasons cannot apply to them only from the perspective of the state power, regardless of the group's position on the issue of membership in the state. National belonging defines for a nation's individual members the appropriate terms of membership in a polity. For example, although the benefits of belonging to a larger state may create obligations on the part of minority groups toward other citizens, such obligations alone do not create the freely endorsed identification of the minority group members with the larger state and thus the appropriate terms of membership in that state. National identity underscores that political power operates meaningfully for those it governs *only if* it originates with the agency on whose behalf the authority operates. Federal authority is meaningful for its national unit only if the primary-level, or unit-level, authority consents to membership in the federation.

One may object that according to this definition, a federation does not count as a nation, whilst its constituent "nations" do, whereas the primary political group for the members of federations like the UK or Switzerland seems to be the whole of the federal state. This concern can be easily resolved based on my definition. If members of a *de facto* federal unit consider the federal state to be their primary political community, the unit constitutes not a national unit but an administrative-territorial unit. (If the members of all federal units feel this way, the federal state and the national group coincide.) My definition avoids rigidly ascribing status to groups based on present geographical divisions and thus satisfies **C1**. I will consider double-level national allegiances in federations when I discuss "nested" national identities below.

Members of a national group not only ought to share the beliefs of a national political culture but also ought to be willing to approve those beliefs as describing what they truly self-identify with. In an oppressive society, people may act in accordance with an official set of beliefs that describes the terms of membership in a national group without acknowledging these official beliefs and the corresponding political culture as truly representing their identity. Such a "vacuous" political culture cannot define a nation. As I discuss in the next chapter, the members of national

groups in oppressive societies may have not fully articulated what they identify with, but they do know that they do not identify with the set of official beliefs. Another case when non-identification with the set of officially stated beliefs signals that a set of beliefs does not represent the right kind of political culture to identify a national group occurs when the leadership of a minority group strategically promotes claims to nationhood. If the population to which these claims refer does not endorse them as authentic expressions of its identity, these claims about where the meaningful limits of political authority ought to lie similarly fail to define the national group.

A common objection to theories acknowledging the significance of self-determining communities is that nations are too often “created” artificially, and thus this process should not be encouraged. A definition like mine might be perceived as contributing to the process of creating new national groups—as an elite attempt to encourage nations to form where they would not otherwise have done so. If the elites succeed in creating a national group, however, the nation is created in earnest. The point of my agency-based approach is not to encourage the formation of new nations but rather to reflect the facts of political reality and the life of group agents. If group members all identify with the set of beliefs concerning the bounds and nature of group membership that constitute nationhood—even if they did not identify with the same set of beliefs several years ago—it is unfair to continue evaluating the nature of their group engagement based on the kind of collective agent they used to be. An account of nationhood that satisfies **C2** ought to account for the dynamic nature of group identities, but it also ought to guard against the identification of national groups based on beliefs group members are forced to act upon without accepting them freely; it also should guard against making judgments about group identities based on the unverified statements of elites or outsiders. If neither circumstance that would exclude a group from qualifying for nationhood obtains, however, and if the majority of the group voluntarily accepts the opinion of the elite as their own, then the corresponding group agent is in fact organized as a nation around what was initially the elite-defined or elite-identified set of beliefs. One may argue that the consensus is false (or planted) by tracing the origin of the opinion of the majority to the elite political players who managed to persuade the group members to adhere to the beliefs of membership through some sort of manipulation. But if public consensus in the end was formed so as to reflect the beliefs of what initially was only a narrow segment of public, this cannot be taken as evidence of the non-existence of the corresponding national group. An appeal to this kind of “evidence” may conflate two facts belonging to consecutive stages of belief-acquisition—the fact that public attitudes and opinions originate in the minority opinion and the fact that the majority, after it has acquired these beliefs, holds them “for real” (whatever their origin is).

In what ways can the members of a national group share the end of being a collective agent organized around the good of self-determination? Members give meaning to their idea of nationhood through the notion of the ideal correspondence between the identified domain of members and the political power of a primary political community. Returning to the example of one worldwide political community introduced

in Chapter 2, such a community could be considered a nation. Its members would need to be able to maintain their group identity internally to avoid a split that would make some members outsiders, they could not engage in national self-determination as the exercise of freedom with respect to other similar communities. My definition is both able to handle the present conundrums of sub- and inter-state group relationships and to apply to a world without divisions among political communities. Presently, however, members of every national culture are aware of the existence of other groups that share similar beliefs of membership, and they know that each group's actions are in part determined by its respective shared beliefs about what other groups' shared beliefs are. Holding these beliefs implies that they are also likely to have a notion of the ideal mutual standing of groups like them and to share an identity that describes a primary political community. Thus, co-nationals have a notion of the powers and entitlements of their national group with respect to other groups, which they can evaluate by comparing the present status of their group to their notion of the group's ideal standing. Ideally, to relate to other groups, a national group needs to be able to maintain a proper authority and to have control over its membership by achieving proper standing in relation to other collectives. Thus, it needs to have a say over important aspects of the group's relations with other groups, such as the parameters of its inclusion in a multinational state or the degree of interference that other groups can exercise over its internal affairs concerning political governance or even language. In other words, the group's goal is to exercise its ability to have a say about its political future, or a degree of self-determination in relation to other groups that aspire to control their own political futures.

Depending on the group's real situation, its shared end can be either to establish or to maintain effective agency. It needs to be emphasized that the *exercise* of effective agency is not required for a national group to be identified. The presence of a political culture endorsed by the members, who share the end of becoming an effective agent, is sufficient to identify a group as a nation.[34] As I discuss in the next chapter, a nation whose political expression is curtailed has a "potential political culture"—a set of beliefs individuals hold about the community they regard as self-determining and about their government or the dominating nation. If group members' beliefs concerning membership are interdependent but not cooperative, as they would be in a group that discriminates against a set of its members, however, we would need to be cautious about treating the group as a collective agent and assigning it rights based on its constitution.

In short, then, *nationhood can be defined as a political culture based upon the shared end of acquiring or maintaining effective agency having to do with self-determination*. Nations, then, are the corresponding collective agents organized around self-determination. "Self-determination," as I defined it in Chapter 2, is the capacity of a group to control its own political future. The current—relational—meaning of self-determination is closely associated with the acquisition of a state of one's own, but in principle it does not have to be. Sharing a state with others does not necessarily preclude a group from being self-determining as long as it has a say about the terms of inclusion and a chance freely to agree to belong by, for example, choosing not to exercise a constitutional right of exit.[35]

Although nations require some form of self-determination in order to exercise effective agency, my definition does not immediately translate into the right of national groups to self-determination. Whether to grant the right to a national group requires separate consideration. A group qualifying as a national group may perceive its self-determination as trumping that of another group or groups. In this case, the group would not have the right to self-determination, although it would satisfy at least one necessary condition to qualify for the right—that of being a national group. My new definition of a nation, therefore, does not promise the enjoyment of self-determination to national groups, nor—because the realization of self-determination need not be associated with the acquisition of independent statehood—does it entitle national groups to statehood.

If we define nations on the basis of their possession of a political culture that defines the limits of meaningful authority for their members, we rule out as not being nations those linguistic, religious, cultural, or ethnic minorities that make claims to accommodation within existing limits of power. A cultural community that thinks its claims can be satisfied within the larger political community does not aspire to be self-determining; a cultural community that believes its culture can be protected only if it has its own primary political community does. Thus, if a group's shared beliefs about membership are about defining the terms of membership *within* a given political community and not about belonging to this or to some other political community, the community we are looking at is not a nation.

One might object that this criterion fails to exclude groups that are obviously not nations, such as self-governing municipalities or groups that possess other institutional arrangements associated with the middle level of democracy. But the political culture associated with the middle level of democracy defines itself as limited by its inclusion in the larger body of members of a political community (usually a state). A city government that aspires to city-state status, that is prepared to be fully self-determining with all ensuing responsibilities, and that is supported by its population *can* potentially represent a national group; however, if its citizens acknowledge that their power is limited and applies only to the areas delegated to them by the state or federal government, they perceive the larger community to be the primary locus of legislative and executive power over them and cannot be a nation. A national group aspires to operate over the domain of members in its relation to nonmembers, with the shared goal of safeguarding all the powers, rights, and immunities its members have in relation to other communities of a similar sort. The powers of a city government are not defined in relation to other city governments but by the division of competences within the state. Or, a Parent-Teacher Association can decide upon certain rules guiding citizens' behavior and use political means to implement them, like raising taxes to fund school programs enacted through a municipal referendum. But the Parent-Teacher Association influences the lives of other citizens only in a very limited way: it determines educational policies, but it does not decide how to relate to other political communities and it does not normally question the limits of the larger political community. (If it does, this may signal that there is more than one national group present within the territory of the state.) Although educational

decisions made in Buffalo, New York, may take into consideration what is being taught in Toronto, Ontario, this thinking is framed by and operates within an already present political culture of self-determination within the United States. The association can pass decisions concerning some national ideals and symbols,[36] but parents and teachers do not determine the basic outlines of the national political culture and its ideals, they only have a degree of discretion concerning how to implement them. A change in the national political culture can be initiated from the middle level of a democracy—for example, parents' and teachers' attitudes and actions with respect to the Pledge of Allegiance can influence the national culture in the long run—but any such change can only be enacted by the government associated with the national group at large. Besides, such a change is likely to be about the terms of membership, not its bounds. A self-determining group (usually called "a people") has the capacity to be entirely determined by the conditions of its internal life and thus to be a self-sufficient political community.

Political elements of nationhood (such as claims to political autonomy or self-determination) are recognized by many authors,[37] but their notions of nationhood also include other elements that go beyond this particular type of political culture. Thus, it could be objected that although it may be necessary to establish the presence of a political culture of self-determination in order to be able to distinguish between national and ethnic groups, my definition is too narrow in its focus on political culture alone. Below, I consider why the presence of such a culture, together with self-identification, is sufficient to define nationhood.

Why Political Culture and Not Culture?

There are two interconnected characteristics of culture that are commonly identified as relevant to its being used in concepts of nationhood. The first is that culture is shared by the members of a nation.[38] The second is that members of nations recognize one another through their common culture.[39] Culture also allows others—nonmembers—to recognize members of a nation. By considering the process of naturalization, however, I will establish that it is sufficient for individuals to recognize one another as belonging to the same or different *political* cultures associated with self-determination in order to determine their corresponding joint or separate national membership. Although not all national groups are willing to accept immigrants as citizens, I will use this example to highlight what kind of culture is important for characterizing "open" nations and will then explain why the same kind of culture suffices for "closed" ones as well.

Foreigners living either abroad or within the territory of a nation cannot claim membership in the nation merely by virtue of their desire to belong, even if they share many traits of what is referred to as "national character." For a national of Z to become a member of X, Xians have to recognize the Zian as a co-national. A private recognition and acceptance of the Zian by each Xian is not enough, even if the Zian

is a very famous person whom everyone wants to have as a co-national. Xians realize that their approval has to be publicly communicated. There is also an understanding among co-nationals that they have the power to accept a foreigner because, as a national group, they are in charge of regulating their membership. The recognition of a foreigner as a new member is achieved in big, impersonal communities through the mediation of the institutions that symbolize the power of the people of X, and it is a political expression of their national identity.

The transition from being an outsider to being a member does not signify that the culture of the Zian has changed, although some naturalized citizens are willing to undergo, and are successful at achieving, difficult cultural assimilation. Compare a visitor to X who shows many traits of the national character, such as language, pronunciation, culture (as both a set of habits and common cultural images), knowledge of literature, and so on, to an immigrant citizen of X who has not yet culturally assimilated. What kind of culture will allow co-nationals to recognize the latter but not the former as one of them? It is status as a member in relation to the national political culture—a set of shared beliefs about the limits and membership of the political community—that makes the latter into a co-national. A person living in a suburban area of southern Ontario, for example, is not much different culturally from a suburban dweller in the bordering area of the United States. Their respective beliefs about belonging to two different political cultures, however, make them members of two different national groups.

Whether shared beliefs constitute part of a national group's political culture depends on the context of their use. The belief that French should be the language of Quebec, when expressed by a member of the Francophone community who is concerned with the survival of this community's culture, is a cultural belief. This same belief is a part of Quebec's political culture, however, if it addresses the corresponding right Quebec's citizens claim to have: the right to choose, as a self-determining community, which direction Quebec's culture is going to take and which aspects of its government are to be promoted. To cite another example, citizens of Ontario and Michigan may not have the same attitudes toward state-sponsored health care. Their attitudes are a part of culture to the extent to which they relate to co-nationals' shared way of life, characterized by such features of national character as self-reliance or generosity. But their attitudes belong to political culture insofar as they are a part of a general disposition toward the items that ought to be controlled in order to maintain the political identity of the Canadian or American peoples.

This is not to say that all the beliefs of a particular political culture need to be agreed upon or shared by all members of a political community. Co-nationals may disagree about many issues, such as which party should be in power, or about moral values, and they may also have very different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. People in the same political culture, however, disagree about issues other than those that relate to belonging to the culture. They agree that they belong to the same collective agent and that they ideally ought to share a political community. Even in the extreme form of national disagreement, a civil war, the contested issue is normally not whether national membership is to continue to be shared but rather a particular version of nation building. It has to be clear, however, that there is a limit to the kinds

of arguments, controversies, and disputes that can coexist within the same political culture. A disagreement about the status of a secessionist group in a state whose other citizens think that the group should remain within the state's borders transcends the limits of one political culture and presents a conflict of self-determination between two different political cultures, because the secessionist group does not want to belong to the state. The Georgian and Abkhazian or Russian and Chechen conflicts, for example, are not civil wars or fights against terrorists, but rather conflicts between two nations.

I do not mean to suggest that language or the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group beyond the political realm are not important. What I suggest is that concentrating on political culture is sufficient for determining what a nation is for the purposes of regulating relations among national groups.

It could be objected that political culture may be sufficient to define nationhood in an open society because, first, this political culture is the shared societal culture and, second, because the group members—normally—accept people from other cultural groups, but that political culture is not sufficient to define a national group that is very exclusive in defining its characteristic features. I would argue that it is fair to define through political culture not only open but also ethnically, culturally, or otherwise exclusive nations. An exclusive cultural nation, Y, may identify a set of features necessary for membership and consider those who do not possess them to be nonmembers. If Y seeks protections and exemptions within a broader political culture, it is not a nation but an exclusive ethnic or cultural group. But why is Y's relation to a particular kind of political culture sufficient to identify it as a nation? The exclusive national group uses special characteristics to identify and control the set of members of its political community. Thus, it possesses or aspires to possess the capacity to determine the limits of meaningful political authority. If eventually Y relaxes or changes its exclusive criteria of membership, it will still remain a nation: it is not the particular criteria but what it wants and can do with them that defines what kind of group it is. So if we determine that Y possesses a political culture with the shared goal of becoming a collective agent and pursuing self-determination, we have sufficient information to identify Y as a national group. It would also be possible on this basis to define the division of powers with the neighbors in the region, within a multinational state, or both in order to assure Y's capability to control its exclusive membership (provided it does not interfere with the self-determination of others).

Defining nationhood may appear more difficult when we consider complex (or "nested") national identities. A nested nation is a group with a "split-level," or double, identity and a double allegiance to its (usually federal) state and its national group proper, such as the Scots in Britain or the Catalans in Spain.[40] Such groups' members consider themselves to be members of both their national group and the larger state—that is, to be both Scottish and British, or Catalan and Spanish. In contrast, rival nationalities do not associate with their host states, and they advance their claims to self-determination as secessionist claims. Miller, who introduces the distinction between nested and rival national identities, emphasizes that national groups normally aim at political autonomy as an independent unit.[41] Thus, a precondition

for a group's successful existence as a nested nationality is that the recognition of its aspiration to self-determination *within* the larger state be acceptable to its members. It is precisely when a group perceives that the satisfaction of its self-determination claim is possible within the state in which it is included that its double identity is formed; otherwise, nested national identities may very easily become rival national identities. Thus, my definition of nationhood provides an appropriate background for the explanation of nested national identities. The concept of nationhood as limited to political culture, moreover, correctly registers the change of group identity from non-national to national. It also correctly indicates the continuous existence of a nation, even if its ethnic and cultural makeup changes.[42] It is the emergence or the continuous presence of a political culture expressing a group's will to be self-determining that allows us to identify it as a national group.

History, attachment to a territory, and culture are often considered as separate and independent variables in formulations of the concept of nation. For the purposes of defining what a nation is, however, history and attachment to territory should be regarded as features of political culture. Specifically, elements of political history—historical events in some way relevant to self-determination, such as battles for independence, first meetings of the nation's parliament, the dates of the different decrees and declarations announcing the main principles of the political system and nation's Constitution, the rights and responsibilities of its citizens, and parables about founding historical figures—are part of political culture.[43] Geographical facts about a nation can be closely connected with historical ones, but their relevance to political culture lies in the description of the nation's borders, of its minority nations or its diaspora abroad, of the geographical locations of friendly and hostile nations, and so on.

Those events that are considered to be a part of national history are taught in schools and discussed by the media. These events are selected and interpreted by the group, and the choice of nationally significant historical events may be different at different moments of the nation's existence. Some historical events are forgotten and others overemphasized, mythologized, or both.[44] Eric Hobsbawm points out that sometimes even historical continuity has to be invented. He also notes that ancient materials can be used to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes, while some old ways are deliberately not used or adapted.[45] Thus, the means of what Gellner calls "high culture" serve the purpose of mobilizing agency by furnishing political culture with a record of historical events that can be shared by members to make their membership meaningful in terms of historic continuity.

Like history, attachment to territory becomes part of the mobilization of a national collective agency. It designates a relational property national groups possess even when based on the same historic and geographical facts. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs share a common history, for example, and are attached to the same territory. But the common facts of history and geography become parts of very different narratives, because these narratives are constructed from each group's shared perceptions of the limits of its membership and authority in relation to the other group. It is the sense of history as it is included in political culture that is relevant to the concept of the nation.

The same nation, moreover, may have more than one version of its national history. Disagreements about history within the same nation may be "points of common concern"[46] perceived as different versions of the same history. But if there are several radically incompatible versions of national history in circulation, this may signal that the political unit is in a state of crisis and that it may be composed of more than one national unit. In the case of two nations, even those events upon the interpretation of which the nations agree are perceived as belonging separately to "their history" and to "our history," and thus are made meaningful only when included in the respective contexts of political cultures. Therefore, history can be only looked at in relation to nationhood as part of political culture: the same historical events belonging to two different sets of beliefs about membership (which constitute the corresponding collective agents) are two different histories for the purpose of the characterization of national groups. When I speak about the political culture of a nation, I include elements of history and territory in the notion instead of considering territory, history, and culture as three independent national characteristics. Only those elements of history and territory that belong to political culture should be considered to identify national groups. Thus, the concept of nationhood as limited to political culture associated with effective group agency can correctly register the change of group identity from non-national to national. It also correctly indicates the continuous existence of a nation, even if its ethnic and cultural makeup changes.[47] Thus, my definition satisfies **C2**.

Definitions that use culture instead of political culture in the notion of a nation pass **C1** but fail **C2**, because the idea of culture, when not qualified as political, is too inclusive to distinguish between national and ethnic groups and too exclusive to unequivocally recognize multicultural nations.[48] A typical culturalist definition that exhibits this weaknesses is Joseph Stalin's. He defined a nation as "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture."[49] He clearly would not have recognized a multilingual or multicultural nation as a valid one. Moreover, transitional societies whose identities are in flux require us to concentrate on the aspects of collective agency highlighted by my definition to determine whether, in the dynamics of change, any transition in national allegiance has taken place and whether it is over. The culture of a group may remain the same at the same time that it splits into two national groups with two different political cultures, or changes in culture may occur in the context of stable national identity. Looking specifically at political culture in its connection to collective agents' political aspirations allows us to register these changes.

To identify a collective agent that satisfies a necessary condition for holding a primary moral group right to self-determination, we need to look at the set of second-order beliefs constitutive of membership in it and determine whether they relate to self-determination as the group's shared good. In this section, I demonstrated that we can identify national groups through the presence of a particular type of political culture characterized by sets of particular beliefs, but not necessarily corresponding institutional structures. To determine whether a national agent is present, we need to look for the expression of the group's constitutive beliefs and for the members'

self-identification with these beliefs. If our search indicates that a political culture of the required kind is present, the group is a nation. If these beliefs are not expressed in non-democratic contexts, however, we cannot be sure what nations are present in a given territory. In the next section, I will briefly consider how potential political cultures can be expressed. I will provide a more detailed consideration of potential political cultures in the next chapter.

The Expression of Potential Political Cultures

I have already explained why the requirement that the political culture that characterizes a nation must be endorsed by co-nationals excludes official cultures in an oppressive society from being considered as nations. But what exactly constitutes national political cultures in the partial or complete absence of corresponding public spheres, and how can the beliefs and attitudes that constitute such cultures, which I call "potential political cultures," be expressed?

The structures of self-government and the corresponding political cultures of the national republics in the former USSR could not be considered to be expressions of these nations' political cultures. They were official government structures with corresponding expressed sets of officially endorsed beliefs about and attitudes toward politics, controlled by the center and incorporated into the overall communist political culture, which, moreover, was based on the Russian language. Hence, official political cultures were "vacuous" to the extent that people did not identify with them.[50] A vacuous political culture is usually accompanied by one or more potential political cultures, which are to a great extent imagined by co-nationals, since they do not have outlets for systematic expression. For the members of potential political cultures, however, these cultures represent shared sets of beliefs about the meaningful limits of political authority and about membership.

Different ways of expressing these beliefs exist. When national groups have institutions of self-government, the limits of membership defined in vacuous and potential political cultures largely coincide, but co-nationals do not self-identify with the official forms of their group representation. Rather, they share beliefs negative in relation to the vacuous culture in the form of "an official belief that X is not true." In the absence of proper political expression, they do not necessarily articulate the content of their national political culture, although they can transmit cultural identity traits and do not disagree with the limits of membership. Circumstances permitting, a vacuous culture may be accompanied by a real political culture with limited expression as well. (Take, for example, the existence of *Solidarnost* in Poland.) A good example of a positively expressed potential political culture was that of the Kosovo Albanians under the Yugoslav regime after their autonomy was abolished.

Although co-nationals cannot be sure about the beliefs others hold due to the lack of communication in the public sphere, their sense of national belonging and their conviction that this belief of membership is shared by others can nevertheless be verified. The beliefs of the potential political culture can be shared in a vari-

ety of contexts, such as church, some nongovernmental organizations, and political parties, if they are permitted,[51] and they can be different in different areas populated by the national group. The whole of the national political culture exists as a set of incomplete and overlapping spheres of expression maintained by pockets of horizontal ties among citizens. The sets of beliefs representing a potential political culture may be different in different areas populated by the national group and may be expressed in various ways. A potential political culture is, therefore, public, and it is commonly recognized through a set of shared beliefs that are not as elaborate and complete as those of a nation with a fully expressed political culture but are often discernible nonetheless.[52]

One can base pronouncements about which national minorities may be present in the territory of an oppressive state and evaluations of their treatment by the state to some extent on analysis of the dominant political culture and its institutions. When a national group, usually a minority, is severely discriminated against and lacks the means of expressing its political culture, its identity is inadvertently confirmed and publicly expressed in a negative form by the hostile attitudes of the political culture of the oppressing nation. Exclusionary treatment by the authorities aimed at the suppression of the minority identity, such as an explicit prohibition of any political institutions for the group or a targeted violation of its members' human rights, can indicate the group's existence. A potential political culture of the minority nation is provided, as its public expression, an "exoskeleton" of the set of beliefs of the vacuous political culture. The reaction of the dominant culture does not allow us to determine with certainty what type of group a suppressed minority is, although we may be able to guess by the kind of things the group is prohibited from engaging in.

Nevertheless, the presence of a potential political culture, especially in its "negative" expression, is not a fully reliable indicator of the presence of national groups. Sometimes, the suppression of a group may lead to the group's losing its constitutive features: its agency can be destroyed. Nevertheless, if a potential political culture survives, minority co-nationals recognize one another, first, through what they consider to be their shared traits (which may vary across the group due to the lack of communication). Some of these shared traits might be recognized by the larger society for the purposes of exclusion. The minority members also share identification as being "not-them"—not the majority. For example, Crimean Tatars who were deported from their territory in 1944 were able to fully express their political culture when they were repatriated after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is wrong to think that their political culture was always there in a complete form, just waiting to be expressed. It has undergone significant changes over the last two decades, evolving from claims to cultural protection to full-fledged claims to self-determination. The political culture of Crimean Tatars nevertheless always had a "negative" expression in the official Soviet political culture that attempted to eliminate Tatar national identity.[53] My definition of nationhood identifies potential candidates for nationhood in such cases, which is the best that can be done when political expression is controlled.

Since membership in a potential political culture is sometimes not entirely defined even for its members, their beliefs may change when their culture acquires full expression and their collective agency has a chance to actualize. For example, it would have been a mistake to consider Moldovans a part of the Romanian nation based on the beliefs about the limits of their political community expressed by the potential political culture they identified with under the USSR. But a judgment about their desire to be an independent nation would have been both wrong and premature if it had been made during the Soviet era: it was simply not clear what Moldovans' national identity would be until they had a chance to express their effective agency properly.[54] It should be noted that the full expression of a political culture does not prevent its future changes: the Moldovan identity may revert in the future to pan-Romanian, but the issue of the detection of a potential political culture will not arise, because the change will be accompanied by a freely expressed and verifiable identity.

The uncertainty of potential political cultures calls for what I will call the "cautious approach" to claims to nationhood in oppressive or transitional societies. The presence of a vacuous culture tells us that we should pay attention to changing or not clearly expressed national identities and suspend our judgment concerning the national composition of the society in question. This does not mean, however, that the formulation of principles for the regulation of relations among national groups should be withheld until the final composition of a transitional multinational state is determined. On the contrary, defining in advance the terms of interaction among any national groups that might emerge within the territory of the state facilitates peaceful political changes during the transition to democracy.

This forward-looking component notwithstanding, it is worth asking whether the seemingly agnostic stance of the "cautious" approach impairs the capacity of the international community both to pass judgments about the makeup of oppressive multinational states and to act to aid oppressed non-state groups in such states, especially national groups without any self-government structures. For although having a set of general norms is important for the regulation of relations concerning self-determination, they cannot be applied properly if we do not know what kind of group we are dealing with and whether the minority in question requires the protection of only minority (linguistic, cultural, or ethnic) or also national (self-determination) interests. I consider how to approach these problems in Chapter 4, which deals with potential political cultures in greater detail. Here I would like to merely point out that the effort of the international community to improve oppressive states' human rights records increases the chances that we can learn about their national makeup with more precision.

There are also some other benefits of applying the cautious approach to evaluating the expressed national makeup of an oppressive country. Such an approach would have called into question the officially promoted national structure of the former Soviet Union due to its lack of freedom of speech and expression, which prevented all voices from being heard. The cautious approach would have required a skeptical attitude toward the officially expressed national identities until it could be shown that the official division into national groups and their hierarchy was accepted

and maintained voluntarily in a political climate free of coercion. The vacuous character of this hierarchical structure could have been determined by looking at the self-identification of the members of the groups in question.

Why Self-Identification is Not Enough to Define a Nation

The existence of potential and vacuous political cultures points to the importance, in defining national groups, of individual identification with a set of beliefs about national belonging. The self-identification of group members alone is not enough to define a nation, however. A group of people in a given territory cannot be defined as a nation on the basis of simple summation of the majority individual preferences, for several reasons: If the majority in a given territory thinks it constitutes a nation and a 30% minority in the same territory thinks it is a different nation, 50% plus one may override the minority's national identity. Majority rule is not capable of recognizing permanent minorities.[55] Using census data regarding individual identification will not do because of the familiar problem of distinguishing between ethnic and national minorities, which threatens the violation of **C2** unless some collective forms of identification are considered. Recording which individuals consider themselves Russian or Ojibwa in Minnesota, for example, does not explain whether these individuals are organized as group agents around some shared goods and, if so, what type of group they constitute.

As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, if it is suggested that at each particular moment a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they have formed one, then, lest we beg the question, we need to explain what the ground for their behavior is and what this behavior involves—to define the content of their belief of national belonging. An important feature of national belonging is that national identity requires some public endorsement through a shared political culture. Although individual self-identification is very important for determining what groups form a nation—and not only for potential political cultures—when the populations of two or more nations are thoroughly mixed, only identifying political cultures of self-determination makes it possible to determine which nations are present within the territory of a state.

To identify with a belief of national belonging, an individual has to believe that others do so as well. This requires a public framework that generates and reaffirms second-order beliefs of belonging, including the notion of shared group ends. In a historical perspective, this system of beliefs needs to be passed along to future generations. Even if it is not the case that every individual has a reflective wish for self-determination, individuals identify with the political culture that is shared and endorsed by their co-nationals. Even for potential political cultures, self-identification cannot be the only characteristic that defines nationhood, for the endorsement of a political culture characterizing a nation cannot be exclusively private.

Finally, defining nationhood on the basis of the summation of individual identity claims does not guarantee that we can distinguish between rival nation-building strategies of the same national group or between those of rival nations in the same territory. Two or more competing conceptions about the political future of a group of people living in a particular territory represent rival nation-building strategies if the same belief about the limits of membership in a political culture is shared by all competing ideas. Rival nationalities normally perceive themselves to be separate political communities, whether in the presence of rival claims to the same territory or in their absence. By looking for a political culture defining membership in a primary political community, one can detect whether a conflict is over the control of the same political sphere or whether it is about acquiring another, independent one, and therefore whether there is more than one political culture present. Based on this criterion, in the transitional period after the fall of the Soviet Union, for example, Moldova was not only faced with two competing nation-building efforts within the Moldovan nation but also with a rival Russian-speaking nation formed in the Transdniester region.

What happens when there is no unanimity among the members of a group concerning what political culture to identify with? Is the decision about what nations are present in a given territory still based on majority endorsement and corresponding participation in a collective agency? The summation of majority preferences correctly indicates what nations are present in a given territory only if we take into consideration all the political cultures within this territory. The majority of Canadians include Quebec as a part of the Canadian nation. To determine whether it is indeed so, however, we also need to look at the majority preferences within Quebec, since the province exhibits a political culture of nationhood. Within Quebec and other provinces, moreover, there are First Nations (the indigenous populations of Canada), whose majority vote within their groups has to be considered in order to determine the true national makeup of Canada. Finally, if there are Anglophone groups in Quebec claiming self-determination, we need to determine their status based on which political culture they relate to. It matters whether they want to be independent of Quebec on the ground of being Canadian, not Quebecois, or on the ground of being an independent collective agent with a separate political culture.

Finally, how does my notion of nationhood work when some individuals aspire to self-determination, others oppose it, and yet others are indifferent? How many members of a group have to identify with the political culture of the group as a self-determining group for us to think of the group as a nation? In this case, we still need to consider what political cultures associated with self-determination are present in the territory in question, for the individuals who oppose the group's mobilization in terms of the shared good of self-determination still associate their political membership with some primary political community. Determining what self-determining communities exist within a given territory avoids the conundrum that Margalit and Raz's approach to self-determination faced in assigning a nation to the majority on a given territory regardless of the presence of minority nations. It is also possible that one or more of the political cultures associated with self-determination will not be

stable, creating disagreement about the type of group mobilization present in a territory. In this case, to assist a peaceful mobilization, whatever shape it may assume, legal frameworks should be available to accommodate several possible scenarios in a transitional area. I discuss the issues associated with formulating a constitution for a transitional area in the next chapter.

A subjective definition stating that any group that claims it is a self-determining national community should be considered such satisfies **C1** but not necessarily **C2**, for such a definition may fail to render a clear verdict on the national make-up of a territory with mixed national groups or to distinguish competing nation-building efforts and rival nations, and thus it is not sufficiently pragmatic. Moore points out that self-identification can help in defining jurisdictional units in a case of several self-determining groups.[56] A group's claims can be identified in such a case only by reference to a political culture, however, and thus only if they belong to a properly constituted collective agent. Hence, not only culturalist but also subjective definitions, when clarified to satisfy **C2,** converge on the elements by which I identify nationhood.

Summing up, a nation is a collective agent characterized by a political culture organized around the idea of self-determination and with which members of the nation identify. This definition does not settle the question of the entitlement of national groups in advance, and therefore it satisfies **C1**. The definition satisfies **C2** because it provides distinctions among various groups based on their self-definition as collective agents and accounts for dynamic changes in national identities.

Nationhood and Self-Determination

Having defined national groups, I can now restate what constitutes the moral foundation of the right to national self-determination. In Chapter 2, I argued that the right to self-determination is a primary moral right of a certain type of group. The entitlement to the right to self-determination results from the very nature of collective agents organized around the constitutive shared good of self-determination and the relations of equality among them. National groups are defined by their ability to be determined by the conditions of their internal life, and they inherently need to exercise self-determination to maintain their constitution. Thus, they possess a moral right to self-determination.

It would be wrong either to allow the enjoyment of the benefits of self-determination only to some national groups or to deprive all of national groups of the right to exercise this capacity. Even if there were a way to level down the allocation of the benefits of self-determination by reorganizing the world community into a few oppressive states that inhibit attempts by any national groups to mobilize, it would be the wrong thing to do, since self-determination promotes important moral values. Given the dynamic aspects of nationhood, it is important to provide a framework that helps group agents to form and actualize correctly rather than in a way that is detrimental to their members and individuals outside of the group.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, certain views on self-determination held by members of a group divest the group of the capacity to be equally free with other groups. This happens when the group's conception of self-determination does not correspond to a form practicable in the international world in which the group exists. Presently, this can happen if self-determination is not understood in political (and, by extension, territorial) terms. Nations, very generally, can be defined as units of self-determination, but my definition of a nation as an agent organized around a *political* culture of self-determination is rendered in terms of the contemporary understanding of self-determination. In this world, groups with a non-political idea of self-determination are placed in a category other than "nations." Does this aspect of qualification for nationhood and the right to self-determination tie my approach to political contingencies, thereby making my approach so narrow that it runs contrary to the meaning of moral entitlement?

"Practicable" does not mean "currently practiced by the majority." It refers to the broadest possible and conceptually coherent application of the general idea of self-determination in the present international system, as constrained by the requirements of moral acceptability. I create a comprehensive classification of different types of group agents to ensure that their existence is protected through a principled determination of their entitlements based on their constitution. Group agents can move from one category to another if their internal constitution changes.

A group that has the intention of being determined by the conditions of its internal life needs to protect its freedom and acquire the form of control for doing so required by present circumstances. The group members have to formulate their intentions accordingly. This is why it is imperative to define a morally acceptable form of self-determination that is also practically possible and thus capable of becoming an international norm.

If a group agent does not intend to organize so as to be capable of being equally free with others, the group agent is not a nation. If a group agent declares that it is self-determining but is content with non-political forms of group organization, the life of this group is inevitably shaped and controlled in significant ways by the political society within which the group is included, whose constitution is external to the group. This turns a group into an agent that qualifies for a derivative right, because the group in the end only wishes to be better accommodated within the larger society. A group can delegate the maintenance of some important functions of its self-determining status to a larger group within whose territory it resides, but such a group can be said to preserve its capacity for equal freedom only if it is able to unilaterally take back the powers it has relinquished. Even in such a case, the group's understanding of self-determination is political and territorial, because it merely delegates certain tasks of maintaining these aspects of its existence to another group while ultimately retaining control over its political future. Before the group opts to enjoy self-determination in a "reduced" form, it first conceives of itself in terms of being self-determining in the "right" way.

Let us consider how this analysis applies to a group like the Roma who claim to be a non-territorial national group. To determine whether the Roma are a nation entitled to self-determination or an ethnic group that deserves only polyethnic rights

we need to consider if they are organized around the *political* culture of self-determination and consider the group's intentions. If they conceive of their nationhood in terms of political self-determination, they need to be accommodated properly. Since agents that are capable of equal freedom need territory for their political pursuits it should be then considered how to provide them with territory or how to assure that the powers they delegate to other, territorial groups still safeguard significant control over their group constitution. I discuss possible accommodation for territorially dispersed groups in Chapter 6. If the Roma do not conceive of their nationhood beyond certain self-governing powers within the political and economic structures of their host states, they function as an ethnic group. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that they may eventually transform into a national group.

My concept of nationhood is clear enough to specify the potential holders of the right to self-determination, and it does this better than the existing international system. The present legal right to self-determination belongs to occupied or colonized national groups, but this definition of its subjects is unhelpful in a multinational setting. In an occupied territory with several national groups, does each of them deserve the right to self-determination (and in the present system, a state of its own), or do they have to exercise the right jointly and hence share a state? We still need to define those groups that qualify to enjoy the right—even a very exclusive right—to self-determination. But it is much easier to do this with a comprehensive conception nationhood at our disposal. The common acceptance of my definition of nationhood could help with the assessment of substate groups' entitlements and the definition of the subjects of the right to self-determination.

My concept of nationhood is open and inclusive, because it can characterize nations universally, while a great number of features beyond the political culture of self-determination characterize national groups only disjunctively. I do not consider political culture organized around the shared good of self-determination to be the only important characteristic of nationhood. There may be other features that some or all national groups share. I only argue that the presence of this type of political culture is necessary and sufficient to characterize nations, especially in the context of the right to self-determination. The notion of political culture associated with self-determination also captures the dynamic aspects of nationhood, such as changes in or the emergence of new national allegiances, which are an important feature of contemporary political landscapes.

Being a description of a universal property of national groups, presently in relation to other such groups, my definition sets the ground for looking at the self-determination of every group as limited by the exercise of self-determination by other groups, and it therefore provides for restrictions on the right. Whether the communities' mobilization is undesirable depends on the norms guiding a nation's relations with others, but it is not the definition that determines the outcome.

In the next chapter, I consider how to treat group agents in transitional societies. I establish an applicable norm regulating the right to self-determination in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 6 I show how it can be enforced.

Notes

1. Parts of this chapter are an extended version of the argument in Anna Moltchanova, "Nationhood and Political Culture," Journal of Social Philosophy, 38(2), Summer 2007, 255–273, publisher: Wiley and Sons Ltd.
2. One such set of norms, for example, would recognize the universal right of such groups to self-determination but disassociate self-determination from the acquisition of statehood as I demonstrate in Chapter 5.
3. Council of Europe, European Treaties, ETS No. 157 (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 1.II.1995), http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/157e.htm.
4. Different versions of the nation-state definition are supported in Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 69, 119; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 1, 43; and Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, volume 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 119. I consider these three definitions on the next section.
5. Many contemporary conceptions of "nation" are informed by the historically contingent dichotomy between state-endowed and substate national groups. Michel Seymour, for example, defines a nation as a national majority alongside national minorities and ethnic groups and formulates his idea of a national culture on the basis of the majority culture. See *On Redefining the Nation*, Cahier No. 97–01 (Montreal: Universite de Montreal, Faculte des arts et des sciences, 1997).
6. Such a language, he argued, links the members of the nation to the "whole previous life of the nation." Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, p. 58.
7. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.
8. Ibid., p. 7
9. Ibid., p. 19.
10. Craig Calhoun, "The Problem of Identity in Collective Action," in *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology*, ed. Joan Huber (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), p. 59, quoted in Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 20.
11. It is impossible to achieve a "detached," unconditional definition of nationhood using the methods vividly described by Ernest Renan in his "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?": "Ce que nous allons faire est délicat; c'est presque de la vivisection; nous allons traiter les vivants comme d'ordinaire on traite les morts. Nous y mettrons la froideur, l'impartialité la plus absolue" [What we are going to do is delicate; it is almost like a vivisection; we are going to treat the living as normally we treat the dead. We will use cool reason, and absolute impartiality.] In *Œuvres complètes de Ernest Renan* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, n.d.) tome 1, p. 888.
12. Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, p. 119.
13. Canovan defines nationhood as follows: "A nation is a polity that feels like a community, or conversely a cultural or ethnic community politically mobilized; it cannot exist without subjective identification, and therefore is to some extent dependent on free individual choice, but that choice is nevertheless experienced as a destiny transcending individuality; it turns political institutions into a kind of extended family inheritance, although the kinship ties in question are highly metaphorical; it is a contingent historical product that feels like a part of the order of nature; it links individual and community, past and present; it gives to cold institutional structures an aura of warm, intimate togetherness." *Nationhood and Political Theory*, p. 69.
14. Ibid., p. 97.
15. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1.
16. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Viking Adult, 1994), p. 108.
17. Ibid., p. 121.
18. Yael Tamir, for example, argues for the weakening of the structure of the nation-state as one of the options for the accommodation of national minorities. See *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 72.

19. Gellner's theory is a good reflection of a particular type of nationalism—the nationalism of the minority nations in the time of industrialization and the fall of the great empires. As Roman Szporluk points out, however, Gellner missed that the former imperial centers were also undergoing the process of nation building, that there were different national responses to modernity within the same nations, and that there were often other ideas about national identity besides the official line. Gellner "was less ready to recognize that modernization profoundly affected also the so-called 'old continuous nations'—that *they* too were undergoing a crisis during transition to modernity, as they faced the task of creating *their* nation-states on the ruins of their respective imperial 'Megalomanias.'" He "paid little attention to intranational and international relations, including situations, common in Eastern Europe, when one and the same ethnic group was an object of rival nation-building efforts at the same time—invoking different ethnic, historic and political arguments for its cause and proposing *different* national responses to modernity." And "He did not consider the possibility that the...[people]... themselves might have other ideas, besides the official one, about their national identity: he refused to concede that national identity is a subject of intranational contestation and the ideological sphere is a battlefield in the struggle for hegemony within the nation." See Roman Szporluk, "Thoughts about Change: Ernest Gellner and the History of Nationalism," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 35–36.
20. David Miller, "Secession and the Principle of Nationality," p. 266.
21. David Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 113.
22. Margaret Moore, "On National Self-Determination," pp. 900–913 in *Political Studies* 45(5), p. 905.
23. Moore, "On National Self-Determination," p. 905. A similar emphasis on the subjective factor is present in the works of Seton-Watson (H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1997), p. 7); Cobban (A. Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (London: Collins, 1969), p. 107); Philpott (D. Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," 352–85 *in Ethics*, 105/2 (1995), p. 365), Norman (Wayne Norman, "Theorizing Nationalism (Normatively): The First Steps," pp. 51–66 in Ronald Beiner, (ed.), *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
24. Lea Brilmayer provides a similar criticism of the subjective approach in the context of the decisions made by a group concerning their status and self-determination in "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,"177–202 in *Yale Journal of International Law* 16(177), 1991, p. 177).
25. Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*, (New York: Crowell, 1969), p. 65.
26. Walker Connor *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 202.
27. Ibid., p. 213.
28. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (New York: Bedminster, 1968) 2: 2, p. 922.
29. Ibid., 2, p. 925.
30. Michael Hechter's approach to nationhood also emphasizes subjective features of the phenomenon.: He associates any type of nationalism enacted in the name of a politically self-conscious nation to engender a demand for national sovereignty and thus places nationhood in the right context Hechter bases his understanding of national identity in cultural distinctions, however; I will discuss how this kind of approach fails to satisfy C2 when I explain why political culture is enough to characterize nations. Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 96.
31. Archie Brown, defines political culture as that part of culture which bears relevance to politics; he excludes formal institutions and behavior patterns from the scope of culture. Brown, A. "Conclusions," in A. Brown (ed.) *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (London, The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1984), p. 155. According to Stephen White, political culture is "the attitudinal behavioural matrix within which the political system is located." (Brown, *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, p. 6) I exclude both political institutions and an unqualified idea of behavior from the notion of political culture.

32. Although my definition of a nation follows David Miller's in important ways, it is different in that it concentrates on political culture and not on culture. Miller describes a nation as "a group of people who recognize one another as belonging to the same community, who acknowledge special obligations to one another, and who aspire to political autonomy—this by virtue of characteristics that they believe they share, typically a common history, attachment to a geographical place, and a public culture that differentiates them from their neighbors." See "Secession and the Principle of Nationality," p. 266. When Miller wants to distinguish between national and ethnic groups, he points out that national groups make a claim to self-determination and create the appropriate organizations and institutions to fulfill the claim. See *On Nationality*, p. 113. Hence, it makes sense to refocus the definition to clearly identify that the public culture of national groups and the actual or desired political autonomy have to do with a special type of political culture.
33. The idea of legitimate authority as being based on dependent reasons can be found in Joseph Raz "Authority, Law and Morality," in Raz, J. *Ethics in the Public Domain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 210–237.
34. I will consider incomplete ways of maintaining a political culture associated with nationhood in the section on potential political cultures.
35. It is enough for my project to assume the truth of a point widely accepted in the scholarship on nationhood, namely, that it is not necessary that statehood and nationhood be firmly associated. For example, see David Miller (1996) "Secession and the Principle of Nationality," p. 261–282; Buchanan, A. "Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System."
36. If we consider Ernest Gellner's position, all education run by a nation-state is thoroughly nationalistic. See *Nations and Nationalism*.
37. David Miller and Margaret Moore emphasize the importance of political self-consciousness for nations as opposed to ethnic groups. See David Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 113, and Moore, *The Ethics of Nationalism*, p. 6. Robert Ware offers a concept of a nation as a political group in a given territory sharing common projects and common will. See "Nations and Social Complexity," in *Rethinking Nationalism*, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1996), pp. 135, 157.
38. Thomas W. Pogge, for example, defines a nation as "a potentially self-sustaining community of people bound together by a shared history and culture." See "The Bounds of Nationalism," in *Rethinking Nationalism*, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1996), p. 463.
39. Miller, "Secession," p. 266.
40. Miller, "Nationality in Divided Societies," in *Citizenship and National Identity*, pp. 125–141.
41. Ibid., p. 127.
42. Like "societal culture," an idea used by Will Kymlicka in his theory, a political culture can stand some changes but remain in existence. See *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 87.
43. The interpretation of the same historical events can be different at different times, under different systems of government, or in different parts of the nation. The reunification of Ukraine and Russia in 1654 by Bogdan Khmel'nitsky, for example, was considered under the socialist government to be a landmark event in the development of the nation, and Khmel'nitsky was regarded as a hero, while another historical figure, Getman Masepa, was considered a traitor for signing a treaty with Sweden some 50 years after the reunification. He was defeated by Peter the Great, and the defeat was considered another landmark of Ukrainian history. Masepa was considered a hero by nationalists, however, while Khmel'nitsky was regarded by them as an unwise politician who made the wrong ally. Nowadays, in the official Ukrainian history, Masepa is not a traitor anymore, and Khmel'nitsky is not a hero. There is a new, more balanced attitude to the history of Ukraine. It is acknowledged that the way Ukrainian history was written under the Soviets was a result of the policy of Russification waged by the center, and that Ukrainian history was considered from the Russian point of view. For a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian history, see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1993).

44. Ernest Renan defines a nation as emphasizing commonalities and the forgetting of historical events, which leads to divisions: "L'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses...tout citoyen français doit avoir oublié la Saint-Barthélemy, les massacres du Midi au XIIIe siècle" [The essence of a nation is not only that all members have many things in common, but also that all of them have forgotten many things. . .all French citizens had to have forgotten Saint-Bartholomew, the massacres of the Middle of the 18th century.] See "Qu'est-ce que'une nation," p. 892.
45. Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 6–8.
46. David Laitin, "Political Culture and Political Preferences," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): p. 589.
47. Like the societal culture, an idea used by Kymlicka in his theory, a political culture can stand some changes but remain in existence. (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 87). He defends the distinction between immigrant and national minorities. (Ibid., Chapter 5)
48. Another "political culture" concept of a nation is offered by Robert Ware, who says that a nation is a political group on a given territory sharing common projects, common will; a nation is different from nationality, which is understood as a people with the shared language, culture, ethical beliefs. He points out that there can be identical nations but not nationalities. (Robert X. Ware, "Nations and Social Complexity," pp.133–160 in *Rethinking Nationalism*, at pp. 135, 157) In his concept of a nation, it is not clear what the difference between national and ethnic minorities is.
49. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 12.
50. Archie Brown characterizes an "official political culture," which I call a "vacuous political culture," as follows: "Official political culture represents official norms, desiderata and political goals rather than societal values and beliefs, attitudes towards authority to be fostered in the mass of the population; the type of political participation which is encouraged; the interpretation of the country's history which is favored; the attitude adopted towards political organizations other than official; the view taken of religion; the nature and extent of political information deemed appropriate to possess for citizens; and the goal, or goals, in terms of which present labours and sacrifices are justified or legitimized." See *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, p. 180.
51. The Greek Catholic Church, for example, was prohibited from functioning in the former USSR in the regions of the Western Ukraine incorporated into the USSR in 1940. However, there was an underground network of Greek Catholic priests who would perform some basic rites, such as baptism. For the people who lived in areas where such networks existed, the networks symbolized their distinct status and continuity with the past. Not all the territory had such networks, however, and many did not know about their existence. For this part of the population, self-identification with their nation was expressed in other ways. They would put their children in one of the Ukrainian schools that were allowed in the Western Ukraine, for example, as an expression of their belief in their national belonging. Still others would turn to the writings of the intellectual nationalist dissidents to find an expression and confirmation of their national beliefs. Though the people of the Western and Eastern Ukraine have had different religions, political beliefs, and ideas about nation building—even their languages have been somewhat different—they perceived themselves as one people, and when they could build their own state after the fall of the USSR, they did, often disagreeing about methods and ideology but not about membership and their right to self-determination. I would like to thank Natalka Patsiurko for her information on the Western Ukraine.
52. Potential political cultures can also have a corresponding set of beliefs and attitudes expressed by co-nationals abroad. This expression does not always correspond to and cannot immediately stand in for a potential political culture of the nation in the homeland. It first needs to be verified whether this set of beliefs is indeed how the nation in the homeland perceives its own status.

53. For the history of the Crimean Tatar nation in the USSR and for some recent developments, see Belitser, N., Orlyk, P. *The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement* (Kyiv, Ukraine, Institute for Democracy, 2000); Pohl, J. O. “The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars,” presented at the 5th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, 13–15 April 2000, Columbia University, New York.
54. This is not to say that basic beliefs of potential political cultures always change when they are “actualized.” The Lithuanian national political culture, for example, did not undergo radical changes after its proper actualization.
55. Making a higher than 50% threshold necessary for decision-making can lead to the problem of supermajority, when a minority of citizens decides the fate of the country (for example, if 70% is required to make a decision, 31% against it could thwart what is clearly (69%) a majority preference (for a discussion of supermajorities see Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), Chapter 11).
56. Moore, “On National Self-Determination,” p. 905.