



The New
Synthese
Historical
Library
Volume 57



Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity

edited by
Jill Kraye
and Risto Saarinen



 Springer



- Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1609) *Clavis artis Lullianae, et verae logicae duos in libellos tributa*, Straßburg (rpt. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms, 1983).
- (1620) *Cursus encyclopaediae libris XXVII complectens universae philosophiae methodum, serie praeceptorum, regularum et commentariorum perpetua*, Herborn.
- (1626) *Compendium philosophicum, exhibens methodum, definitiones, canones, distinctiones, et quaestiones, per universam philosophiam*, Herborn.
- (1630) *Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta*, Herborn (rpt. in 5 volumes with a foreword by Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1989).
- Anonymous (1580) *Traite de l'estat honneste des Chrestiens en leur accoustrement*, Geneva.
- Baur, Jürgen (1965) *Gott, Recht und weltliches Regiment im Werke Calvins*, Bonn: Bouvier.
- Beyerhaus, Gisbert (1910) *Studien zur Staatsanschauung Calvins mit besonderer Berücksichtigung seines Souveränitätsbegriffs*, Berlin: Trowitzsch (NSGTK 7).
- Bockmühl, Klaus (1987) *Gesetz und Geist. Eine kritische Würdigung des Erbes protestantischer Ethik*, Gießen, Basel: Brunnen, I: *Die Ethik der reformatorischen Bekenntnisschriften*.
- Bohatec, Josef (1950) *Budé und Calvin. Studien zur Gedankenwelt des französischen Frühhumanismus*, Graz: Böhlau.
- Bonet-Maury, Gaston (1889) *Le protestantisme français au XVI^e siècle dans les universités d'Orléans, de Bourges et de Toulouse* (BSHPF 38), pp. 86-95, 322-330, 490-497.
- Bullinger, Heinrich (1903) "Confessio helvetica posterior IV", in: E.F.K. Müller (ed.), *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche*, Leipzig: Deichert (rpt. Waltrip: Spenner, 1999).
- Burmeister, Karl-Heinz (1974) *Das Studium der Rechte im Zeitalter des Humanismus im deutschen Rechtsbereich*, Wiesbaden: Pressler.
- Calvin, Johannes (1863) *Institutio Christianae Religionis* [1539], in: idem, *Opera quae supersunt omnia*, ed. G. Baum, E. Kunitz and E. Reuss, Braunschweig, Berlin: Schwetschke, I.
- (1926) *Christianae Religionis Institutio* [1536], in: idem, *Opera selecta*, ed. Peter Barth, München: Kaiser, I, pp. 19-283.
- (1928-1936) *Institutio Christianae Religionis* [1559] in: idem, *Opera selecta*, ed. Peter Barth, Wilhelm Niesel and Dora Scheuner, München: Kaiser, III-IV.
- Corpus iuris civilis* (1970) 15th edition, Dublin, Zürich: Weidmann, II: *Codex Iustinianus*, recognovit et retractavit Paulus Krueger.
- (1972) 10th edition, Dublin, Zürich: Weidmann, III: *Novellae*, recognovit Rudolfus Schoell et Guilelmus Kroll.
- (1973) 22nd edition, Dublin, Zürich: Weidmann, I: *Institutiones*, recognovit Paulus Krueger; *Digesta*, recognovit Theodorus Mommsen, retractavit Paulus Krueger.
- Daneau, Lambert (1565) *Devx traictez de Florent Tertvllian, doctevr tres-ancien, et voisin du temps des Apostres, enuiron CLXX. ans apres l'Incarnation de Iesus Christ. L'vn des parures et ornemens, L'autre des habits et accoustremens des femmes chrestiennes. Mis en François par L. Daneau, Ministre de la Parolle de Dieu*, Paris (2nd. ed. ["Plus vn traité de saint Cyprian Euesque de Carthage, touchant la discipline et les habits des filles"], Geneva, 1580).
- (1565) *Traite de Florent Tertvllian, doctevr tres-ancien, et voisin du temps des apostres, enuiron CLXX. ans apres l'incarnation de Iesus Christ, touchant l'Idolatrie. Mis en françois par M. L. Daneau, docteur és droicts, et ministre de la Parole de Dieu*, s. l. [Orléans].
- (1566) *Devx traitez de S. C. Cyprian, iadis Evesque de Carthage. L'vn, contre les ieux et ioueurs de cartes et de dez. L'autre, par lequel il monstre que l'homme Chrestien*

ne doit voir ni assister à aucuns ieux de battelage, ni aux spectacles publics. Plvs vne epistre du mesme autheur touchant ce mesme argument, s. l. [La Rochelle].

- (1566) *Traite de S. C. Cyprian, iadis Evesque de Carthage, du mal qu'apporte l'Enuie et Ialousie du bien d'autrui. Item, vn autre traité du mesme Cyprian, touchant la discipline et les habits des filles, s. l. [Orléans].*
- (1574) *Brieue Remonstrance sur les ieux de sort ov de hazard. Et principalement de Dez et de Cartes. En laquelle le premier inuenteur desdits ieux, et maux infinis qui en aduiennent, sont declarez. Contre la dissolution de ce temps, s. l. [Geneva] (2nd ed. 1591).*
- (1576) *D. Avrelii Avgustini Hipponensis episcopi liber De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum. Lamberti Danaei opera emendatus et commentarijs illustratus, a quo eodem additae sunt haereses ab orbe condito ad constitutum Papismum et Mahumetismum, etiam eae quae hic erant ab Augustino praetermissae, Geneva (2nd ed. 1587).*
- (1576) *Physica Christiana siue, de rerum creatarum cognitione et vsu, disputatio e sacrae Scripturae fontibus hausta, et decerpta, Lyon (2nd ed. Geneva, 1579; 3rd ed. 1580; 3rd ed. 1588; 4th ed. 1602; 4th ed. 1606).*
- (1577) *Ethices Christianae libri tres. In quibus de veris humanarum actionum principiis agitur: atque etiam legis Diuinae, siue Decalogi explicatio, illiusque cum scriptis Scholasticorum, Iure Naturali siue Philosophico, Ciuili Romanorum, et Canonico collatio continetur. Praeterea Virtutum, et Vitiurum, quae passim vel in sacra Scriptura, vel alibi occurrunt, quaeque ad singula legis Diuinae praecepta reuocantur, definitiones, Geneva (1579; 1582; ³1583; ³1588; 1601; 1614; s. l. 1640 [?]).*
- (1577) *In D. Pavli priorem epistolam ad Timotheum commentarius. In qvo non solvm ipsius Epistolae doctrina, et artificium singulorumque argumentorum loci explicantur: sed etiam vera Disciplinae Ecclesiasticae forma, tum ex dei verbo, atque ex ipso Paulo, tum ex veteribus synodis repetita atque restituta est, vt legitima et Apostolica regendae Dei Ecclesiae ratio et norma hodie in vsum reuocari possit, Geneva.*
- (1579) *De ludo aleae, Geneva (rpt. in: idem, Opvscvla omnia theologica, ab ipso avthore recognita et in tres classes diuisa. Quid avtem in singylis classibus contineatur, ea quae epistolam dedicatorem sequitur pagina indicabit, Geneva, 1583.)*
- (1579) *Methodvs sacrae scriptvrae in pvblicis tvm praelectionibvs tum concionibus vtiliter atque intelligenter tractandae: Qvae praxi, id est, aliquot exemplis, et perpetvo in Epistolam Pavli ad Philemonem commentario illustratur, s. l. [Geneva].*
- (1580) *Geographiae poeticae, id est vniversae terrae descriptionis ex optimis ac vetustissimis quibusque Latinis poetis libri quatuor: quorum primus Europam: secundus Africam: tertius Asiam: quartus mare vniuersum, et maris insulas continet. In singulis autem libris hic ordo diligenter est observatus, vt cuiusque orbis partis Regiones, populi populorumque mores, vrbes, flumina, et montes illustriores ex iisdem poetis in certa capita distribuantur, atque describantur, s. l. [Geneva] (Lyon, 1580; [with different title] s. l. [Geneva], 1589; Lyon, Paris, 1613).*
- (1580) *Physices Christianae pars altera, sive de rerum creatarum natvra. Quae in sex tractatus pro dierum, quibus Deus ipse operatus est numero diuiditur. Quot autem, et quam varia rerum genera contineat ex indice capitum, quem epistolae dedicatoriae subjecimus apparebit. Per Lambertum Danaeum, Geneva (2nd ed. 1582; 3rd ed. 1589; 4th ed. 1606).*
- (1581) *Physiqve francoise, comprenant en treize liures ou traittez, assauoir l'vn d'Aristote, onze de Basile, et vn de Iehan Damascene, le discours des choses naturelles tant celestes, que terrestres, selon que les philosophes les ont descrites, et les plus anciens Peres ou Docteurs Chrestiens, les ont puis apres considerees, et*

- mieux rapportées à leur vrai but. Le tout nouvellement traduit de grec en françois par Lambert Daneav. Plus deux cartes, l'une contenant la description du ciel: l'autre de la terre, s. l. [Geneva].*
- (1583) *Christianae isagoges ad Christianorum theologorum locos communes, libri II, cum praefatione Theodori Bezae, s. l. [Geneva] (2nd ed. Geneva, 1588).*
- (1583) *In Evangelium Domini nostri Iesu Christi secundum Matthaeum commentarii brevissimi, in quibus tamen et doctrina, et methodus huius Evangelii, itemque aliorum in eodem argumento, perspicue traditur et explicatur, s. l. [Geneva].*
- (1584) *Christianae isagoges pars quarta, quae est De Ecclesia, eiusque legitima administratione, ac potestate: ut et vera ecclesia agnosci: et ex Dei verbo regi possit. Denique hic, quae de praefectorum ecclesiae legitima vocatione, disciplinae ecclesiasticae veteri forma, et usu: excommunicatione, caeterisque huiusmodi rebus hodie tam anxie quaeri solent copiose tractantur, s. l. [Geneva] (2nd ed. 1587).*
- (1584) *Isagoges Christianae pars altera seu secunda, in qua de angelis tum bonis, tum malis, ac daemonibus agitur, caeteraque tractantur, quae in hoc argumento quaeri, ac disputari a Christianis, atque etiam ethnicis scriptoribus solent, Geneva (2nd ed. 1587; 1588).*
- (1586) *Isagoges Christianae pars quarta [sic!]: Quae est de salutaribus Dei donis erga ecclesiam. In qua et de bonis ecclesiasticis et de electione Dei, sacramentis, et vita aeterna agitur, reliquisque capitibus, quae sequens index continet, Geneva (2nd ed. 1591).*
- (1588) *Isagoges Christianae pars quinta, quae est de homine, ubi quae de hominis pii et Christiani officio, tum, qua privatus, tum qua magistratus est: de primi hominis statu: de eiusdem lapsu: de anima: de peccato originali: de libero arbitrio: et libertate Christiana, caeterisque similibus quaeruntur, breviter explicata sunt, et in quatuor libros tributa, s. l. [Geneva].*
- (1595) *Compendium sacrae theologiae, seu erotemata theologica, in quibus totius verae theologiae Christianae summa breviter comprehensa est, Montpellier.*
- (1596) *Politicae Christianae libri septem, s. l. [Geneva].*
- De Vries de Heekelingen, Herman (ed.) (1923) *Correspondance de Bonaventura Vulcanius pendant son séjour à Cologne, Geneva and and Basel (1573-1577), The Hague: Nijhoff.*
- Diemer, A. (ed.) (1968) *System und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Dokumentation, Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.*
- Dierse, Ulrich (1977) *Enzyklopädie. Zur Geschichte eines philosophischen und wissenschaftstheoretischen Begriffs, Bonn: Bouvier.*
- Elert, Werner (1931-32) *Morphologie des Luthertums, München: C.H. Beck, V. I: Theologie und Weltanschauung des Luthertums hauptsächlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, II: Soziallehren und Sozialwirkungen des Luthertums (rpt. 1958).*
- Fatio, Olivier (1976) *Méthode et Théologie. Lambert Daneau et les débuts de la scolastique réformée, Geneva: Librairie Droz (THR 147), (1*-105*, Daneau's works).*
- (1981) "Lambert Daneau", in: Jill Raitt (ed.), *Shapers of Religious Traditions in Germany, Switzerland, and Poland 1560-1600, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 105-120*
- Félice, Paul de (1882) *Lambert Daneau (de Beaugency-sur-Loire), pasteur et professeur en théologie, 1530-1595. Sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses lettres inédites, Paris: Fischbacher (rpt. Geneva: Slatkine, 1971)*
- Gass, Wilhelm (1886) *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, Berlin: Reimer, Vol. II/1: Sechzehntes und siebzehntes Jahrhundert. Die vorherrschend kirchliche Ethik.*
- Guillot, Alexandre (1896) *Pasteurs et prédicateurs de l'Eglise genevoise depuis Calvin jusqu'à nos jours, Geneva: Eggimann.*

- Hall, Basil (1966) "John Calvin, the Jurisconsults and the Jus civile", in: *Studies in Church History*, Leiden: Brill, III, pp. 202-216.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1964) *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 4th ed., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann (Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe 2).
- Holl, Karl (1927a) "Der Neubau der Sittlichkeit [1919]", in: idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, 4/5th ed., Tübingen: Mohr, I. *Luther*, pp. 155-287.
- (1927b) "Was verstand Luther unter Religion? [1917]", in: idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, 4/5th ed., Tübingen: Mohr, I. *Luther*, pp. 1-110.
- Hotman, François (1559) *Iurisconsultus, sive de optimo genere iuris interpretandi*, 4/5th ed., Basel: Hervagius.
- Hotson, Howard (2000) *Johann Heinrich Alsted, 1588-1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation and Universal Reform*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- (2001) *Paradise Postponed: Johann Heinrich Alsted and the Birth of Calvinist Millenarianism*, Dordrecht and London: Kluwer.
- Hundeshagen, Karl Bernhard (1864) *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik insbesondere des Protestantismus*, Wiesbaden, I (rpt. Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1963).
- Jouanna, Arlette (1977) *Ordre social. Mythes et hiérarchies dans la France du XVI^e siècle*, Paris: Hachette.
- Kisch, Guido (1972) *Studien zur humanistischen Jurisprudenz*, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
- Klein, Jürgen & Kramer, Johannes (eds.) (1988) *J. H. Alsted, Herborns calvinistische Theologie und Wissenschaft im Spiegel der englischen Kulturreform des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts. Studien zu englisch-deutschen Geistesbeziehungen der frühen Neuzeit*, Frankfurt a.M., Berne, New York, Paris: P. Lang.
- Kreppel, Friedrich (1968) "Das Problem Zeitgeist", *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 20, pp. 97-112.
- Lecerf, Auguste (1929) "La doctrine de l'Eglise dans Calvin", *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 73, pp. 256-270.
- Le Gal, Patrick (1984) *Le droit canonique dans la pensée dialectique de Jean Calvin*, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires (SF.NS 63, sectio canonica 3), pp. 73-76.
- Lehmann, Hartmut (1996) *Max Webers "Protestantische Ethik". Beiträge aus der Sicht eines Historikers*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 1579).
- Leith, John H. (1989) *John Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life*, Louisville: John Knox.
- Léonard, Emile G. (1982) *Histoire générale du protestantisme*, 2nd ed., Paris: Presses universitaires de France, II: *L'établissement (1564-1700)*.
- Litt, Theodor (1935) *Philosophie und Zeitgeist*, Leipzig: Meiner.
- Löwith, Karl (1958) *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 4th ed., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Luthardt, Christoph Ernst (1893) *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, Leipzig: Dörfli & Franke, Zweite Hälfte: *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik seit der Reformation*.
- Matoré, Georges (1988) *Le vocabulaire et la société du XVI^e siècle*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Meylan, Henri and Dufour, Alain et al. (eds.) (1960-2001) *Correspondance de Théodore de Bèze*, 23 vols, edited from the collection of Hippolyte Aubert, Geneva: Librairie Droz, XVI.
- Michel, Walter (1969) *Der Herborner Philosoph Johann Heinrich Alsted und die Tradition*, Diss. phil., Univ. Frankfurt a. M.
- Millet, Olivier (1992) *Calvin et la dynamique de la parole. Etude de rhétorique réformée*, Geneva: Slatkine (Bibliothèque Littéraire de la Renaissance, sér. 3, t. 28).

- Monheit, Michael L. (1988) *Passion and Order in the Formation of Calvin's Sense of Religious Authority*, 2 vols, PhD diss., Princeton University.
- Mortari, Vincenzo Piano (1956) *Ricerche sulla teoria dell'interpretazione del diritto nel secolo XVI*, Milan: Giuffrè, I: *Le Premesse*.
- Mousnier, Roland (1969) *Les hiérarchies sociales de 1450 à nos jours*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Münch, Paul (1978) *Zucht und Ordnung. Reformierte Kirchenverfassungen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Nassau-Dillenburg, Kurpfalz, Hessen-Kassel)*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- (1986) "Volkskultur und Calvinismus. Zu Theorie und Praxis der 'reformatio vitae' während der 'Zweiten Reformation'", in: Heinz Schilling (ed.), *Die reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland. Das Problem der "Zweiten Reformation"*, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus (SVRG 195), pp. 291-307.
- Reibstein, Ernst (1958) *Völkerrecht. Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis*, Freiburg i. Br., München: Alber, I: *Von der Antike bis zur Aufklärung*.
- Reid, W. Stanford (1985) "John Calvin, Lawyer and Legal Reformer", in: W. Robert Godfrey & Jesse L. Boyd III (eds.), *Through Christ's Word*, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ., pp. 149-164 (rpt. in: Richard C. Gamble (ed.), *Calvin and Calvinism. A Fourteen-Volume Anthology of Scholarly Articles*, New York and London: Garland, 1992), V. 1, pp. 57-72).
- Reinhard, Wolfgang & Schilling, Heinz (eds.) (1995) *Die katholische Konfessionalisierung*, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus (SVRG 198).
- Ritschl, Otto (1906) *System und systematische Methode in der Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Sprachgebrauchs und der philosophischen Methodologie*, Bonn: A. Marcus.
- Rublack, Hans-Christoph (1992) *Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus (SVRG 197).
- Salmon, John Hearsy McMillan (1975) *Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century*, London: Benn.
- Schellong, Dieter (1995) "Calvinismus und Kapitalismus. Anmerkungen zur Prädestinationslehre Calvins", in: Hans Scholl (ed.), *Karl Barth und Johannes Calvin. Karl Barths Göttinger Calvin-Vorlesung von 1922*, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, pp. 74-101.
- Schilling, Heinz (ed.) (1986) *Die reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland. Das Problem der "Zweiten Reformation"*, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus (SVRG 195).
- (1988) "Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich. Religiöser Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620", *Historische Zeitschrift* 246, pp. 1-45.
- Schilling, Heinz & Behrisch, Lars (eds.) (1999) *Institutionen, Instrumente und Akteure sozialer Kontrolle und Disziplinierung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa/Institutions, Instruments and Agents of Social Control and Discipline in Early Modern Europe*, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann (Ius commune, Sonderhefte 127).
- Schindling, Anton (1997) "Konfessionalisierung und Grenzen der Konfessionalisierbarkeit", in: idem & Walter Ziegler (eds.), *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung. Land und Konfession 1500-1650*, Münster: Aschendorff, V. 7, (KLK 57), pp. 9-44.
- Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm (1983) *Topica universalis. Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker Wissenschaft*, Hamburg: Meiner (Paradeigmata 1).
- Schneckenburger, Matthias (1855) *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs. Aus dessen handschriftlichem Nachlasse zusammengestellt*, ed. E. Güder, 2 parts, Stuttgart: Metzler.
- Schweizer, Alexander (1850) "Die Entwicklung des Moralsystems in der reformierten Kirche", *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 23, pp. 5-78, 288-327, 554-580.

- Sinnema, Donald (1993) "The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy", *Calvin Theological Journal* 28, pp. 10-44.
- Stolleis, Michael & Härter, Karl & Schilling, Lothar (eds.) (1996) *Policey im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann (Ius commune, Sonderhefte 83).
- Strohm, Christoph (1996) *Ethik im frühen Calvinismus. Humanistische Einflüsse, philosophische, juristische und theologische Argumentationen sowie mentalitätsgeschichtliche Aspekte am Beispiel des Calvin-Schülers Lambertus Danaeus*, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter (AKG 65).
- (1999a) "Theologie und Zeitgeist. Beobachtungen zum Siegeszug der Methode des Petrus Ramus am Beginn der Moderne", *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 110, pp. 352-371.
- (1999b) "Zur Eigenart der frühen calvinistischen Ethik. Beobachtungen am Beispiel des Calvin-Schülers Lambert Daneau", *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 90, pp. 230-254.
- (2000) "Neustoizismus", *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* XXXII, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. 190-194.
- (2001) "Das Theologieverständnis bei Calvin und in der frühen reformierten Orthodoxie", *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 98, pp. 310-343.
- Troeltsch, Ernst (1912) *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, Tübingen: Mohr (reprinted 1994) (Gesammelte Schriften, 1).
- Troje, Hans Erich (1977) "Die Literatur des gemeinen Rechts unter dem Einfluß des Humanismus", in: Helmut Coing (ed.), *Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte*, München: C.H. Beck, V. II: *Neuere Zeit (1500-1800). Das Zeitalter des gemeinen Rechts*, part 1: *Wissenschaft*, pp. 615-795.
- (1969) "Wissenschaftlichkeit und System in der Jurisprudenz des 16. Jahrhunderts", in: Jürgen Blühdorn & Joachim Ritter (eds.), *Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft. Zum Problem ihrer Beziehung im 19. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, pp. 63-88.
- Weber, Max (1991) *Die protestantische Ethik I. Eine Aufsatzsammlung*, 8th ed., Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.
- Weerda, Jan Remmers (1964) "Wilhelm Zepper und die Anfänge der reformierten Kirchenrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland [1955]", in: idem, *Nach Gottes Wort reformierte Kirche. Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte und ihrem Recht*, ed. Anneliese Sprengler-Ruppenthal, München: Kaiser, pp. 162-189.
- Wuttke, Adolf (1861) *Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre*, Berlin: Wiegandt & Grieben, I.
- Zanchius, Hieronymus (1613) *Epistolarvm libri dvo*, in: idem, *Opervm theologicorvm D. Hieronymi Zanchii*, Geneva, VIII, pp. 72-442.
- Zepper, Wilhelm (1596) *Von der Christlichen Disziplin/oder Kirchengzucht: Das ist Welcher gestalt den grossen vilfaltigen sünden/lastern vnd ärgernussen vnder den Euangelischen gestewert vnd gewehrt: hiergegen aber ein recht gotseliges und bußfertiges leben vnd wandel in der Kirchen Gottes angestellt vnd erhalten werden müge*, Siegen (rpt. ed. by Dietrich Thyen, Kreuztal: Die Wielandschmiede, 1980).

Aristotelianism and Anti-Stoicism in Juan Luis Vives's Conception of the Emotions

Lorenzo Casini
(University of Uppsala, Sweden)

Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540) is perhaps best known as an educational and social theorist, as well as for his spirited attack on scholastic logic.¹ His contribution to philosophical psychology is, however, also worthy of consideration. On account of his insights into human nature and conduct the Valencian humanist has occasionally even been called ‘the father of modern psychology’.² Vives’s philosophical reflections on the human soul are mainly concentrated in *De anima et vita* (1538).³ This treatise, which belongs to the late and philosophically more interesting and mature stage of his intellectual career, is divided into three books: on the soul of animals; on the rational soul; and on the emotions (*de anima brutorum, de rationali, et de affectionibus*). The enormous importance Vives attached to the exploration of the emotions, to which almost half of the treatise is devoted, is reflected in the fact that he regards ‘that philosophy which provides a remedy for the severe diseases of the soul’, not only ‘the foundation of all morality, private as well as public’, but also ‘the supreme form of learning and knowledge’.⁴

¹ For a general study of Vives’s thought, see Noreña (1970).

² The first one to ascribe this epithet to Vives seems to have been Watson (1915). In the view of Gregory Zilboorg (1941), p. 194: ‘Vives was not only the father of modern, empirical psychology, but the true forerunner of the dynamic psychology of the twentieth century.’

³ There is still no critical edition of Vives’s *De anima et vita*. The most commonly used text is the one included in the edition of Gregorio Mayans y Siscár: Vives (1782–90). References to this edition are preceded by the letter M. For an edition which can be called critical in the limited sense that it compares Mayans’s text with the first edition of 1538, see the edition of Mario Sancipriano: Vives (1974). References to this edition are preceded by the letter S. All quotations from *De anima et vita* are taken from Sancipriano’s edition. On the lack of critical editions of Vives’s works see Ijsewijn (1981).

⁴ S, p. 86; M, III, pp. 299–300: ‘Adde, quod est de affectibus speculatio, quæ tertio libro continetur, fundamentum universæ moralis disciplinæ, sive privatæ, sive publicæ’; and M, I, p. 17: ‘Summum in litteris omnibus atque eruditione est ea Philosophia, quæ ingentibus

Vives considered himself to be the first to deal with the investigation of the emotions in an adequate manner. In his view, this study was neither conducted nor transmitted with sufficient care by the ancients. Although they are not introduced as two opposed views, the positions of Aristotle and of the Stoics are mentioned as examples of this deficiency: ‘The Stoics, who Cicero claims to have followed, corrupted the whole subject with their quibbling. Aristotle dealt with this matter in the *Rhetoric* only to the extent that he though was sufficient for a politician.’⁵ In spite of the fact that unresolved attempts to harmonize Stoic conceptions with Augustinian views can be discerned in Vives’s moral philosophy, he firmly rejected the Stoic view on the passions.⁶ Moreover, although his attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy is far from straightforward, there is no doubt that he was deeply critical of his ethics. In the sixth book of *De causis corruptarum artium*, for example, he argues at length that Aristotle’s ethics, on account of the worldly conception of happiness and virtue, is—unlike Platonism and Stoicism—completely incompatible with Christian religion.⁷ Vives’s criticism of Aristotle’s contribution to the subject of the emotions, however, seems to leave no room for doubt that he based his assessment principally on the *Rhetoric*.⁸ The present paper aims to show that the Peripatetic tradition nonetheless constitutes one of the most important sources of inspiration for Vives’s conception of the emotions and his rejection of the Stoic theory of the passions.

animi morbis remedium adfert.’ The most comprehensive study of Vives’s analysis of the emotions is Noreña (1989).

⁵ S, p. 454; M, III, p. 421: ‘estque tractatio hæc non satis diligenter a veteribus sapientiæ studiosis vel animadversa, vel tradita. Stoici, quos Cicero secutum se profitetur, omnia hæc argutijs suis perverterunt. Aristoteles in *Rhetoricis* tantum de materia hac exposuit, quantum viro politico arbitratus est sufficere.’

⁶ It has been argued that a basic tension pervading Renaissance thought was that between what can broadly be termed Stoicism and Augustinianism. Augustine incorporated several Stoic doctrines into his own thought, and at first glance, the affinity between these two ethical systems might have seemed impressive. Stoicism was commonly regarded as fundamentally compatible with Christianity, and many Stoic ethical doctrines were adopted by Christian writers. Nonetheless, at a deeper level, these traditions were radically opposed to each other, and the tension between them constituted a frequently recurring element in Renaissance humanism. See, e.g., Bouwsma (1975). Vives’s *De concordia et discordia in humano genere* (1529) constitutes, in the view of Noreña (1989), p. 47, an example of ‘the humanist attempt to harmonise Stoic metaphysical and ethical conceptions with Augustinian religious views’.

⁷ M, VI, pp. 208–22. For Vives’s attitude towards Aristotle’s philosophy in general see Noreña (1970), pp. 166–73; Margolin (1976); Trujillo (1993).

⁸ For the *fortuna* of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the Renaissance see Green (1994a) and (1994b).

ARISTOTELIANISM AND ANTI-STOICISM IN LATE ANTIQUITY AND THE RENAISSANCE

Aristotle regarded emotions not only as natural responses to the way things appear to us but also as constituents of the good life. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the doctrine of virtue as a mean is applied to passions as well as actions, emotions are described as valuable and necessary parts of moral conduct. On Aristotle's account, the virtuous person not only does the right thing but is affected in the way which reason instructs and has emotions 'at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way' (1106^b21–23). For example, to feel anger on the right grounds, against the right persons, at the right moment and for the right length of time, is in his view praiseworthy. Those, on the other hand, who do not get angry at the things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish (1125^b26–1126^a6).

The position of the Peripatetics changed somewhat during the Hellenistic period. In this new account, the emphasis was on the moderation of passions rather than on the fact that they should be felt in a manner appropriate to the specific situation.⁹ This modification, however, constituted a polemic against Stoic interpretations of the Aristotelian tenet that virtue is a mean between two vices (1107^a2), rather than a contrast to the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (*apatheia*). The definition of virtue as a mean state of the passions was an attempt to counter an interpretation of the doctrine of the mean which reduced virtue to moderate vice, instead of seeing it as a way of avoiding opposed vices.¹⁰

A standard version of this position is presented in Plutarch's *De virtute morali*, where the monistic psychology of the Stoics is rejected on the grounds that, in addition to the activity of reason (*to logistikon*), there is also an emotional element (*to pathêtikon*) in the human soul. In Plutarch's opinion, emotions are natural and should not be eradicated but instead educated. A good or reasonable emotion (*eupatheia*) arises when reason, rather than extirpating the emotion, moderates it so that in the soul of the temperate person it helps the virtues.¹¹ As we shall see, Plutarch's conception of emotions and his criticism of Stoic ethics were a major influence on Vives.

Opposition to the Stoics gave rise to a controversy between proponents of a moderate degree of passion (*metriopatheia*), on the one hand, and

⁹ See Annas (1993), pp. 60–1, and especially Gill (1997), pp. 6–7.

¹⁰ See Becchi (1975).

¹¹ Plutarch, *De virtute morali*, 442A, 449B and 451C–D.

advocates of complete freedom from passion (*apatheia*), on the other.¹² This controversy—concerning which Renaissance authors could find information in the writings of Cicero, Seneca and many others—remained an important feature of the disputes over the nature of the passions.¹³ In his *Dialogus consolatorius*, Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459) describes the issue in the following way:

Most erudite and friendly men, we saw that this controversy of ours was formerly more fully debated by—and not yet resolved by—the Stoics and Peripatetics, the greatest leaders of ancient philosophy. For the Stoics, harsher than the other philosophers, say that grief and other perturbations of the mind are evils of opinion, not of nature. The Peripatetics, truly a little more humane, argue that sicknesses of the mind at first arise from nature but that they are worsened afterwards by opinion. Which of these positions was true is worthily debated among us. Our Angelo indeed approves the *sententia* of the Stoics. I, however, follow and approve the position of the Peripatetics, which accords more truly with human life.¹⁴

In contrast to the extreme ethical stance of the Stoics, many Renaissance authors preferred the more moderate Peripatetic position, arguing that it provides a more realistic basis for morality, since it places the acquisition of virtue within the reach of normal human capacities. The *Dialogus consolatorius*, which was composed after the death of Manetti's son Antonino, recounts a conversation between Manetti and his brother-in-law Angelo Acciaiuoli, in which they discuss the appropriateness of grief after the loss of a son. Acciaiuoli's argument—almost entirely derived from Seneca's *De consolatione ad Marciam*—is that grief is a product of the human mind; Manetti, on the contrary, maintains that emotions are natural and legitimate.¹⁵

Even Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406), who had given the highest praise to the Stoics, felt himself forced to reconsider the psychological validity of the Stoic theory after the death of his sons Piero and Andrea. His disillusionment with Stoic ethics derived from the realization that it was beyond his power to feel no grief at all in the face of such a bereavement. To Francesco Zabarella (1360–1417), who in a letter of consolation had urged him to remember that grief is pointless since death is not an evil, he replied that Aristotle had maintained that death is the most terrible thing of all and that 'the authority of Aristotle and the moderation of the Peripatetics

¹² See Dillon (1983); Striker (1996), pp. 293–99; Sorabji (2000), pp. 194–210.

¹³ See, e.g., Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, IV.37–50; and Seneca, *Epistulae*, 85 and 116. There are, however, interesting cases, such as Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), whose discussion of emotions in *De morali disciplina* shows no awareness of the difference between the Stoic and the Peripatetic doctrines. See Kraye (1981).

¹⁴ Quoted from McClure (1991), p. 100. There is a misprinted line in the final sentence of the passage quoted above in Manetti (1983), p. 46. See instead De Petris (1977), p. 93.

¹⁵ See De Petris (1977) and (1979); McClure (1986), pp. 451–6 and (1991), pp. 98–104.

are superior to that severity, or rather hardness, and unattainable ideal of the Stoics'.¹⁶

The same kind of criticism is also discernible in Vives's *De anima et vita*, where the reader is urged to 'forget the Stoics, who through the petty cavils of their school, tried without success to transform into stones what nature had shaped as human beings'.¹⁷ In this repudiation, however, one can also observe a further criticism: the arguments of the Stoics amount to no more than a deeply misleading juggling with words. In Vives's assessment, they 'babble with a most annoying and endless loquacity, trying to define everything by reducing it to subtle trickery'.¹⁸ The view that the Stoics coin new words and, deviating from the common usage, deliberately distort the meaning of generally accepted terms, was quite common during the sixteenth century; it can be found, for example, in Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Pier Vettori (1499–1585) and Francesco Piccolomini (1523–1607).¹⁹

This charge goes back to Cicero's *De finibus bonorum et malorum* and also constitutes the starting-point of Augustine's analysis of the passions in *De civitate Dei*.²⁰ Accepting Cicero's allegations, Augustine argues that the dispute between Stoics and Peripatetics is merely terminological, since both parties maintain that passions are experienced by everyone and ought to be submitted to the control of reason. To prove his point he refers to an episode narrated in the *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius about the reactions of a Stoic philosopher in a sea-storm.²¹ Gellius's report deals with an important aspect of Stoic psychology concerning the existence and importance of affective reactions which are not subject to rational control. The Stoics conceded that even the sage would experience physical responses such as pallor or trembling despite his firm belief that there is nothing to fear, and they called these reactions first motions or pre-passions (*propathēiai*).²² Richard Sorabji has argued that Augustine misunderstood Gellius's exposition and failed to grasp the crucial distinction between passions, such as fear, and involuntary first motions, such as trembling.²³

¹⁶ Salutati (1891–1911), III, p. 463. See also Witt (1983), pp. 355–67; McClure (1986), pp. 444–51 and (1991), pp. 95–8.

¹⁷ S, p. 558; M, III, p. 461: 'Sed Stoicos dimittamus, qui se, quos natura homines condiderat, scholasticis cavillatiunculis saxa volerunt reddere: nec sunt tamen assecuti.'

¹⁸ S, p. 84; M, III, p. 299: 'Stoici molestissima loquacitate infinita deblaterarunt, dum omnia cupiunt definire, et ad subtiles redigere captiunculas.'

¹⁹ See Krays (1988), p. 363; (2001–2) and (2002).

²⁰ Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, IV.20.56–IV.28.80; and Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4.

²¹ See Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, XIX.1.

²² See Inwood (1985) pp. 175–81; Sorabji (2000), pp. 66–75.

²³ For a detailed account of Augustine's alleged misunderstanding, see Sorabji (2000), pp. 372–84.

Augustine nonetheless concluded that there could not be any disagreement between Stoics and Peripatetics:

For what does it matter whether it is more appropriate to call them goods or advantages, when Stoic and Peripatetic alike tremble and grow pale with the fear of losing them? They do not call them by the same names, but they hold them in the same esteem.²⁴

Vives would have been very familiar with Augustine's criticism, not least because he produced a critical edition of *De civitate Dei* with a philological commentary.²⁵

VIVES'S CONCEPTION OF THE EMOTIONS

Vives's account of the emotions in *De anima et vita* opens with a discussion of our conative powers as part of our natural endowment. To protect themselves from corruption, created things were granted a natural inclination to self-preservation, while for the sake of well-being they received a faculty of seeking the good and avoiding evil.²⁶ Among the acts of our conative faculties, Vives distinguishes between the motions which precede and those which follow the conclusions of judgement. Whether the former belong to the natural inclination to self-preservation, and the latter to the faculty of seeking the good and avoiding evil, is not clear. The former are nevertheless regarded as natural impulses which arise from a change in the condition of the body, such as the desire to eat when we are hungry and to drink when we are thirsty, the feeling of sadness when we are sick or oppressed by black bile, the exhilaration when pure and clear blood streams around our heart and the vexation caused by being beaten.²⁷

²⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4; for translation see Augustine (1998), p. 364.

²⁵ See Watson (1913); Rivera de Ventosa (1977) and (1986).

²⁶ It is worth noting that Vives's reference to different faculties of the soul is not based on any metaphysical claims and should not be understood as implying any ontological commitments. As Valerio Del Nero (1992), p. 211, has also pointed out, the novelty of Vives's approach consists, on the contrary, 'nella progressiva eliminazione dell'analisi degli aspetti metafisici della struttura dell'anima in favore delle sue manifestazioni fenomeniche'. In one of the most frequently quoted passages from *De anima et vita*, Vives even remarks: 'Anima quid sit, nihil interest nostra scire: qualis autem et quæ eius opera, permultum'. See S, p. 188; M, III, p. 332.

²⁷ S, p. 456; M, III, p. 422: 'Sunt quidam animorum motus, seu impetus verius naturales, qui ex affecto corpore consurgunt: ut edendi cupiditas in fame, bibendi in siti, mœror in morbo, vel premente atra bili, exhilaratio in liquido et puro sanguine circa cor, offensio ad plagam; ij iudicio antevortunt.' See also S, p. 494; M III, p. 436–7: 'Ad esse pertinent necessitates vitæ tuendæ ac propagandæ, quæ naturales nuncupantur, cibus, potio, medicina, ignis, tectum, indumentum: qui appetitus potius dicuntur, quam cupiditates, in quibus impetu

Emotions (*affectus sive affectiones*), on the other hand, are defined as 'the acts of those faculties which nature gave to our souls to follow good and avoid evil, by means of which we are led to the good and move away from or against evil'.²⁸ Emotions are natural faculties granted to us for the sake of our self-preservation and well-being. The emotional faculty (*facultas affectionum*) was placed in the soul by God to prevent us from being inactive, and its functions can be compared to spurs and brakes (*stimuli ac fræni*) which urge and restrain action.²⁹ Fear, for example, was given to us in order to make us avoid whatever is harmful.³⁰ Even the first natural seed of pride was originally something good, given to us so that, considering the excellence of our origin, we might love ourselves, regard ourselves worthy of heavenly things and desire them.³¹ Erasmus (c.1466–1536) favours a similar approach in his *Moriae encomium*, declaring that emotions function like spurs or goads (*calcaria stimulative*), inciting us to perform good deeds.³² In this connection it may also be noted that in *De ira* Seneca attributes to Aristotle the view that anger is a spur (*stimulus*) and a goad to virtue (*calcar virtutis*).³³

Vives furthermore points out that there is no simple terminology concerning the emotions. The term 'emotions' (*affectus*) can refer to the natural faculties, their acts and the habits which arise from those acts.³⁴ This distinction, stemming from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1105^b19–

rapitur animus tacito naturæ stimulo punctus, atque incitatus transilit iudicium neque illi auscultat.'

²⁸ Ibid.: 'Ergo istarum facultatum, quibus animi nostri præditi a natura sunt ad sequendum bonum, vel vitandum malum, actus dicuntur affectus sive affectiones, quibus ad bonum ferimur, vel contra malum, vel a malo recedimus.'

²⁹ S, p. 460; M, III, p. 424: 'Et quandoquidem animus erat habiturus in corpore, indita est animanti ab admirabili artifice Deo facultas hæc affectionum, ut quibusdam veluti stimulis excitaretur animus, ne iacens penitus obrutusque mole corporis, veluti segnis asinus torperet perpetuo, bonisque suis indormisceret, et in eo quod illi valde expediret cessaret; itaque varijs tanquam calcaribus hinc inde subinde excitatur: alias autem cohibetur freno, ne ruat in noxia. Homini etiam ijdem isti non desunt stimuli ac fræni, qua parte est animans, cui sunt eisdem de causis necessarij.'

³⁰ S, p. 688; M, III, p. 508: 'Datus est homini metus, ut caveat nocitura, priusquam se illi applicent.'

³¹ S, p. 720; M, III, p. 520: 'Naturale illud semen primum superbiæ, unde in tantam degeneravit maliciam, non erat malum: nempe ut se homo excellenti conditione progenitum reputans, amaret se, dignumque maximis ac veris bonis censeret; nempe cœlestibus, quæ magno animo appeteret.'

³² *Moriae encomium* in Erasmus (1969–), IV.3, p. 106.

³³ Seneca, *De ira*, I.7.1 and III.3.1.

³⁴ S, p. 460; M, III, p. 423–4: 'Cæterum affectionum non est simplex appellatio; nam facultates naturales in animo dilatandi sui ad bonum, et contrahendi a malo, affectus sunt: et earum actiones in animo eodem censentur nomine; consuetudines quoque, quæ ex actionibus invaluerunt, quæ *hexeis* Graeco verbo nominantur, hoc est habitus.'

29), was quite common among scholastic philosophers.³⁵ It is, however, more likely that Vives's most direct source was Plutarch's *De virtute morali*, where the distinction is spelled out in the following way:

For these three things the soul is said to possess: capacity, passion, acquired state. Now capacity is the starting-point, or raw material, of passion, as, for instance, irascibility, bashfulness, temerity. And passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, as anger, shame or boldness. And finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, this settled condition being bred by habit and becoming on the one hand vice, if the passion has been educated badly, but virtue, if educated excellently by reason.³⁶

A similar structure is also discernible in Vives's account. In the chapter devoted to anger and vexation, for example, he maintains that the natural faculty of anger was given to us in order to make us desire lofty things; so that when we see ourselves rejected and despised for our base and mean actions, we suffer and strive to redeem ourselves by engaging in worthy deeds.³⁷ The act of this faculty, on the other hand, is described as a motion of the soul against a present evil and is considered as a harsh and distressful agitation of the soul, which arises when we see our own goods disdained.³⁸ Irascibility is either the habit which arises from these acts or can depend on natural disposition.³⁹

At first glance, Vives's definition of the emotions seems to have been formulated within the frameworks of Aristotelian teleology and the Christian doctrine of divine providence. His approach should also, however, be seen in the light of ancient discussions pertaining to the emotional part of the soul. Raymond Clements and Carlos Noreña have claimed that Vives was influenced by the theory of the Stoic Posidonius, as reported in Galen's *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*.⁴⁰ But Plutarch's *De*

³⁵ Not a single medieval author is mentioned or quoted in *De anima et vita*. Although Vives spent five years at the University of Paris, it is most unlikely that he learned anything about scholastic theories of the emotions during that period. For Vives's scholastic background, see González y González (1987).

³⁶ Plutarch, *De virtute morali*, 443D–E; for translation see Plutarch (1939), p. 35.

³⁷ S, p. 616; M, III, p. 483: 'Tributa est homini ira ad appetitum rerum excellentium, ut quum videat se, ac doleat, ob viles abiectasque actiones rejici ac contemni, det operam, ut se ab illis vindicet, transferatque ad præclaras, quæ contemni iure non possint.'

³⁸ S, p. 466; M, III, p. 426: 'Motus in malum præsens, ira'; S, p. 598; M, III, p. 475: 'Ira est concitatio animi acerba, quod bona sua videt contemni, quæ ipse putat non esse contemnenda, in quo et semetipsum censet contemni; cuique enim precium atque æstimatio ex suis bonis'; and S, p. 604; M, III, p. 478: 'Et ut est ira dolor, quod bona sua, quæ putat non aspernenda, contemnuntur.'

³⁹ S, p. 598; M, III, pp. 475–6: 'Ira est motus, iracundia habitus, vel ingenium naturale.'

⁴⁰ See Clements (1967), p. 232; Noreña (1989), pp. 143–4 and 147. Although he did not abandon psychological monism, Posidonius recognized different capacities (*dunameis*) in the soul and maintained that in addition to the activity of reason (*to logistikon*), there is also

virtute morali, in which the emotional part (*to pathêtikon*) of the soul is described as a faculty (*dunamis*), seems a more likely source of inspiration.⁴¹

EMOTIONS VS PASSIONS

In Vives's view, the acts of the emotional faculty, 'no matter how quick and hasty they might be, always follow the conclusions of judgement'.⁴² As he himself stresses, the terms 'good' and 'evil' in his definition of the emotions mean, not what is really good or evil, but rather what each person judges to be good or evil.⁴³ Consequently, the more pure and elevated the judgement is, the more it takes account of what is really good and true, admitting fewer and less intense emotions and becoming disturbed more rarely. Immoderate and confused movements, on the other hand, are the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness and false judgement, since we judge the good or evil to be greater than it really is.⁴⁴ The self-love which derives from pride, for instance, when it is mixed with ignorance, blinds us and makes us think that we are the best and the most worthy of everything good.⁴⁵

These considerations of the different degrees of emotion bring us to another important distinction in Vives's account: that between different kinds of emotions in accordance with their intensity. He compares the motions of the emotional faculty with those of the sea:

an emotional aspect (*to pathêtikon*) in the soul, whose movements (*pathêtikai kinêseis*) are an essential component of the passions. These affective movements, which Galen erroneously identified with passions (*pathê*), were conceived as natural reactions to appearances, and their existence was regarded as an essential aspect of human nature. For detailed accounts of Posidonius's theory, see Fillion-Lahille (1984), pp. 121–99; Cooper (1998); Gill (1998); Sorabji (1998) and (2000), pp. 93–132 and 255–60.

⁴¹ Plutarch, *De virtute morali*, 443C–D.

⁴² S, p. 456; M, III, p. 422: 'reliqui omnes quantumcunque celeres et prærapidi, iudicij sententiam sequuntur; non enim movetur animus, nisi præiudicatum sit bonum esse, aut malum, id quod est obiectum.'

⁴³ Ibid.: 'Bonum et malum in præsentia id voco, non tam quod revera tale est, quam quod quisque sibi esse iudicat.'

⁴⁴ S, pp. 462 and 464; M, III, p. 425: 'quo est autem purius iudicium, et celsius, eo pauciores et magis leves affectus admittit: tanto scilicet accuratius despicit, quid quaque in re sit bonum et verum; ita fit ut commoveatur tum rarius, tum lentius. Nam ingentes illæ agitationes et præturbidæ ab ignorantia sunt, et inconsideratione aut a falso: quod bonum malumve maius censem esse, quam revera sit.'

⁴⁵ S, p. 708; M, III, pp. 514–5: 'Infixæ sunt huius mali radices nostris pectoribus; quoniam ex eo amore nascitur, qui inditus est naturaliter cuique sui ipsius; is enim, ut est admistus ignorantia, excæcatur, efficitque ut quisque sibi videatur optimus, ac proinde bonis quibuscunque dignissimus.'

Just as in the motions of the sea one is a soft breeze, one stronger and another vehement, stirring up in a terrible storm the whole sea from the depths, along with the sand and the fishes; so in the motions of the soul some are light, so that you might almost call them beginnings of a rising motion, some more intense and others shake up the whole soul and drive it away from the seat of reason and condition of judgement. These are real disturbances and unrestrained motions, since now the soul is hardly in control of itself, becoming instead subject to an alien power, blinded and unable to see anything. The former you might rightly call emotions, while the latter are the commotions and agitations which the Greeks call *pathê*, that is, passions, since the whole soul suffers as if from a blow and becomes agitated.⁴⁶

Vives's distinction between emotions and passions seems to correspond to the approach taken by the proponents of a moderate degree of passion (*metriopatheia*). In this respect, the distinction between *êthos* and *pathos*—stemming from the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition—is of particular interest.⁴⁷ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle associates *êthos* with the presentation of the character of the speaker and *pathos* with the production of an emotional reaction in the audience (1356^a1–21). In Cicero, however, the distinction between *êthos* and *pathos* has become associated with two different styles of speech:

There are, for instance, two topics which if well handled by the orator arouse admiration for his eloquence. One, which the Greeks call *êthikon* or 'expressive of character', is related to men's nature and character, their habits and all the intercourse of life; the other, which they call *pathêtikon* or 'relating to the emotions', arouses and excites the emotions: in this part alone oratory reigns supreme. The former is courteous and agreeable, adapted to win goodwill; the latter is violent, hot and impassioned, and by this cases are wrested from our opponents; when it rushes along in full career it is quite irresistible.⁴⁸

A further development in the distinction between *êthos* and *pathos* is to be found in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, a work with which Vives was very

⁴⁶ S, p. 462; M, III, p. 424: 'At vero, quemadmodum in maris motibus est alius auræ tenuis, alius concitator, alius vehemens, quique horrida tempestate mare omne a fundo verrat cum arena ipsa et piscibus: sic in his animorum agitationibus quædam sunt leves, quas velut initia quædam dixeris surgentis motus, aliæ sunt validiores, aliæ animum universum concutunt, deque rationis sede ac statu iudicij depellunt; quæ vere sunt perturbationes, et impotentia: quod quasi iam animus sui non sit compos, sed in alienam potestatem reciderit: et cæcitates, quod nihil despiciat; nam primas illas, affectiones rectius dixeris; alteras, commotiones, seu concitationes, quæ Græci *páthê* nominant, quasi passiones; patitur enim animus universus illo velut ictu et agitur.'

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Gill (1984); Wisse (1989). Vives's interest in rhetoric and the emotions dates back to the very beginning of his career; and he also lectured on this topic in Paris in 1514. See Vives (1991).

⁴⁸ Cicero, *Orator*, 37.128; for translation see Cicero (1962), pp. 401 and 403.

familiar.⁴⁹ In this case the distinction has a bearing on two different kinds of emotions, weak and strong respectively:

Emotions however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is called *pathos* by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by *adfectus*: the other is called *êthos*, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent ... The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain *pathos* as describing the more violent emotions and *êthos* as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill.⁵⁰

It is not clear which 'ancient authorities' Quintilian was referring to in this passage; however, it has been pointed out that the early Peripatetics not only used difference in degree to distinguish different kinds of emotions but also, within the sphere of rhetoric, worked with a narrow notion of *pathos* which was restricted to strong emotions that affect judgement.⁵¹ Vives's distinction is dictated by similar principles, since what characterizes unrestrained motions, in his view, is the fact that they 'shake up the whole soul and drive it away from the seat of reason and condition of judgement'.

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION

In Vives's opinion, all emotions, with the exception of the natural impulses which arise from a change in the condition of the body, always follow the conclusions of judgement (*iudicium*), which is defined as a kind of assessment constituted by the assent to or dissent from discursive reason and rational conclusions.⁵² He maintains nonetheless that for the sake of self-preservation and well-being, living creatures were also granted perceptual faculties, external as well as internal; for it is sensible knowledge which provides the kind of judgement that urges us to action or

⁴⁹ For some remarks on Quintilian's influence on Vives's philosophical psychology see Swift and Block (1974); Conde Salazar (1998).

⁵⁰ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, VI.2.8–9; for translation see Quintilian (1939), II, pp. 421 and 423. See also Plutarch, *De virtute morali*, 443C.

⁵¹ See Fortenbaugh (1994).

⁵² S, p. 278; M, III, p. 362: 'Iudicium est censura, hoc est approbatio et improbatio rationis, discursus videlicet et clausulæ'; and S, p. 282; M, III, p. 363: 'Itaque si iudicium censeat conclusionem esse veram, illi se applicat, et eam complectitur tanquam sibi congruentem: quæ complexio, assensus, seu opinio, atque existimatio dicitur: sin falsam, aversatur, quæ est dissensio.'

restrains us from it.⁵³ The term ‘judgement’ is used here in a loose sense; but does not include ‘any form of cognition’, as Carlos Noreña suggests.⁵⁴ For example, even in animals the reception of an image in the imagination is not sufficient to produce an emotion, if an estimative act, which in animals plays the role of judgement, is not added.⁵⁵ Vives, however, maintains that a rational judgement is not always necessary to arouse an emotion; on the contrary, as happens in most cases, an impression is sufficient if the fantasy (*phantasia*) ‘draws to itself in its confusion a certain species of opinion or judgement’.⁵⁶ His belief that the fantasy can ‘draw’ an impression to itself probably rests on the view that different psychological functions have different locations in the brain. In his exposition of the internal senses, the imagination is located in the front ventricle of the brain and the fantasy in the central one.⁵⁷ According to Vives, the operation of the imagination, which consists merely in the passive reception of the images imprinted on the senses, is not able to provide the necessary evaluation in order for an emotion to arise. The

⁵³ S, p. 454; M, III, p. 421: ‘Quocirca cognitio tum sensuum, tum interior omnis, propter iudicandum est animanti addita: iudicium vero, ad nos vel impellendos, vel retrahendos.’

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Noreña (1989), pp. 149 and 151.

⁵⁵ S, p. 456; M, III, p. 422: ‘non enim movetur animus, nisi præiudicatum sit bonum esse, aut malum, id quod est obiectum: idemque in brutis usu evenit, in quibus non sola imaginatio parit affectum, nisi et existimatio accesserit, quæ illis iudicij cuiusdam locum obtinet.’ In his discussion of the internal senses, Vives describes the estimative faculty (*facultas extimativa*) as a hidden natural impulse, shared by men and animals, which produces judgement out of sensible species. By means of the estimative power, a creature judges whether something is good and useful or dangerous and harmful, rousing thereby the emotional faculty, as when a sheep avoids a wolf, even if it has never seen one before. S, p. 172; M, III, p. 328: ‘Extimativa autem facultas est, quæ ex sensilibus speciebus impetum iudicij parit. Iudicium hoc ad profuturum aut læsurum tendit: quippe ad salutem retulit natura, vel cognitionem sensorum, vel stimulum suum. Itaque iudicatur prius, quale quique in se existimetur: hinc, quam congruens aut damnosum. In priore censura, sequitur animus sensum, vel visum; in posteriore occulto naturæ stimulo agitur, et rapitur impete, ut cum ovis fugit lupum nunquam antea visum, et gallinaceus aquilam vel accipitrem, et homo draconem ac monstra rerum: quin etiam ad primum quorundam hominum aspectum, congressumque, cohorrescimus.’ The example of the sheep perceiving the wolf as dangerous comes originally from Avicenna’s *De anima*. For a discussion of Avicenna’s conception of the estimative faculty, see Black (1993); Hasse (2000), pp. 127–41. For a general survey of developments in the theory of the internal senses after Aristotle see Wolfson (1935); Klubertanz (1952); Harvey (1975).

⁵⁶ S, p. 458; M, III, pp. 422–3: ‘sed non semper ad affectum excitandum opus est iudicio illo, quod ex rationum collatione de rebus statuit: illud sufficit, et est frequentius, quod imaginationis movetur visis. Itaque sola phantasia trahente ad se tumultu suo speciem quandam opinionis et iudicij, quod bonum sit, aut malum quod est ei obiectum, in omnes animi perturbationes versamur.’

⁵⁷ S, p. 172; M, III, p. 328: ‘Hisce facultatibus diversa attribuit natura instrumenta, et ceu diversas officinas in cerebri partibus; nam in anteriore cerebro dicunt esse sensuum fontem sedemque, ibique imaginationem constitui; in medio phantasiam, et extimativam.’

active working of these images is instead accomplished by the fantasy, which is described as 'marvellously free and disengaged'. The fantasy is able to create whatever it pleases out of the impressions received by the imagination; in other words, it can represent something as either good or evil. Therefore, if it is not controlled and bridled by reason, it can shake up and disturb the soul in the same way as a storm stirs up the sea.⁵⁸

This is basically Aristotle's approach. In the *Rhetoric*, emotions are regarded as spontaneous and natural responses to evaluative impressions or appearances. As Gisela Striker points out, 'it is evident that Aristotle is deliberately using the term "impression" rather than, say, "belief" (*doxa*) in his definitions in order to make the point that these impressions are not to be confused with rational judgements. Emotions are caused by the way things appear to one unreflectively, and one may experience an emotion even if one realises that the impression that triggered it is in fact mistaken.'⁵⁹ In order to describe the influence of the fantasy, Vives discusses the example of a married couple feeling miserable and starting to cry when, seated by the fireplace, they discuss the possibility of losing their only son, who, healthy and vigorous, is with them at that moment.⁶⁰

In the chapter devoted to anger and vexation, Vives also discusses the interesting case of fits of anger which arise all of a sudden, so that many think they are natural and precede judgement.⁶¹ In his view, however, these abrupt outbursts neither precede nor depend on the judgement that we have been slighted, but are instead based on the combination of a judgement rooted beforehand in ourselves, which leads us to consider ourselves worthy of honour and respect, and the impression that we have been slighted. Vives's point might perhaps be spelled out in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of the practical syllogism as expounded in *De motu animalium*.

According to Aristotle, the first premise of the syllogism, which represents a desiderative state and consists of a universal judgement, is 'through the good'. The second premise, on the other hand, is 'through the possible' and consists of a cognitive element containing particular information, obtained from thought or perception, about the possibility of

⁵⁸ S, p. 170; M, III, p. 327: 'Phantasia est mirifice expedita et libera; quicquid collibitum est, fingit, refingit, componit, devincit, dissolvit, res disiunctissimas connectit, coniuntissimas autem longissime separat. Itaque nisi regatur et cohibeatur a ratione, haud secus animum percellit ac perturbat quam procella mare.'

⁵⁹ Striker (1996), p. 291. See also Sihvola (1996).

⁶⁰ S, p. 688; M, III, pp. 507–8: 'coniuges quidam miserabiliter cœperunt lamentari, quod essent ad focum collocuti, quid ipsis fieret, si unicum suum amitterent, qui illis erat sanus, et valens? Sed hoc phantasie regnum late per affectiones omnes patet.'

⁶¹ S, p. 600; M, III, pp. 476–7: 'est alter qui subito quidem existit, et quasi sine tempore ad primum tactum contemptus, ita ut nonnulli naturalem esse ducant, et iudicio antevertere.'

fulfilling the desire in question. The conclusion which results from the two premises is an action that follows with necessity if nothing hinders the agent. It is also important to note that, in Aristotle's view, reason does not stop to consider obvious premises, which explains why something done without calculation can happen so quickly.⁶²

In Vives's case the belief that we are good, learned, generous, industrious and pre-eminent, and that people therefore ought to show us honour and respect, might be seen as a desiderative state which corresponds to the first premise. The impression of being slighted constitutes the cognitive element which corresponds to the second premise. Consequently, as soon as some kind of slight becomes manifest, even at distance, anger suddenly blazes up.⁶³

The kind of opinion or judgement constituted by an impression can also be compared to the apprehension which, in the Stoics' view, generates emotional movements or first motions. In *De ira*, for example, Seneca gives a careful description of how the first mental agitation which affects us when we think ourselves wronged or harmed, and which does not become a passion without a voluntary act of assent, is induced by the impression (*species*) of a wrong which has been committed. Seneca's account deals with the same aspect of Stoic psychology—the existence and importance of affective reactions which are not subject to rational control—which we encountered in connection with Augustine's discussion of the episode of the Stoic philosopher in a sea-storm, as narrated by Aulus Gellius. According to Seneca, first movements are not passions but rather beginnings preliminary to passions (*principia proludentia adfectibus*). The first motion of anger occurs when we have an impression of a wrong committed; but it is not sufficient to receive the impression in order for the passion to arise, the impression must also be assented to.⁶⁴ It is not farfetched to assume that, for Vives, precisely this kind of explanation constituted the quibbling by means of which the Stoics had debased moral psychology.

On the basis of his account, Seneca criticizes the view of Aristotle and his followers, pointing out that certain things are in our power only at the

⁶² Aristotle, *De motu animalium*, 7. See also Nussbaum (1978), commentary and essay 4.

⁶³ S, p. 600; M, III, p. 477: 'alias vero non ex iudicio a contemptu orto subito, sed ex illo quod in animo habemus præceptum; et confirmatum, bonos esse nos, doctos, generosos, industrios, præstantes, oportere nobis honorem exhiberi, et reverentiam, non oportere nos contemni; ex hoc iudicio informato intus atque infixio subito ira incalescit ubi primum contemptus vel procul sese protulit ac ostendit.'

⁶⁴ Seneca, *De ira*, II.2.2–5 and II.3.4–5. See also Seneca, *Epistulae*, 113.17–18. For detailed discussions of Seneca's treatment of passions and first motions in *De ira* see Fillion-Lahille (1984); Inwood (1985), pp. 175–81 and (1993); Rist (1989); Sorabji (1998) and (2000), pp. 55–75.

start and that thereafter they sweep us along with a force of their own and do not allow us to turn back. As soon as the mind throws itself into anger, for example, it is bound to be swept along.⁶⁵ Cicero, too, accepted the Stoic solution as the most probable and maintained that trying to moderate passions, as the Peripatetics wish to do, is like thinking 'that a man who has flung himself headlong from Leucas can stop his fall when he will'.⁶⁶ According to Seneca, the violence of anger does not develop gradually, but instead begins at full strength. If it could be moderated, then it would not be anger and should be called something else, since anger for him is by definition unbridled and ungoverned.⁶⁷

In his account of anger, Vives explicitly challenges Seneca's position, contrasting it with the view of Plutarch: 'Seneca holds that anger arises suddenly in its entirety, which Plutarch rightly contests; for anger grows from its own causes, like fire when it is supplied with tinder.'⁶⁸ Vives's source here seems to be *De cohibenda ira*, in which (*pace* Dillon) the remedies through which anger can be made obedient and subservient to reason are discussed.⁶⁹ Plutarch stresses the importance of having correct judgements (*krisis*) ready to hand, since it would be impossible to acquire them when anger already has upset the soul.⁷⁰ Moreover, the less consistent anger is, the more efficacious the appeal to these judgements will be. In his view, if the arousal of anger is carefully observed, it will be easily stopped. Plutarch's account might seem contradictory in this respect. Anger is first described as something impossible to calm down unless the right judgements have already been made; but then its moderation is discussed as something fully possible. It must, however, be noted that Plutarch is discussing different kinds of anger, because, as he explicitly points out, 'anger does not always have great and powerful beginnings; on the contrary, even a jest, a playful word, a burst of laughter or a nod on the part of somebody, and many things of the kind, rouse many persons to anger'.⁷¹ Depending on the different causes, there are more intense or less intense forms of anger. Motions which are weaker can be the subject of moderation since their growth is slow and can easily be observed. But as soon as anger,

⁶⁵ Seneca, *De ira*, I.7.4

⁶⁶ See Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, IV.17.37–IV.21.47; for translation see Cicero (1966), p. 371.

⁶⁷ Seneca, *De ira*, I.9.3 and III.1.3.

⁶⁸ S, p. 604; M, III, p. 478: 'Seneca totam iram subito dicit existere, cui merito Plutarchus refragatur; crescit enim ex suis causis, ut ignis fomento subiecto.'

⁶⁹ According to Dillon (1996), p. 189, *De cohibenda ira* 'advocates the extirpation of anger (*aorgêsia*) rather than its mere control, and attacks those (the Peripatetics) who would dignify this passion with the name of "greatness of soul" or "righteous indignation".'

⁷⁰ Plutarch, *De cohibenda ira*, 453D–454B.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 454D. For translation see Plutarch (1939), pp. 101 and 103.

no matter of what kind, is at its height, it ‘shunts off the mind, ... so that the soul can neither see nor hear anything that might help it’.⁷²

Plutarch, who was not familiar with Seneca’s *De ira*, criticizes Hieronymus of Rhodes’s assertion that we have no perception of anger when it comes into being, but only when it is already in existence, holding not only that it is possible to observe the development of anger, but also that ‘none of the emotions, at the time when they are gathering and beginning to move, has a birth and increase so easy to perceive’.⁷³ This is precisely the point which Vives invokes against Seneca; moreover, in Plutarch’s account it is also preceded by a passage in which anger is compared to fire:

And so, just as it is an easy matter to check a flame which is being kindled in hare’s fur or candlewicks or rubbish, but if it ever takes hold of solid bodies having depth, it quickly destroys and consumes ‘with youthful vigour lofty craftsmen’s work’, as Aeschylus has it; so the man who at the beginning gives heed to his temper and observes it while it is still smoking and catching flame little by little from some gossip or rubbishy scurrility need have no great concern about it; on the contrary, he has often succeeded in extinguishing it merely by keeping silent and ignoring it. For he who gives no fuel to fire puts it out, and likewise he who does not in the beginning nurse his wrath and does not puff himself up with anger takes precautions against it and destroys it.⁷⁴

Plutarch’s influence on Vives seems significant in more than one respect. To begin with, his considerations of the different kinds or degrees of emotion might have been an important source of inspiration for Vives’s distinction between the different kinds of emotions in accordance with their intensity. In Plutarch’s view what characterizes unrestrained anger, that is, the emotion at its height, is the fact that it ‘shunts off the mind’ and prevents the soul from obeying any kind of exhortation or admonition. In the passage in which Vives compares the motions of the emotional faculty to those of the sea, he follows Plutarch almost verbatim, pointing out that the distinctive feature of unrestrained motions is that they ‘shake up the whole soul and drive it away from the seat of reason and condition of judgement’.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS

Another respect in which Plutarch’s account might have been influential on Vives is the comparison of anger to fire. In *De anima*, Aristotle notes that

⁷² Ibid., 453E–F. For translation see Plutarch (1939), p. 99.

⁷³ Ibid., 454E–F. For translation see Plutarch (1939), p. 105.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 454E–F. For translation see Plutarch (1939), p. 103

the physicist and the dialectician would define anger differently: the latter would call it something like the desire for retribution, the former a boiling of the blood and heat around the heart. In his view, however, the genuine physicist is the one who combines both accounts (403^a29–^b9). An interest in both the cognitive and the physiological aspects of psychological and emotional processes is one of the features which sets Vives's approach apart from traditional philosophical psychology and, as Raymond Clements has pointed out, 'perhaps no other lay-author of the Renaissance is so rich with medical lore in his writings as Juan Luis Vives'.⁷⁵

Vives takes an interest not only in the effects produced on the body by emotions—which in the case of anger are disgusting and more suited to animals than to human beings: the change of facial expression, the quivering of the mouth, the impediment of speech and such like—but also in the physiological constitution of emotions.⁷⁶ In line with the Galenic tradition, Vives maintains that our rational capacities follow the temperament of the body and that the organs of the rational capacities are located in the brain and consist of thin and very clear spirits exhaled from the pericardial blood.⁷⁷ In his view, when we start to feel vexed, the pericardial blood becomes hot, and the heart starts to swell and palpitate. There is, however, no actual anger or vexation until these hot spirits move from the heart and penetrate into the brain. Therefore, no matter how hot the heart is, we remain calm and quiet until this heat reaches the brain.⁷⁸ Physiologically speaking, the movements of the emotional faculty consist of animal spirits in motion which converge on the middle ventricle of the brain, that is, the part of the body where the fantasy (*phantasia*) rules. Consequently, we can attribute bodily qualities to the emotions, calling them hot, cold, wet, dry or a mixture of these.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Clements (1967), p. 219. See also Travill (1987).

⁷⁶ S, p. 602; M, III, p. 477: 'In corpore vero horrendos edit effectus, et viro indignos. ... inde est etiam mutatio vultus, trepidatio oris, impedimentum sermonis, et alia visu teterrima, belluæ plane, non hominis.'

⁷⁷ S, p. 288; M, III, p. 365: 'Sed functionis rationalis organa sunt in cerebro, spiritus quidam tenuissimi et lucidissimi, quos illuc exhalat sanguis cordis; ij sunt organa intima cognitionum omnium.'

⁷⁸ S, p. 602; M, III, p. 477: 'Effervescit enim sanguis circa cor initio offensionis, corque ipsum turgescit, unde est frequens illa palpitatio in pectore: sed nondum est ira tamen, nec offensio quousque ardentes illi a corde spiritus cerebrum invaserunt; quantumcunque enim pectus incalescat, sedatus erit homo, et quietus, si calor ad cerebrum non penetret.'

⁷⁹ S, p. 458; M, III, p. 423: 'quo fit, ut manifesto ad partem corporis vergant, in quo tantopere dominatur phantasia. Quamobrem affectus omnes in præsentia in easdem illas qualitates tribuimus, ex quibus corporis natura constat: ut alij sint calidi, alij frigidi, alij humidi, alij aridi, alij ex horum aliquibus commisti, nam humani corporis contemperatio, ex his ipsis qualitibus efficitur; et cuius quisque affectus est naturæ ac ingenij, in simili corporis natura facile tum nascitur, tum augetur: in contraria non perinde.'

Plutarch's metaphorical description of anger in terms of fire might therefore have had a profound meaning for Vives, who in this circumstance also criticizes the traditional approach based on the distinction between concupiscible and irascible emotions, pointing out that the kindling in the heart when the soul is excited because of what it takes to be something difficult, happens without anger or vexation, since there is no kind of evil present. Consequently, to attribute the performance of great deeds to the irascible part of the soul corresponds to treating every kindling of the blood as anger, which is an abuse of the term.⁸⁰

The physiological character of emotions gives rise to an interaction between temperament and emotions, since, while the bodily temperament promotes the generation and growth of emotions with similar qualities, emotions influence the quality of the temperament. Whatever affects the temperament of our body also affects our emotional dispositions. Vexation is hot and dry and thrives in similar bodily constitutions.⁸¹ Those whose brain humours are very hot blaze up extremely fast.⁸² Cold temperaments are slower to anger, but also more unyielding when angry.⁸³ In Vives's opinion, we can also observe how some people give up the desire for revenge after a short while. With a formulation which once again reminds us of Plutarch's account, he maintains that their anger is 'quenched instantly, like burning flax'. This depends on a disposition of their lungs and the thinness of the blood around their heart, and it happens because the heat which proceeds from the lungs is extinguished when the anterior cone touches them.⁸⁴

A salient feature of this physiological approach is the belief that by affecting our temperament through diet or life-style, we also influence our emotional dispositions and reactions. The temperament of the body can be affected by internal as well as external circumstances. Diet, age, health and

⁸⁰ S, p. 600; M, III, p. 476: 'quemadmodum etiam est genus quoddam inflammationis in pectore, quum concitat se animus, magnosque ardores ad grande aliquid arduumque efficiendum concipit: quod sine ira atque offensione contingit; nulla enim mali est species obiecta. Irasci tamen vocant omnes, etiam Aristoteles ipse, et grandia opera ad partem irascibilem referunt, abutentes nomine, quod omnem incensionem sanguinis sub ira comprehendunt; est hoc autem inflammatae cupiditatis.'

⁸¹ S, p. 592; M, III, p. 473: 'nam affectus hic ad calidos et siccos refertur: idcirco in similibus constitutionibus corporum, et qualitatibus locorum ac temporum facile invalescit.'

⁸² S, p. 602; M, III, p. 477: 'Celerrime igitur exardescunt quibus humores in cerebro sunt praefervidi.'

⁸³ S, p. 612; M, III, p. 481: 'Lentiores sunt ad iram frigidae temperaturae, sed in ea pertinaciores.'

⁸⁴ Ibid.: 'Fervor ille a pulmonibus extinguntur quum illos conus attingit cordis. Quosdam videmus brevissimo tempore facere finem ultionis cupiendae, propter pulmones paratos, et raritatem sanguinis circa cor, qui statim restinguitur, ut stupa incensa.'

the emotions themselves belong to the internal circumstances.⁸⁵ The external circumstances which can affect the temperament of the body are time and place. These can be natural—such as the seasons of the year, the hour of the day and our natural environment—or subjective—such as the time and place in which our private and public affairs take place.⁸⁶ A wholesome diet for people prone to anger is based on cold food and drink, with added fat for those who are bilious.⁸⁷ People who drink water are impetuous and irascible since their spirits are thinner and can be quickly seized by burning anger. Those who drink beer or wine have thicker spirits, which flare up less easily.⁸⁸ Anger ceases to rage easily during holidays and celebrations, with games, banquets, merriment, prosperity and success.⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

Although its importance has not yet been generally acknowledged, Vives's analysis of the emotions was very influential during the late Renaissance. The third book of *De anima et vita* does not provide a systematic theory, but it is nonetheless rich in original insights. Vives's originality lay above all in the importance he attached to observation and experience. In order to emphasize the complexities of our emotional life, he avoided the systematic rigidity of scholastic philosophy, preferring a looser descriptive approach, which, in Wilhelm Dilthey's opinion, 'marks the transition from metaphysical to descriptive and analytic psychology'.⁹⁰ Another feature which characterizes the originality of his approach is the interest in the physiological dimensions of psychological and emotional processes. But,

⁸⁵ S, p. 458; M, III, p. 423: 'Hæ autem corporis temperationes alias incitantur atque exacuuntur, alias comprimuntur et coërcentur internis atque externis rebus; internæ sunt, affectus ipsi; nam tristitia facit frigidos et aridos, lætitia calidos et humidos. Affectus enim rationem corporis non recipiunt modo, sed præstant; corporis autem sunt cibus et potus, ætates, morbi.'

⁸⁶ S, p. 460; M, III, p. 423: 'Hæc sunt externa: tempus naturale, ut quattuor anni partes, et diei horæ: tum nostrum, quo continetur status rerum, seu publice, seu privatim; locus item naturalis, noster.'

⁸⁷ S, p. 612; M, III, p. 481: 'Itaque iuvat ratione victus uti moderata: ut cibi ac potiones sint frigidæ, et in biliosis crassæ.'

⁸⁸ S, p. 606; M, III, p. 479: 'Aquæ potores vehementes et iracundi sunt, quia tenues habent spiritus, qui cito corripiunt ab incendio iræ. Qui vinum potant, vel cervisiam, crassiores habent, et ad incendendum minus faciles.' In Seneca's view, it is wine which inflames anger, since it increases heat: see Seneca, *De ira*, II.19.5.

⁸⁹ S, p. 612; M, III, p. 481: 'Ira defervescit facile festis diebus, celebritatibus, ludis, convivijs, hilaritate, rebus prosperis, et successu.'

⁹⁰ See Dilthey (1914), p. 423: 'So bezeichnet Vives den Übergang aus der metaphysischen Psychologie zu der beschreibenden und zergliedernden.' On Vives's descriptive approach see also Sancipriano (1981).