


# أحمد عرابي المصري



تصوير عن الأحداث التي وقعت بمصر  
من يناير سنة ١٨٨١ إلى أكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢



# أحمد عرابي المصري

هذا تقريرى عن الحوادث التى حصلت  
فى مصر من تاريخ يناير سنة ١٨٨١ لغاية شهر  
أكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ مقدم من طرفى الى  
وكيلى الشرعى المستر برودلى  
اليدافع به عنى امام  
المحكمة المصرية

قسم النشر بالجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

## تنويه

تم جمع وطبع هذا الكتاب نقلا عن التقرير الذي أعده الزعم

احمد عراى دون إدخال أى تعديل من الناشر

حقوق الطبع والنشر محفوظة للناشر

الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة - قسم النشر

طبعة ١٩٨٢

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## القسم الأول - الباب الأول

### فيما يتعلق بالحوادث التي حصلت قبل الحرب

ان الجيش المصري كان مركبا من اثني عشر اليا<sup>(١)</sup> بيادة في سنة ١٨٨٠. وارىد تقليله الى ستة الايات فقط في سنة ١٨٨١ ميلادية في مدة نظارة<sup>(٢)</sup> عثمان باشا رقي وكانت العادة بمصر الميل الى التعصب الجنسي فكانت جميع الترقيات والنياشين والمكافآت للجنس الجركسي لكونهم من ممالك العائلة الخديوية وممالك الذوات الذين هم ممالك العائلة الخديوية ايضا وبعد هذه الطائفة الاتراك وغيرها الذين هم ليسوا بمصريين والمولدين<sup>(٣)</sup> وبعد ذلك جنس المصريين لا يصير تقدمهم ولا استخدامهم الا للضرورة لعدم وجود غيرهم ولذلك لحد هذا التاريخ ما كان يوجد بالعسكرية مرتبة باشا اي (جنرال) من ابناء البلاد المصرية مع لياقتهم واستعدادهم الذي لا ينكر فشرح ناظر الجهادية في ترتيب، اللازم من الجركس ثم الاتراك وغيرهم من المولدين وما زاد عن ذلك حين اللزوم يكون من المصريين فائر ذلك في قلوب الضباط المصريين فاجتمعوا في متري وكنت في وليمة عند احد الحجاج فأرسلوا الى فوجدهم في غضب شديد فهوت عليهم الامر بان يتقدم عرضحال الى رئيس النظار رياض باشا بطلب المساواة بين المستخدمين وترك التعصب الجنسي وسن قوانين عادلة تكفل لكل انسان حقه وتوجيه مسند نظارة الجهادية الى رجل وطني حسب قوانين الدول العادلة وان يكون العرض محتوم عليه من اثنين او ثلاثة فقط تنوينهم عنكم فاستقر رأيهم على ذلك وانا بوا عنهم الميرالايات الثلاث المصريين وهم انا احمد عرابي وعلى فهى الميرالاي وعبد الغال حلمى الميرالاي وينا<sup>(٤)</sup> على ذلك تقدم العرض بما ذكر الى رئيس النظار وما ذلك الا للحصول الالفة والمحبة وصفاء القلوب بين جميع المستخدمين بل بين جميع ساكنى مصر وازالة ما في قلوبهم من العداوة المتولدة عن عدم المساواة والميل الى التعصب المصر بمصالح العموم فابنتى على ذلك عقد مجلس من النظار والاختيارية<sup>(٥)</sup> من الشركس تحت رياسة الحضرة الخديوى وانتهى بصدور امر خديوى بالتحقيق على حسب العادة المصرية ولكن

(١) الاى : فرقة عسكرية مختلفة العدد

(٢) نظارة : وزارة

(٣) المولدين : الذين ولدوا في مصر من نسل اجنبى

(٤) بناء .

(٥) حاشية الخديو

مقتضى الامر يشعر كل مطلع عليه بان يصير مجازاتنا بالاعدام بطريقة مصرية اى غير ظاهرة اذ ان عباراته لم يسبق لها نظير في حق من يتظلم من مظلمه الى رؤساء الحكومة وكان ذلك في ٣٠ يناير سنة ١٨٨١ ميلادية وفي يوم ٣١ منه تحرر لنا افادات من ناظر الجهادية بتوجهنا الى الديوان بقصر النيل في صباح يوم غرة<sup>(٦)</sup> فبراير لاجل زفاف شقيقة الحضرة الخديوية وفي الميعاد المحدد توجهنا الى الديوان فوجدناهم اجتمعوا فيه جميع الباشاوات وامراء الالابات المستخدمين والمتقاعدين وفي الحال تلى علينا امر الخديوى بهذا الجمع وصار اعلامنا باننا مرفوتين من محل خدماتنا وبتعيين بدلنا في المجلس امراء للألايات التي كنا بها وجردونا من سيوفنا واخذونا الى السجن وفي حال مرورنا كان فيه ضباط من اصاغر الشركس شاهرين الطبنجات علينا حتى دخلنا اودة السجن ومن بعد قفل الباب سمعنا خسرو باشا يضحك ويقول بلسان التركى (زنبلى هرفلر) كلمة استهزاء معناها (فلاحين شغاله بالمقاطف) ثم صدر بامر ناظر الجهادية قبل ذلك الى قايقام بك اورطة مستحفظية مصر ابراهيم بك فوزى بتقوية عساكر القره قولات ومنع العساكر التي تريد الدخول الى مصر وباستحضار باقى عساكر الاورطة تحت الطلب وبانه يلقى القبض على جميع القايقامات والبكباشية والصابغات الذين من ابناء العرب المستخدمين والمستودعين منهم ويرسلوا كل من قبض عليه الى الحبس بالقلعة وعند انتهاء القبض عليهم يرقيه الى رتبة ميرالاي ثم انه ارسل امر الى مصلحة وابورات الميرى<sup>(٧)</sup> باستحضار وابور وحضوره الى قصر النيل وما ذاك الا لحملنا فيه وقيل انه كان به ثلاثة صناديق من صاج بها ثقوب بقصد وضعنا فيها ورمينا في البحر حسب عادة الحكومة في مدة الخديو السابق ولما تم الامر على ذلك قامت عساكر اجي بياده الى قصر النيل واخرجتنا من السجن وفي الوقت نفسه وقفت على المحل المرتفع الذى امام الديوان وصحت على العساكر بصوت على ان يلازموا الادب وان لا يمد احد منهم يده بسوء الى احد الجركس او غيرهم فانهم اخواننا وان لا يقع منهم ما يحل بواجبات الانسانية ولولا وقوف هذا لجبرهم الغضب على التهور ثم صرفت العساكر الى محلهم وتوجهت معهم الى قشلاق<sup>(٨)</sup> عابدين وتحرر منى بمعنى ما سبق ايضاحه الى حضرات قناصل جنرالية دولتى انكلترا وفرنسا وباقى وكلا دول اوربا نستغيث بهم ونطلب منهم النظر في امرنا بوجه الحق والعدل وان جميع

(٦) اول فبراير

(٧) هكذا وردت في المخطوطة الاصلية

(٨) ثكنة الجنود



الاورباويين في ذمتنا وارسلت تلك المكاتبة الى وكيل فرانساً حضرة البارون دورنج<sup>(٩)</sup> وترجيئنا فيها ابلاغ ما فيها الى باقى وكلاء الدول كما وان ورقة العزيمة التى حضرت لى بختم ناظر الجهاديه لزفاف شقيقة الخديو بطريق التحيل تسلمت ايضا الى قنسلاتوا فرانساً وفى اثناء ذلك اجتمعت اللوات بطرف الخديو بعابدين واجمعوا امرهم على حضور جميع الااليات والطوبجية ويكلفوا عساكر برنجى الاى بان يلقوا السلاح ويسلمون لهم فان ابوا تضرب عليهم المدافع وفى ذلك ما لا يخفى من حصول فتنة عظيمة داخلية لولا ان الاى السودان حضر من طرا حين بلغه ما حصل لنا من الاهانة والسجن ذلك الذى اوقف عزمهم عن التثبيت فى استعمال القوة وقد ادركنا حضرة وكيل انكلترا السياسى المستر ادوارد مالت<sup>(١٠)</sup> ووكيل فرانساً السياسى حضرة البارون دورنج وتوسطا فى اصلاح الامر وصدر من الخديو عفو عام وعطيت لنا اوامر خديوية بابقاء كل واحد فى وظيفته وفى آلاية كما كان وصدرت اوامر للالايات بابطال طريقة التعصب الجنسى وان الجميع يكونون اخوة على حسب طلبنا وترتب محمود باشا سامى ناظرا الجهادية بدل عثمان باشا رفقى اتباعا فى ذلك للقوانين العادلة وفى يوم اثنين من فبراير طلب جناب الخديو ظابطان<sup>(١١)</sup> برنجى يياده وتحالف معهم على حفظه وانه قد عفى عنهم حقيقة ولما تحقق لى ذلك توجهت اليه واستأذنت فأذن لى فتمثلت بين يدي جنابه الرفيع والتمست منه ان يدخلنى ضمن هذا اليمين فقبل منى ذلك فحلفت حلفت صادق انى احافظ عليه كما احافظ على نفسى وانصرفت داعيا بتشيد ملكه على قواعد العدل والمساواة وفى يوم الجمعة الموافق ٤ فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ امرنى أنا واخى على بك فهى برنجى ميرالاي بان اتوجه الى كل من قنسل<sup>(١٢)</sup> جنرال انكلترى<sup>(١٣)</sup> وفرانساً ونبلاغها باننا متكفلين وضامين الراحة العمومية والمحافظة على الاورباويين وعلى اموالهم فتوجهت مع اخى المذكور لزيارة حضرات القناصل الجنرالية وبلغناهما ما امرنا به مع ان هذا البلاغ هو حقيقة افكارنا وعليه نبى جميع اعمالنا .

ولحد هنا انتهت مسئلة غرة فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ .

Baron de Ring (٩)

Edward Malet (١٠)

(١١) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

## الباب الثاني من القسم الأول في الحوادث التي اعقبت ذلك

... كنا نظن ان ذلك العفو هو حقيقى وان تلك الاوامر التي مقتضاها الالفة والحبة والتقاعد عن التعصب الجنسى صادرة عن اخلوص نية واذا يبذر الشقاق والعدواة يبذر في ارض القلوب الخالية من الشرف. ذلك بان يوسف كمال باشا الشركسى وكيل دائرة الخديو امكنه بواسطة واحد بانجاويش حركسى من الالى السودان بان يستحضر بانجاوشية السودان المتزوجين من دائرة الخديو ويصرف لهم نقودا واغراهم بان يحمولوا المساكن على مخالفة الضباط وعدم سماع اوامرهم ووعدهم بانهم سيتقون ضباطا وهذه التنبهات عن اوامر الخديو ولما تحقق ذلك بالجرنال صار رفت باشا المذكور من الدائرة ظاهرا ولكنه جارى اشغالها خفية ولما لم تنتج هذه المكيدة قام بعده بيث الفتن والدسايس ابراهيم اغا الخاص بمجدة الخديو ذلك بانه امر فرج بك الزينى السودانى من مستودعية الجهادية بان يغرى بانجاوشية السودان على قتل ضباطهم كاقترار المذكورين واعترافهم بذلك عند التحقيق ووجد معه ورقة مخنومة بحتم ابراهيم اغا المذكور ومذكورا بانها اتمها بناء عن امر الخديو وتلك الورقة اطلع عليها محمود باشا سامى وقتها وحكم مجلس العسكرية على فرج بك المذكور بعزله وتزيله الى رتبة بكباشه وارساله الى مصوع فصدر امر الخديو بارسالة بشرفه وربته الى مصوع مستودعا ذلك بانه لم يفعل شئ من نفسه بل مامورا بما حصل منه ثم بعد ذلك صدر من الخديو امر بازسك فرج بك المذكور من مصوع الى الخرطوم واستخدامه بها لكونها بلدته وله فيها املاك وذلك من غير اطلاع النظار على هذا الايزم انه صار ارسال زوجته اليك المذكور الى الخرطوم على طريق سواكن<sup>(١)</sup> بمصاريف على طرف الدائرة الخديوية بغير ترخيص من الحكومة كما الجارى في مثل ذلك ولما لم ينجح الفساد بواسطة البانجاوشية وفرج بك السودانى توجهت الأفكار الى التمكن من الفساد بواسطة اليوزباشه سليم صائب واليوزباشه على البيب كلاهما من الالى السودان المذكور الذى تحت امره عبد العال بك حليمى وقتها لكون سليم صائب المذكور متزوج من دائرة الخديو وصرفت لها النقود الكافية بواسطة ابراهيم اغا المذكور وهما صارا يجهدان في وقوع الفشل والمفاسد في الالى المذكور والى ان تكامل عدد من اتبعهم تسعة عشر ظابطا<sup>(٢)</sup> وتحققت دساتهم ومفاسدهم بمجلس عسكرى خصوصى مختلط من اورباوين وغيرهم تحت رياسة وكيل الجهادية حسن باشا افلاطون ولما تبين ان مصدر ذلك جميعه من الحضرة الخديوية توقعت عليهم احكام خفيفة جدا بالسجن من ١٥ ايام الى شهرين من غير نقص شئ من مراتبهم وارسال البعض منهم ليستخدم في

(١) سواكين

(٢) هكذا في المخطوط

السودان برتبته وشرفه وبذلك التقصان بالحقا كل هذا التخفيف مراعاة لحاظ الخديوي ومع ذلك لم تنفذ تلك الامتكام قولا بان الخديو عنى عنهم ذلك بانهم مامورين من طرفه (بواسطة ابراهيم الخادمة الخاضعة له) كل ذلك واضح بجوانب التحقيق ومثل تلك المفاصل جرى منها في اجنى الاى وفي ٤ سجن الاى الذى كان بعهدتنا ولكن كنا نرذلها اول باولى لعدم كثرة الاشاعات اخرضا على مقام الحضرة الخديوية لكوفى كنت اول مناضل عنه المصل اصلاحه وازالة ما فى نفسه ولما طاك الامر ولم يتمكنوا من البطش بنا لواسطة عدم موافقة ناظر الجهادية محمود سالمى باشا لتلك الأفكار امر الخديوي محمود شاذلى باشا بان يقدم استعفاة حسب العادة المصرية فاستعفى وتعين بدلده داود باشا يكن ظهر الحضرة الخديوية رجل تربي في بيت ابيه لا يعرف الحكومة ولا الادارة ولا الجهادية فاصدر امره بعدم توجه اخذ الضباط الى منزله وعدم الختاج الضباط مع بعضها وكل من وجد مع آخر في الطريق يجرى ضبطه بمعرفة الضبطية وعساكر المستحفظين امر لا يوافق الشرع ولا القانون حتى اداه الاستعجال في حث الانتقام الى ان صار يتوجه ليلا في امراك الالايك ليتم على ضباطها وضار وضع زجناك على بيتي وبيت عبد العال بك حلمي ليلا بقصد القبض علينا غدرا والفتك بنا ظلمنا ولكن عبد العال بك كان في الاية وانا كنت توجهت ليلا الى العباسية في مركز الالاي فخشية ان يتبعني احد من الفتاكين دخلت في بيت احد اصحابي لزيارته بعد منضي ساعتين من الليل حضرة خليل بك لثان بشارع الفجالة ولاجل ان لا يدركني احد بالطريق فبعد مضي عشرة دقائق مر بالطريق اثنين خيالة بحركة الهجوم وما زالوا كذلك حتى وصلنا محل الالاي بالعباسية فوقفها عساكر الداورية وسألوهم عن امرهم فاجابوهم انها متوجهين الى سراى القبة وانهم ضلوا عن الطريق فاستدوخوا عساكر الداورية الى الطريق الموصلة الى القبة بلدة بجوار العباسية ولاشك ان قصدوا ادراكى واخذنى غدرا وكان ذلك ليلة ٦ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨١ (وكان معنى احد الضباط اسمه عبد الكريم افندي حتى اني ركبت في عربته لاجل ان لا يعرفني احد وبلا سباب التي توضححت سلبت الامنية وصار كل انسان خائف على نفسه يترقب ما يراى يصنع به ولما احسبت نهاء الاهالى الذين هم ابايتنا واخواننا ورؤساء عشائرهم حضروا الى مصر ورواوا انه لا حاسم لسلب الامنية الا افتتاح مجلس نواب الامة المصرية يضمن لها ارواحها واموالها واعراضها وسن قوانين عادلة يعتمد عليها في حفظ الحقوق تضاهي قوانين المجالس المختلطة وحدود تامة المحاكم والمحكوم لثقت كل عند حده ولا يتعداه مع تغيير هذه النظارة التي في مدتها سلبت الامنية وكثر الخوف وكتب بذلك عريض منهم سلمت بايديهم عند سقوط النظارة الى دولتو شريف باشا عند جعله رئيسا للنظار على يد ابي سلطان باشا بالنيابة عن نهاء الامة المصرية ورؤسائها ولكون العسكرية والاهالى بعضهم من بعض ومعاملتهم في الخير والشر واحدة فوصى هذا هذا<sup>(٣)</sup> الطلب للعسكرية ولكون ان جميع الآليات استنابت ضباطنا

وضباطها<sup>(٤)</sup> لوثوقهم بى واعتمادهم على امانتى فوضوا الى تلك الطلبات وعند شدة التهورات الواقعة من ناظر الجهادية داود باشا وزيادة الخوف كتب من طرفى الى ناظر الجهادية فى ٩ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨١ بان جميع العساكر ستحضر الى ميدان عابدين لعرض طلباتها وطلبات اهاليها على الحضرة الخديوية الساعة ٩ عرقى من يوم الجمعة وفى المعاد المذكور أتت العساكر من محلاتها الى ميدان عابدين بغاية الأدب والاحتشام وقبل ذلك تحمر من طرفى الى كافة قناصل الدول الاورباوية بما سيصدر<sup>(٥)</sup> اجراه مع الهدو والسكون فى الوقت المعين وانه لا خوف على رعاياهم ولا على اموالهم وانه سيطلب فقط من الخديوى ما يجعل البلاد حرة حافظة لحقوقها ثم اعرضنا تلك الطلبات على الحضرة الخديوية بواسطة مستر كوكسن<sup>(٦)</sup> قنصل دولة انكلترا باسكندرية حيث كان موجودا وقتها فقبل الخديوى تلك الطلبات جميعها التى هى مقررّة باول ديكوتو<sup>(٧)</sup> صدر من جنابه الكريم فى اول ولايته وان تلك الطلبات هى من اقصى اماله لكونها شرعية جميعها وصدر امره الكريم بتوجيه النظارة ورياستها الى دولتو شريف باشا وانصرفت العساكر داعين له بطول العمر والجميع متشكرين له على احياء البلاد وتمهيرها من ضيق ريقة<sup>(٨)</sup> الاستعباد المصرى ولما حصل من شريف باشا التأخير عن قبول الرياسة تقدم له من عمد الاهالى الذين كانوا موجودين خلف اظهنا فى ميدان عابدين عرايض يلحوا عليه فيها بقبول الرياسة عليها نحو الاربعة الف ختم فرحا بخلصهم من ذاك النظارة التى من جملة ما اصابهم فى مدتها من الضرر حرمانهم من فوائد سبعة عشر مليون ليرا قيمة المقابلة التى كانت تحصلت منهم فى مدة الخديوى السابق لأجل سداد الديون الأجنبية التى كانت على الحكومة بل حرمانهم من اصل المبلغ المذكور برمته مع أنه كان الواجب اعتبار هذا المبلغ دين على الحكومة اسوة باقى ديون الاورباوين ومن جملة اعمالها رفت الوطنيين من الخدمات الميرية مع استعدادهم وقلة مرتباتهم واستخدام كثير من الاورباوين بمرتبات زائدة مع ان اعمالهم لا يمكن اجراها الا بواسطة الاصاغر من الوطنيين ولذلك صارت جميع الوظائف المهمة بيد الاورباوين من غير نظر لاعمالهم خلافا للقاعدة العادلة المرغوبة فى كل حكومة عادلة ثم تشكلت النظارة وترتب محمود باشا سامى ناظرا للجهادية وبناء على تلك الحوادث حضر وفد من طرف الحضرة السلطانية تحت رياسة دولتو على باشا نظامى فقبل وصوله بيومين جرى لارسال آلاينا الى التل الكبير وارسال آلاى

(٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٥) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٦) Cookson

(٧) مرسوم

(٨) حبل فيه عروة

عبد العال بك الى دمياط لاجل عدم تمكن الوفد من مقابلتنا ووقوفه على حقيقة ما كان جاريا ولما اراد الباشا المشار اليه اجراء التحقيق فلم يرغب الخديو ذلك اعتمادا على ان تلك الطلبات كانت من افكاره وانه عفى عن كل ما حصل وان الجند في غاية الطاعة والانقياد وانصرف الوفد على ذلك ثم جرى تشكيل مجلس النواب وافتتاحه بعد تنظيم قانونه وسنت قوانين عادلة للعسكرية واختلاف وقع بين مجلس النواب ومجلس النظار بعد مضي عدة شهور استعفى شريف باشا رئيس النظار وانحلت نظارته واذ ذاك فوضت الحضرة الخديوية انتخاب النظار الى مجلس النواب فبمعرفة مجلس النواب وتصديق الخديو صار ترتيب محمود سامى باشا ريساً<sup>(٩)</sup> للنظار والداخلية ومصطفى باشا فهمى ناظرا للخارجية والحقانية وعلى باشا صادق ناظرا للمالية ومحمود باشا فهمى ناظرا للاشغال وعبد الله باشا فكرى ناظرا للمعارف وحسن باشا الشريعى ناظرا للاوقاف وحيث كان في غضون ذلك كنت وكيل للجهادية جرى انتخابى وترتيبى ناظرا للجهادية الامر الذى ما كنت اتمناه ابدا ولكن لاجتماع واتحاد جميع افكار العسكرية واعضاء مجلس النواب على ترتيبى بهذه<sup>(١٠)</sup> النظارة اذ بوجودى فيها لا يتصور حصول ادنى خطر على احد من العسكرية أو من الاهالى وتطمئن القلوب والخواطر قبلت تلك الوظيفة المهمة مع معرفتى بما انا محفوف به من المصاعب في توقيف وتنظيم تيار افكار العموم المنبعث بقوة سريعة من عيون قلوب مختلفة متعددة كل يرى سرعة الوصول الى الغاية الوحيدة التى هى حرية البلاد وحياتها ولا يبالي بما يطرأ من المصاعب التى ربما تمنع الوصول الى تلك الغاية المقصودة كل هذا وانا اجهد نفسى في سبيل التقدم مع الراحة والتؤدة حرصا على طلب النجاح مع حفظ الارواح والاعراض والاموال حتى بذلك نكون ادينا واجباتنا الوطنية ولم يلحق تاريخنا المصرى ما يسود وجهه امام العالم المتمدن وبعد ترتيب هذه النظارة استقامت الاحوال وترتيب الامور وخلص كثيرا من القضايا المهمة المتراكمة في مجلس النظار وتنظمت احوال الجهادية وصار ترقية للمستحقين للترقى بدل النقصان وبعد ذلك احسنت الحضرة الخديوية على برتبة باشا وسلمتى فرمانها السلطاني مع اظهار الرضى على كما وجهت قبل ذلك الى كل من اخوانى على فهمى وعبد العال حلمى وطلبه عصمت ويعقوب سامى وحسن مظهر رتبة باشا أى جنرال مع اظهار غاية المسرة والممنونية ونحن الجميع داعين له بداوم توفيقه لنجاح البلاد وكنا نظن اننا خلصنا من تلك العراقيل والمصاعب التى كنا نعانيها ووصلنا الى ارض النجاح الواسعة ولم يبق الا سن القوانين العادلة وتحسين حال الدواوين والمحاكم وانه لم يبق حقد في القلوب واذا بداعى الخيانة ينادى علينا اين المفر ذلك بان احد المالك الخديوية الذين بمدرة القبة

(٩) هكذا في المخطوطة

(١٠) هكذا في المخطوطة

اتفق مع غلام معه في المدرسة من أولاد الجراكسة في وصاية عبد العال باشا جلبي على مشتري مقدار من الزرنيخ لاجل تسميم عبد العال باشا وبالفعل اجروا ذلك بطريقة إن الغلام الذي تحت وصيته واسمه محمد خورشيد وضع السم في اللبن المعتاد الباشا المشار اليه على شره ليلاً<sup>(١١)</sup> وأولاً الخادمة ضبطت اللبن والغلام لكان هلك الباشا بعد مضي قليل من الساعات وأوراق تلك القضية موجودة بالضبطية منها يعلم أن ذلك الفعل بدسائس من سراي الخديو ولما لم تنجح تلك المكيذة تألف حزب كبير من الجراكسة وآمروا وتحالفوا على قتل وقتل جميع رؤساء الضباط أبناء العرب المصريين ولما دعى إحداهم المسي راشيد أفندي أنور للتخالف معهم على ذلك وكان من الذين يخافون الله ومتحلياً بحلية الإنسانية إني عن الإجابة وتوجه في الحال وأخبر طلبه باشا عصمت بحقيقة الأمر وهو كتب للجهادية بذلك وبإخبارية محمود باشا سامي رئيس النظارة ومصطفى باشا فهمي ناظر الخفائية وبإني النظارة بتلك المسئلة وعرضها على الخديو جرى تحقيق تلك المأمرة الجركسية في مجلس عسكري تحت رئاسة الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسني الجركسي لكونه رجل ذو شرف وذمة وأمانة ومن التحقيق اتضح عظم هذا الحزب وإن مصدره الحضرة الخديوية كما هو واضح بمرئال التحقيق وتوقعت عليهم الأحكام بإرسالهم إلى البلاد السودانية نفياً مؤبداً وعرض هذا الجنرال على الخديو وتلى عليه بحضور جميع النظارة ولما كانت بلاد السودان بها حرارة قوية شديدة لا توافق صحة الجراكسة المولودين في بلاد باردة وانها تكون سبباً في ضياع حياتهم طلبت من اخواني النظارة مساعدتي على انقاذهم من تلك الأحكام وإرسالهم إلى بلادهم أو إلى محل ما يرغبون خارج الحكومة المصرية برتبهم وشرههم حرصاً على حفظ الحياة حتى لمن قصد اتلاف حياتي فأجابوني لذلك مع التعجب وعرضنا عرضة محتومة منا جميعاً وأعرضنا لها للحضرة الخديوية وتوجهنا إليها جميعاً نرجوها قبول هذا الرجاء رحمة بهم فأجاب الخديو بأنه من ضمن المهومين<sup>(١٢)</sup> وأجد باشا ولا يمكن تنفيذ أحكام عليه إلا بأمر الحضرة السلطانية لذلك لا بد من عرض المسئلة على الباب العالي ثم صدر أمره إلى الدبجالية بالتنفيذ بخلافه للجاري إذ إن الأصول المتبعة هو إن الترقيات والمجازاة التي تكون من الجهادية تعرض بلا واسطة للمعية ومن المعية تصدر للجهادية بالتنفيذ بلا واسطة أيضاً ولكن إن الداخلية لم تتوسط في عرض هذا الجنرال ولم يكن لها حق في الأمر على الجهادية بتنفيذ تلك الأحكام توجد ناظر الداخلية ورئيس النظارة محمود باشا سامي بعد أخذ رأي اخوانه النظارة إلى جناب الخديو وعرضوا عليه إن يصدر أمر الخديو بالتنفيذ على ذات أوراق القضية ومرسل للجهادية لا جرى مفعولها وحفظها على يدون واسطة اتباعاً لأصول الجهادية في مثل ذلك فصدر أمره العالي على نفس الأوراق

(١١) الجملة هكذا في المخطوطة الأصلية

(١٢) المهين

وارسلت للجهادية كما ذكر وجرى مفعولها وصار ارسال المحكوم عليهم الى بلاد الشام ومنها توجهوا الى  
الاستانة وبعد افتتاح الحرب ارسل لهم الخديو واحضرهم الى الاسكندرية وما ذلك الا لعلهم يانه هو  
السبب فيا حصل لهم وانهم لم يقدموا على تلك المؤامرة الا بارادته ثم انه بعد انصراف رئيس النظار من  
حضرته الخديوية في مساء ذاك اليوم كنا في وليمة بطرف عمر بك رحى ومعنا ريس النظار محمود سامى  
باشا فجاؤه خبر ان حضرة قفصلى دولة انكلترا وفرنسا الجتراليه حضروا بمقره وانهم يريدوا مقابلته فقام  
في الحال وتوجه اليهم وبرفته ناظر الخارجية مصطفى باشا فهمى فأخبراه ان حياة الخديو والاورباويين  
مهدة فاجابها ان حياتهم جميعا مكفولة بحياته وسألها عن اسباب ذلك فاجابها ان الخديو اعلمها  
بذلك وان محمود باشا هدد الخديو بقوله له ان حياتك وحياة الاورباويين على خطر فانكر حصول ذلك  
واخبرها بما عرضته على جنابه العالى بخصوص عدم توسط الداخلية في جنرال تحقيق قضية الشراكسة  
ليس الا وصادقه على ذلك ناظر الخارجية فالحق والحق اقول ان هذه العبارة الخنزرة التي لاحقيقة لها  
هى اصل البلاء الذى صب على مصر صبا وهى السبب لجلب المراكب الحربية من دول اوربا الى نهر  
اسكندرية وبورسعيد وهى السبب في حادثة ١١ جون بسكندرية<sup>(١٣)</sup> المفتتة للاكباد على حين كان  
المصريين<sup>(١٤)</sup> مع الاورباويين في اثناء عيشة واحسن تودد اذ لولا وجود المراكب الحربية بسكندرية لما  
حصل ذلك التهور وما حصلت تلك المصيبة الشنعاء وهى السبب ايضا في ايقاد نار الحرب من امة  
عظيمة مشهورة بالعدل ورحمة للانسانية ومحررة للرقاب من الاستعباد على بلاد مصر سينتج البخت التي  
طلما دافعت عنها اطاع الطامعين وطلما كانت مصر تعتمد اعتمادا جازما ان لا يأخذ بيدها وينشلها من  
بئر الاستبداد والاستعباد المملوءة بالافاعي ويوصلها الى مجوحة الحرية الاحكومة الانكليز  
ولكن قضت افكار الحاكم الغير محب لبلادته بذلك ومن ذاك الحين حصل نفور الخديو من هيئة  
النظار وخصوصا من رئيس النظار وطلما صرح يانه لا يريد ولا يريد ان يرى محمود باشا سامى  
وفي تلك الايام غدر باحدى السيدات المعترات غدرا شنيعا المساة عيشة هانم من عائلة مزحوم  
احمد باشا الطويحي كانت من الذين يتترك بهم في سراى الخديو ذلك يانه الخديو ارسلها لعربة  
ليللا مع احد الطواشية واخذها من بيتها ليوصلها الى السراى فوصلها الى الضيطة ومعرفة  
مصطفى بك صبحى وكيل الضيطة ارسلت الى السكة الحديد وكان في انتظارها وابور مخصوص  
توجه بها الى السويس ولما علمت المسكينة ابنتها بذلك ارسلت لها ملبوساتها مع مخادمتها الى  
السويس ومن هناك نزلت الحادمة المسكينة مع سيدتها المظلومة بابور في البحر الاحمر بقصد

(١٣) هكذا في المخطوطة

(١٤) هكذا في المخطوطة

نفيها الى الحجاز ثم اشاعوا ان الست هربت في جدة مع انها كبيرة في العمر ضعيفة وعليها غفر مخصوص ثم لم يعلم لها ولا لخادمتها الى الآن مستقر سوى البحر الاحمر وذلك من غير جناية ولا تحقيق فأين نصراء الانسانية وكان جزاء ابنتها المسكينة على ارسال ملبوسات والدتها رفت (١٥) زوجها فلما علم زوجها اسباب رفته طلق زوجته المذكورة فكوفيء باعادته للخدمة حالا تلك السياسة المحبوبة عند بنى البشر يا نصراء الحق وبعد حادثة هذه السيدة المسكينة باربعة ايام اشيع في سراى عابدين بان العسكر الغفراء سرقوا جواهر شوبكات (١٦) السراى مع انهم غفراء على السراى وما فيها فتوجه حكمدار برنجى الاى بياذة (١٧) الذى بعابدين احمد بك فرج وتفوس في خدمة السراى فاشتبته في المأمور بحفظ الجواهر محمد حسن المخصص لحفظ ملبوساة الخديو المتربى في بيته صغيرا الى ان تزوج من سراى الخديو فأمر بارساله الى الضبطية وسئل (١٨) فيها فاعترف بالجواهر انها كانت معه وانه القاها في مراحيض الضبطية ودل عليها فصار استخراجها تماما وتسلمت ليد الخديو حفظا لشرف العسكرية وبسؤال المذكور في الضبطية اجاب انه ليس بسارق وانما ابراهيم اغا (١٩) توتنجى الخديو امره باخذ الجواهر وحفظها حين عودته من ابعادته ولا علم له باسباب ذلك وكان تحرر من الجهادية للضبطية بلزوم التحقيق اظهارا لحفظ شرف العسكرية ومنعا لحصول مثل ذلك ولاجل الوقوف على الحقيقة يلزم استحضار ابراهيم اغا المذكور وسؤاله عما نسب اليه فلما علم الخديو بذلك امر بارسال ذلك المسكين ليلا بوابور مخصوص الى السويس ومنها ارسل صباحا مع عيشة هاتم المسكينة في ابور واحد ولا يعلم مستقره الى الآن الا البحر الاحمر او الموت الاحمر من غير تحقيق ولا حكم شرعى واما ابراهيم اغا فعطيت له النقود اللازمة وارسل الى بلاد الشام والآن حضر يتهددنى في السجن اذ كنت باكى العين حزين القلب على اولئك المساكين وهذين الحادتين وما هو متجدد في كل وقت من الحوادث المفزعة صار كل مصرى لا يامن على نفسه ولا يهنئ في نومه في بيته يخشى ان يصيبه ما اصاب اولئك المظالم وذلك كله معلوم عند النظار وغيرهم واعضاء مجلس النواب ايضا كما انهم اى النظار اعرضوا للخديو عن منع ذلك ولا كان يفيد بشيء ان هذا هو الاستبعاد المطلق ولكن

(١٥) كذلك في المخطوطة

(١٦) هكذا في المخطوطة .

(١٧) هكذا في المخطوط

(١٨) هكذا في المخطوطة

(١٩) هكذا في المخطوطة



اين المحررون لرقاب المصيرين ثم لا يزال ذلك النفور متمكن من نفس الخديو الى ان جاءت  
مراكب انكلترا وفرنسا الحربية وتقدم من حضرات قناصلها لأئمة بناء على رأى ارتآه ابو سلطان  
باشا غير جازم به كما صرح بذلك غير مرة ومقتضى تلك اللائحة هو سقوط نظارة محمود سامى  
باشا وتوجهى الى اوربا وتبعيد على فهمى باشا وعبد العال حلمى باشا الى داخل البلاد المصرية  
ولما كان مقتضى هذه اللائحة هو من الامور الداخلية التى لا دخل فيها للغير لم صار<sup>(٢٠)</sup> قبولها  
بمجلس النظار لا لاجل حفظ وظائفنا ولكن حرصا على حقوق البلاد التى فوضت لعهدتنا  
وامانتنا اما الخديوى فقد قبلها بادية بدء ولما كانت هذه المسئلة من العضلات واختلف فيها بين  
الخديو والنظار عمل جلسة بديوان النظارة وتقرر فيها طلب اعضاء مجلس النواب للنظر فيما  
اختلف فيه وتسوية المسئلة بوجه مرضى اذ يجوز قانون ذلك اذا طراء على البلاد امر غير اعتيادى  
فحضروا النواب وصار اطلاعهم على تلك اللائحة فجميعهم رفضوا قبولها وطارت الاخبار فى  
جميع البلاد فحصل فرع شديد واجمع الرأى العمومى على عدم قبولها وحضرت عمد البلاد  
واعيانها الى مصر معلنين برفض هذه اللائحة ورفض من يقبلها وكتبوا بذلك محررات مخطومة  
باختامهم واحضروها لطرفى لوثوقهم بى وكذلك لما لم يأذن الخديو بافتتاح مجلس النواب رسميا ختم  
على رفض تلك اللائحة كثير من اعضاء مجلس النواب وجاء كثير من العلماء والتجار والاعيان من  
كل جهة وقدموا محررات باختامهم وقتوى شرعية من افاضل العلماء بوجود خلع الخديو بمقتضى  
احكام الشرع الشريف الاسلامى وموجود بعض من تلك المحررات بطرفى وبعضها يوجد بطرف  
محمود باشا سامى رئيس النظار ولما صمم الخديو على قبول اللائحة وعدم افتتاح المجلس استعفت  
النظارة وقيل استعفاؤها وكان فى اثناء ذلك الحج على كثيرا قنصل جنرال فرنسا مسيو  
سكوتس<sup>(٢١)</sup> ومسيو مونج<sup>(٢٢)</sup> قنصل فرنسا بمصر بأن اتوجه الى باريس واتخلص من تلك  
الصعوبات ولكن لعلمى بان جميع الناس متعلقين بى ونفس اعضائى<sup>(٢٣)</sup> مجلس النواب  
معتقدين بانه لا بقاء لمجلس النواب الا بوجودى ولا بقاء لسلامة والراحة الا بوجودى وانه اذا  
خرجت من مصر خربت بيوتهم جميعا كما ان جميع الاهالى والعسكرية لا يمكنونى من الخروج  
وانه يخشى من حصول حركة مدهشة تصدر عن طيش بسبب ذلك يعلم صحة قولى هذا من رأى

(٢٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة

M. Sinkiewicz (٢١)

M. Monge (٢٢)

اعضاء (٢٣)

اهل اسكندرية ذكورا واناثا كبارا وصغارا يجتمعون بالثوارع<sup>١</sup> ومنافذ البيوت ليسلمون على<sup>٢</sup> وينظروني بنين المحبة وكذلك من رأى اجتماعهم بالسكة الحديدية من القطر الى اسكندرية هذا الذي منعتني من التوجه الى اوربا او الى الاسكندرية ثم في صباح ليلة استعفاء النظار حضر لمتزلي حضراتا قناصل جترالية دول المانيا والرومينا والنمسا وايطاليا وكلفوني بأن اعطيهم كلمتي بحفظ الاورباوين جميعهم واموالهم القاطنين في القطر المظري فاعتذرت لهم بأن استعفيت من الخدمة فلم يقبلوا عذري بل الجابوني بانهم يقولون وان جميع المصيرين مثنى عليهم كفايتي للاورباوين فانهم يجرمونهم غاية الاحترام فلوثقوني بان العسكرية لا يفعلون شيئا يحل بشرقهم العسكري وان الاهالي يكرمون نزلاتهم قاطعت لهم كلمتي بحفظ مجتليج الاورباوين القاطنين بالقطر المصري وحفظ اموالهم كما احافظ على نفسي وعلى اولادي ومالي لحين تشكيل هيئة حكومة قانصرقوا مطمئين وفي مساء هذا اليوم اجتمعوا اعضاء مجلس النواب بمتزلي ابي سلطان باشا رئيس النواب ودعوني للحضور اليهم فاجبتهم فكلفوني بان احافظ على الامن العمومي وكذاك معهم جملته من العلماء وقاضي متصرف قرتهم بان استعفيت وقبل استعفائي فكيف اكلف بهذا الامر وليس لي صفة في الحكومة فاجابني رئيس المجلس ابو سلطان باشا وسعادة سليمان باشا اباطة احد الاعضاء بانهم نواب الامة وانهم يكلفوني بذلك وانهم لا يقبلون استعفائي وانهم يتوجهون الى الخديو ويطلبون منه امرا بابقائي في نظارة الجهادية كما كنت وفي تلك الليلة حصلت مذاكرات ومحاورات في حالة البلاد وما كانت عليه في الازمة الماضية وما حل بها من النكبات وما ابيح فيها من الدماء كل ذلك نتيجة الاخكام الاستبدادية وفي الحاله التي وضلت بها البلاد وفي امر اللائحة التي قبلها الخديو فالكل اجمع على طيب خلع الخديو اذا لم يرفض قبول اللائحة المذكورة وانصرف المجلس على ذلك وفي صباح غدا حضر لمتزلي رئيس مجلس النواب وسليمان باشا اباطه وسلمتني سليمان باشا بيده امرا من الخديو بابقائي ناظرا على الجهادية وظنوا ان بهذا الامر يبطل مفعول اللائحة ولكن الظن لا يقتنى من الحق شيئا ثم اني قدمت تشكراي للخديو وقبلتني بغاية البشاشة وصرت اباشر جميع الاشغال في مدة انحلال النظارة التي هي عبارة عن عشرين يوم ولم يحصل فيها ما يكدر ضفاء الراحة وفي تلك المدة ملئت مضر يقبائل العربان حتى تحافت الاهالي والاورباوين من كثرتهم وكان السبب في ذلك ان الجناب الخديو استحضرهم وقررتهم اليه حتى كان يتخيل للزائرين ان سراي الاسماعيليه هي مجتمع العربان على غير عادة كل ذلك يقصد ان يكونون ضدًا للعسكرية بغير موجب وكان مدير البحيرة ابراهيم بك توفيق يهيج العربان ويهتجه للمدريات بتعليقات سرية لاجل ايقاع الضرر بمن حرروا محركات برفض تلك اللائحة ووثوق

حركة الاحتلال ولكن الغريبان خريصين جدا على شرفهم فلا يركنوا الى اقوال لا توافق الشريعة والشرفا وفي تلك المدة نخضر الوفد العثماني تحت رياسة دولتو درويش باشا وانزل في سراي الجزيرة فهزعت اليه وجوه الناس ونبايهم وعلماهم ليسلمون<sup>(٢٤)</sup> عليه ويشكون اليه ما هو حاصل من الخديو ومن لزوم مراعات احكام الشرع الشريف فصار السنجهم الآن جميعا ظلما وعدوانا بل انتقامه حتى غصت السجون بالمذيريات وممن واسكندرية ثم وبفقده احوال العسكرية تحقق له ان العسكرية محافظة على الطاعة والانتظام ولم يقع منهم اذى شئ<sup>(٢٥)</sup> .  
ويوجب المسئولة وبناء على ذلك طلب من الحضرة السلطانية تحوير الماتين نيشان على اذمة ضباط الجيش مكافئة لهم على حسن سلوكهم وطلب لى ايضا النيشان المجيدى من الطبقة الاولى ذات الكوردون<sup>(٢٦)</sup> وبعد ذلك شكلت هيئة نظارة جديدة برياسة سعادة زاغب باشا فكان سعاده رئيسا للنظار وناظرا للخارجية وسعادة احمد زشيد باشا ناظرا للداخلية وعبد الرحمن رشدى بك ناظرا للمالية ومحمود باشا الفلكي ناظرا للاشغال وسليمان باشا اباظه ناظرا للمعارف وعلى باشا ابراهيم ناظرا للحقانية وحسن باشا الشريعى ناظرا للاوقاف ورتبوا ناظرا للجهادية كما كنت اولا وقيل انه بذلك بطل المفعول اللائحة وزالت الكوارث ولاجل اطمئنان الجميع صدر أمر بالغفو اخير اعن جميع الحوادث الماضية الا ما يختص بمحادثة اسكندرية المحزنة الواقعة في ١١ يونيه سنة ١٨٨٢ تلك الحادثة المريعة حدثت في التاريخ المذكور على حين غفلة بين زعاع الاسكندرية وبين الاورباوين وبناء على امر المعية بتعيين من يلزم من الجهادية لتحقيق تلك الحادثة تعين وارسل سعادة وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا سامى وارسل الآبين<sup>(٢٧)</sup> بياده وبطارئين طوبجية واوزطين سوارى لحفظ الامن العمومى داخل اسكندرية وخارجها وقد لهجت بجميع جزائيل الاورباوين بحسن تيقظ عساكر الااليات وسهرهم على حصول الامن والراحة وكانت تلك العساكر تحت قومندانية طلبه باشا اعضمت فقام بتلك المأمورية الحسن قيام وقد سمعت من الحضرة الخديوية بناء عليها وزلا من محافظ اسكندرية ان اضل هذه الحادثة زجل الماطى ورجل خار من اهل اسكندرية وانه باجتماع الناس اطلقت عليهم البنادق والظبنجات من الثباينيك وبناء على ذلك تخرجت مثنى خطاب الى وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا بما هو مشاع وانه يتبصر في

(٢٤) هكذا في المخطوطة

(٢٥) هكذا في المخطوطة

(٢٦) شريط

(٢٧) مثنى

حقيقة تلك الحادثة بغاية الحزم ويجهتد في إظهار الفاعل الحقيقي مع المحامات عن شرف الحكومة والعسكرية والميل الى اتباع الحق هذا ما علمته من امر تلك الحادثة وقبل تشكيل هذه النظارة كان جرى تصلح وترميم الاستحكامات على حسب العادة السنوية فصدر امر الخديو بناءً عن امر الحضرة السلطانية بابطال انشاء استحكامات في اسكندرية بما ان ذلك يعد تهديدا للدونمة الانجليزية وان لم يصر ابطالها تضرب الدونمة بالمدافع على البلد حتى تدمرها وتحرقها حسب تليغات كاتب سر سفارة انكلترا بالاستانة للمباين المهابوني<sup>(٢٨)</sup> فصار ابطال جميع الاعمال حتى ان الخديوى ارسل مندوبان<sup>(٢٩)</sup> من طرفه وهما حسين بك الترك وحسين افندى<sup>(٣٠)</sup> فوزى من المعية لاجل تحقيق ابطال الاشغال وتحمر منه للاستانة بذلك وكنا نتعجب كيف ان التريعات في الطوابى العادية تعد تهديدا وحضور المراكب الحربية واحاطتها بالثغور المصرية لا تعد تهديدا ولكن نتذكر ان الحق للقوى . في ٤ يوليو سنة ١٨٨٢ بعد تشكيل هذه الوزارة حضر النيشان المجيدى بمفرماته العالى الشأن من الاستانة واستلمتها من يد الحضرة الخديوية اظهارا لرضائه عنى وابلغنى ممنونته منى وانه تحقق صدق خدامتى وانصرفت شاكرًا لهذه المنة واعرضت تشكراتى تلغرافيا للمباين المهابوني وتشرفت برد جوابه تلغرافيا بابلاغ محظوظية الحضرة السلطانية من حسن طاعتى وخلوصى وان ذلك النيشان مكافئة لى على حسن سلوكى وصدقاتى اما نياشين ضباط العسكرية فتوزع بعضها على خدمة المعية وبعضها تسلم للخديو ولم ينل احدا من الضباط شيئاً منها مع ان بعضهم من بلغ رتبة الباشا ولم يعط له نيشان ابدا مع ما ابرزه من الصداقة فى المحاربات والخدمات العديدة وما ذلك الا لكونهم مصريين جريا على العادة الغير المألوفة عند المتصفين بالانصاف وبعد استلامى النيشان كلفنى دولتلو<sup>(٣١)</sup> درويش باشا بان اتوجه للاستانة لاعيش فى كنف الحضرة السلطانية مع بعض اخوانى فاعرضت عليه اعدارى التى اخبرت عنها قنصل جنرال فرانسوا وانى اخشى ان الناس يمنعونى من السفر بطريقة غير معقولة كما هو مشاهد لدولته من اذحام الناس بالاسكندرية حين مرورى لشدة تعلقهم بى وكذلك سعادة راغب باشا رئيس النظار لعلمه بما يحصل للناس من الدهشة وتوقع ضرر عظيم اذا صار توجهى الى الاستانة عرف دولته بأن هذا التكليف لا يوافق المصلحة ومما سبق تسطيره يعلم انى كنت محبوبا عند جميع

(٢٨) العرف والمكاتب الرسمية الخاصة بالسلطان بقصره بالاستانة

(٢٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة (أفندى)

(٣١) هكذا فى المخطوطة

الشعب المصرى محبٌ لخير العموم موثوقٌ بأمانتى وشرفى وانه ليس لى غاية شخصية كما يزعموا  
المبتلون بل غايتى الوحيدة هى تحرير بلادى ورفاهية اهلها وتمتعهم بخيرها فى ظل حكومة  
شوروية عادلة تعطى الحقوق لاربابها بدون فرق بين الاهلين<sup>(٣٢)</sup> والاجنين<sup>(٣٣)</sup> حتى يكون  
جميع سكان مصر كالواحد بدون فرق بين تعدد المذاهب والاعتقادات اذا الكل انسان تجمعا  
جامعة الانسانية ومما يدل على عدم تمكنى من الخروج من مصر اذ ذاك ما عرض تلغرافيا من  
رؤساء العساكر البرية والبحرية بالاسكندرية للخدو بشأنى فى يوم استعفاء نظارة محمود سامى  
باشا ومما يدل على ان الناس غير قابلين لتلك اللائحة اعتراف الخديو بالتلغراف الصادر من جنابه  
الكريم الى الرؤساء المذكورين ردا لما ورد منهم فى اليوم المذكور . نعم قبل ختام هذا القسم اقول  
ان الحضرة الخديوية كانت ارسلت ثابت باشا الجركمى المشهور بالتعصب الجنسى الى الاستانة  
ليكون وكيله فيها فى شهر نوفمبر سنة ١٨٨١ ولأجل تغيير افكار رجال الدولة من جهة العساكر  
المصرية حتى بذلك يتوصل الى تغيير افكار الذات السلطانية اشيع فى دوائر الاستانة بان العساكر  
المصرية خرجوا عن الطاعة وانهم يريدوا تشكيل دولة عربية وانى متفق مع الانكليز على ذلك  
فكثرت اللغط بذلك حتى توجست شرا اذ لا معرفة لى باحد فى الاستانة ليدافع عنى ويكذب ما  
نسب الى من الاباطيل واذا بحضرة الشريف السيد احمد اسعد وكيل الفراشة الشريفة بالمدينة  
النورة عن السلطان حضر الى مصر فارفقته بعريضة تبرأت فيها مما نسب لى وللجيش بغير حق  
وورد الى من سيادته جواب بقبول تلك العريضة مع طلب محافظتى على الطاعة استجابا لرضى  
الحضرة السلطانية هذا ما انتهى اليه علمى من تحرير القسم الاول المحتوى على جميع الحوادث  
المهمة التى حدثت من غرة فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ لغاية ٩ يولية<sup>(٣٤)</sup> سنة ١٨٨٢ قبل حصول الحرب  
الانكليزية فى مصر .

تم القسم الاول ويليهِ الثانى

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(٣٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة



## القسم الثاني في حوادث الحرب وما يتبعها

في الحرب العوان وما ادراك ما الحرب العوان هي ( حرب الانكليز ) الامة التي فيها نصرء الانسانى الامة المحامية عن المظلومين . الامة المحرة لرقاب العباد المستعبدين . الامة المحافظة على اتباع الحق والقوانين . ( مع من ) مع مصر . البلاد التي لا ينكر احد ما فيه اهلها من الاستعباد وما تجروه من غصص الاستبداد . البلاد التي طالما سفكت دماء اهلها بغير وجه شرعى ولا حكم قانونى . البلاد التي طغت حكامها وبغت وتفنتت في انواع المظالم . البلاد التي لا يعتبر حكامها شرعا ولا قانونا . البلاد التي عبتت حكامها من دون رب العالمين . البلاد التي كانت تظن ان لا منقذ لها من جب الظلمين ولا موصولها الى فضاء الانسانى الا دولة انكلترا الشفوقة على النوع الانسانى فخاب املمها . وبعد ان قربت ابنائها من قم ذلك الحب وظنوا انهم ناجين اذ جاءهم الحرس الانكليزى فوقع القبض على من خرج من الحب والقاه فى (١) قراره لتشهيه الافاعى خلافا لما هو معهود فى رجال الانكليز من الشفقة والرأفة على النوع الانسانى . ذلك لما اعلن الخديو ان حياته وحياة الاورباوين فى خطر حضرت المراكب الحربية من جميع الدول اى دول اوربا العظام وهاجرت الاورباوين من مصر الا قليلا منهم وهاجت افكار الناس جميعا لحضور المراكب واسف المصريون على فراق اخوانهم الاورباوين الذين كانوا معهم على وفاق تام ثم قيل بان فى ترميمات الطوابى تهديد للدونمة الانجليزية دون باقى مراكب الدول الاورباوية الموجودة بسكندرية فابطل عمل الترميمات ثم حضر الى قومندان عسناكر اسكندرية مخاطبة من جناب الاميرال سيمور (٢) الانكليزى بانه جارى قفل بغاز مينا اسكندرية بالاحجار وانه ان لم يمنع رمى الاحجار فانه يقابل هذا العمل بمثله فبأمر الخديو ورأى النظار كتب له بانه لا اصل لرمى الاحجار ولا لزوم لذلك وارسل اليه ايضا وكيل البحرية ورخص لجنابه فى القبض على من يفعل ذلك ثم فى يوم عشرة يولييه سنة ١٨٨٢ حضر خطاب ثانى من الاميرال المذكور الى القومندان المذكور بانه جارى تركيب مدافع فى طابية صالح والمكس وقائد باى وانه يريد تنزيل

(١) هكذا فى المخطوطة

Admiral Seymour (٢)

جميع الاسلحة الموجودة في طوابى اسكندرية من العجمى الى برج قايد بك مع ان الطوابى المذكورة لا يكن فيها الا الاسلحة الموجودة بها من مدة محمد على باشا حتى القذافات الخشب اكلها السوس ولم يكن بها اسلحة جديدة اصلا الا الموجود<sup>(٣)</sup> في طابية قائد بك من مدة اسماعيل باشا وان لم يجاب الى ذلك يضرب على الطوابى عند طلوع الشمس من يوم ١١ يولييه سنة ١٨٨٢ حتى يهدمها ويحرقها فبعد لذلك مجلس النظار والاختيارية من الذوات وتحت رياسة الخديو ودرويش باشا وقدرى بك من الوفد العثماني وبعد المذاكرة تقرر ارسال ناظر المالية وناظر الداخلية ووكيل البحرية واحد رجال المعية ذكران بك الى الاميرال سيمور يتوجه في ان الطوابى المذكورة لم يكن بها اشغال ولم يتركب فيها اسلحة مستجدة ابدا وها هي مستعدة للكشف عليها من طرفه ومع ذلك فيسمح له بتزليل ثلاثة مدافع من الطوابى المذكورة ارضاء لخاطره فتوجهوا المذكورين ورجعوا بالبلاغ الاخير وهو انه لا بد من تزليل كافة المدافع وانما يتنازل في كونه يسمح للعساكر المصرية انها هي التي تجرى تزليل المدافع عوضا عن العساكر الانجليزية فبعد المداولة طويلا بالمجلس المذكور تقرر ان تزليل اسلحة الطوابى الموضوعة من مدة خمسين سنة بلا موجب حربي عار كبير لا يمكن تحمله ومع كوننا لا نريد حربا مع اى دولة خصوصا دولة الانجليز لكن بطريق المحورية وحفظا للشرف اذا ضربت المراكب على الطوابى تجاوبها الطوابى انما تكون الجاوبة بعد خروج خمسة او ستة ضربات من مدافع المراكب وكان الخديو يظهر شدة الغيرة والحماس ولطالما قال اذا حصل ضرب فائه يحمل بندقية ويكون في مقدمة العسكر ثم انصرف المجلس على ذلك وعرض للأستانة من طرف الخديو ودرويش باشا بما تقرر ولما اتت الساعة المعينة اطلقت كلة من مركب الاميرال ثم تتابع الضرب من جميع المراكب وبعد خروج نحو الخمسة عشر كلة من المراكب جاوبتها مدافع الطوابى واحتدمت نيران الحرب مدة عشرة ساعات ونصف متوالية حتى تهدمت الطوابى جميعها لكونها من الطرز القديم وسقطت مدافعها وتهدمت سراى راس التين واحترقت من نيران الكلال مع هدم كثيرا من البيوت التى داخل البلد خصوصا جهة محطة اسكندرية لانه كثيرا من مقذوفات المراكب الهائلة كانت متوجهة على طابية الداماس التى كنت بها مع جميع النظار وكانت المقذوفات تقع على البيوت المجاورة لتلك الطابية والمحطة المذكورة وبعد ذلك انقطع الضرب من الطرفين وفى اثناء اشتداد القتال كانت تأتينا ياوران الخديو ومجى الدين افندى ياور درويش باشا يترددون فى كل ساعة يشجعوننا ويبلغوننا سلام الخديو ودرويش

(٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة



باشا ويمدحون العساكر على صبرهم وثباتهم مع عدم استعداد الطوايى وجودة اسلحة المراكب الحربية الانجليزية ونحن مع ذلك نتعجب من وجود الخديو فى سراى الرمل على شاطئ البحر من غير مبالاة ولا خوف من المراكب كانه لم يكن حرب بين حكومته وبين مراكب الانجليز ولكن لا عجب من امر الله ثم انه عند انقطاع ضرب المدافع توجهت مع النظار الى الخديو واعرضنا لجنابه الرفيع ما حصل فى هذا اليوم فشكر العساكر عليا<sup>(٤)</sup> اظهروه من الثبات واعرضت له ايضا انه اذا كان الغرض هدم الطوايى فقد تهدمت واذا كان الغرض غير ذلك فإذا نصنع فعقد مجلس النظار تحت رياسة الخديو ودرويش باشا المندوب السلطانى للنظر فيما يصير اجراء<sup>(٥)</sup> بعد اتلاف الطوايى اذا استمر القتال فبعد المداولة تقرر انه اذا اطلقت المدافع من المراكب فى الحال ترفع الرايات البيضاء من جميع الطوايى علامة التوقيف عن الضرب والشروع فى المخبرات السلمية واذ ذاك يتوجه طلبه باشا وذران بك فى صندل بحرى لطرف مركب الاميرال سيمور ويخبرانه بأن الحكومة المصرية لا يكن بينها وبين حكومة انكلترا ما يوجب تكدير خاطر فضلا عن الحرب بل دائما محافظة على حقوقها وحقوق رعاياها واذا كان الغرض الاصلى تنزيل المدافع فقد تهدمت الطوايى جميعها وتكسرت المدافع وانه لا يكن عندنا قوة تدافع المراكب بل ولا تريد حربا ويأخذ رايه عن ذلك وانصرف المجلس ليلا وعطيت التعليمات بذلك الى كافة الطوايى وتوجهت الى باب شرقى وبث فيه وفى صباح يوم ١٢ يوليه سنة ١٨٨٢ قبل الظهر بساعتين ونصف ابتدأت المراكب تضرب على البلد فرفعت الرايات البيضاء من كافة الطوايى ولكن المراكب لم تلتفت اليها الا بعد ان اطلقت نحو ال ٢٥ عدد او ٣٠ عدد كلة ثم بطل الضرب وتوجه طلبه باشا فى البحر الى طرف الاميرال فقابله مأمور من طرف الاميرال فاخبره بما قر عليه راي الخديو والمجلس فبلغه المأمور ان جناب الاميرال يطلب استلام ثلاثة مواقع متجاورة وهى طابية العجمى وطابية المكس وطابية باب العرب لاتخاذها معسكرا للجيش الانجليزى<sup>(٦)</sup> وانه يريد حضور امر بذلك من الخديو قبل الساعة ٣ بعد الظهر وان تأخر فانه يستأنف الضرب ثانية ويأخذ تلك المواقع قهرا وكان باقى عليها<sup>(٦)</sup> الوقت ساعة ونصف فقط فرجع طلبه باشا مسرعا وتوجه الى الرمل وكنت توجهت اليها ايضا مع رئيس النظار واعرض طلبه باشا طلب الاميرال على الخديو فعقد لذلك مجلس تحت

(٤) على ما

(٥) هكذا فى المخطوط

(٦) على هذا

رئاسة الخديو ودرويش باشا حضره اسماعيل باشا حفي المشهور بابي الجبل من الاختيارية وابو سلطان باشا رئيس النواب وتقرر بالعرض عن ذلك للاستانة حيث ان فرمان السلطاني لا يجوز للخديو ان يعطى قطعة ارض من ارضى الحكومة المصرية الى آية دولة اجنبية وان يعود طلبه باشا لينتق الاميرال ذلك فتوجه المذكور لكنه لبعد المسافة وقصر الوقت تأخر عن الميعاد المحدد وبوضوئه الى ديوان البحرية وجد ان قننوب الاميرال حضر الى ديوان البحرية في الميعاد وترك هناك خبرا بان الميعاد مضى ولم يأت جواب من الخديو وانه عاد وسيسئانفت الضرب على البلد ثانياً وأما الخديو فآته امرى في المجلس بأرسال قوة الى جهة طابية العجمى ولا يمكن العساكر الانجليزية من الخروج الى البر فاعرضت على جنابه بان هناك ارض مكشوفة ومقدوفات المراكب لا يمكن عساكر البيادة من الدنو الى شاطئ البحر فضلاً عن قطع خط المواصلة ما بين اسكندرية وبينها فغضب لذلك وقال لم جعلتم عساكر اذا كنتم لم تمنعوا عساكر العدو عن بلادكم ثم انصرف المجلس وتوجهت مع راغب باشا الى منزله الكائن على شاطئ المحمودية ونحن نتفكر في شدة الخديو وغضبه خوفاً على طابية العجمى من استيلاء عساكر الانكليز عليها وتتعجب من تجمع العربان باسلحتهم حول سراى الرمل مع وجود العساكر وان تجمعهم بغير واسطة الجهادية لا يكون الا لأمر غير اعتيادى وتذكر ما كان اشيع من ان شيخ عربان اولاد على كلف من طرف الخديو بواسطة ابراهيم بك توفيق مدير البحيرة بأنه حرز تلغرافا الى أوروبا انه ضد الجيش المصرى وانه اذا امره الخديو بتأديب الجيش المذكور فانه قادر على تاديبه وتشريده كان ذلك في المدة التى كانت الحكومة فيها بدون نظار يعنى قبل نظارة راغب باشا ثم بعد ان مكثنا في بيت سعادته نحو ساعة جاءنا طلب من الخديو فتوجهنا معا الى سراى الرمل واخبرنى الخديو بأنه حضر اربع بلوكات<sup>(٧)</sup> بيادة الى الرمل لاي سبب وحيث كنت لا اعلم حقيقة ذلك فاعرضت على جنابه بأنه لا علم لى الا انه يمكن انهم حضروا لتقوية الغفر على السراى فقال لا يلزم وجودهم هنا وان الغفر الموجود من قبل كفاية فدعهم يتوجهوا لتأدية خدمته في الجيش اولى وانفع فخرجت اليهم وطلبت الضابط المعين منهم وسألته عن أسباب حضوره وبأمر من حضر فاخبرنى ان رئيسه سليمان بك سامى امره بالحضور لتقوية الغفر فامرته بالتوجه الى آليه لعدم لزوم العسكر بطرف الخديوى وان الغفر الموجود من قبل كفاية وتركه وتوجهت الى جهة اسكندرية فلما قربت من وابتور المياه القريب من باب الشرق وجدت ازدحام شديد والعساكر مختلطة مع الاهالى والجميع متوجهين

جهة الجمودية فكان الرجل لا يلتفت لزوجته والمرأة لا تسأل عن طفلها والاطفال تصيح والنساء  
 تبكى كأنه يوم المحشر تدهش لرؤيته ارباب العقول فنزلت عن العربية وتخلت الناس ماشيا حتى  
 وصلت الى باب شريق فوجدت عيد بك الميرالاي وسألته عن هذه الحالة فقال انه اشيع بأن  
 المراكب تستضرب على البلد فخرج من كان ياقيا فيها وخرجت العساكر باولادها وازواجها بغير  
 انتظام وانه يجمع عساكر الآية فامرته بسرعة تجمعهم ومنع العساكر عن الخروج ثم اتى وقت  
 بنفسى في الباب امنع العساكر وقيل لى ان سليمان بك سامى مع جانب من العساكر يريد احراق  
 البلد وانه في حالة جنون فارسلت له حالا بالحضور فحضر ومعه نحو بلوكين غير منتظمين فسألته  
 عما نسب اليه من كونه يريد احراق البلد فانكر ذلك وقال انه كان معه اورطة متفرقة في الشوارع  
 الموصلة الى الميناء لمنع خروج عساكر المراكب الحربية الى البر ولكن وجدت بعض العساكر معهم  
 اقشة بفته فامرته بضبط تلك الاقشة ومعرفة الذين وجدت معهم فجمعها واولع النار فيها فامرته  
 بعدم احراقها وحفظها حتى تسلم للمحافظة بعد معرفة اسباب وجودها مع من وجدت معهم وما  
 زلت اجول بين بين العساكر واذكرهم بالشرف والعار وامنعهم عن الخروج وامرهم بالمدامة على  
 حفظ البلد وكتب ارى كثيرا من العربان خارجين من البلد مع الاهالى وجميعهم حاملين السلاح  
 ومعهم اشياء تظهر انها جديدة وانها لا تليق ان تكون من لوازم العربان سكان البادية وكانه ما  
 كان اجتماعهم حول سراى الخديو بالرمل الا لهذا الغرض ولا يعد انهم اخذوا بعض البضائع من  
 الدكاكين وحرقوا البعض لعدم معلوميتهم بعواقب الامور ومازلت امنع العساكر واشجعهم على  
 عدم ترك البلد واذا بحضور حسن باشا الشريعى وسليمان باشا اياظه وحسين بك الترك ياور  
 الخديو ومعى الدين افندى ياور درويش باشا واخيرونى ان العساكر الذين بالرمل وقفت تحت  
 السلاح سوارى (٨) ويناده واجتالوا بالسراى فلاي سبب جصل ذلك فدهشت لما سمعت هذا  
 الكلام وبعد افاقتى ارسلت طلبه باشا ليفرق العساكر عن السراى ويبحث عن السبب وتبرأت  
 من هذا العمل وسأل سليمان بك سامى عن اسباب ارسال عساكر البياده من آلايه الى الرمل  
 فقال انه وجد مراكب متوجهة جهة الرمل فارسل لها اربعة بلوكات تقوية من نفسه بدون امر وما  
 توجه طلبه باشا الى السراى المذكورة لم يجد شىء (٩) من ذلك واتضح ان العساكر رأيت مراكب  
 متوجهة جهة طابية برج السلسلة القريبة من الرمل فظنوا انها آتية لتأخذ الخديو فحملوا اسلحتهم

(٨) فرسان ، خيالة

(٩) هكذا في المخطوطة

واحتاطوا بالسرأى لحفظ الخديو فتشكر الخديو لذلك وارسل حسين بك الترك ياور خديو<sup>(١٠)</sup> مع سعادة طلبه باشا ليلغنى سلام الخديو ولكنه ما وصل الى سيدكر ذلك بان معظم العساكر خرجت من البلد بصورة غير منتظمة ولم يتجمع عند باب شرق الا القليل وحضر كثير من الضباط وفيهم نسيم بك قيمقام سواحل اسكندرية واخبروا ان المراكب اتت تحت برج السلسلة لتتمكن من الضرب على قشلاق باب شرق ولتقطع خط الرجعة فرايت انه غير متيسر جمع العساكر في هذه الحالة وانه لا بد من اتخاذ موقع مناسب لتجمع العساكر وازالة ما قام بافكارهم من الدهشة والاضطراب فامرت اميرى الآلين هم عيد بك وسليمان بك سامى بان يذهبوا بمن تجمع معهم من العساكر الى المحمودية بعد خروج جميع الاهالى وخرجت مع راغب باشا راجبا عربته لحد مفرق السكة فنزلت من عربته حيث كان هو متوجه الى الخديو وانا توجهت الى المحمودية ولازلت اسرع فى المسير بقصد ان ادرك اول الناس لاوقف العساكر حتى وصلت بعد المغرب الى كوبرى المحمودية المارة عليه السكة الحديدية وهناك انتخبت قطعة ارض خلف المحمودية ووجدت بروجى<sup>(١١)</sup> فامرته بضرب علامة التجمع ولا زالت العساكر تتوارد شيئاً فشيئاً الى الصباح والضباط الذين تركهم باسكندرية ما حضروا بعساكرهم الا الساعة ٧ ليلا لعدم خلو الطريق حيث كانت شواطئ المحمودية مزدحمة بالناس والبهائم والعربات وغيرها والكل يبكى ويصيح على ما حل به وفى الساعة الخامسة من الليل تقريبا حضر طلبه باشا واخبرنى بامر العساكر المقال بانهم احتاطوا بالسرأى وانه ما وجد اثرا لذلك وان الخديو مسرور وارسل معه حسين بك الترك ليلغنى السلام وانه كان مرافقا له لحد الكوبرى ولكنه لكثرة الأزدحام وشدة الظلام وعدم معرفة الموقع رجع الى الرمل وفى صباح يوم الخميس ١٣ يوليو سنة ١٨٨٢ - رأيت ان الذى تجمع من العسكر لا يبلغ الثلث وان معظم الجيش تقدم الى قدام وان الموقع لا يصلح لانه تحت نيران مقذوفات المراكب وخلفه الملاحه فتوجهنا بالعساكر حتى وصلنا الى محل يقال له عزبة خورشيد الكائنة فى جنوب محطة الملاحه بمسافة خمسة الآف متر وهناك أقامت العساكر الى اليوم الثانى فتجمع نحو نصفهم وفى اليوم المذكور كان اورسل<sup>(١٢)</sup> وابورات مخصصة من مصر الى الرمل لاجل ركوب الخديو وفاملية ومن بجميته فيها ورجوعهم الى القاهرة فتوجهت الواورات

(١٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١١) ميقو ، نافخ بالبو

(١٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

وعادت فوارغ واتضح ان الخديو توجه بعائلته ومن معه الى اسكندرية وانه تحت الحرس الانجليزى وفى يوم الجمعة ١٤ يوليو توجهت بالعساكر الى عزبة كنج عثمان وهناك اتخذت المعسكر وتجمعت العساكر فيه وابتدئ فى اعمال المتاريس وحيث انه فى ١١ يوليو يوم الضرب على اسكندرية كان تمحر اعلان بالتلغراف من رئيس مجلس النظارة الى كافة جهات الحكومة ان البلاد صارة فى حالة حرية وان الحكومة صارة فى هيئة عرفية تحت احكام القوانين العسكرية حسب الاصول فكل من وقع منه ما يخل بالراحة العمومية يجازى على مقتضى الحكم العسكرى فترتب لذلك مجلس حرقى بالجهادية ولما ان الخديو توجه الى اسكندرية بعد خروج الاهالى والعساكر منها تحت الحرس الانجليزى فأما ان يكون اسيرا وأما ان يكون انحاز الى الجيش المحارب لبلاده وفى كلا الحالتين لا يجوز ترك البلاد بلا حاكم حسب احكام الشرع الشريف الاسلامى اذ ان فى الحالة الاولى وهى الاسر لا يجوز ان يكون اسيرا وحاكما ينظر فى مصالح البلاد كما انه لا يجوز ترك البلاد فوضى بلا حاكم ينظر فى مصالح اهلها وفى الحالة الثانية وهى الانحياز فكتاب الله يحكم عليه بخروجه من جماعة المسلمين وبذلك لا يصح ان يكون حاكما عليهم من اجل ذلك تمحر تلغراف منى الى وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا سامى لنظر ذلك فى المجلس وتمحر المابين الهايوى تلغرافا بذلك وفى ١٧ يولييه تقريبا حضر لى تلغراف من الخديو يوجه على جميع المسؤولية وانى السبب فى حدوث الحرب وان اشغال الطوائى وتركيب المدافع فيها لم كان يقطع وانه حصل الصلح ومقتضى توجهى له للمكاملة معى مشافهة فعلمت من ذلك انه مأسور وانه مأمور بطلبى للقبض على وانه ينبنى عن نفسه بنسبة اسباب الحرب الى فكتبت له تلغرافا بان انحياز جنابه الى الجيش المحارب لبلاده اثر فى قلوب الناس تأثيرا عظيما واتتمت تعريفى بشروط الصلح حتى اتمكن من التوجه الى اسكندرية فلم كان يجاوبنى بشئ فكتبت تلغرافا الى وكيل الجهادية للنظر فيما ذكر فى المجلس وكذلك تمحر من الخديو ومن راغب باشا الذى كان رئيس (١٣) النظار لكافة جهات الحكومة محصول الصلح وابطال التجهيزات الحربية فتعطلت حركة التجهيزات الحربية نوعا مع حصول المناوشات بين مقدمات الجيشين عند حجر النواتية فكتبت لوكيل الجهادية بنظر ذلك فى المجلس وان المناوشات حاصلة بين مقدمات الجيشين ومن ذلك يعلم انه لم حصل صلح وكتبت للمديريات بارسال طلبات الجهادية بدون تأخير ولا يلتفتوا لأوامر تصدر بشأنها من غيرى هنالك عقد مجلس عام بديوان الداخلية للنظر فى كل ما ذكر حضره وكلاء النظارات ورؤساء

الدواوين والمصالح والعلماء والأعيان وتذكروا فهذا الامر الذى دهم البلاد فقير رأيهم على  
أرسل وفد منهم الى الخديو بابنكندرية ويطلبوا منه ومن النظار ان يتوجهوا الى القاهرة عاصمة  
البلاد فانه كانوا<sup>(١٤)</sup> مطلقين السراح فيجيبونهم الى ذلك وان كانوا مقهورين على بقائهم في  
اسكندرية تحت حفظ العساكر المحاربة للبلاد فيعود الوفد الى مصر ويخبر المجلس ليرى رايه وتألف  
هذا الوفد من علي باشا مبارك ورؤف باشا ومن العلماء الشيخ احمد كبهه شيخ رواق الصغايدة  
بالازهر والشيخ على نائل ومن التجار السيد احمد بك السيوفى وسعيد بك الشماخ وكيل  
طرابلس العرب وارسلوا وغادوا الى مصر ثانيا ما عدا على باشا مبارك والسيد احمد السيوفى  
حجزا في اسكندرية ويعود الوفد علينا بكفر الدوار افادونا بان الباطل لا يغنى من الحق شيئا  
وان من غش المسلمين فليس منهم وان الذين باسكندرية تحت قهر الانكليز وانه لا يستطيع اخذ  
أن يخرج منها الا بورقة رخصة من الانكليز ولكنهم مأمورين بأن يقولوا غير ذلك لهذا ونشر اعلان  
من الخديو بجمعة في ٤ رمضان الموافق ٢٠ يولييه سنة ١٨٨٢ يعلن الناس فيها بغزى حيث ان لم  
اعمل على مقتضى الامر الخديوى ارسال العساكر الى جهة العجمى لدفع ومنع عساكر الانكليز  
عن تلك الجهة بل تركت اسكندرية بلا موجب واخذت العساكر وتوجهت الى كفر الدوار  
فعرض هذا على المجلس ايضا وصادر امر من الخديو بالتلغراف الى وكيل الجهادية بذلك وباطال  
التجهيزات الحربية هنالك عقد مجلس حافل يزيد عن خمسينية نفس حضره ثلاثة من  
البرنشات<sup>(١٥)</sup> وشيخ الاسلام وقاضى مصر والشيخ المفتى والصياد السادات والسيد التكرى  
وكثير من العلماء الاعلام وبطريك الاقباط والمطران وكثيرين من القيسى<sup>(١٦)</sup> وحضره حاجام  
اليهود ووكلاء نظام الدواوين ورؤساء جميع المصالح ووكلاها والمديون وقضاة المديرات والمفتين  
اللذين بالاقليم وكثير من نباء مجلس النواب وعمد الاهالى ونباها وأعيان التجار وغيرهم وكثير  
من ذوات المعية الخديوية والاختيارية من الزوات المتقاعدين ونظرت فيه جميع الاوراق  
والمشورات التى صدرت من الخديوى وما كتب منى وأبعد المداولة بالمجلس المذكور تقرر فيه  
بقوانين الخديوى وان لا يسمع له امر اصلا لكونه يخرج عن حدود الشرع الشريف والقانون  
البيئى وتقرر ايضا بوجوب المدافعة عن البلاد والراعى بالحاماة وبالمدافعة عنها حيث كتبت موجود

(١٤) فان كانوا

(١٥) امير، سليل الملك

(١٦) قسيس ج قساء

مع العسكر بجهة كفر الدوار. وختم بذلك على هذا القرار من جميع اعضاء هذا المجلس وتحرر منه تلغرافا للحضرة السلطانية مع ذكر اسماء المشاهير من الموقعين على هذا القرار وصدار اعلاني بذلك رسميا فترتب مجلس اداى للنظر فى احوال البلاد من ضمنهم حسين باشا وكيل الدخالية ويطرس باشا وكيل الحقاينة ويعقوب سامى باشا وكيل الجهادية واجمىد باشا نشأت ناظر الدائرة النسبية وغيرهم عبارة عن جمهورية مؤقتة لحفظ نظام البلاد الى أن تنقشع سحب المضائبات المتكاثفة على مصر كل ذلك ولم احضر هذا المجلس ولم اشاهده ولم يكن لى فيه رأى حتى انهم لقبونى بلقب حامى البلاد المصرية وصاروا جميعا يخاطبونى بهذا العنوان ولكن ائى المصنفون فما ذكر جميعه يعلم بانى تأمل ان هذه الحزب التى لم يسبق لها نظير فى سزعة تنوعها وتشكيلها باشكال غريبة متباينة كانت شرعية قانونية وانى مأمور بالحاربة بمقتضى قرار المجلس المشكل تحت رئاسة الخديوى وبمقتضى ما ذكر فى امر الخديوى الصادر بعزلى واوامره التى نشرت فى شأن ذلك الدالة على انه امرى بالمداممة على الحرب وعزلى بسببها انهزام الجيش ومأمور بالمدافة والمحامات عن البلاد بمقتضى قرار المجلس العام الذى هو عبارة عن الأمة المصرية على اختلاف ادبائها ومذاهبها وان الخديوى صار لا يحق له فى الحكم على البلاد التى قرز اهلها بخروجه عن حدود الشرى والقانون من المعلوم ان الجهاد على مقتضى الشريعة الإسلامية اما ان يكون بالنفس او بالمال او بالرأى وقد ادب الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها ما يجب عليها فى سبيل المدافة عن الوطن فانهم قدموا انفسهم واولادهم متطوعين عن طيب نفس وبذلوا انبواهم فى سبيل الشرف والوطن فبنهم من تبرع ينصف ماله ومنهم من تبرع بماله اجمع ومنهم من تبرع بثلاثين راس من الخيل وثلاثة الاف اردب من الغلال يعلم ذلك من التلغرافات الواردة من اهالى المديرىات بدون واسطة الى ديوان الجهادية او الينا بكفر الدوار ومن التلغرافات التى كتبت من طرفى للمبترعين بالتشكر لهم ويعلم ايضا من التلغرافات الواردة لنا من حكام المديرىات حتى انه فى امدة ثلاثين يوم اجتمع نحو المائة الف نفس من العساکر والمتطوعين والعراب وملثب الاخوان بالذخائر الوافرة واجتمع نحو الثمانية الاف من الخيول والغلال من المبترعين ونحو الاربعة الاف جمل وكثير من النقود من غير واسطة تلك غيرة لم يسبق لها نظير من عهد صدر الاسلام لآن واما السراى فجميع الذوات والعلماء واعيان البلاد كانت تأتينا بدون انقطاع فى كفر الدوار وحتى فى راس الوادى وكل يجود بما عنده من الراى وبناء علما ذكر تكون الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها اما انها محاربة بالحق والقانون واما انها عاصية باغية بالقوة والقهر المنافيان للحق والعدل هذا واما ما تبرعت الناس به من البقر والجاموس والاغنام فهذا شى لا يمكن تقديره ومن جملة التبرعات

توارد الخوخ والعنب والبطيخ للجيش من جميع الجهات بدون انقطاع ووضح ذلك بقيودات التلغراف بكفر الدوار والتل الكبير ورشيد ودمياط حتى ومن جملة المتبرعين دائرة رياض باشا وخيرى باشا مع كونها غائبين عن مصر وجميع دوائر اعضاء العائلة الخديوية ومع كل ذلك كانت المخبرات الجغرافية (١٧) التلغرافية لا تنقطع ما بين راس التين وبين بعض الناس بمصر والاستانة الى ان حصل تبيؤظ التلغراف اخيرا من جهة راس التين وفيما ذكر تبصرة وذكري للمتصفين هذا وفي ابتدا حضورنا الى كفر الدوار وجدنا رعاع العربان والمولدين منهم جارين النهب والسلب في المهاجرين من الاسكندرية وفي الأبعد والعزب وبلاد مديرية البحيرة في هياج عظيم حتى ان المديرية كتبت لنا تلغرافا بان العربان هددوا نفس العزب المجاورة لدمهور قاعدة المديرية وصار قتل رجل قبلى وزوجته وتركوا طفلا صغيرا رضيعا من احد العزب واضحة اسماءها بالاعراض المتقدم لنا من احد اقارب المذكورين هذا الامر الذى احزننى كثيرا ولم ازل اتذكر واتصور صورة ذلك الرضيع المسكين فى الحال كتبت للمديرية بسرعة القبض على الفاعلين والتحفظ على حياة ذاك الرضيع وتكررة (١٨) منى الاستعجالات الاكيدة حتى صار ضبط الفاعلين واعترافهم بقتل الرجل المذكور وزوجته وها هم موجودين للآن بسجن المديرية لا أعلم ماذا تم نحوهم من اجل ذلك ارسلت ما يلزم من العسكر لحفظ المديرية والبلاد والعزب وحفظ اهلها واموالها ومنع تلك التعدييات وتحمر للمجلس بتغير (١٩) مدير هذه المديرية ابراهيم بيك توفيق الترجمان وقد علم اخيرا ان المدير المذكور كان اعطى تعليمات الى مشايخ العربان باجرى (٢٠) نهب البلاد عند حصول الحرب لاجل تفريق قوة العسكرية وتحمر لمدير الدقهلية بارساله الى الجهادية محفظا عليه وتحمر للجهادية بما علم عنه وبلزوم تحقيق ما نسب اليه بالمجلس العرفى واما مشايخ العربان فانهم لم يسمعوا تلك الاوامر المغايرة للانسانية الا انه صار اشاعتها بين رعاع الناس والمولدين من الاعراب ففعلوا ما فعلوا وصار كثير منهم بما معهم من المنهوبات وارسلوا للمجلس بافاده دالة على ما توقع منهم وما وجد معهم مجازاتهم ووضح ذلك فى قلم الوقوعات فى اركان حرب الذى كان بكفر الدوار ثم حكم المجلس عليهم بالسجن بالطوختانه بمدد معلومة .

(١٧) يعنى بالشفير

(١٨) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٠) باجراء



وبما حصل من زيادة تيقظ العساكر التي تفرقت بانحاء المديرية المذكورة تبدد الخوف بالامنية واطمأنت الخواطر واستقامت الاحوال يشهد بذلك الخواجه ابراهيم رجل اسرائيلي اورباوى عزبته بالقرب من بركة غطاس وصادر المديرية كما انه حصل بمديرية طنطا هيجان من المهاجرين الاسكندرانيين قتل فيها بعض الاورباوين بنفس المديرية من اجل ذلك صار استبدال المدير ابراهيم باشا ادهم وارسل الى المجلس لمحاكمته على عدم حفظ الامن في المديرية وفي الحال ارسلت العساكر البياده والسوارى الى طنطا وزفته والمحلة وغيرها من مراكز المديرية فاستتبت الراحة وحصل الامن ومن قبل ذلك كان تخرر منى منشورا الى كافة المديريات والمحافظة وجميع الدواوين بالمحافظة على ارواح جميع الاورباوين اللذين بالمدن منهم والذين بالارياض وحفظ اموالهم حيث ان من اقام منهم معنا آمنة فله ما لنا وعليه ما علينا وانهم اخواننا في الانسانية حتى ولو كان انكليزيا اذ انه لا يعد محاربا الا اللذين بايديهم السلاح في ميدان الحرب ومن اراد منهم التوجه الى بلاده فعلينا حفظه وصيانتة كما نحافظ على انفسنا واولادنا الى ان يبلغ مأمته حسب احكام الشرع الشريف المحمدى معلوم ذلك بدفاتر كل ديوان من دواوين الحكومة حتى أن من كان يريد التوجه منهم الى الاسماعيلية كان يتعين معهم عساكر لمخافتهم لحد تلك الجهة يعلم ذلك المسيو دلبسيس والمسيو مازتو<sup>(٢١)</sup> قنصل دولة ايطاليا بالزقازيق والمسيو دبون<sup>(٢٢)</sup> قنصل فرانسبا ايضا والتحريرات التي تخررت منى تلغرافيا بهذا الخصوص للجهادية والضبطية والمنصورة والزقازيق وغيرها وبما حصل من تلك النصائح والتنبيهات كانت جميع الاهالى مع من بقى من الاورباوين اخوة في غاية التودد حتى ترتب على ذلك اعادة كثير من الاسماعيلية وبورسعيد من التجار الاورباوين الى مصر معلومة اسماؤهم بطرف ابراهيم بيك فوزى مأمور الضبطية وقتها وكذلك كان تخرر منى لضبطية مصر ومديرية الوجه البحرى بتوزيع مهاجرى الاسكندرية على البلاد والبيوت الشهيرة وان يدعوا الناس لاعانتهم وان يسكنوهم في مساكن طيبة ويحسنوا اليهم غاية الاحسان في مدة هجرتهم وبذلك حصل لهم من اقبال الناس عليهم بالاكرام ما لا يقدر قدره وفي اوائل شهر اغسطس سنة ١٨٨٢ وقع الضبايط دادلى دوشير<sup>(٢٣)</sup> الانكليزى اسيرا في يد عساكر فرقة ابو قير فارسله لى قومندان الفرقة المذكورة خورشيد باشا طاهر

M. de Lesseps; M. Mazzetti (٢١)

M. Dupont (٢٢)

Dudley de Chair (٢٣)

مكرما فامتقبلته واجلسته بجانبى. وازلت روعه واتخذته صديقا الى واكرمتا بثوابه. ثم ارسلته الى مصر بافادته للجهادية بأن يصير اقامته في محل يليق لاقامة الاشراف ويتعين له من يوانسه من الضباط الذين يعرفون اللغة الانكليزية ويكرمونه بغاية الاحرام وان يقبلوا منه التلغرافات والجررات التي يكتبها لوالديه او لرئيسه او لاعى جهة حتى ان والدة الضابط المذكور حررت لى تلغرافا من لندن تشكرني على احسن عناية بولدها كما تجر من طرفه وتخصص لاقامته بالسراى المعدة لتعليم اولاد الخديو ثم وقع اسيرا ضابطا قبل انه تلباني فصار اكرامه وارسل ايضا بالافادة لاقامته مع دادلي دوشيز لكونه كان مستخدما في الجيش الانكليزي ثم جئ لى بضابط بحرى تلباني وجدته دائرية فرقة مربوط وهو مفردا ماشيا بارض الملاحة لا ملابس عليه اصلا الا قيص فقط ولا قوة له على السير فالسنوه ملاس احدى (٢٤) العسكر وازسلوه مكرما فوجدته ضعيفا واقدمه متورمة من تأثيرات الاملاح عليها فاكرمته وازسلته استتالية (٢٥) كقر الدوار واستحضرت له ملاس مخصوصة من مصر ولا زال هناك الى اخر يوم ولا ادرى محله الآن وهذا الضابط كان خاطني عنه مسيو دليسبس قبل وجوده. وعند حضوره انقطعت المحازبات التلغرافية بين مصر والاسماعيلية فلم امكن اعطاء خبر عنه كما انه ابنى ان يعطى عنه اخبار الى قنصل دولته واسباب وجوده بدون ملابس قال انه كان التي جزمته ومشي فناه في هذا المكان فاحترقت اقدمه من الاملاح فقطع قطعة من ملابسه وربط اقدمه بها ومشي بها حتى ثقلت عليه الاريزة من تعلق الاتربة والطين بها فخلعها من اقدمه وقطع غيرها وربط اقدمه ثانيا ومازال على هذا المنوال حتى قطع جنين ملابسه ولم يبق معه الا قيص فقط وكذلك ضبط اثنين ضباط وواحد خكيم وتسعة عساكر كانوا خرجوا من فلوكة الى البر اجهة ابو قير وارسلهم لطرفنا قومندان فرقة ابو قير مع الاحرام وبالتحقيق اتضح انهم نمساويين من مركب نمساوية وكانوا اتوا الى تلك الجهة عن غلط حصل من عدم معرفة الخطة جيلا لتغيير البثانة من محل الصحة وجائنا مكاتبه من قنصل النمسا في اسكندرية فارسلناهم مكرمين الى مركبهم يتجدثون بما لا قوه من الاحرام وكذا الاثنين ضباط اللذين صار ضبطهم بمعرفة طلائع فرقة الصالحية وازسلوا الى مصر بغاية الاحرام بما وجب معهم من النقود التي تبلغ ثلثاية جنيته انجليزي وكذلك الضابط الذي وقع اسيرا يوم اختلاط سنوارى الجيشين في معركة القصاصين ارسل مكرما لاقامته مع دادلي دوشيز تلك كانت معاملتنا مع

(٢٤) هكذا في المخطوطة

(٢٥) مستثنى

الاسرى ونحن متهمين<sup>(٢٦)</sup> بالتوحش فما بالنا الآن لا نعامل بمعاملة مثلها ونحن مستسلمين بانفسنا لدولة عظيمة ذات شرف وذمة هي انجلترا وما بالنا وضعنا في سجن خصمنا الذى طالما تمنى وقوعنا في حالة كهذه كانه لم كان محاربا لدولة الانكليز معنا فنكل الامر في فضل ذلك لنصرء الانسانية واما احترامى للمنافع العمومية فثبوت بما حررته مرارا الى جناب مسيو دليسيبس تلغرافيا وما ورد لى من طرفه تلغرافيا بخصوص احترام كنال<sup>(٢٧)</sup> السويس كل الاحترام ما دام ان المراكب الحربية لم تتخذ ميدانا للحرب ولازال هذا الاحترام الى ان شغلته المراكب الحربية واجرت الضرب على جهة نفيسة فكتبت الى المسيو المذكور منطرفى بأنه ما دام ان القتال اتخذ ميدانا للحرب فقوانين الحرب تقضى علينا باعتباره كذلك فاجابنا بان نعمل بما يسوغه لنا قانون الحرب هنالك تحر تلغرافا من طرفى بذلك الى قومندان فرقة الخط الشرقى الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسنى وباشمهندس عموم الاستحكامات محمود باشا فهمى وباجراء سد الترفة الحلوة والقتال ان امكهم ذلك حسب ما تقتضيه الاحوال الحربية ومن الاطلاع على صور محركات جنابه الى ولده وزوجته فى باريس يعلم شدة حرصنا على احترام القتال المذكور وكذلك مداومة مراكب البوسطة على السفرية بعد حصول الحرب ولما حصل توقيف من العساكر عن السفر وتحمر لنا عن ذلك من وكيل السفن بالسويس فامرته تلغرافيا بمداومة السفرية<sup>(٢٨)</sup> حسب المعتاد حيث ان ذلك من المنافع العمومية مع تفهيم العسكر بذلك فكانت البوسطة منتظمة فى سيرها لحين خروج العساكر الانجليزية الى السويس وبالنسبة لحرصنا على احترام القتال لم كان ارسل الى الجهة الشرقية قوة عسكرية لحفظها لاننا كنا لا نتصور اصلا انتهاك حرمة القتال من اجل ذلك لم صار ايجاد متاريس وطوابى للمدافعة تحمى بعضها بعضا فلما اتخذت الاسماعيلية مركزا للجيش الانجليزى وحصلت المحاربة مع العسكر المصرية الذين كانوا فى المحسمة لاعمال المتاريس فى يوم الجمعة الموافق ٢٥ اغسطس سنة ١٨٨٢ والحيل الانجليزية اخذت عليهم خط الرجعة انهزمت عساكرنا ومعهم راشد باشا وتخالد باشا واما المهندس الشهير محمود فهمى باشا فانه اخذ اسيرا لما ناله من شدة الاسف على ترك هذا الموقع المهم الذى لم تسمح له نفسه بتركه وفراره للاحاقه بالتل الكبير هنالك توجهت فى يومها من كفر الدوار الى التل الكبير اكتفاء بوجود طلبه باشا بفرقة كفر

(٢٦) متهمين

(٢٧) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٨) السفر

الدوار وكذلك على باشا فهمى قام من مصر ومعه الآلاى الاول من البياده الى التل الكبير لتقوية عساكره وتتابع ورود العسكر طويجه وسوارى وبياده واخذ فى عمل المتاريس والطوايى بقصد توصيلها من الصالحية الى التل الكبير الى الدار البيضاء<sup>(٢٩)</sup> الى جبل عتاقة بوضع تتمكن به العسكر من ان تحمى بعضها بعضا وبذلك يمكن المدافعة عن البلاد من غير خسارة كما حصل فى جهة كفر الدوار ومع ذلك حصل حركتين حربيتين بجهة كبرى القصاصين ثبت فيها الجيشين المتحارين ثباتا عظيما وجرح فى ثانيتهما الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسنى وسعادة على باشا فهمى فارسلا الى مصر وجاء بدلها على باشا الرويى ليكون قومندان للجيش ومن قبل ان تتمكن من اتمام عمل المتاريس كما ذكر عاجلتنا العساكر الانجليزية والهندية وهاجمتنا السوارى ومعها الطويجية السوارى الى تطير معها أينما طارت على حين غفلة فى ظلمة الفجر واشتعلت نيران الطويجية والبياده المهلكة من الطرفين مقدار ساعتين ثم اتت فرقة سوارى بطويجيتها من خلف الجيش فكان ذلك سببا لخذلان الجيش وتشسته فى يوم الاربعاء ٢٩ شوال سنة ١٢٩٩ الموافق ١٣ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨٢ ميلادية ولما حصل هذا الخذلان توجهت من الجبل الى بليس وسوارى الانجليز على مقربة منى وهناك تقابلت مع على باشا الرويى فتوجهنا الى الشاطىء<sup>(٣٠)</sup> ثم ركبنا وابور السكة الحديد وتوجهنا الى القاهرة فوجدنا اهل المجلس جميعهم فى ديوان الجهادية وحضرات البرنسات حضروا ايضا بالديوان وبعد المداولة والتيقن بأن دولة الانجليز لا تريد الاستيلاء على مصر تقرر انه حيث الامر كما ذكر فلا لزوم للدفاع بعد ذلك اعتمادا على ان دولة الانجليز موصوفة بحب الانسانية والاعتدال فى كل امر وانها متى تحققت الامر ووقفت على افكار اهل البلاد لا شك انها تسعى فيما يوجب تحريرهم وراحتهم وحفظهم وبناء على ذلك كتب تلغراف من طرفى الحكمدار فرقة العباسية المكونة من خمسة وثلاثين الف عسكرى سعادة رضا باشا فى يوم ١٤ سبتمبر سنة ٨٢ بانه اذا حضرت عساكر الانجليز ترفع لهم الرايات البيضاء ويتقابل مع ريس العساكر الانجليزية ويخبره بانتهاء الحرب اعتمادا على شرف دولة الانجليز وحرصا على حفظ البلاد من الدمار وعند الغروب اتت العساكر السوارى البريطانية والهندية فرفعت لهم الرايات البيضاء وتوجه رضا باشا لمقابلة الجنرال (لوى)<sup>(٣١)</sup> وكذلك ارسلت ابراهيم بيك فوزى ضابط مصر لمقابلة الجنرال ايضا

(٢٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٠) الشاطىء

(٣١) General Lowe

وارسل وفد قبل ذلك من قبل المجلس لمقابلة الجنرال (ولسلى) (٣٢) في بنها وبعد الغروب بساعة ونصف حضر ابراهيم بيك فوزى المذكور واخبرنى بان الجنرال (لوى) الانجليزى يريد مقابلتى فى العباسية وكذلك قومندان فرقة عساكر كفر الدوار كان حضر فى هذا اليوم الى الديوان فجأة تلغراف من قومندان فرقة العباسية بان الجنرال المذكور يريد مقابله فى هذه الساعة وتوجهنا جميعا الى طرف الجنرال (لوى) بالعباسية وكذلك ارسلت له على بيك يوسف رئيس الالاي الذى فى القلعة حسب طلب جنابه ولما تقابلت مع الجنرال ومعى طلبه باشا فقال الجنرال (لوى) المذكور هل تقبلنا ان تسلما انفسكم اسرى للدولة الانجليزية فقلنا نعم على شرط ان نكون فى ذمة دولة انجلترا وشرفها وخلعنا سيوفنا وسلمناها ليد الجنرال (لوى) نيابة عن القائد العمومى الجنرال ولسلى وقلنا له سلمنا سيوفنا وانفسنا الى ذمة انجلترا وشرفها فصوت اولادنا وصوت الانسانية يطالبون انجلترا وكل الانجليز بحقوقنا وجنابكم بالنيابة عن الحكومة الانجليزية وعن كل انجليزى واعلم انه موجود بالعباسية خمسة وثلاثون الف عسكرى ومثلهم فى كفر الدوار ورشيد ودمياط وغيرها ولكن حرصا على البلاد وحققنا للدماء واعتمادا على شرف انجلترا وانها لا تريد الاستيلاء على البلاد المصرية قد ابطلنا المدافعة وسلمنا انفسنا لذمتكم وشرفكم فقبل ذلك منا وبقينا بطرفه ثلاثة ايام ثم حضرنا الى عابدين ومكثنا بطرف الكولونيل (تين) (٣٣) قومندان آلاى الغونارديا الانجليزى لغاية ٤ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ ونحن فى غاية الراحة ثم صار تسليمنا الى السجن المصرى فى يوم الخميس الموافق ٥ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ فذاك اليوم كان يوما عظيما حيث فرقوا بينى وبين صاحبي طلبه باشا الذى كان يوانسنى واوانسه ووضعونى فى اودة لا شى فيها ولا كرسى وقلوها على فكنت فيها حتى جاء خادمى فلم يسمح له السجنان بدخول شى غير سجادة ولحاف ثم دخل على الضابط الموكل باهانة المسجونين وفتشنى واخذ ما كان معى من الاوراق الخصوصية لارسالها لمجلس التحقيق وخرج هو ومن معه من رجال الاهانة ثم دخل بعده طائفة من حاشية الخديوى اعرف منهم عثمان بيك رأفت ناظر الاسطبل الخديوى وحسين افندى فوزى من قلم تشريفات خديوى وتقدم الى رجل من الاتراك اللذين يركبون دائما ويسرون امام الخديوى المعدين لاعدام الحياة عند اللزوم وصار يفتشنى ويخرج قيصى من تحت البنطلون فلم يجد معى الا

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General Wolseley (٣٢)

Colonel Thynne (٣٣)

احجية<sup>(٣٤)</sup> كنت حاملها لحفظ اولادى الاطفال من داء التشنج العصبى الذى كانوا يموتون به فاخذها بعنف وقوة وكنت اقول له دعنى اخرجها اليك فيقول لا انا مأمور بصوت مزعج حتى انه اخرج الجزمة من قدمي وفتشها ثم خرجوا وبعد ساعة فتح الباب واذا بمحجر جريدة الاهرام اسمه ( بشاره ثقله ) فظننت انه جاء ليزورنى ويهون على المصاب لكونه كان معنا قبل الحرب وكان يحلف بدينه وشرفه انه كواحد منا وانه من دعاة الحرية وكنا نجمله ونكرمه واذا به اتى بوقاحته ليشمت بنا وقال لى بنفور عرابى اى شئ سويت رايت اى شئ صار لك فعلمت انه ذو وجهين وانه لا شرف له فلم اجاوبه فتوجه وبعد ساعة اخرى دخل طايفة ثانية من الاتراك اتباع دايرة الخديوى وبعض عساكر المراسلة الذين هم بمعيتة وفتشوا السجادة واللحاف والقوهم يمينا وشمالا وخرجوا واقاموا ليلتها غفراء على المسجونين وفى يوم ٦ اكتوبر توجهوا لاشغالهم وفى ليلة ٩ اكتوبر الساعة ٨ افرنكى من الليل يوافق الساعة ثلاثة ونصف عربى تقريبا بعد ان خلعت حوايجي ونمت واذا بالباب قد فتح ودخل على جماعة نحو العشرة اشخاص او اثنى عشر شخصا لا حقيقتهم لشدة الظلام وقال قاتل منهم بصوت قبيح هائل يا عرابى اما تعرفنى فظننت انهم مأمورين بقتلى الا انى تثبت وقلت له لست اعرفك فمن انت وما الذى تريده فى هذا الوقت فقال انا ابراهيم اغا وسبنى وشمئنى بقوله يا كلب يا خنزير انت كنت عايز ايه منى وثقل على ثلاث مرار وعلمت انه ابراهيم اغا تنوچى الخديوى الذى كان توجه الى الشام هربا بسبب سرقة الالماس من سراى عابدين لاجل عدم التحقيق مع محمد حسن الذى ارسل الى البحر الاحمر ليلقى فيه كما سبق ذكره وها انا فى اودة ذات منفذين من جهة واحدة عليها اقفاص من حديد وخارجها شمسيات من خشب مسمرين لا يفتحان أبدا وعند مجئى الطعام من البيت بصحبة الخادم ياخذة منه احد الاتراك غفراء السجن ويفتح الباب ثم يدخل الطعام داخل الباب ويقفله سريعا ويتركنى وشأتى كأنى وحش داخل قفص الا ان قفص الوحش متجدد الهواء دائما وينور له ليلا ونحن محرم علينا القيان<sup>(٣٥)</sup> وغيرها مطلقا مبالغة فى الاهانة وكذلك صار القبض على جميع الضباط من رتبة البيكباشى فصاعدا وبعض الصاغات واليوزباشى والملازمين وسجنوهم وكذلك على كثير من العلماء واطباء مجلس النواب والاعيان من العمدة والتجار وغيرهم حتى غصت بهم السجون فى مصر واسكندرية والمديريات وظهر مصداق قول اعضاء مجلس النواب ان بقاء

(٣٤) حرز ، عوذة

(٣٥) قينة قيان : خدم

المجلس لا يكون الا ببقاى فان خرجت من مصر فلا مجلس ولا بلاد بل بعد ازالة جميع الاعيان  
والمتنبيين من المصريين وتبعيدهم وخراب بيوتهم تصير اهالى مصر عبيدا ارقاء يستخدمون فى اقدر  
الخدمات تلك المحاربة التى لم يسبق لها مثيل حيث ان الخديوى تسبب فى حضور المراكب الحربية  
الى مصر ثم كان أول مسارع الى الحرب ومحرض عليها حتى التبس علينا الامر ثم انحاز للجيش  
المحارب لبلادهم ثم استمر الحرب باسمه فكانت عساكر الانجليز تقاتل باسم الخديوى اعتمادا على ان  
الجيش المصرى عصاة والخديوى ينشر المنشورات بان عساكر الانجليز لا تريد الاستيلاء على  
البلاد وهكذا تنوعت فى صفاتها وظهرت فى اشكال غريبة فاذا كان الجيش عاصيا على زعمهم  
فا بال الناس جميعا ينظرون الى كثير من الذوات الملكية مسجونين وكثير من العلماء الاسلام  
واعضاء مجلس النواب واعيان العمدة والتجار ونهائى الدواوين وغيرهم من الاهالى صار سجنهم  
حتى ملئت السجون بكافة المديرات والمحافظات وغيرها واذا كان الجيش والمدكورين وباقي  
الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها كلها على راي واحد مشتركين فى امر واحد وهو الحق فما بالناس  
نرى اول دولة مشيدة لاركان العدل والحق تقهر تلك الامة سيئة البخت ارضاء لشخص واحد  
على ان هذا الشخص لا تجيز له شريعة قومه ان يكون اميرا عليهم ابدا هذا مع احترام دولة انكلترا  
للشرايع والاديان وكيف تكون تلك السيرة فى بطون التواريخ لدى عالم الانسانية فنكل الحكم  
فى ذلك لشرف الامة الانجليزية . ان مصر لم تكن محاربة لدولة الانجليز اصلا ولكنها كانت  
مدافعة عن نفسها فقط حرصا على اعادة المودة مع دولة انكلترا المحافظة على حقوق المصريين منذ  
زمن مديد وطلبا لبقاء ابواب الصلح مفتحة واعتمادا على انها متى تبينت الحقيقة لا تنظلم المصريين  
حقوقهم وحجتنا فى ذلك ما هو مشاهد فى تحسين حالة الزراعة وحفظ النيل وعدم ما يتخلل  
بالراحة العمومية التى بها يتخيل ان البلاد لم يكن فيها حرب اصلا هذا مع حفظ املاك  
الاورباوين وزراعاتهم فى العاصمة والارياف وغير ذلك حصول التسليم مع وجود سبعون الف  
من العساكر والمتطوعين وكثير من الاسلحة والذخاير الحربية فضلا عن كثرة الترع والجسور  
والخلجان التى يستعان بها كثيرا فى المحاربات خصوصا فى مدة النيل فاذا كانت عاصيا فكيف اسلم  
نفسى مع وجود تلك القوات الكبيرة الكثيرة معى والبلاد مستعدة لاعانتى بالرجال والمال واذا  
تقطعت جميع الاسباب فكيف اسلم نفسى الم تكن ارض الله واسعة فهاجر فيها او لم كنت  
اتوجه الى لندره فاحتمى فيها ان فيذلك لتذكرة لمن يتذكر . فالحق والحق اقول انى لست بعاصى  
وانما قتت وقامت البلاد اى الامة المصرية فى طلب تحرير بلادها مع غاية الشرف وحفظ  
الناموس لا لغاية شخصية كما يفتروا المبطلون بل انى مكلف بحفظ البلاد من طرف الحضرة

السلطانية حيث تبين بعظمة اخلاصى وسوء مقاصد الخديوى كما ورد لى بذلك كتاب من حضرة الشيخ محمد ظافر من خواجى الذات الشاهانية وكتاب اخر من سعادة احمد باشا راتب ياور الحضرة السلطانية موجودين بطرقى للآن ثم انى صرت قائد للجيش فى المدافعة عن البلاد بوجه الشرع والقانون وامر الخديوى والمجلس اولا وقرار الامة ثانيا وليس بعد ذلك بدليل ولا برهان . هذا ما انتهى اليه البيان فيها حضرات المحامين عنى ذو الشرف المستر برودلى<sup>(٣٦)</sup> ومستر نابير<sup>(٣٧)</sup> ذو الشرف ومستر ايف<sup>(٣٨)</sup> ذو الشرف ويا حضرات نصراء الانسانية والمحامين عن الحق بانفسهم وباموالهم من غير ان تأخذهم فيه لومة لائم صديق الامين مستر بلونت<sup>(٣٩)</sup> ذو الشرف والكمال والمشركين معه من احبائه المحافظين على شرف الانسانية بالانجلترا هذه الرسالة كتبها بيدي عما صار من الحوادث الابتدائية والانتهاية على مقتضى الحق والانصاف بدون شك فيها ولا ريب وليس بعد الحق الا الظلال المبين .

انتهى

١٦ ذو الحجة سنة ١٢٩٩ هجرية

موافق ٢٩ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢

بمدينة كولبو بجزيرة سيلان

احمد عرابى المصرى

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Broadley (٣٦)

Napier (٣٧)

Eve (٣٨)

Blunt (٣٩)



meant nothing more than words, seeing that he had taken the army with him, and that Loutfi Pasha's appointment meant little less, seeing that the English were in command of the city, it must strike one as being almost Gilbertian." **Reflections of Egypt**, p.222.

81. The Arabic is **tawqīf al - Khediwi**: the word more commonly means to seize or 'to arrest', but here a less specific translation seems preferable. The 'Commission' had, after all, no power to arrest him nor did they seek to appoint a new Khedive.

82. The S.O.A.S. manuscript specifically uses the Arabic words **jumhūriyya mu'aqqata** i.e. "provisional republic." The Sabry version, has, surprisingly, instead of these words: "une sorte de comité de salut public...." **L'Esprit National Egyptien**, p.279

83. British historians, for all their bias against 'Urābī, have given the Khedive little credit for his conduct during this crisis. Major E.W. Polson Newman, for example, in whose work we find a closely researched account of the 'Urābī period, comments about the Khedive:

The only loyalty he showed was to those support he wanted. He had now deserted his country and, according to Moslem law, had no more authority over his people. His whole conduct with regard to British armed action had placed him in a position which no man could justify, and dispelled once and for all the charge of rebellion which was made against 'Urābī and his followers. **Great Britain in Egypt** (London 1928), p. 108.

84. This paragraph and the following one are omitted from Sabry.

85. A remarkably different view of the Egyptians' treatment of their prisoner appeared in the official **British Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt**, under the authorship of Colonel J. Maurice (London 1887). Therein, p. 17, it is stated: "Mr. De Chair, a Midshipman, sent with despatches, had been captured on the 29th July, and being sent to Cairo, was paraded through the streets with an announcement that it was Sir B. Seymour who had been made prisoner." One cannot but wonder who would have taken the young De Chair, from his rank not yet a full adult, for the senior and distinguished British Admiral

86. This interesting digression, over the following three paragraphs, that offers further proof of 'Urābī's humane treatment of prisoners, was omitted from Sabry and abridged in the **Review** version

87. The following two sentences are omitted from Sabry.

88. This conversation, like much of the preceding paragraphs, is condensed and given in narrative form in both the **Review** and Sabry versions.

89. Bishāra Taqlā and his brother Salīm, both Lebanese by birth, founded **al-Ahrām** in August 1876 as a weekly journal. Within a short period it expanded in size and became a daily newspaper gaining support from its progressivist and reformist editorial policies. Trying to maintain a middle ground between Nationalists and the Khedive it satisfied neither totally and in its early life was much assisted by French support. In 1892, following the death of Salīm, Bishāra became its editor as well as manager and in 1898 the newspaper moved its offices to Cairo. It remains, of course, in publication today as the most prominent newspaper in the Arab world.

90. This remark offers an equation by which to interpret 'Urābī's other references to specific times. See note 74 above.

91. The following two sentences were omitted from both the **Review** and Sabry versions.

92. The rest of this paragraph and the following two were omitted from Sabry; the passage was given in condensed form in the **Review** version.

93. A Turkish title given to the confidential secretarial staff of the Ottoman state who worked directly with the Sultans.

94. These words of reference to the Island of Colombo, where 'Urābī began his exile in January 1883, seem written with a different pen and may perhaps have been added, along with a second mark of 'Urābī's seal, when he despatched the manuscript to Blunt in England. This final page of the manuscript is reproduced in this present text, *vide* p. ii above.

Sāmī in which he admitted carrying out the burning of Alexandria and charged that he had done so on direct orders from ‘Urābī. Further attempts by the prosecution to corroborate these charges failed, however, and Sāmī was soon removed to Alexandria. Although he later tried to attenuate and finally to deny his ‘confession’, he was tried and convicted by Court Martial and hanged there on June 9 of the following year. He was, therefore, the only prominent Nationalist figure to be executed.

72. The Arabic word used is *bafta* which referred to a low-grade, loose-woven cotton cloth. The *Review* version mistranslated this as ‘silk’ and condensed the passage, omitting reference to the burning of this material.

73. The four lengthy paragraphs that follow were much condensed in the Sabry version.

74. The Arabic is *fi al-sā‘ at al-khāmisa fi al-layli*. Precisely what time is intended by this is unclear. In a later time designation, see p.99 and note 88 below, ‘Urābī makes a differential of 5 hours between ‘European time’ and ‘Arab time,’ a practice apparently then widespread in the Near East and now still used by some of the older generation in the Arabian peninsula. If he is in fact here referring to ‘Arab time’ then, in accord with his own equation mentioned above, this would be equivalent to 10 p.m. ‘European time.’

75. The Arabic word used is *al-hars*. The *Review* version has the sentence describing the Khedive as under British ‘protection.’ Although capable of this meaning, ‘Urābī would scarcely have used the word here in that sense, no doubt preferring the English word ‘guard.’ His carefully elaborated case that follows depends, after all, on his assumption that the Egyptian sovereign was unwillingly in enemy hands. This understanding alone justified his own initiatives and acceptance of instructions from the Cairo citizen-councils. ‘Urābī would surely not have accepted the interpretation that the Khedive needed ‘protection’ by the British from himself!

76. This presumably is the telegram dated July 14, the text of which is given in John Ninet’s account. Blunt concluded from its wording that it was dictated by the British; its text was not, it is interesting to note, included in the official *Blue Books*.

77. ‘Urābī was clearly correct. Cartwright’s telegram to Granville the following day, July 15, stated: ‘The Khedive has summoned him here. If he comes he will be arrested, if not, declared an outlaw.’ Quoted in Blunt, *Secret History*, p.393.

78. ‘Alī Pasha Mubārak (1824-1893) was one of the most remarkable Egyptians of the late nineteenth century. Born of poor fellah parentage, he received training for the army and reached officer status. Serving later with the Egyptian army contingent during the Crimean war, he specialised in engineering and became his country’s leading expert on irrigation and drainage. An extraordinarily versatile man, he received many high administrative appointments, including the posts of Minister of Education and of Public Works. He was a founder of Egypt’s first National Library and founding editor of the country’s earliest educational-cultural-scientific journal the *Rawdat al-Madāris al-Misriyya* begun in Cairo in 1870. An impressive geographer-historian as well, his *al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya li Misr al-Qāhira*, published in twenty volumes, is a mine of information on an extensive range of subjects. Mubārak was also innovative as a proto-novelist; his *Alam al-Din*, published in 1882, is a four-volume fictional account of the travels, observations, and discussions of an Egyptian Sheikh and a British Orientalist in Egypt and Europe, a formula that al-Muwailihī and Hāfiz Ibrāhīm were later to emulate.

Apparently an early supporter of the Nationalists, ‘Alī Mubārak did not report back from his mission as a member of the delegation who went to see the Khedive in Alexandria on behalf of this Cairo ‘Council.’ He was later rewarded by the Khedive with high executive positions in his new government. In his *al-Khitat* (vol. IX pp.57-58) Mubārak wrote disparagingly of ‘Urābī and of the Nationalist movement.

79. The names of these two men are omitted, without explanation, from the Sabry version.

80. De Kusel neatly underlined the absurdity of this situation: ‘Two things done always strike me as not being wanting in humor, one being the dismissal of ‘Urābī from his office and the appointment of Omar Lutfī Pasha as Minister of War. When one thinks that ‘Urābī’s dismissal

62. The **Review** version adds the detail that this meeting lasted “for an hour and a half.”

63. De Kusel, who witnessed the bombardment from one of the ships, gives a colorful account of this unequal confrontation between a static line of forts using antique weaponry and the superbly equipped and armoured British naval units. He comments on the gallantry of the Egyptian defenders and quotes a personal letter he received dated that day from Captain Molyneux on the flagship *Invincible* commenting that “The Egyptians gave it us much hotter than we expected.” **Reflections of Egypt**, p. 203.

64. Blunt charged (**Secret History**, p. 380) that there was a prior understanding between the Khedive and the British that he should be at a palace on the Maḥmūdīyya Canal during the bombardment, of which he received notice as early as July 6. In the event, however, Tawfīq preferred to retire to the palace at al-Ramla from where he could view the battle, having been, according to Lord Charles Beresford (**Blunt, Secret History**, p. 381), who received the Khedive at the official Ra’s al-Tin palace after the British landing, genuinely uncertain as to its outcome. Gladstone, the British Prime Minister, replied to a July 12 question in Parliament that “. . . we have no information whatsoever at present as to the state of things in Alexandria or as to the position of the Khedive.” **Hansard**, vol. CCLXXII, 1882, p.166

65. It is amusing to read how Sir Charles Dilke, British Foreign Secretary, also stressed, in the acrimonious House of Commons debate of July 12 on the bombardment, the Khedive’s courage at this time in behaving as a friend of Britain: “If His Highness were not already the true friend of this country, we should especially admire, at all events, the courage he has displayed on this occasion: and I can assure the right honorable Gentleman that every possible step will be taken under the circumstances, which can be taken, to secure the safety of the person of the Khedive.” **Hansard**, vol. CCLXXII, 1882, p.190.

66. The Arabic is *lā ‘ujaba min amri Allah*. This remark is omitted from the **Review** version and the whole passage is missing from the **Taqrīr** Arabic printing.

67. The **Review** translation adds the detail that ‘Urābī went: “to Ramleh about sunset.” Does this insertion and that of note 62 above reflect Broadley’s interest, like the meticulous lawyer that he was, in establishing precise references to time and place?

68. The **Review** version states “. . . that the Admiral required three forts to be occupied by British troops.” But the manuscript wording is *liittikhādhihā mu‘askaran lil-jaysh al-injilīzī*, implying the establishment of a camp or barracks for the British army. This demand clearly presented a grave legal problem for the Egyptians and they were keenly aware of the possible parallels with the French occupation of Tunisia. The Egyptian response, insistence on the need to gain the Sultan’s permission, was surely predictable to the British.

69. The Arabic is *ḏiwān al-baḥrīyya*, which the **Review** version strangely mistranslated as “. . . arrived at the beach.”

70. Sabry (see **L’Esprit National Egyptien**, p. 275 footnote), suggests that, bowing to pressure from other revolutionary leaders who feared the Khedive might flee and advocated that he be sent under guard to Cairo, ‘Urābī compromised by despatching 400 troops to surround the palace. Their commander, however, Muḥammad Muṭīb, was a known supporter of the Khedive and allowed him to leave the next day to join the British forces in Alexandria. ‘Urābī’s denial here of knowledge of the sending of the troops and the subsequent events seem to argue against Sabry’s interpretation. ‘Urābī did not, after all, have to refer to the troops in this his defence statement and only does so to provide evidence of his innocence of evil intent regarding the Khedive.

71. A substantial part of Alexandria burned to destruction after the military engagements. It was later charged, and widely suggested in the European press, that ‘Urābī had ordered the burning of the city. Whosoever the guilt, however, it was Sulaimān Sāmī who paid with his life. Escaping with Hasan Mūsā al-‘Aqqād to Crete after the defeat at Tell el-Kebir, the pair were soon captured and returned to Egypt by the island’s Ottoman authorities. Jailed in the Dāira al-Sanīya, Sāmī was vigorously interrogated without the knowledge of Broadley and contrary to a prior agreement between the defense team acting for the Nationalists and the government prosecution. Two days later the **Egyptian Gazette** began publishing a sensational statement by

Shereef Ahmed Asaad, who came to Cairo with Dervish Pasha in May 1882, also concurred in these injunctions, and took charge of a petition to the Sultan on our behalf. He also wrote me, much later on, a letter in a similar strain.

During the early part of the hostilities I telegraphed several times to Constantinople. About the beginning of August, I telegraphed to Yaseen Bey, one of the Sultan's attendants, stating what had taken place during the hostilities, and submitting that the war was a legitimate and legal one, that the Khedive had gone to the enemy, and was therefore in exactly the same position as the Bey of Tunis.

On the 12th of Ramadan 1299 (August 6, 1882) I telegraphed to Yaseen Bey, stating that Dervish Pasha, instead of advising the Khedive to remain with his people, had allowed him to join the enemy, and that the town of Alexandria had been delivered to the British Admiral.

When the news reached me that the Porte proposed sending troops to Egypt, knowing that this would be injurious to the Egyptians, I telegraphed on the 8th of Ramadan (August 2, 1882) to Yaseen Bey, stating that Egypt was sufficiently provided with men, arms, and ammunition to defend the country and protect the Sultan's rights, and that we were unanimous in our decision to stand by those rights.

Never, during those negotiations or afterwards, up to the present time, has the Porte disapproved of our doings. The Sultan has both by act and letter often approved them. How can I then be a rebel? Is not the Sultan admitted by Englishmen to be sovereign of Egypt?" *Nineteenth Century Review*, pp. 981-2.

This passage is perhaps one of the "additional notes" and "one or two corrections" Broadley reports (p. 114) that "Urābī later made to his original manuscript.

56. As<sup>c</sup> ad's title, here translated roughly as "custodian of the holy places in Medina," was *vakīl al-Farāsha*. The post originally applied to those given the honor of sweeping the holy buildings in Mecca and Medina. By this date, of course, the title was honorary and conferred on a court official to indicate the high degree of the Sultan's confidence the holder enjoyed.

57. The highly emotional opening paragraphs of this section were toned down and much condensed in both the *Review* and Sabry versions.

58. "Urābī's tribute to the reputation of the British is strangely twisted in Sabry's version. His translation reads, "Ou est cet amour de l'humanité dont les Anglais sont si fiers?" *L'Esprit National Egyptien*, p. 271.

59. The European sources cast serious doubt on the veracity of "Urābī's insistence in the following passages that the Egyptian army was not taking measures to strengthen and to protect its forts. Baron de Kusel, at the time the Acting Director-General of Customs at Alexandria and a British witness to the city's bombardment, also tells an extraordinary story of a secret underwater weapon that seems to indicate a high degree of Egyptian interest in defending the country's ports. The weapon is said to have originally been ordered from the United States by General Stone Pasha, the American Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian army, and "Urābī seems to have known of its delivery to the Alexandria customs building. De Kusel reports how his curiosity was aroused by the constant visits from high-level Egyptian Ministry of War emissaries asking the whereabouts of a mysterious package. He therefore located and opened it himself and, discovering it to be a "submarine, explosive weapon," had it dismantled and despatched at night directly to Admiral Seymour's flagship. The Admiralty in London were later, he reports, "profuse in thanks!" See de Kusel, *An Englishman's Reflections of Egypt 1863-1887*, (London, 1915,) pp. 179-183.

60. This seems to convey the meaning of the Arabic: *wa lam yakun bihā aslihatun jadīdatun aṣlan illā al-mawjūd* (sic) *fi tābiyat Qā'id Bey min muddati Ismā'īl Bāshā*. The sentence was omitted from the *Review* version.

61. The *Review* version gives the full composition of the delegation: "It was presided over by the Khedive in person, and the following personages were present, viz. Dervish Pasha and Kadrı Bey, the Sultan's envoys, Ragheb Pasha, Ahmed Rashid Pasha, Abderrahman Bey Ruchdi, Sulciman Pasha Abazah, Hassan Pasha Sherai, Mahmoud Pasha Fehmy, Isma'īl Pasha Hakki, Varashli Pasha, Raouf Pasha, Mohamed Pasha Sais, Kassim Pasha, Ibrahim Pasha Ferik. I was also there as Minister of War. The Khedive took notes of the opinions of the members in his own handwriting." *Nineteenth Century Review*, p. 982. It is easy to visualise Broadley suggesting inclusion for the English translation of an exhaustive listing of all those present at this vitally important meeting.

whose support for °Urābī vacillated frequently, held the post of President of the Chamber of Deputies at this time.

47. °Urābī is here implying that Sulṭān Pasha had indeed, however fleetingly, suggested °Urābī's exile, inter alia, as a solution to the crisis. In Sabry's version, however, there is the implication that Sulṭān never made the suggestion at all: "...note commune sur l'avis de Sultan Pacha qui en répudia, à plusieurs reprises, la paternité. Cette note..." L'Esprit National Egyptien, p. 264.

48 The government resigned on May 26, 1882.

49. Some financial guarantees would clearly have had to be made early in the discussions to which °Urābī here refers. In his so-called *Autobiography* stated verbally to Blunt in Cairo in March 1903, twenty years later, and attached as Appendix I to Blunt's *Secret History*, °Urābī reported that the French Consul did in fact offer him, on behalf of the French Government, £ 500 a month for life if he would take up permanent residence in Paris. °Urābī denied in the same conversation knowledge of involvement by the Rothschilds, whose investments are said to have totalled some £ 9,000,000 in Egypt at the time, in the offer. For Blunt's contrary views and comments see his *Secret History*, especially pp. 241, 334, and 487.

50. The inverted commas are not present in the original Arabic. The phrase is a commonly employed quotation from the Koran. Vide Sura 53 al-Najam v. 28.

51. The following sentences relating to the Khedive were omitted without comment from the original English translation.

52. Blunt maintains, in the *Secret History* pp.301 - 303, that it was the British Cabinet that requested to the Sultan the appointment of such a Commission. The plan, he states, was to have an Ottoman military representative of such stature and known ruthlessness lead the Commission that he would by his sheer force of character prevail on °Urābī to agree to self-exile in Istanbul. If this failed then, according to Blunt, the Commissioner was simply to shoot °Urābī dead. The Egyptian leader's popularity seems, however, to have been greater than London or Istanbul realised and so the Darwish mission failed. The Commission also included Sheikh Aḥmad As-°ad, who was sympathetically inclined to °Urābī and whose function was to report independently to the Sultan. Contrary to the understanding of the British Cabinet, Blunt suggests (op. cit. p. 305), the Sultan had actually reached no prior decision to execute °Urābī and viewed him as a potentially more compliant substitute to the Khedive Tawṣīq for close Ottoman control over Egypt. This view seems substantiated by the letters quoted in Note 46 above.

53. The *al-mabeyn al-humayūnī*, the Turkish term given in the manuscript, refers to the suite of offices and apartments within the palace in Istanbul where the Sultans met with their closest advisors and made their policy decisions.

54. The remainder of this paragraph is omitted from the Sabry version but given in condensed form in the *Review* version.

55. The *Review* version differs remarkably from both the S.O.A.S. manuscript and the Sabry translation from this point until the final paragraph that ends this section. The additional passage states:

I was therefore obliged to have recourse to the learned and pious Sheikh Mohamed Zaffer, the Sultan's confidant and spiritual advisor, whom I knew by fame, although I had never met him personally. I wrote to him, through Ali Fetoor Ragheb, contradicting all the projects which had been attributed to us, and requesting him to explain to His Majesty the loyalty of my feelings, and my strong attachment to the fundamental principles of our sacred law, which make it a duty to obey the Ameer El Moumreen (Commander of the Faithful).

The Sheikh was pleased to answer through Ali Fetoor aforementioned, his letter, written in the Turkish language, stated that he had laid before His Majesty the contents of my communication, that the Sultan was satisfied with my loyalty, and commanded me to persevere in my obedience; but added that His Majesty desired me to defend the country at all costs from invasion, lest it should share the fate of Tunis, and that he cared neither for Ismail, Halim or Tewfik, but for the man who should carry out his instructions. So, also, wrote Ahmed Ratib Pasha, with whom I had a long personal conference when he was journeying to the sacred places, whose letter came along with that of Mohamed Zaffer.

because Ahmed Pacha Ratib only arrived three days ago, and yet in that time, owing to his declarations of your fidelity and true intentions, His Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you. I only received the message I have just given you yesterday, and I hope to be able to send you by next week's post a more detailed letter. In every case be careful not to let any letters you send fall into strange hands, but try to get a special messenger, and as for this time it would be better if you were to send your answer by the hand of the man who brings this letter

Your servant,  
Muhamed Zaffer,

4 Rebi-al-Akhir, 1299. (February 22, 1882).

The following letter, of the same date, is from the Ahmed Ratib, aide-de-camp and Secretary to the Sultan, mentioned in the above:

I related to His Majesty the Sultan the conversation we had on the railway between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa on my return to Stamboul, and it caused great pleasure to His Majesty, and he ordered me to communicate to you his Imperial compliments. I related to His Majesty all the kind treatment I received at your hands, and the courtesy my eyes witnessed while I was in Cairo, and His Majesty was extremely gratified thereat, so that the satisfaction he felt in your devotion and fidelity was increased manifold. People had made him think that you were acting, I know not how, contrary to right, and had succeeded in perverting His Majesty's ideas about you; but now that I have exposed the true statement of the case to him I swear to you that His Majesty deeply regrets ever having paid any attention to these false and lying statements about you, and, as a good proof of this, His Majesty has commanded me to write this letter, and to express to you the sentiments which follow. It matters nothing who is Khedive of Egypt. The thoughts of the ruler of Egypt, his intentions and his conduct, must be governed with the greatest care, and all his actions must tend to secure the future of Egypt, and to uphold intact the sovereignty of the Caliph, while he must show the most perfect zeal in upholding the faith and the country's rights. This will be required of him. Of the persons who have been on the Khedivial throne, Ismail Pacha and his predecessors gave bribes to Ali Pacha, Fuad Pacha, Midhat Pacha, and other representatives of the Sublime Porte, traitors, and, after shutting the eyes of the officials, dared to overtax and oppress the Egyptians, and in addition to this they made heavy debts and brought the Egyptians under a grievous yoke, and today in the eyes of the world their state has specially appealed to our pity; (sic) but the whole position is an extremely delicate one, which calls for the necessity of finding a speedy and sure remedy. Therefore, it behoves you above all things to prevent anything that might lead to foreign intervention, and never to stray from the just and true path, nor to listen to any treacherous falsehoods, but in every way with watchful care to hinder the seditious projects of foreigners. This is the great hope of the Sultan, and, since we two shall correspond in the future, you must take the necessary precautions to prevent our letters from falling into strange hands. For this, the easiest way at present — and there is no safer channel you can find — is to trust your correspondence to the true and trusty man who carries this letter and that of Sheikh Muhamed Zaffer. I would also add that it is indispensable that you should send secretly some officer who knows well what is going on in Egypt, and who is a trusted friend of yours, to present at the footstool of His Majesty reports on the state of the country in true detail. I beg you to send the answer by the man who brings this letter.

Ahmed Ratib,

Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan

4 Rebi-al-Akhir. (February 22, 1882.).

Given in Broadley, op. cit. pp. 166-170.

The originals of these two letters eventually passed into the possession of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and he reproduced, almost verbatim, these same translations in his **Secret History** commenting on their significance as follows:

These two letters are records of such high historical importance that if ever my memoirs come to be printed they should be annexed to them in facsimile. They explain much of what happened later in June at the time of the Dervish Mission, and they prove that if Arabi took upon himself then and during the months of the war the position in some degree of dictator in Egypt, it was not without ample justification from a Mohammedan point of view, in the commands of the Caliph as head of his religion to protect the province against Christendom. They show, too, why it was that in the month of August Abdul Hamid was so loath to proclaim him a rebel, and how absurd was the charge of rebellion brought against him at his trial.

46. Abū Sulṭān Pasha, the respected Fellah octogenarian and early Constitutional leader

pour lui remettre une requête a S M le Sultan reduisant a neant cette legende de rebellion qu'on m'avait imputee . Je recus, en reponse, une lettre concluante de Sa Majeste, une autre de S E Ahmed Rateb Pacha une troisieme du Cheikh Mohamed Zafer tendant , toutes, a me rassurer . Du reste, elles sont entee en ma possession L'Esprit National Egyptien, pp 263-264

The sense of this comment, and with reference made to 'Asaad, Ratib and Zaffer', is reported in the Review version p. 981, suggesting that Broadley repositioned the information in this paragraph to a point in the summation of this section of the manuscript where its impact would be greatest

The papers that 'Urābī had kept stored in his house were released to his lawyers and translated by a "Mr Beaman." Broadley reports, however, that there was no trace of the "more explicit letters" of Ahmad As'ad despite references to them in other letters by the same writer. But 'Urābī's wife had preserved, in their original sealed envelopes, the following letters. Their evident importance, since they came from two of the Sultan's closest advisors, justifies their reproduction in the present text

From Muhamed Zaffer, Chaplain to the Sultan

To his Excellency the Egyptian Minister of War

Excellency, I have presented your two faithful letters to His Majesty the Sultan, and from their contents he has learnt all your sentiments of patriotism and watchfulness, and especially have the promises you make of your efforts to guard faithfully and truly His Majesty's interests been a cause of lively satisfaction to His Majesty, so much so that His Majesty ordered me to express his pleasure and his favour to you, and further bade me write to you as follows viz --

As the maintenance of the integrity of the Caliphate is a duty which touches the honour of every one of us, it is incumbent on every Egyptian to strive earnestly after the consolidation of my power to prevent Egypt from passing out of my hands into the rapacious grasp of foreigners, as the vilayet of Tunis has passed, and I repose all my confidence in you, my son, to exert all your influence and to put forth every effort to prevent such a thing happening. You are to beware never for one moment to lose sight of this important point, and to omit none of the precautionary measures which are called for by the age in which we live: keeping always before you as a perpetual goal the defence of your faith and of your country, and especially you must persist in maintaining your confidence and the ties which bind you.

That country Egypt - is of the highest importance to England and France, and most of all to England and certain seditious intriguers in Constantinople, following in the path of these Governments, have for some time past been busy with their treacherous and accused projects. Since they have found it to their profit jealously to promote these intrigues and seditions in Egypt, it is the especial desire of His Majesty that you should keep a very careful eye on these persons and things. According to the telegrams and news sent by the Khedive Tewfik, one of this party, we see that he is weak and capricious, and also it is to be remarked that one of his telegrams does not corroborate another, but they are all in contradiction. In addition to this I may tell you that Ali Nizami Pacha and Ali Fuad Bey have spoken to His Majesty most highly in your favour, and Ahmed Ratib has repeated to His Majesty the substance of the conversations he had with you in the railway carriage between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa, and, as His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed Pacha, he desires me again for this reason to express his trust in you, and to say that, as he considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness, he requires you above all things to prevent Egypt from passing into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for intervention there. The orders which Ahmed Pacha Ratib will receive on this head will be separately communicated to you. Both my letter and that of Ahmed Pacha Ratib, by order of His Majesty, have been written by one of His Majesty's own private secretaries, and, after we have affixed our seals to the letters, we also put an extra special seal on the envelopes. In a special and secret manner I tell you that the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik, but the man who thinks for the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind him to the Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to His Majesty's firmans, who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere, who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials, who does not dewane one hair's breadth from his line of duty, who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against them, and ever preserve his country and his faith intact—a man who does this will be pleasing, agreeable to, and accepted by our great lord, the Sultan. If I have not entered into any further details in this letter of mine I beg you to excuse me,

paragraph, as follows: "The Circassians were at once arrested, tried, and were all sentenced to exile in the Soudan, knowing that the climate there would be most trying to men born in a cold country, and would possibly be fatal to them" *Nineteenth Century Review*, p. 976.

32. The reference is to ʿUthmān Rifqī, who had earlier served as Minister of War and whose elevation to the rank of Pasha had originated with the Sultan.

33. This further charge of direct involvement by the Khedive was, of course, omitted from the Review version.

34. This sentence was omitted from the Sabry version.

35. The several paragraphs preceding, following and including this one are much abridged in the Review version, the damaging criticism of the Khedive and reference to his hatred for Sāmī being thus tactfully omitted.

36. Reference to the following events was totally omitted from the Review translation. A series of dots across page 978 suggest but do not specify an omission. The references to the demands of the British and French Consuls for changes in the Egyptian government and the accompanying circumstances were condensed into three short paragraphs on that same page; a close association between text and translation recommences with the paragraph "On the morning after . . ."

37. Interpreting a passive verbal form as an active, Sabry mistranslated this passage and directly to the Khedive as having: "... commit lâchement un acte de trahison à l'égard de L'Esprit National Egyptien, p. 262.

38. The Arabic *kānat min alladhīna yatabarraku bihim* . . . suggests that she was a clairvoyante, palmist or dream interpreter, a person credited with special powers and whose counsel might therefore be sought on personal matters. ʿUrābī's *Kashf al-Sitār* gives her name as ʿĀ'isha al-Kudīyyā. The somewhat garbled account therein states that her function was to prepare incense and perfumes for the Khedive and to recite incantations for him. The passage suggests that she offended the ruler by advising him to stop plotting against the reformists and to institute reforms himself. *Kashf al-Sitār*, p. 227.

In his introductory comments on ʿUrābī's 'Defense Statement' Broadley reports: "As an example of the events which appear to have been only too common at that time, he tells the story of the Lady ʿĀ'isha Hanem, who on an allegation of undue interference by supernatural means in the affairs of the Khedivial family, was banished either over or under the Red Sea without a hearing or a trial." *Nineteenth Century Review*, p. 115

39. A sarcastic reference, of course, to the British. In its paraphrase of this passage Sabry's version moves substantially away from the Arabic text while maintaining the general sense.

40. An Ottoman title, the Tutunji was traditionally in charge of the ruler's smoking pipes. The position permitted, as in Ibrāhīm Āghā's case, prominence as the Khedive's trusted confidant and instrument of his personal instructions.

41. Ibrāhīm Āghā had been implicated in the 'Circassian plot' and expelled with the others to Syria.

42. Presumably Muḥammad Ḥasan.

43. The Arabic is *aw al-mawt al-aḥmar*, there being a play on *al-baḥr al-aḥmar*, the Red Sea. His murder is obviously implied.

44. Broadley reports as factual the complaints of ʿUḥaybī and of the other defendants at threats of violence and attempts at intimidation made by this same man against them while awaiting trial in prison.

45. Sabry at this point translates as follows a paragraph that is not present in the Blunt manuscript:

Entre temps, Sayed Ahmed Assaad arriva au Caire, en route pour Constantinople. Je profitai de sa presence



23. Sabry gives the penalty as: "entre quinze jours et un mois." The **Review** version omits all details of the attempts mentioned here to subvert the army

24. No less an authority than the British Consul General in Egypt at the time, Sir Edward Malet, substantiated <sup>6</sup>Urābī's fears. He stated that: "spies were continually hovering about the residences of the Colonels... there was no doubt in the mind of Arabi Bey that he was to be murdered." Malet also gave his opinion that it was an incident on "the night of the 8th September," when an unidentified man who demanded but was refused access to <sup>6</sup>Urābī's house and was later seen entering the police headquarters, that directly precipitated the <sup>6</sup>Ābdīn confrontation of the following day. Most of the works of history, however, see the crisis arising directly from <sup>6</sup>Urābī's reluctance to accept a posting outside Cairo. For comments from Cromer and the quotation from Malet see Cromer, **Modern Egypt**, p. 143.

25. The International or "Mixed" Tribunals were instituted in February, 1876. Prior to their establishment suits against foreigners in Egypt had to be brought before the appropriate Consular courts, these were widely agreed to act in favor of the foreign communities. The foreigners could themselves sue native Egyptians before the same Consular courts and gain advantageous settlement by bringing diplomatic pressures to bear. The "Mixed" Tribunals were established to decide all cases involving a plaintiff and a defendant of different nationalities, whether or not either party were Egyptian. In suits involving real estate only, both parties could be of the same nationality. The composition of the Tribunals was international: the panels established for the Courts of First Instance and Appeal had a slight majority of foreign judges but were in all cases under the nominal presidency of an Egyptian. As is seen from <sup>6</sup>Urābī's admiring comment, the "Mixed Courts" were viewed as having greatly improved the prior system.

26. The section up to this point in this important paragraph is condensed to one sentence in the Sabry version, the references to Shaṙīf, Abū Sulṭān and Dā'ūd Pasha being omitted.

27. The following important passage, up to the sentence beginning: "As a consequence of these events..." in the following paragraph was condensed and adjusted in the **Review** version to read, "...seventeen millions of the public money instead of using it to pay the just debts of the country. Amongst other things they had discharged almost every native from the service, though their pay was small, and have given all responsible posts to Europeans, indifferent to the laws of right or wrong." <sup>6</sup>Urābī's emphasis on the financial grievances and the appointment of Sāmī as Minister of War, both significant elements in the crisis, were thus omitted from the original English translation

28. In 1871 Ismā'īl had instituted a **muqābala** system under which a property owner could pay his taxes for six years in advance and thereafter for perpetuity pay only one half the taxes that would otherwise have been levied. The Khedive's objective at the time was to have the resources to pay off the increasingly onerous National Debt. The plan failed, however, to achieve its purpose and in 1880 Sir Rivers Wilson prevailed upon the government to repeal the **muqābala** laws. This action was most unpopular with the landed aristocracy, many of whom became convinced that their interests would best be served by alignment with <sup>6</sup>Urābī and the Nationalists.

29. The **Review** version tactfully avoids <sup>6</sup>Urābī's implication of direct involvement by the Khedive. The sentences from "Within a few hours" to "the Khedive's palace" were changed to read: "The papers relating to this matter are to be found at the chief police station, indicating how and where the plot first originated." A.M. Broadley, "Instructions to my counsel," in **Nineteenth Century Review**, December 1882, p. 976.

30. The Sabry version gives the man's name as "Rachid Pasha Hassan." M. Sabry, **La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien** (Paris, 1924) p.260.

31. This entire paragraph, which underlines the Khedive's role in the plot, was omitted from the 1882 translation: the references to the exile of the Circassians that follows provide, moreover, the best example of the mistranslations occurring in that document. The **Review** version reads, from the reference to the Khedive and up to the sentence beginning "I asked..." in the following

‘Alī against the Mamluk princes, when he invited them to a celebration at the Citadel and then massacred them. ” ‘Urābī and his friends, he goes on, made plans to be rescued if taken into custody. But we are also told that ‘Alī Bey Fahmī was so disturbed to find himself in prison that he almost tried to kill himself by leaping out into the Nile! See *Kashf al-Sifār*, pp. 157- 158.

12. The Arabic wording is *al- mustakhdimīna wa al- mutaqa<sup>c</sup> idīna*.

13. In his *Kashf* memoirs ‘Urābī details how four named officers of middle rank refused to accept the appointment of the three regimental commanders to replace those dismissed and persuaded their soldiers to revolt. See *Kashf al-Sifār*, pp. 160- 161.

14. ‘Urābī recounts in the *Kashf* memoirs how he publicly embraced a Circassian officer, Ismā‘īl Pasha Kāmil, in front of the troops he was addressing to give dramatic impact to his speech. See *idem*, p. 159.

15. Baron de Ring is accused by Cromer of an active role in intrigues by ‘Urābī against the Khedive. Following representation from the Khedive to the President of France, de Ring was recalled, leaving Egypt on February 28. See Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, p. 141.

16. The *Kashf* memoirs give interesting details of this meeting. General Charles P. Stone Pasha, the American graduate of West Point who was then Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army, is said to have argued for military action against the rebels but was opposed by Lieutenant - General Ismā‘īl Pasha Kāmil, the Circassian officer referred to in note 14 above. The Khedive did decide to send orders to the Sudan regiment to advance to Cairo to put down the rebellious Guard regiment but Major Khuḍar Effendī Khuḍar, a supporter of ‘Urābī, had already imprisoned the regiment’s high command and was himself leading the soldiers to assist ‘Urābī. *Kashf al-Sifār*, pp. 162-4.

17. Mahmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī, whose name appears so frequently in the *Defence Statement*, was of mixed Circassian and Egyptian ancestry from an ancient and privileged family; he was a prominent figure in Cairo before ‘Urābī’s rise to fame. Service with the army had taken him on important assignments to Istanbul, Paris and London and had drawn him to the attention of Khedive Ismā‘īl, who appointed him head of his palace guard and sent him on diplomatic missions abroad. Under Tawfīq he played a major role in reorganizing the Egyptian General Staff and later served him as Minister of Waqfs. An intellectual, he was an influential figure in the foundation of the Khedivial library and the establishment of a Museum of Fine Arts in Cairo, and is still best known as a gifted and dedicated poet, a pioneer in the renaissance of Arabic poetry.

The native-born Egyptian officers ‘Urābī headed looked on Sāmī as an ally against the court and Circassian elite in the power struggles of early 1880 and 1881. Sāmī headed the government in which ‘Urābī became Minister of War and that was briefly in power prior to the crisis leading to the British bombardment of Alexandria. Having remained loyal to the Nationalists throughout the months of war preparation that followed, he was charged with sedition along with ‘Urābī and was convicted and exiled with him to Ceylon. His seventeen years of enforced residence there resulted in the posthumously published volumes of his original verse and anthologies for which he is now chiefly known.

18. The two preceding sentences are much condensed in the Sabry version.

19. The Arabic word used is *dā’ira* and refers to the Khedive’s personal court administration.

20. The Khedive’s harem and entourage included women of Circassian origins who were given in marriage to bureaucrats and soldiers to ensure their loyalty to the Egyptian throne and administration.

21. The *Kashf* account refers to the subversion of eight sergeants but curiously states that they were paid only eight Egyptian pounds apiece for their loyalty! *Kashf al-Sifār*, p. 219

22. The Ottoman military title given, *bekbāshi*, approximates that of Major or Lieutenant - Colonel; Sabry strangely gives ‘sergent’ indiscriminately for both this senior rank and that of *yuzbāshī*, approximately Captain, in his French version.

## NOTES

1. Since the early thirteenth century Egypt had been dominated by descendants of a caste of mercenaries purchased, by the country's then rulers, from the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The 'mamluks', as they were known, the word meaning 'slave' or 'one owned', soon established their own controlling dynasties over Egypt. Even at the end of the nineteenth century the country was still largely controlled by an elite of Turkic-Circassian origin allied to the court of Muḥammad Ālī and his heirs which was itself, of course, Albanian in origin and Turkish in speech.

2. The word used is **muwalladīna** (i.e., bred as an Arab, but not an Arab) a term recognized in Ottoman canonical law as connoting that the individuals to whom it referred had the status of adopted slaves or ex-slaves.

3. A high Ottoman title awarded to those who have performed some signal service to the state. The title could be applied to both civilians and those in the military services.

4. It is clearly stated in 'Urābī's autobiographical account given to Blunt in Cairo in March 1903 that only 'Abd al-Āl and 'Alī Fahmī were in fact waiting at his house. 'Urābī states there also how he learned at this party that he and 'Abd al-Āl were to be removed from their commands. The point is important, as the impression given in the present manuscript is clearly that the petition the three officers signed was on behalf of the army as a whole and bore no direct relationship to their personal situation. The Autobiography account is straightforward and specific. Describing the discussion between the three officers at 'Urābī's house, it also states:

We therefore took council what was to be done. 'Abd el - Aal proposed that we should go in force to Osman Rifqi's house and arrest or kill him, but I said, "No, let us petition first the Prime Minister, and then, if he refused, the Khedive." And they charged me to draw the petition up in form. And I did so, stating the case, and demanding the dismissal of Osman Rifqi, and the raising of the army to 18,000 men, and the decreeing of the promised Constitution. This we all three signed, though knowing that our lives were at stake.

5. The pilgrimage to Mecca is, of course, obligatory for all Muslims who have the means. The return home of a **Hajjī**, someone who has made the pilgrimage, is traditionally accompanied by elaborate celebrations arranged in his honor by the pilgrim's family and friends.

6. The Arabic given is **raḥul waṭanī**. 'Urābī and the reform movement were widely referred to as 'nationalists'. The **Taqrīr** printed version substitutes the words **aḥad al-miṣriyyīna**, 'an Egyptian'.

7. At the time colonelṣ 'Urābī, Fahmī, and Ḥilmī commanded respectively regiments stationed at 'Abbāsiyya, 'Abdīn, and Ṭūrā.

8. Cromer later observed that Sir Auckland Colvin and M. de Blignieres, the British and French Comptrollers, were "most unwisely excluded" from this meeting. **Modern Egypt**, 2nd edit. (London 1911), p.139.

9. The decision was then made that, after the dismissal and arrest of the three officers, there was to have been a Court Martial. Rifqī, as Minister of War, was to have presided over a court consisting of Circassian officers and two foreigners, Stone Pasha, an American and Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian army, and Laramie Pasha, a Frenchman who was Director of the Military Schools. See **Kashf al-Sīr al-Asrār**, (Cairo, no date), p. 157. and **Salīm al-Haqqāsh, Miṣr lil-Miṣriyyīna** (Cairo 1884), vol. 7. p.5.

10. The **Qaṣr al-Nīl** housed the official quarters of the Minister of War. It became subsequently the headquarters and Cairo barracks for the British forces in Egypt. Now demolished, its site approximates that of the present **Maidān al-Taḥrīr**.

11. 'Urābī's later account in his **Kashf** memoirs suggests that the Khedive's plot was very transparent. He states that the three colonels were sure it was a trick since they knew it was too early for the wedding celebrations. They assumed a deception similar to that of "Muḥammad

recounts truthfully, fairly and incontrovertibly the full story, from beginning to end, of the events that occurred. And all else but what is true is plain falsehood.

The End

16th Dhū al-Ḥijja 1299 A.H.

Equivalent to October 29, 1882—in the town of Columbo on the Island of Ceylon.<sup>94</sup>

Ahmad<sup>c</sup>Urābī  
The Egyptian

(Signed and marked twice with his seal.)

religions of others, and so how will mankind view such conduct in the annals of history? We will put our trust in the honor of the British nation to decide the issue.

Egypt was not at first engaged in war with the British government. Egypt was merely defending herself and hoping for the return of friendly relations with the British government which has for so long protected the rights of the Egyptian people. Egypt sought to keep the doors of peace open wide and was sure that when the truth was established Britain would not deny the Egyptian people their rights.<sup>92</sup> Our proof for this is in the apparent general improvement in agriculture, our measures controlling the Nile river, and the absence of anything detrimental to public tranquillity, making one think at first there were no war in progress in the country. Another proof is our protection of the properties and plantations belonging to Europeans, both in the capital and the countryside.

Yet a further proof is our surrender, even though we still had 70,000 regular and volunteer soldiers and great quantities of arms and military supplies. There were, too, numerous canals, bridges and ditches such as are commonly put to good use in military engagements; they would have been especially effective at a time when the Nile was high.

If I were a rebel why would I have surrendered when I still had all those large and numerous forces with me and the country ready to help me with men and money? And if all else had failed, why would I have surrendered myself in any case? Was not the whole wide world there to flee to? Or why could I not have gone to London and sought refuge there? All that should give cause for thought.

The absolute truth is that I was no rebel. I took action and the country, the whole Egyptian nation, took action with me to seek the emancipation of our land. We behaved with the utmost honor and respected all laws. I did not pursue any of the personal ambitions that detractors ascribe to me. In fact, I was entrusted with the country's protection by the Sultan himself, for my sincerity and the evil intentions of the Khedive had become quite clear to His Majesty. A letter to this effect came to me from His Excellency Sheikh Muḥammad Zāfir, one of the *khodjas* of the Imperial presence,<sup>93</sup> and there was another letter from Aḥmad Pasha Rātib, aide-de-camp to the Sultan; both are still in my possession.

My appointment, moreover, as commander of the army, charged to defend the country, came about in a perfectly legal way, firstly by order of the Khedive and of the Chamber of Deputies and secondly by the decision of the nation. Clearly no further proof is needed.

So, then, my statement herewith is at an end. For you, the counsels for my defense, the Honorable Mr. Broadley, the Honorable Mr. Napier, the Honorable Mr. Eve, and for all those champions of civilization who defend with their own persons and possessions the cause of justice, caring nothing for criticism and slander, and for you my trusted and admired friend, the Honorable Mr. Blunt and for his friends in Britain who also act to preserve the dignity of humanity, I have written this statement by my own hand. It

calling me a dog and a pig and asked, "What did you want from me anyway?" Then he spat at me three times. This, then, was Ibrāhīm Āghā, the Khedive's personal servant who had got away to Syria because of the theft of the diamonds from 'Ābdīn palace and the failure to hold an investigation with Muḥammad Ḥasan who had been sent off for disposal at sea, as I earlier mentioned.

And so here I am now in a room that has on one side two iron-barred windows with wooden shutters outside nailed tight which are never opened. When the servant brings the food from the house one of the Turkish guards takes it from him, opens the door and pushes it inside. Then he immediately locks the door again, leaving me alone as if I were some wild beast inside a cage! But cages at least have constant fresh air and are lit up at night. Yet we are absolutely deprived of valets and servants, which is insulting and degrading to the extreme.

All officers of the rank of major and above, along with some senior captains, captains and lieutenants, have been put in jail. This has also happened to many scholars of Islam, to members of the Chamber of Deputies, and to prominent mayors and merchants and others. The prisons of Cairo, Alexandria, and the provinces are consequently filled with them. The belief expressed by many Deputies that their Chamber would remain operative only so long as I did myself has indeed been proved true.<sup>91</sup> If I were removed from Egypt there would be no Chamber and no nation left. Following the elimination and exile of all Egyptians of prominence and distinction along with the destruction of their seats of influence the people of Egypt will become slaves in bondage and will be given only the meanest forms of employment.

That, then, was a war without precedent. It was the Khedive who caused the arrival of the warships to Egypt. Thereafter it was he who first both planned and agitated for war and foisted the whole affair on us. But then he sided with the army fighting against his country, the war continuing in his own name. The British soldiers actually fought in the name of the Khedive, on the justification that the Egyptian army was in rebellion. The Khedive issued proclamations saying that the British troops had no wish to seize possession of the country.

The war had thus many strange and different facets. If it were the army that was in rebellion what must all the people think now, when they see so many high members of the royal family in jail? And how about all those scholars of Islam, members of the Chamber of Deputies, prominent mayors and merchants, along with important government officials and other citizens filling the prisons in all the provinces and towns? And if the army and all those mentioned, along with all the rest of the Egyptian nation regardless of their religious affiliation, were united about and participating in one single action, which was that of justice and right, what must we think when we see that nation foremost in the support of those values actually overpower that unfortunate nation to please just one person? And all this even though that person is definitely not permitted, by the laws of his people, to be their ruler.

The British government has always, moreover, respected the laws and

Damyāt, and elsewhere. But out of our concern to prevent the country's destruction and relying on the honor of Britain and the fact that it does not want to annex Egypt, we have decided against further combat and have delivered ourselves up to your protection and honor."

He accepted this statement of ours and we remained with him for three days. Then we went to Ābdīn and remained under the charge of Colonel Thynne, the Commander of the British 'Grenadier' regiment, until October 4, 1882, living in great comfort. Then, on Thursday October 5, we were delivered over into the Egyptian prison. That was a terrible day for me, since they then separated me from my companion Tūlba Pasha, whose friendship I had so enjoyed. They put me in a totally empty room, without even a chair, then locked it. There I stayed; eventually my servant arrived but the guards refused to let him bring anything in except a rug and a blanket.

Then in came the officer whose task it is to degrade the prisoners. He searched me and took all personal papers I had with me to send them to the Commission of Inquiry. He and his aides left and then a group from the Khedive's entourage came in. Of them I knew only 'Uthmān Bey Ra'fat, manager of the Khedive's stables, and Ḥusayn Effendī Fawzī who belonged to the staff of the Khedive's protocol office. One man, one of those Turks who always ride in front of the Khedive and are willing to give up their lives if necessary, came over and set about searching me. He pulled my shirt outside my trousers but found only the amulet I wore to protect my children from the illness that produced the nervous convulsions from which they so suffered. He snatched at it forcibly and although I offered to take it off for him, he yelled, "No! I'm ordered to do it!"

He even took the shoes off my feet and searched them. Then they left. An hour later the door opened again and in came the editor of the Ahrām newspaper, Bishāra Taqlā. I thought he had come to visit me and to console me for my difficulties, since he had been with us before the war. He had sworn by his religion and his honor that he was truly one of us, a genuine partisan of liberty. We had admired and honored him. But now he had come only to berate and insult us. "Oh 'Urābī," he said disgustedly, "what have you done? What do I see has become of you?"

I could see that he was two-faced, a man without honor, and made him no reply. He then left.

Another hour later a group of Turks came in, all members of the Khedive's entourage, along with some of the guardsmen from his court. They searched the rug and blanket, threw them to left and to right and then left. That night they placed guards over the prisoners and then on October 6 at about 8:30 European time, equivalent to about 3:30 Arab time,<sup>90</sup> after I had taken off my shoes and fallen asleep, the door suddenly opened and in came a group of ten or perhaps a dozen people. I could not see them properly because it was so very dark. One of them spoke, his voice ugly and menacing: "Hey, 'Urābī, don't you know me?"

I thought they had orders to kill me, but I kept my poise and replied. "No, I don't. Who are you anyway and what do you want at a time like this?"

"I am Ibrāhīm Āghā!" he announced. Then he swore and cursed at me,

and artillery from the two sides lasted for two hours . Then a detachment of cavalry with their artillery came from the rear of the army and that caused our army to be cut up and dispersed ; that was on the 29th of Shawwāl 1299 A . H ., equivalent to September 13, 1882.

Following the collapse of the army, I went from Jabal 'Itāqa to Bilbays, with the British cavalry following close behind me . There I met 'Alī Pasha al-Rūbī and we went together to 'Inshās and took a train up to Cairo . We found the Council in session at the Ministry of War, with Their Highnesses the Princes also present . Following lengthy discussion and having assured ourselves that the British had no intention to annex Egypt, and the situation being as it was, the decision was made that there was no further need to resist . we relied on the fact that Britain is characterized as having a love for humanity and for justice in all matters . We believed that having studied the situation properly and having become aware of the feelings of the people, the British would surely strive to emancipate and protect them .

Following that, I sent a telegram on September 14 to His Excellency Riḍā Pasha, the Commander of the army division at 'Abbāsiyya which numbered some 35,000 men, that he should raise white flags if British troops approached . I instructed him to meet with their commander and to tell him that the war was over, that we were putting our trust in the honor of the British and were anxious to preserve the country from destruction .

At sunset, British and Indian cavalry units did arrive, the white flags were raised, and Riḍā Pasha went forward to meet General Lowe . I also sent out Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī, the Cairo chief of police, to meet the General . Prior thereto the Council had sent a delegation to Benhā to meet General Wolseley .

An hour and a half after sunset Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī arrived and informed me that the British General Lowe wished to meet with me at al- 'Abbāsiyya . Similarly the Commandant of the army division at Kafr al-Dawār who had arrived that day at the Ministry of War suddenly ( received ) a telegram from the commandant of the army division at al- 'Abbāsiyya informing him that the General wished to meet with him at once . We all went together to meet him at al- 'Abbāsiyya ; I had similarly sent 'Alī Bey Yūsuf, the commander of the regiment at the Citadel, to His Excellency ( the General ) as he had asked .

When I, along with Ṭulba Pasha, did meet General Lowe he asked, " Do you agree to give yourselves up as prisoners of the British government? "

" Yes, " we replied, " on condition that we will be under care of the protection and good honor of the British government . "

We then took off our swords and surrendered them into the hands of General Lowe who was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wolseley . We also<sup>88</sup> told him that as we were surrendering our swords and ourselves to the care and honor of Britain, our children and the voice of all humankind was calling upon England and all Englishmen to give us our full rights .

" Your Excellency, " we told him, " is acting for the British government and for all Englishmen . You should be informed that at al- 'Abbāsiyya there are 35,000 soldiers and a similar number at Kafr al-Dawār, Rashīd,



My respect for the public welfare and property is proved by my frequent telegraphic communications with His Excellency M. de Lesseps and his replies stressing the need to strictly respect the neutrality of the Suez Canal so long as warships did not use it as a battlefield. This neutrality was maintained until the warships did use it to shell the Nafīsha region. I then wrote to M. Lesseps stating that since the Canal had now been used as a field for battle, the laws of war now required us to consider it as such. He replied that we should do as the laws of war prescribe. I then telegraphed that to the commander of the Eastern Front, that great General Rāshid Pasha **حُوسَب**, and to the director of all the engineering projects, Maḥmūd Pasha Fahmī, to construct a dam over the Sweetwater Canal and over the Canal itself if that were possible under the war-time circumstances. By examining copies of the letters sent by de Lesseps to his son and to his wife in Paris, the intensity of my wish to respect the neutrality of the Canal may be clearly seen.

The fact that the mailboats continued to move after the outbreak of the war provides similar evidence for this. When we received a report from the Director of Traffic at Suez that our soldiers were stopping the ships. I telegraphed him to keep things moving as usual since a public facility was involved and to so explain the matter to the soldiers. The postal service continued to run smoothly until the British troops landed at Suez.

Also regarding our respect for the neutrality of the Canal, no armed force at all was sent over to protect the East bank. This was because we could not imagine the Canal being violated. We therefore made no defensive fortifications and ditches which could have been used to protect one another. And so when the British took Ismā'īliyya as their headquarters and engaged the Egyptian army, busy building defenses at al-Maḥsama, on Friday August 25, 1882, our forces were beaten. The British cavalry cut off their line of retreat and so Rāshid Pasha and Khālīd Pasha were captured. The famous engineer Maḥmūd Fahmī was himself also taken prisoner; he was so overcome with grief at the loss of that vital position adjoining al-Tall al-Kabīr as it did, that he was simply unable to leave it and take flight.

That same day I moved to al-Tall al-Kabīr, leaving Kafr al-Dawār under the command of Ṭulba Pasha. 'Alī Pasha Fahmī left Cairo, bringing the First Regiment of infantrymen as reinforcement to al-Tall al-Kabīr. More detachments of men of the artillery, the cavalry and the infantry arrived constantly and worked to construct the fortifications and ditches which would lead from al-Saliḥiyya to al-Tall al-Kabīr, to al-Dār al-Bayḍā' to Jabal 'Itāqa in such a way as to enable the positions to protect one another and to defend the villages without loss, as had happened at Kafr al-Dawār. Nevertheless two military engagements did occur near the bridge at al-Qaṣāṣīn, at both of which the opposing armies fought most bravely. In them General Rāshid Pasha Husnī and 'Alī Pasha Fahmī were wounded and sent back to Cairo, 'Alī Pasha al-Rūbī coming down instead as commander of the Army. But before we were able to complete the defense fortifications I mentioned, British and Indian forces made a surprise attack. It was a cavalry charge including mobile artillery that can be moved quickly anywhere, and came unexpectedly at early light of dawn. Devastating fire from the cavalry

accept any letters or telegrams he might like to send to his mother , his commanding officer or to anyone else . Eventually this officer's mother sent me a telegram from London thanking me for the fine care of her son about which he had written to her . For accommodation he was given the palace that had been set up for the upbringing of the Khedive's sons .

Then another officer , who was said to be Italian , was also captured , well treated and sent up with similar instructions that he be accommodated along with Dudley de Chair , since he was in the service of the British army . Then I was brought a naval officer , an Italian who had been found by a patrol of the Maryūt division wandering near exhaustion in the salt-fields wearing nothing but a shirt . They gave him some soldiers' clothes and sent him up , treating him with all respect . I found him to be very weak and with his feet badly affected by the salt and so I had him conducted to the hospital at Kafr al-Dawār and had some clothes brought specially for him from Cairo . He was still in the hospital until the final day and I do not know where he is now .

M . de Lesseps had spoken to me about this officer before we found him . By the time he was there the telegraphic communications between Cairo and Ismā'īliyya were disrupted and I was unable to give any information about him ; he also declined to give any news of himself to the Consul of his own country . The reason for his being found without clothes was as follows : he said he had thrown away his shoes and walked barefoot but that eventually the salt had burned his feet . He had then torn up one piece of his clothing to make bandages for his feet and walked on with them until they became loaded with dirt and mud . He then took them off his feet and replaced them with other pieces of clothing he tore off . This went on until he used up everything except his shirt .

We also captured two officers , one doctor and nine soldiers who came ashore from a sail boat over towards Abū Qīr . The officer in command of the Abū Qīr division sent them to us with all dignity . After an investigation , it became clear that they were Austrian and from an Austrian ship . They had come to that area by mistake having failed to understand the map correctly because the position for al-Bathāna had been replaced with that of Maḥall al-Siḥḥa . After we received a letter from the Austrian Consul in Alexandria , we sent them back to their ship , with them expressing their thanks for the proper treatment they had received . The case of the two officers captured by forward troops of the division at al-Sāliḥiyya was similar . They were sent with every dignity to Cairo along with the cash they had with them which totalled three hundred pounds sterling . Similar also was the case of the officer who was captured in the cavalry engagement between the two armies in the battle at al-Qaṣāṣīn ; he too was honorably treated and sent to stay with Dudley de Chair .

This , then , was the way we treated our prisoners , though we are accused of being barbarous . How , one wonders , are we not treated in a similar way , having surrendered ourselves to a great and honorable nation , the British ? How is it that we have been put in jail by our enemy , who longed so much to see us in such circumstances , as if he was not himself , like us , at war with England . We will rely on those who champion civilized conduct to decide .

give them prison sentences of specific lengths in the Citadel. The greater vigilance of the soldiers, who were now dispersed into various parts of the province, resulted in fear being replaced by a widespread sense of hope and security of mind. A certain European Jew named Ibrāhīm, with an estate near Birkat Ghaṭṭās, will testify to this fact.

Civil disorders also similarly occurred in the province of Ṭaṇṭa, where refugees from Alexandria went on a rampage and some Europeans were killed. Because of this the governor, Ibrāhīm Pasha Adham, was replaced and sent for trial by the Council for his failure to maintain security in the province. I also quickly sent in both infantry and cavalry troops to Ṭaṇṭa, Zifta, al-Maḥalla, and other important towns in the provinces and this action restored peace and security. Even previously to this I had sent out notices to all the provinces, governorates, and administrative offices emphasizing the need to protect the lives and property of all Europeans both in their towns and villages. I instructed that all those dwelling with us were under our protection and subject to the same privileges and obligations as ourselves. They were our brothers in common humanity and that included even the British. Only those actually bearing arms against us on the battlefield could be considered our enemies. Similarly, it was our duty to protect any foreigners wishing to leave for their native countries; we should guard and preserve them as we did our land and children until they should reach a place of safety. This was in accord with the honored precepts of Islamic law. All this is quite apparent from records kept in each office of the governmental administration. In fact, some Europeans wanting to go to Ismā'īliyya were provided an army guard to see that they arrived there safely. M. de Lesseps and M. Mazzeiti, Italian Consul at al-Zaqāziq, and M. Dupont, French Consul there, will testify to this. Similarly, the despatches I sent by telegraph to this effect to the Ministry of War, to al-Manṣūra, to al-Zaqāziq and elsewhere provide similar testimony. The effect of these instructions was to reestablish good friendly relations between the people and the remaining Europeans so that many European businessmen did return from Ismā'īliyya and Port Sa'īd to Cairo. The names of these are known to Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī, officer-in-charge of the Police Department at that time.

I also sent instructions to the Cairo Police Department and to the various provincial administrations of Lower Egypt that refugees from Alexandria should be distributed among the towns and wealthy families of prominence. I recommended that people be asked to help and accommodate them in all ways possible while the refugees were away from their own homes. As a result they did receive fine treatment of inestimable value.

Early in August 1882 an English officer named Dudley De Chair was taken prisoner by our troops of the Abū Qīr detachment. He was well treated and sent up to me by their commandant, Khurshīd Pasha Ṭāhir. I welcomed him, offered him a seat, made him feel at ease and treated him like a friend. I housed him like an honored guest and then sent him up to Cairo with instructions to the Ministry of War that he be given accommodation worthy of the nobility and provided with an English-speaking officer for companionship. I ordered them to treat him with the utmost respect<sup>85</sup> and

accordance with what was both right and legal or in treason and violent aggression and therefore contrary to both right and justice.

As well as all this,<sup>84</sup> people donated cattle, water-buffalo and sheep in amounts impossible to assess. Large quantities of plums, grapes and melons were also constantly arriving as gifts for the army from all quarters, as is clear from the records of telegrams at Kafr al-Dawār, al-Tall al-Kabīr, Rashīd and Damietta. Donations also came from the estates of Riyād Pasha and Khayrī Pasha, even though they were both out of Egypt, as well as from the estates of members of the Khedivial family.

In spite of all this, messages continued to be sent in cipher code by telegraph between Ra's al-Ṭīn Palace (the Khedive's headquarters at Alexandria) and certain individuals in Cairo and Istanbul; this went on until telegraph communication with Ra's al-Ṭīn was eventually cut. This gives cause for reflection to fair-minded people.

Shortly after we arrived at Kafr al-Dawār, moreover, we discovered that some bedouin and half-breed louts had been pillaging and robbing the refugees from Alexandria and those in the suburbs. The country estates and villages of Buhayra province were consequently in a state of great agitation — so much so that the provincial government sent us a telegram that the bedouins had even threatened estates close to Damanhūr, the capital of the province. On one estate a Copt and his wife had been killed, leaving an unweaned baby; their names are on the complaint presented to us by one of the family's relatives. This incident greatly distressed me and I kept thinking about that poor baby. I promptly wrote to the provincial government ordering the capture of those responsible and instructing that the baby be properly cared for. I continued pressing the matter until finally they (the culprits) were captured; they confessed to having killed the man and his wife and are still held in the provincial jail, although I do not know what it has been decided to do with them.

Because of all this, I sent out the troops necessary into the towns and estates of the province to protect the inhabitants and their property and prevent such violence. Then I wrote to the Council to replace the governor of that province, Ibrāhīm Bey Tawfiq al-Turjumān. It was later learned that this man had given instructions to the bedouin chiefs to pillage the countryside if war broke out in order to disperse the strength of the army. I sent word to the governorate of Daqhiliyya province to send him under guard to the Ministry of War. To that Ministry I wrote a report of what was known about him and stressed the need for an investigation by the Military Court of the allegations against him. The bedouin sheikhs did not, in fact, obey his instructions, which were so inhumane and barbaric. His orders did, however, become rumored amongst some of the bedouin riff-raff and half-breeds and so their misdeeds resulted. Many of them were seized, along with their plunder, and they were sent for punishment to the Council, along with information regarding what they had done and the items found in their possession. Details of all this are with the records office attached to the military staff command which was at Kafr al-Dawār. The Council did later

Minister for the Interior , Buṭrus Pasha , the Deputy-Minister for Justice , Ya‘qūb Sāmī Pasha , Deputy Minister for War , and Aḥmad Pasha Nash‘at , Director of the Khedivial Affairs Administration , along with others . It was somewhat similar to a provisional Republic,<sup>82</sup> designed to preserve the country’s order until such time as the disaster - filled storm clouds gathering over Egypt might disperse .

All this transpired without my attendance at or participation in any way in this Council or its deliberations until they themselves entitled me “ Protector and Guardian of all Egypt ,” a designation by which everyone began addressing me .

But where now are men of justice and honor ? From all that has been stated it must be overwhelmingly obvious that this war , without precedent in the speed and manner in which it materialized so strangely and unexpectedly , was indeed lawful and legitimate . I was clearly ordered to go to war by authority of that Council over which the Khedive presided , as also by reason of the Khedive’s very edict issued dismissing me and his accompanying instructions . These showed he had commanded me to continue fighting and only dismissed me because the army had been routed . I was similarly ordered to defend and protect the country by authority of the decision of the General Council , which was itself an expression of the entire Egyptian nation regardless of religious affiliation or denominational differences . The Khedive , moreover , no longer had authority to rule over the country after its people decided that he had stepped beyond the boundaries of the law.<sup>83</sup>

It is commonly understood that , in accordance with the law of Islam , one must participate in the **jihād** , the righteous and holy war , either with one’s person , one’s wealth , or one’s moral support . The Egyptian nation , for all its variety of religious affiliation , did indeed do its duty in defense of the homeland . The people offered themselves and their sons , volunteering willingly , and did spend their wealth for the sake of honor and the nation . Some contributed half their work and others contributed everything they owned . One person gave thirty horses and 3 ,000 ardabs of grain . These facts can be verified from the telegrams that arrived directly and without intermediary from the people in the provinces either to the Ministry of War or to us at Kafr al-Dawār . These facts are also apparent from the telegrams of thanks I sent to these voluntary contributors , as well as from the telegrams we received from the governors of the provinces .

In a period of thirty days approximately 100 ,000 men , regular soldiers , volunteers , and bedouin , had assembled and the stores were filled with plenty of provisions . Some 8 ,000 horses and mules also were contributed and about 4 ,000 camels along with considerable sums of money that was equally unsolicited . Such enthusiasm as this knows no parallel in all the history of Islam up to the present time . Public opinion was united ; all the most prominent men of the country , men of stature and education , kept coming to us at Kafr al-Dawār and even Ra’s al-Wādī , offering their best advice .

This all being as we have stated then , the Egyptian nation , regardless of religious affiliations , must be viewed as having gone to war either in

they would no doubt agree. But if they were being compelled to stay in Alexandria under guard by the troops at war with the country, then the delegation would return to Cairo and report to the Council for what action it might then decide. This delegation was composed of 'Alī Pasha Mubārak<sup>78</sup> and Ra'ūf Pasha, along with Sheikh Aḥmad Kubbūwah, The Sheikh in charge of the Upper Egyptian division of al-Azhar, and Sheikh Alī Nā'il representing the scholars of Islam; al-Sayyid Aḥmad Bey al-Suyūfī and Sa'īd Bey al-Shammākh,<sup>79</sup> the Agent for Western Tripoli, represented the merchant class.

They were despatched and returned again to Cairo, except for 'Alī Pasha Mubārak and al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Suyūfī who were detained in Alexandria. When the delegation came back to us at Kafr al-Dawār, they reported that: "Truth can never gain from falsehood" and that a man who has deceived the Muslim community could not be considered a Muslim himself. Those at Alexandria were, they said, totally under the control of the British. No one could leave the city without a permit from them, although they had been told to state the contrary. A proclamation had, moreover, been signed and issued by the Khedive on the 4th of Ramadān, equivalent to July 20, 1882 that is, informing the people of my removal from office.<sup>80</sup> The grounds stated were that I had failed to obey the Khedive's orders to send troops towards al-'Ajamī to defend it and to prevent the British forces landing in that area. I had, it said, also abandoned Alexandria without cause and taken the troops to Kafr al-Dawār. All this was also presented to the General Council.

A telegram from the Khedive to the Deputy-Minister of War now came to that same effect and also ordered him to cease all preparations for battle. At that point, an enormous meeting was held, attended by over 500 people including three princes, the Sheikh of Islam, the Chief Judge of Egypt, the Grand Mufti, al-Sayyid al-Sādāt and al-Sayyid al-Bikrī as well as many of the most renowned scholars of Islam. The patriarch of the Copts, the Bishop, as well as many priests also attended, along with the Chief Rabbi of the Jews. The Deputy-Ministers and Directors and Deputy-Directors of all government agencies, governors, and judges and Muftis from the provinces as well as many Deputies of the Chamber, village mayors, important merchants, and many senior and retired members of the Khedivial court and administration were present as well.

All the documents and proclamations that were issued by the Khedive and what I had written were examined by the Council, and following their deliberations it was decided to put a stop to<sup>81</sup> the Khedive. His orders would in future be disregarded since he had acted outside both civil and religious law. It was also decided that the country must be defended and that I be charged with conducting this defence, since I was already there with the army at the front at Kafr al-Dawār.

A document to this effect was signed by all members of this Council and a report about this decision was sent by telegram to His Majesty the Sultan giving the names of its most prominent signatures. My appointment was officially announced and an Administrative Council was formed to examine the state of the country. Its members included Ḥusain Pasha, the Deputy-

in a state of war and that, martial rule having gone into effect, anyone disturbing the peace would be punished according to military law. A military tribunal was for that purpose set up within the Ministry of War.

Since the Khedive had gone into Alexandria after the civilians and soldiers had left it, and was under British guard, either he was now a prisoner or he had deserted to that army engaged in battle with his country. In either case, the nation could not, in accordance with the stipulations of Islamic law, be left without a ruler. For in the first case, that of his capture, he could not be both a prisoner and a ruler properly caring for his country's interests. Similarly, the country could not be abandoned to anarchy, with no ruler to care for the people's interests. In the second case, that of his desertion, the Koran would have judged him to exile from the community of Muslims and it would therefore not be right for him to govern Muslims. Because of all this, I sent a telegram to the Deputy Minister of War, Ya'qūb Pasha Sāmī, to have the Council look into the matter. I also sent a telegram about this direct to the Sultan's personal quarters in Istanbul.

On approximately July 17, a telegram<sup>76</sup> from the Khedive arrived which placed all the responsibility on me as the cause for the outbreak of war. It insisted that the works in progress in the forts and the installation of guns in them had not been stopped. It said that peace had now come and that I had to go to speak with him personally. From that I learned that he was a prisoner and that he had been ordered to summon me so that I could be seized.<sup>77</sup> I also concluded that he was blaming me for having caused the war to save himself.

I consequently sent a telegram to His Highness saying that his siding with the army at war with his country had had a very bad effect on people. I requested him to inform me of the terms of the peace so that I would be able to go to Alexandria. He made no reply to me and so I sent a telegram to the Deputy-Minister of War to have this matter discussed by the Council. Telegrams were also sent by both the Khedive and Rāghib Pasha, who was the Prime Minister, to all agencies of the government saying that peace had come and that preparations for war should be discontinued; these preparations were, as a consequence, somewhat curtailed, despite the occurrence of skirmishes involving some of the army's advanced elements at Ḥajar al-Nawāṭīyya.

I therefore wrote again to the Deputy-Minister of War to have that fact too discussed at the Council; since skirmishes involving advanced elements of the army were occurring, we knew that we were not, in fact, at peace. I wrote to the provincial governments that they should comply with supply requests from the Ministry of War without delay and that they should pay no heed to any orders other than my own.

At that point a General Council Meeting was held at the Ministry of the Interior to consider all these matters. It was attended by the Deputy-Ministers and heads of governmental agencies and also by men of prominence in every field; they engaged in discussions about this whole affair that had so dumbfounded the country. They finally decided to send a delegation to the Khedive at Alexandria to request both him and the Ministers to return to Cairo, the nation's capital. If they were free agents

surrounded the palace to protect him . The Khedive then sent back Ḥusain Bey al-Turk , his aide-de-camp , along with His Excellency Ṭulba Pasha to convey his regards and thanks to me . But by the time they reached me most of the troops , for reasons that will be explained , had left the town in disorderly fashion , only very few having assembled there at Bāb-Sharqī . Many officers did arrive including Naṣīm Bey, the officer-in-charge of the Alexandria shoreline . They reported that the ships had gone below Burj al - Silsila to be able to shell the Bāb al - Sharqī barracks and to cut off the lines of retreat.<sup>73</sup>

I considered that it would be impracticable to assemble the troops in such circumstances and that I had to find a suitable position where this could be accomplished and where they could overcome their state of shock and confusion . I therefore ordered colonels ʿĪd Bey and Sulaymān Bey Sāmī to gather the men with them together and to move out to the Maḥmūdīyya Canal after all the civilians had left. I then went in Rāghib Pasha's carriage as far as the railway junction . There I descended from his carriage since he was going on to the Khedive . I set off to the Maḥmūdīyya hurrying as fast as I could to reach the head of the line of people in order to stop the soldiers . It was after sunset when I reached the railway bridge over the Maḥmūdīyya Canal and there , over behind the canal , I selected a piece of land . Then I found a bugler and told him to sound the signal to assemble . From then on till morning the soldiers gradually gathered . The officers I had left in Alexandria arrived with their troops only at seven o'clock at night because the roads had not been clear ; the canal banks were both very crowded with people , domestic animals , carriages and the like, all shouting and lamenting what had happened .

At approximately five hours after nightfall<sup>74</sup> Ṭulba Pasha arrived and told me about the soldiers who were supposed to have surrounded the palace and how this was not at all the case . He told me that the Khedive was pleased with me and had sent Husain Bey al-Turk to give me his regards . The latter had accompanied him as far as the bridge but since it was crowded and dark and he had no knowledge of that area he had returned to al-Ramal .

On the morning of Thursday, July 13, 1882, I could see that the troops now gathered there were less than one third of the total ; the greater part of the army had gone on ahead . I also perceived that the position selected was not appropriate , since it was within range of the shells from the ships and there were salt-beds at its rear . So we led the troops away until we reached a place called ʿIzbat Khurshīd , which lay some 5,000 metres to the south of Milāha station . The troops remained there until the next day , about half the army now having gathered . That day special trains were sent from Cairo to al-Ramal to transport back to Cairo the Khedive , his family and those of his court there with him . The trains were in fact sent but returned empty ; it was clear that the Khedive had gone along with his family and entourage into Alexandria and that he was now under British guard.

On Friday, July 14, I accompanied the troops to ʿIzba Kanj ʿUthmān which we made our camp ; there the work of building defenses began . On July 11, the day Alexandria was bombarded, the Prime Minister had sent telegrams to all agencies of the government announcing that the country was



Mahmūdīyya Canal. They were panic-stricken, men caring nothing for their wives, women making no attempt to find their children. The children were screaming and the women weeping, as though judgement day had come. It was an awesome sight to witness. I got down from my carriage and went forward on foot until I reached the East Gate, where I found ʿĪd Bey, a Colonel. I asked him the reason for all this and he said that rumors that the ships were about to shell the town had caused those still there to flee. The soldiers were also in disorderly flight with their wives and children. ʿĪd Bey said he was in the process of gathering some troops from the regiment and I told him to hurry up and do so and to prevent the soldiers from leaving. I then took up position at the Gate myself to stop them.

I was told that Sulaymān Bey Sāmī was acting insanely and that he and a body of troops had tried to set the town afire.<sup>71</sup> I sent for him at once and he soon arrived with one or two ill-ordered companies. I asked him about the report that he wanted to burn down the town but he denied it and said he had a battalion of men scattered through the streets leading to the harbour to prevent the soldiers from the warships from getting ashore. But I discovered that some of the men had quantities of calico<sup>72</sup> cloth with them and I ordered Sulaymān Bey to confiscate it all and identify those on whom it was found. He did gather it together and set it alight but I told him not to burn it but to keep it until it could be handed over to the police department, after investigation of why and how it came into the possession of these soldiers.

I continued passing around among the soldiers reminding them of their honor and duty, discouraging men from desertion and ordering them to continue in defense of the country. I also saw that among the civilians leaving the city there were many bedouins. They all bore arms and carried pieces of color-printed calico that seemed to be new and not the sort of necessity that seems appropriate for desert-dwelling bedouins. It seemed that their gathering around the Khedive's palace was for this purpose alone; they must have taken some goods from the shops and burned others, not realizing the consequences.

I was still there restraining the soldiers and persuading them not to leave the town when Ḥasan Pasha al-Sharīfī, Sulaymān Pasha Abāza, Ḥusain Bey al-Turk, the Khedive's aide-de-camp, and Muḥī al-Dīn Effendī, who was Darwīsh Pasha's aide, arrived on the scene. They informed me that the troops at al-Ramal, both cavalry and infantry, had drawn their weapons and surrounded the palace; they demanded why this had happened. I was dumbfounded to hear this and when I overcame my surprise I despatched Ṭulba Pasha to disperse the troops from the palace and to find out why this had happened. I was innocent of any role in this affair. I then asked Sulaymān Bey Sāmī why the infantrymen had been sent from the regiment to al-Ramal. He replied that he had observed ships heading for al-Ramal and so had sent four companies there as reinforcements on his own authority alone. When Ṭulba Pasha arrived at the palace he found no problem. It became apparent that the soldiers had seen ships moving towards the fort at Burj al-Silsila, which was near al-Ramal, and had thought they were moving in to capture the Khedive. They had therefore drawn their weapons and

the territories of the Egyptian government to any foreign state. Ṭulba Pasha was, therefore, to return to the Admiral and so inform him.

Ṭulba Pasha did set off but because it was a long way and time was too short, he was late for the appointment. When he arrived at the Naval headquarters<sup>69</sup> he learned that the admiral's representative had indeed been there at the stated time and had left a message saying that since the appointed hour had passed with no reply from the Khedive, he had gone back, and that the bombardment of the city would recommence.

At the Council meeting, the Khedive had ordered me to send a force of men over to Fort al-'Ajamī so that the British troops would be unable to make a landing. I objected to His Highness that the land was exposed there and that shells from the ships would prevent our infantry from getting near the coast, apart from the fact that communications between the fort and Alexandria had been broken. The Khedive therefore became very angry and demanded: "What sort of soldiers are you if you can't keep enemy troops out of your country?"

Then the meeting broke up and I went with Rāghib Pasha to his house on the bank of the Maḥmūdīyya Canal, discussing on the way the violence and anger of the Khedive and his fear that Fort al-'Ajamī would be taken by the British. We were very surprised to see so many armed bedouin around the palace at al-Ramal, despite all the soldiers there. We thought there had to be some extraordinary reason for them to have gathered there without the Ministry of War having played any rôle. We recalled the rumors that the Sheikh of the 'Awlād 'Alī bedouins had been asked by the Khedive, through Ibrāhīm Tawīq, the Governor of al-Buḥayra province, to send a telegram to Europe saying that he was opposed to the Egyptian army and that on receiving orders from the Khedive, he would be quite capable of teaching the army a lesson and putting it to flight. That was during the period when the government was without a Ministerial Cabinet, before the appointment of Rāghib Pasha.

We remained in his house for about an hour; a summons came then from the Khedive and we went together to the palace at al-Ramal. The Khedive informed me that four companies of infantry had arrived there and asked me why this was. Since I was unaware of the real reason for that I told His Highness that I did not know<sup>70</sup> but assumed that they might have come to strengthen the palace guards. He replied that the guards already present were sufficient and told me to order them off to service in the army, which would be more appropriate and useful. I therefore went out and asked the officer in charge of them why they had come and on whose orders. He told me that his superior officer, Sulaymān Bey Sāmī, had ordered him to come to strengthen the guard. I then instructed him to go back to his regiment because there the Khedive had no need for more troops, the guards already present being sufficient.

Leaving him, I then made my way towards Alexandria. When I approached the waterworks over by the city's East Gate, I met with an enormous mixed crowd of civilians and soldiers, heading towards the

no war raging between his government and the British . But then , strange are the ways of the Lord.<sup>66</sup>

When the guns ceased firing , I went<sup>67</sup> along with the Ministers to the Khedive and we detailed to His Highness what had transpired that day and he expressed his gratitude for the fortitude shown by the troops . I pointed out to him that if the objective had been the destruction of the forts , this was achieved : if the objective was something else , what should we therefore do now ?

A council meeting was then convened and presided over by the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha , the Sultan's representative , to decide what should be done now , after the destruction of the forts , if the fighting were to continue . After long discussion , it was decided that if the ships opened fire again then white flags were to be raised on all the forts as a signal that the fighting should cease and peaceful discussions begin . Thereupon Ṭulba Pasha and Dikrān Bey were to go in a state barge over to Admiral Seymour's ship and inform him that the Egyptian government considered it had no substantial area of conflict with the British government , except the fighting itself . We considered , moreover , that we had always properly maintained the rights of the British government and its subjects . The envoys were to point out that if the original objective had been to remove the guns , the forts were now all destroyed and the guns out of action . We had , moreover , no longer any force with which to fight the ships and had no wish for war . They would ask for his ( the admiral's ) comments on all this . It was night-time when the council meeting ended . I gave the agreed instructions to all the forts and then went to Bāb Sharqī , where I spent the night .

On the morning of July 12 , 1882 , two hours and a half before mid-day , the ships began firing on the town . White flags were raised on all the forts but the ships paid no attention until after they had fired some twenty - five or thirty shells . Then the firing ceased and Ṭulba Pasha set out to the admiral at sea . He was received by one of the admiral's officers and Ṭulba Pasha informed him of the decisions made by the Khedive and the Council . The officer then informed him that His Excellency the Admiral required the surrender of three positions neighboring one another , namely the forts of al-<sup>c</sup> Ajamī , al-Mīks , and Bāb al- Arab . These he would use as a base for the British army.<sup>68</sup> He wanted , moreover , an order to that effect from the Khedive by three o'clock that afternoon , after which time he would recommence the bombardment and take the positions by force .

By then only an hour and a half remained before the deadline and Ṭulba Pasha hurried back to al-Ramal , where I as well as the Prime Minister had already gone . Ṭulba Pasha presented the Admiral's demand to the Khedive and a Council meeting was convened over which he and Darwīsh Pasha presided . This meeting was attended by Ismā'īl Pasha Ḥaqqī , known as Abū Jabal and a member of the Ikhtiyārīya ( the Khedive's court administration ) , and by Abū Sulṭān Pasha , the President of the Chamber of Deputies . It was decided to inform Istanbul of the matter since the Sultan's firmān ( his decree of appointment ) did not authorize the Khedive to give away any portion of

eaten and the weapons in Qā'id Bey, dating from the time of Ismā'īl Pasha, were the only ones new when put there.<sup>60</sup>

If the admiral's request were not met then he would start firing on the forts at sunrise on July 11, 1882 and continue until they were totally destroyed. A Council meeting of the Ministers was then held which included selected representatives from the country's notables and took place under the chairmanship of the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha and Qadrī Bey from the Ottoman delegation.<sup>61</sup> Following discussion, it was decided to send the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior, along with the Commissioner of the Navy, and Dikrān Bey, one of the men of the Khedive's court, to Admiral Seymour and to assure him that no work was in progress inside the forts and that no renovated weapons had ever been set up in them. They were, moreover, ready for his own inspection. He would also, despite all this, be permitted to take out three guns from these forts simply for his own satisfaction.

The above envoys went and then returned with the admiral's final communiqué, to the effect that all the weapons were to be brought out. He did, however, concede that Egyptian soldiers instead of British troops could undertake the dismantling of the guns. After lengthy discussion<sup>62</sup> by the above-mentioned Council, it was decided that the removal for no military need of guns positioned in the forts for fifty years would be highly demeaning, an insupportable dishonor. Since we did not desire to go to war with any nation, especially Britain, and would only do so to maintain our honor, we would reply to any bombardment of the forts by the ships only after they had fired five or six shots. The Khedive was meanwhile showing intense enthusiasm and courage and kept saying that if fighting broke out he would himself bear a rifle and be at the forefront of the troops. So the meeting ended and the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha informed Istanbul of the decision that had been made.

At the stated time next morning a shot was fired from the admiral's ship and then all the other ships began firing. After some fifteen shots from them, the fort guns replied and the fighting blazed continuously for ten and a half hours until the forts were all destroyed, since they were of the old-fashioned type. Their guns were ruined and Ra's al-Tīn palace was damaged. Fires broke out where many of the shells struck houses inside the city, especially those towards the Alexandria railway station. This was because many of the shots were fired at Fort Damās where I and all the Ministers were. Consequently some of the shots fell on neighboring houses and on the railway station. Eventually both sides ceased fire.

Throughout this violent battle two aides-de-camp of the Khedive and Muhīy al-Dīn Effendī, Darwīsh Pasha's aide, kept bringing us encouragement and greetings from their masters and praising the fortitude and courage of the troops despite the lack of preparedness in the forts and the excellence of the weaponry of the British ships.<sup>63</sup> We were, nevertheless, very surprised that the Khedive should remain in the palace at al-Ramal,<sup>64</sup> down on the beach, quite unconcerned and fearless<sup>65</sup> for the ships, as if there were

## PART TWO: INCIDENTS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Concerning the savage war.<sup>57</sup>

What, then, was this savage war? It was the war waged by the British! That nation with so many champions of civilization; that nation that defends the downtrodden, that nation that emancipates slaves from servitude, that nation that preserves the maintenance of justice and the laws.

And with whom was it fought? With Egypt. That country whose people, as no one can deny, live in slavery and choke on tyranny, a country that endlessly sheds the blood of its people without moral or legal justification, a country whose tyrannical and brutal rulers have perfected the arts of evil, a country whose rulers give no care for what is rightful or legal, a country whose rulers are worshipped even to the exclusion of almighty God Himself, a country that used to think that England alone, so compassionate towards the human race, would be its only savior from the prison-pit of the wicked, its only guide to the clear air of civilization. But the nation's high hopes have been denied. When its people did draw near the mouth of that pit and thought they would escape, along came the British guard, took prisoner those who had emerged from the pit and threw them down into its depths to be torn to pieces by the snakes. Yet this action was quite contrary to the customary kindness and sympathy of the British towards the human race.<sup>58</sup>

This all came about when the Khedive announced that his life and that of the Europeans were in danger and the warships came from all the nations, from the Great Powers of Europe, that is, and most of the Europeans left Egypt. People were most disturbed by the arrival of the naval vessels and the Egyptians greatly regretted the departure of their European brethren with whom they were in complete harmony.

Then it was said that the renovations to the forts constituted a threat to the British fleet,<sup>59</sup> quite apart from the rest of the ships of various European nations present in Alexandria. The repair work was stopped. Then a letter arrived for the officer in charge of the Alexandrian army command from His Excellency the British Admiral, Seymour, that work was underway to block entrance to the port of Alexandria with rocks. If, the letter stated, the positioning of these rocks was not prevented, then he would retaliate. By order of the Khedive and in concurrence with the Ministers, a message was sent to him that there was no foundation to the report of rocks being thrown, nor any need for that. The Under-Secretary for the Navy also sent the admiral a message authorizing His Excellency to take into custody anyone found doing it.

Then, on July 10, 1882 a second letter came from this admiral to the same officer-in-command that guns were being set up in the Forts of Sāliḥ, al-Miks, and Qā'id Bey. He therefore wanted to take down all the weapons in the forts of Alexandria positioned between al-ʿAjami and Qā'id Bey. This was despite the fact that the only weapons in these forts had been there since the time of Muḥammad ʿAlī pasha! The wooden artillery pieces were worm-

: their proper rights without distinction between civilians and  
ners, so that all the inhabitants of Egypt would be as one, regardless of  
nces of religions and beliefs, since all men belonged to the same  
on humanity. A further<sup>54</sup> indication of my inability to leave at that time  
en by the telegrams sent to the Khedive by military and naval  
anders at Alexandria on the day when the cabinet of Maḥmūd Pasha  
esigned. Further evidence that the people would not accept that note is  
ighness the Khedive's own admission in the telegrams he sent out to  
ommanders, in reply to those he received from them on that occasion.  
, indeed; before concluding this part, I do wish to say that His  
ess the Khedive had despatched Thābit Pasha the Circassian, a man  
ned for his racial prejudice, to Istanbul in November 1881 to be his  
there. This mission was to turn the Turkish government officials  
t the Egyptian army and similarly to prejudice the Sultan himself. And  
ors were spread in official circles in Istanbul that the Egyptian forces  
o longer loyal and that they wanted to form an Arab state; it was said I  
ached an understanding to that effect with the British. These rumors  
great attention and I saw them as serious, since I knew no one in  
ul who could defend me and deny the false rumors relating to me.<sup>55</sup> So  
arrival in Egypt of al-Sharīf al-Sayyid Aḥmad As'ad, the Sultan's  
entative as 'custodian of holy places'<sup>56</sup> in Medina, I gave him a  
ent to take back for me. In it I asserted my innocence, and that of  
of the activities wrongly attributed to us. I later received a reply from  
aying that the document had been accepted and that, to please His  
y, the Sultan, I was requested to remain obedient.  
: brings to an end the first part of my report, covering all the important  
occurring from early February 1881 up to 9th July 1882, shortly  
the British war in Egypt broke out.

Before the formation of that Cabinet the usual yearly renovations and repairs to the defense fortifications were already in progress. But then an order was issued by the Khedive, following a command from His Majesty the Sultan, to cease all fortification construction in Alexandria; such work would be considered a threat by the British fleet. If it did not cease then the fleet would bombard the city, destroying it and setting it afire. This was what the secretary of the British Embassy in Istanbul had informed the Sultan.

All the work was stopped. The Khedive even sent two men to go down from the court to establish on his behalf that the work had ceased; these men were Ḥusain Bey al-Turk and Ḥusain Effendī Fawzī. The Khedive sent a report to that effect to Istanbul. We were amazed how the regular repair work on the forts could be considered a threat while the presence of warships surrounding Egyptian ports was not considered threatening! But then we recall that "Right belongs to the strong!"

On July 4, 1882, following the formation of that Cabinet, the "Majīdīa" decoration, along with the firmān of the Sultan on its award, arrived from Istanbul. I received it personally from His Highness the Khedive, who expressed his satisfaction and gratitude and told me how he was sure of the sincerity of my service to him. I thanked him for his graciousness and also sent a telegram expressing my thanks to the Sultan's private apartments.<sup>53</sup> I was honored by a telegram in reply expressing the great satisfaction of His Highness the Sultan in my obedient and sincere good service, and declaring that the decoration was to reward me for my fine conduct.

As for the decorations intended for the army officers, some were distributed to servants at the court and the rest were kept by the Khedive. Not one of the officers received a decoration, even though one officer had reached the rank of Pasha. He was never awarded a decoration, despite all the dedication he displayed on the battlefield and in many areas of service. This was because these officers were Egyptians; this matter was conducted in a manner contrary to the customary practice of those to whom the word justice is attributed.

Following my receipt of the decoration, His Excellency Darwīsh Pasha bade me go to Istanbul to live at the side of His Majesty the Sultan, along with some of my colleagues. I expressed to him my regrets on the same grounds as I had earlier to the Consul General of France. I was afraid that the people would prevent my leaving and would react very emotionally, as His Excellency had himself witnessed when the people had expressed their deep affection for me by gathering in crowds as I passed through Alexandria. His Excellency Rāghīb Pasha the Prime Minister, aware of how great would be the shock to the people and how great the damage done if I were to leave for Istanbul, similarly informed Darwīsh Pasha that such an order would be contrary to the public interest. He pointed out that past events had convinced him that I was very popular with all the people of Egypt and had the public good at heart. He was sure I was trustworthy and honorable and devoid of the personal ambitions detractors claimed I had; my sole objective was the emancipation of my country and the prosperity its people would enjoy under a just, truly representative government. Such a government would give the

are highly jealous for their honor and do not put their trust in statements not in accord with either the law or honor.

During that period, the Ottoman Commission<sup>52</sup> under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Darwish Pasha arrived and took up residence in the al-Jiza Palace. People of prominence of all types rushed there to greet him, to complain about the Khedive's conduct and to insist on the need for proper adherence to the stipulation of the law. Now all these men are in jail, because of injustice and malice — revenge in fact. The prisons in the provinces, in Cairo, and in Alexandria are overflowing with them.

Having properly inspected the army and established that it had maintained good order and proper obedience and done nothing at all wrong, Darwish Pasha requested some two hundred decorations for the officers from His Majesty the Sultan. These awards would compensate them for their fine behavior. For myself, he also recommended the "Majīdiya" Decoration, of the First Class and with Ribbon.

After that, a new Cabinet of Ministers was formed led by His Excellency Rāghib Pasha, who took the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. His Excellency Aḥmad Rashīd Pasha became Minister of the Interior, Abd al-Raḥmān Rushdī Bey Minister of Finance, Maḥmūd Pasha al-Falakī Minister of Public Works, Sulaymān Pasha Abāza Minister of Education, Alī Pasha Ibrāhīm Minister of Justice, Ḥasan Pasha al-Sharīfī Minister of Pious Foundations. They reappointed me Minister of War; it was thus said that the impact of the note had been nullified and that no further disaster would occur. To increase people's sense of security an edict was issued granting pardon to all those involved in the recent incidents — except, that is, for the deplorable events that took place in Alexandria on June 11, 1882. That dreadful incident occurred all of a sudden on that date and blew up between the riffraff of Alexandria and the Europeans.

Following a directive from the court to have the army appoint people to investigate the incident, Ya'qūb Pasha Sāmī, Deputy Minister of the Army was given the task and sent down with two regiments of infantry, two artillery batteries and two battalions of cavalry to keep order in and around Alexandria. All the European newspapers have since praised the alertness of the soldiers of these regiments and their vigilance in winning peace and good order. These soldiers were under the general command of Ṭulbat Pašā Ismat, who discharged his responsibilities most admirably.

I heard from His Highness the Khedive, based on a report from the Governor of Alexandria, that the incident first arose from a dispute between a Maltese and a donkey-man from Alexandria; as a crowd gathered shots from rifles and pistols were fired down from overlooking windows. Following this report, I sent a letter to the Deputy-Minister of the army, Ya'qūb Pasha, telling him of the rumor and asking him to investigate the incident fully and vigorously and to strive to find the real cause of the incident. I also instructed him to protect the honor of the government and of the army while attempting to pursue the truth. This is all I learned of that incident.



trusted my word and believed that all Egyptians, when they knew of my guarantee of safety for the Europeans, would treat the latter with the greatest respect.

Confident that the soldiers would not do anything to disgrace their military honor and that the civilians would respect their foreign guests, I did promise to give the same care to all Europeans living in Egypt and their possessions as I would to myself and my own family and property until such time as a new government would be formed. The Consuls left satisfied.

That evening, the Chamber of Deputies held a meeting in the house of Abū Sulṭān Pasha, their President, and invited me to attend. I accepted and there they charged me with maintaining public order. They had with them a number of legal scholars and the chief judge of Egypt. I reminded them that I had tendered my resignation and that it had been accepted; how could I then be charged with such a matter when I had no position in the government?

Abū Sulṭān Pasha, the Chamber President, and His Excellency Sulaymān Pasha Abāza, one of the deputies, replied that they were the nation's representatives and that they were charging me with that responsibility. They stated that they would not accept my resignation and were going to the Khedive to request an order from him restoring me as before to the Ministry of War.

That night I obtained various reports and despatches on the current and recent state of the country, the disasters that had occurred and the blood that had been spilled. All that came about as a result of the despotic statutes in effect and the state of affairs at which the country had arrived and because of that note the Khedive had accepted. Those present agreed unanimously to seek the deposition of the Khedive if he did not refuse to accept the note in question.

The meeting thereupon broke up. Next morning the President of the Chamber of Deputies and Sulaymān Pasha Abāza came to my house and the latter handed me an order from the Khedive to resume my office of Minister of War. They fancied that through this action the effects caused by the note would be negated— but “fancy does not avail at all against the truth.”<sup>50</sup> I then offered my thanks to the Khedive, who received me most cordially, and set about fulfilling all my duties while the Cabinet remained dissolved, a period of some twenty days during which no disorders occurred.

But during that time Cairo filled with bedouins and their large numbers did make both the civilian population and the Europeans apprehensive.<sup>51</sup> The reason for all that was that His Highness the Khedive had brought them in. He showed them such favor that visitors imagined that the palace at Ismāʿīliyya was a meeting place for bedouins, a very unusual circumstance. The purpose of this was for them to provide a counter-force to the army— quite unnecessarily.

The Governor of al-Buhayra province, Ibrāhīm Bey Tawfiq, was inciting the bedouin and they were transmitting secret instructions into the provinces to cause trouble for those who had signed the declarations in favor of rejection of that note, as well as to spread further disorders. But the bedouins

stipulated in this note were all purely internal and not subject to interference by others, they were not accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers. This was not to preserve our posts but to maintain the rights of the country that had commissioned us to our positions of trust and responsibility. The Khedive himself did at first accept the note's conditions.

Since this matter had become so difficult to resolve and the Khedive and the Ministers were at odds over it, a special cabinet session was held. There it was decided to request the Chamber of Deputies to examine the questions under dispute and to offer an acceptable solution, since the law did permit that procedure if some unusual circumstance should arise for the country. The Deputies did assemble and set about examining that note; the decision to refuse to accept it was unanimous. This news flew far and wide across the country, causing great apprehension. Public opinion was united on the refusal to accept the note, and village mayors and notables began coming in to Cairo asserting their rejection of it and those willing to accept it. They wrote out statements to that effect, signed them and brought them to me as expressions of their confidence in me. And similarly, when the Khedive refused to allow the official opening of the Chamber of Deputies, many of the Deputies signed statements rejecting the note.

Now many religious dignitaries, merchants and notables arrived from all parts, bringing signed statements and legal opinions from the most respected scholars agreeing on the need to remove the Khedive from office to conform with the precepts of Islamic law. Some of these documents are still in my possession and some were held by Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, the Prime Minister. But since the Khedive still remained determined to accept the note and to refrain from opening the Chamber, the Ministers offered their resignations, which he accepted.<sup>46</sup>

During all this, the Consul General of France, M. Sinkiewicz and M. Monge, the Consul of France in Egypt, tried very hard to persuade me to go to Paris<sup>49</sup> and so free myself from all these difficulties. But since I knew that all the people were deeply attached to me and that the members of the Chamber of Deputies believed that only my presence would guarantee the continued existence of the Chamber and the peace and security of the nation, I could not leave. They believed that if I were to leave Egypt, all would be ruined; the people and the army would similarly not let me leave, and felt that if I did a truly terrible commotion would result. Anyone would agree how true this was who witnessed how the people of Alexandria, men and women, young and old, gathered in the streets and windows to greet me and express their affection for me and how they lined up along the railway track from Cairo to Alexandria. All this, then, prevented me from going to Europe or Istanbul.

On the morning after the Ministry's resignation, the Consuls General of Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy came to my house and requested me to give them my word that I would protect the lives and the possessions of all Europeans dwelling in Egypt. I regretfully declined, pointing out that I had resigned my post. They refused, however, to accept this and replied that they

in the <sup>c</sup>Ābdīn Palace that certain soldiers on guard there had stolen the palace's stock of jewelled ceremonial brooches, despite the fact that they were there to protect the palace and everything in it. The commander of the First Infantry Regiment at <sup>c</sup>Ābdīn, <sup>c</sup>Ahmad Bey Faraj, conducted an investigation of the palace servants and became suspicious of the custodian of the jewels, Muḥammad Hasan; it was his responsibility to take charge of the Khedive's clothing. This man had actually been brought up in the home of Ahmad Faraj and had eventually married a woman from the Khedive's court. Faraj ordered him to be sent to the police headquarters for questioning and there he confessed that he did have the jewels and had thrown them down a latrine, there in the police headquarters. He showed them where and they got them out, all intact; they were then delivered over to the Khedive and so the honor of the army was maintained.

Under questioning this Muḥammad Hasan insisted that he was not a thief but that Ibrāhīm Āghā, the Khedive's <sup>Tūtunji</sup>,<sup>40</sup> had ordered him to take the jewels and look after them until he, Ibrāhīm Āghā returned from a period of absence.<sup>41</sup> Muhammad Hasan said he had no knowledge of the reason for all this. A letter was sent from the War Ministry to the police administration expressing the necessity for an official inquiry to show that the honor of the army was still intact, and to prevent anything similar recurring. It was stated that to discover the truth, the aforementioned Ibrāhīm Āghā should be summoned for questioning about the matters attributed to him.

When the Khedive learned of all this, he gave orders for the despatch of that unfortunate fellow<sup>42</sup> by night to Suez on a special train. Next morning he was embarked on the same steamer with the ill-fated <sup>c</sup>Āisha Hānim and to this time no other abode than the Red Sea or the 'blood-red' death<sup>43</sup> are known for him. All this took place without judicial inquiry or legal judgement.

As for Ibrāhīm Āghā, he was given the necessary funds and despatched to Syria; and now he has come to threaten me in prison,<sup>44</sup> because I was distressed and sorry for those unfortunate people.

Because of these two affairs and other frightening incidents that occurred continually, no Egyptian could feel secure or sleep well in his home. People felt that they themselves might be afflicted as those unfortunates had been. All this was well known to the Cabinet Ministers and to others, as well as to the members of the Chamber of Deputies. They—the Ministers, that is—petitioned the Khedive to prevent these misdeeds, but to no avail. That is absolute despotism indeed; yet where are those who will free the Egyptians from their slavery?<sup>45</sup>

This hatred continued, then, to have control over the Khedive's mind until the British and French warships arrived and their consuls delivered a note in accordance with an opinion that Abū Sultān<sup>46</sup> Pasha had expressed, though not offering it seriously, as he has stated on more than one occasion.<sup>47</sup> This note stipulated that Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha's Ministry must fall, and that I must go to Europe, while <sup>c</sup>Alī Fahmī Pasha and <sup>c</sup>Abd al-<sup>c</sup>Āl Hilmī Pasha should be sent out into the provinces within Egypt. Since the matters

he had spoken with him, using the words, "Your life and those of the Europeans are in danger." The Prime Minister denied that this had occurred and told the Consuls of the request he had made to His Highness regarding the Interior Ministry's having no intermediary role in the case of the Circassians' plot. He insisted that that was all they had discussed, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs affirmed this.<sup>34</sup>

Now the truth is that this lamentable statement, so entirely devoid of truth, is the source of the affliction that has descended so heavily on Egypt. That statement caused the despatch of naval units from the European states to the ports of Alexandria and Port Said. It caused the deplorable events of June 11 at Alexandria at a time when the Egyptians and the Europeans were living in the most cordial and friendly of relationships: if the ships of war had not arrived at Alexandria, the hatred would never have arisen and the dreadful tragedy would not have occurred. It was also the cause for the outbreak of war by one nation, great and famous for its justice and love for humanity, the destroyer of the bonds of slavery, against the unfortunate land of Egypt, that had striven for so long to resist the greed of predators. And for how long a time Egypt had been determined to rely on the government of Britain alone to take her by the hand and lead her forth from the snake-pit of tyranny and slavery into the blissful state of freedom! But the thoughts of the ruler who did not love his country destroyed all that. From that time on the Khedive hated the Cabinet of Ministers and especially the Prime Minister; he often stated that he did not want to see and found no pleasure in seeing Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī.<sup>35</sup>

During<sup>36</sup> that period a certain lady of high reputation was betrayed<sup>37</sup> in a most abominable manner. Her name was Aisha Hānim and she was from the family of the late Aḥmad Pasha al-Ṭūbjī. She was a 'spiritualist-entertainer'<sup>38</sup> at the Khedive's palace. One night the Khedive sent a carriage with one of his eunuchs to bring her from her house to the palace. But he took her instead to the police headquarters and from there she was sent, with the knowledge of Muṣṭāfa Bey Ṣubḥī, the Director of Police, to the railway station where a special train was waiting for her. It took her to Suez.

When her unfortunate daughter learned of this she sent her mother's clothes with a servant girl to Suez; that unhappy girl then embarked with her ill-fated mistress on a ship out into the Red Sea, the intention being to exile her to the Hedjaz. Then they spread the rumor that the lady had fled to Jidda, even though she was frail, advanced in age and under the watch of special guards. And to this day no one is sure where she or her servant might be, the Red Sea being their last known position. All this took place without the perpetration of any crime or any judicial inquiry being made—where indeed were the champions of humanity<sup>39</sup> then, one asks.

The reward of her poor daughter for sending on her mother's clothes was for her husband to be dismissed. When he learned the reason for his dismissal, he divorced this wife of his and was promptly reinstated—now there's the sort of policy that is favored by the human race, you partisans of truth and justice!

Four days after the incident involving this poor lady, the rumor was spread

From the investigation the magnitude of the plot became clear and also the fact that it originated with the Khedive . The commission records make all this clear.<sup>31</sup>

All the Circassians involved were sentenced to permanent exile to the Sudan . The report giving this judgement and sentence was presented to the Khedive and read out to him in the presence of all the Ministers .But since the Sudan has such an extremely hot climate that would have been very detrimental to the health of Circassians born in cold climates and might well have killed them , I asked my fellow Ministers to help me in saving them from that sentence and having them sent back in full rank and honor to their countries of origin or to any other country outside the domain of the Egyptian government . I was concerned to preserve life , even for those who had sought to destroy mine . The Ministers , despite their amazement , agreed and we presented , in person, a petition signed by us all to His Highness the Khedive , urging him to accept our plea as an act of mercy towards them .

The Khedive replied that there was one man<sup>32</sup> of Pasha rank among the accused and that a sentence could be carried out against him only at the orders of His Majesty the Sultan . Consequently , the matter would have to be submitted to the Sublime Porte . He then issued his instructions to the interior Ministry to carry out the sentences . This was contrary to current practice , which was that all promotions and punishments that might originate with the War Ministry would be presented directly , without intermediary , to the Royal Court which would then similarly issue orders directly to the War Ministry to put the matter into effect . The Interior Ministry had played no part in presenting the prosecution papers and had no rights over the War Ministry to carry out the judgements made in this affair . The Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister , Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī , after consultations with colleagues , therefore made their way to His Highness the Khedive and requested him to issue his order of execution directly on the documents relating to the case , asking the War Ministry to fulfil and carry them out without any further intermediary and in accordance with its normal procedures . He did issue an order to that effect on those same documents and they were implemented ; the sentenced men were dispatched to Syria and from there they went to Istanbul . When war broke out , the Khedive sent for them to come to Alexandria ; this he did precisely because he knew himself to be the cause for what had happened to them and that they would not have entered into that conspiracy except in accord with his wishes.<sup>33</sup>

On the evening of that same day of the Prime Minister's audience with His Highness the Khedive , we were with the Prime Minister , Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī , at a party given by Umar Bey Rahmī when messengers brought the news that the Consuls General of Britain and France were at his house and wished to see him . He left to meet them at once , accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs , Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī . The Consuls informed the Prime Minister that the lives of the Khedive and of the Europeans were in danger . He replied that all their lives were in fact guaranteed by his own and asked them why they were concerned . They responded that the Khedive had informed them thus : that Maḥmūd Pasha had threatened the Khedive when

I accepted that important post despite my full knowledge of the difficulties that would encompass me in restraining and in organizing that flood of ideas bursting suddenly forth from within the hearts of so many different elements of the citizenry . Each considered only the speed with which progress could be made to that one agreed goal, namely, the emancipation and renewal of the country, completely disregarding the difficulties that might well arise to prevent achievement of those desired objectives.

Despite all this, I did persevere and make progress, working quietly and tactfully to maintain the safety and dignity of the people while protecting their possessions. This I considered to be our national duty, to ensure that Egyptian history would not be blackened in the eyes of the civilized world. Under this Ministry, conditions became more settled and better organized and a large number of important matters that had piled up for consideration by the Cabinet were disposed of. The affairs of the army were put in good order and the deserving were now promoted rather than reduced in rank.

Soon His Highness the Khedive graciously awarded me the rank of Pasha and expressed his satisfaction when he honored my colleagues °Alī Fahmī and °Abd al-°Al Hilmī, Ṭulbat °Ismat, Ya° qūb Sāmī and Ḥasan Mazhar with the rank of Pasha, General, that is.

During this period, we all were wishing him a long and successful reign, for the good of the country. We thought we were now free of those trials and difficulties we had been suffering, that prospects for success were secure before us and that all that remained was to enact just laws and to improve the government administration and law courts. We felt that there was no hatred left now.

But then suddenly there before us stood treason, blocking the way. What happened was that one of the Khedive's Mamluk retainers at the Qubba School reached an agreement with a Circassian youth with him at the school who was under the trusteeship of °Abd al-°Al Pasha Hilmī, to buy a quantity of arsenic. The objective was to poison the Pasha with it and the fact is they did put the plan into operation. The youth involved, Muḥammad Khurshīd by name, did put the poison in the milk the Pasha was accustomed to drink at night. And if the servant girl had not discovered the youth with the milk, then the Pasha would certainly have died. Within a few hours documents relating to this case were at the police headquarters. It was learned from them that the action had been plotted at the Khedive's palace.<sup>29</sup>

This plot having failed, a large faction of Circassians allied together in a conspiracy to murder me and all other Egyptian-Arab officers of high rank. But when they invited a Circassian named Rāshid Effendy Anwar, a civilised and humanitarian, God-fearing man to join them, he refused and immediately informed Tulbat Pasha °Ismat of the facts. He made a written report to the Ministry of War and also informed Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, the Prime Minister, Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī, the Minister of Justice, and the other Ministers; he also brought the matter to the attention of the Khedive.

An investigation of this Circassian plot was made by a military commission under the chairmanship of that senior General Rāshid Pasha Husnī<sup>30</sup> the Circassian, chosen for his high reputation as a man of honor and good faith.

affixed. They appealed to him to free them from that Ministry which, among all the other sufferings it had brought on them during its term of office, had denied them the interest from the seventeen million pounds<sup>27</sup> taken from them as 'muqābala'<sup>28</sup> tax payments under the reign of the former Khedive in order to make payments on the foreign debts that the government had incurred. They complained also of being deprived of the capital sum itself, in its entirety, even though this money should definitely have been considered a debt owed by the government, just like all the debts owed to the Europeans. The previous Ministry had also, they protested, dismissed native citizens from governmental posts, despite their qualifications and low salaries, and employed many Europeans in their stead at much larger salaries, even though the latter could carry out their work only by the intermediary help of the citizens in lesser positions. Consequently, all the important posts were now, they complained, held by Europeans without regard for the jobs they did, contrary to all just procedures and practices in every equitable government.

So then the new Ministry was formed and Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī was appointed Minister of War. As a consequence of these events, a commission arrived on behalf of His Highness the Sultan, under the leadership of His Excellency 'Alī Pasha Niẓāmī. But two days before their arrival our regiment was ordered out to al-Tel al-Kabīr (Tel el-Kebir) and 'Abd al-'Āl Bey's regiment was sent to Damietta; this was so that the commission would be unable to meet with us and to find out the truth of what had been going on. When the above Pasha did express a wish to carry out an investigation, the Khedive objected on the grounds that the petitions had in fact represented his own ideas, that he had pardoned all, and that the army was now fully obedient and under control. The commission therefore departed.

Then came the formation and opening of a Chamber of Deputies, following the establishment of laws governing it; just regulations were also enacted for the army. Because of a disagreement that occurred between the Chamber of Deputies and the Cabinet of Ministers, a few months later Sharīf Pasha, the Prime Minister, resigned and his Cabinet was dissolved. Thereupon His Highness the Khedive entrusted to the Chamber of Deputies the election of new Ministers. And so it was with the knowledge of the Chamber of Deputies and the approval of the Khedive that Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī Minister of both Foreign Affairs and Justice, 'Alī Pasha Ṣādiq Minister of Finance and Maḥmūd Pasha Fahmī Minister of Public Works. 'Abd Allah Pasha Fikrī Minister of Education and Hasan Pasha al-Sharīfī as Minister of Pious Foundations. And since I had meanwhile been acting as Deputy Minister for War, I was now elected and appointed as Minister of War. This was something I certainly never hoped for but there was a complete concensus and unity on my appointment to this ministry on the part of all shades of opinion in the army and among the members of the Chamber of Deputies. My presence in that position made unimaginable any possible danger to anyone from either the army or the people; all would then feel secure and at ease.

feared for his very safety, wondering what might be done to him.<sup>24</sup> When this malaise became widespread among the upper classes of the Egyptian people, those who are our fathers and our brothers, the heads-of our families, gathered in Cairo. They decided that the only way to restore hope and confidence was to create a Chamber of Deputies which would guarantee the Egyptian nation the safety of their persons, their property and their dignity. The Chamber would institute just laws that could be relied upon to preserve the rights of all, similar to the laws of the Mixed Courts<sup>25</sup> and the rights and prerogatives of both plaintiffs and defendants. This would ensure that all would understand and no one exceed the proper limits of his actions. They asked also for a change in that Ministry which, in its period in office, had so reduced public confidence and so increased the sense of fear.

Petitions were so drawn up and delivered to His Excellency Sharīf Pasha when he was appointed Prime Minister by Abū Sulṭān Pasha acting on behalf of the principal representatives and leaders of the Egyptian nation. Since the army and the people, in their structure and in their mutual conduct towards good and evil were one and the same, this petition was entrusted to the army. And since all the regiments delegated their authority to their officers, these officers, because of their confidence and reliance on my good faith, entrusted these petitions to me. And so, because of the gravity of the rash and irresponsible acts of the Minister of War, Da'ūd Pasha and the increasing public malaise,<sup>26</sup> I wrote to the Minister of War on September 9, 1881, informing him that all the soldiers would parade at 'Ābdīn Square at 9 a.m. on the following Friday, to present their demands and those of the people to His Highness the Khedive.

At the appointed time as above the troops left their barracks and assembled at 'Ābdīn Square, their conduct extremely orderly and well mannered. Prior to this, I had written to all the Consuls of the European states informing them what was to take place at the time specified and that all would be quiet and orderly. I told them they should have no fear for the lives or properties of their subjects and that all that was being asked of the Khedive was what would render the land free and in full possession of its rights.

Then we presented these petitions to the Khedive through the intermediary of Mr. Cookson, the British Consul at Alexandria, who was present (in Cairo) at the time. The Khedive accepted all our requests which affirmed the first declaration His Gracious Majesty had issued at the beginning of his reign. These petitions, he stated, fulfilled his greatest hopes since they were all in accord with the laws. He then issued his command that the government should be turned over to and headed by His Excellency Sharīf Pasha. The soldiers now departed, all expressing their prayers that he be granted a long life and thanking him for reviving the country and freeing it from the noose of the old Egyptian tyranny.

When it happened that Sharīf Pasha deferred from accepting the Prime Ministership, approaches were made to him from the leaders of the citizens who were gathered there behind us at 'Ābdīn Square. They presented him petitions, urging him to accept the Ministry, that had some 4,000 seals



officers, whose intrigues and misdeeds were examined at a special mixed military commission consisting of Europeans and others under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of War, Ḥasan Pasha Aflāṭūn. When it became clear that the original source of the trouble was His Highness the Khedive, they were given weak punishments indeed, imprisonment from fifteen days to two months<sup>23</sup> and without any reduction in their salary. Some of them were sent to serve in the Sudan, with full honor and prior rank, instead of any loss there. All this leniency was to satisfy the Khedive. But in any case none of these punishments was carried out, on the basis that the Khedive had forgiven them (since they had been acting under orders from him) through the intermediary of Ibrāhīm Āghā, his personal servant. All that is clear in the report of the official enquiry.

Similar intrigues were instigated in the First Regiment and in the Fourth Regiment as well, which was allied with us. But we eliminated them one by one to prevent the spread of rumors and out of concern for the position of His Highness the Khedive. I acted thus because I was in fact his prime defender and supporter and hoped for his reform and a change in his attitude.

This went on for some time but they were unable to harm us because of their failure to obtain the agreement of the Minister of War Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha to those ideas. So the Khedive ordered Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha to present his resignation officially. This he did and Da'ūd Pasha Yakan, the Khedive's son-in-law, was appointed in his place. He was a man who had been brought up in his father's house and knew nothing of the government, administration, or the army. He issued orders forbidding any officer to go to his house and forbidding officers to meet with one another. Any officer found accompanying another in the street was to be arrested and the civil and military police notified. This order was contrary to every form of law.

His rash desire for revenge led him to the practice of going by night to the headquarters of the regiments to check on the officers there. He once placed watchmen at night on my house and on that of 'Abd al-'Āl Bey Ḥilmī in order to ensnare and destroy us by some evil and perfidious trick. But 'Abd al-'Āl Bey was already with the regiment and I had left that evening for 'Abbāsiyya to the headquarters of the regiment. Afraid that an assassin might be following me, I went two hours after nightfall, to visit the home of one of my friends in al-Fajāla street, Khalīl Bey Lubnān. Ten minutes later two cavalry men galloped past on the road at full speed and only stopped when they reached the headquarters at 'Abbāsiyya. There they were stopped by the guard patrol who asked them what their business was. The cavalry men replied that they were heading for the Qubba Palace and that they had lost their way. The soldiers of the guard patrol then gave them directions to al-Qubba, a village situated in the vicinity of 'Abbāsiyya. I have no doubt that their real purpose was to find an excuse to entrap and arrest me. That incident occurred on the night of September 6, 1881. I had with me an officer named 'Abd al-Karīm Effendī; it was, indeed, in his carriage that I rode so that no one would recognize me.

For these reasons that I have given, then, hope had gone and everyone

## PART ONE—CHAPTER TWO

The events following thereafter .

We had thought that the pardon was genuine and that the orders decreeing friendship , brotherly love and the avoidance of racial discrimination had originated from a sincere good will . Soon , however , the seeds of dissention and enmity became planted in the soil of certain dishonorable hearts . Namely , Yūsuf Kamāl Pasha , a Circassian and manager of the Khedive's administration ,<sup>19</sup> was able by means of a certain Circassian Master Sergeant in the Sudan regiment to gather together all the Master Sergeants in the Sudan who were allied by marriage to the Khedive's administration .<sup>20</sup> He made payments to them<sup>21</sup> and persuaded them to draw the soldiers into conflict with the officers and to refuse to obey their orders . He also promised them that they would be promoted into officers ; these instructions came from the Khedive .

When the official enquiry established all this , the above - mentioned Pasha was to all appearances dismissed from the Khedive's service , whereas he in fact continued to pursue his activities in secret . This plot having failed Ibrāhīm Āghā , the Khedive's personal servant , began spreading unrest and making intrigues . He ordered Faraj Bey al - Zaynī the Sudanese , an Army reservist , to incite the Sergeants in the Sudan command to kill their officers ; the report of those mentioned here and their confessions to this were made at the official investigation . On him was found a document signed by Ibrāhīm Āghā stating that this was to be done in accordance with the command of the Khedive . That paper was seen by Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī at the time and the Military Board issued judgement against this Faraj Bey to the effect that he be sent into the provinces and his rank be reduced to that of Major ;<sup>22</sup> it was decided to send him out to Musawwa<sup>f</sup> . But the Khedive's order came to place him on the reserves and send him to Musawwa<sup>f</sup> at his present rank and in full honor since he had done nothing at his own volition but had merely obeyed orders . And then later another order came from the Khedive that this Faraj Bey should be sent from Musawwa<sup>f</sup> to Khartoum and given employment there , as that was his home town and where he had properties . All this occurred without the Ministers having examined the matter at all . Next , the wife of this Bey was sent to Khartoum , via Suwākin and at the expense of the Khedive's administration and without the permit from the government that is normal in such cases .

Attempts to cause corruption through the Master - Sergeants and Faraj Bey the Sudanese having failed , thought was now given to bringing it about through Captain Saḥīm Sā'ib and Captain ° Alī Labīb . Both of these were in the Sudan regiment , which at the time was under the command of ° Abd al - ° Al Bey Hilmī . This Saḥīm Sā'ib was related by marriage to the Khedive's court .

Sufficient funds were supplied to the two Captains by Ibrāhīm Āghā and they began doing their best to disrupt and corrupt the operations of the Regiment . Eventually they succeeded in gaining the support of nineteen

Palace and had decided to summon all the regiments, including the artillery, and to demand that the soldiers of the First Regiment give up their arms and surrender. If they refused, they were to be fired upon.

All this would obviously have led to great civil unrest and commotion if it had not been for the arrival of the Sudan regiment from Tura, who, when they heard of the humiliation and imprisonment inflicted on us, came at once. It was that fact that prevented the nobles from persisting in the use of force.

By now His Excellency, Mr. Edward Malet, the Political Agent of England, and the Political Agent of France, His Excellency Baron de Ring, had made contact with us. They acted as mediators in finding a solution to the problem. The Khedive decreed a general amnesty and we were issued Khedivial orders restoring each of us to his original position in the regiment. Further orders were issued to the regiments bringing an end to the system of discrimination by race and instructing people to view one another as brothers, just as we had requested.

Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī<sup>17</sup> was now appointed Minister of War, in place of ‘Uthmān Pasha Rifqī, as was in accord with the just laws of the country. On February 2 His Highness the Khedive summoned two officers of the First Infantry Regiment; they agreed to support him while he affirmed that he had truly forgiven them. When this was reported to me, I went and sought permission to see him. This was granted and, when I stood in his august presence, I petitioned him to include me among those he had pledged to forgive. He accepted this request and I solemnly pledged to preserve and protect him as I would myself. I expressed the prayer that his reign would remain stable and secure firmly based on the principles of justice and equality.

On Friday, February 4, 1881, the Khedive ordered me and my close friend Infantry Colonel ‘Alī Bey Fahmī to present ourselves to the Consuls General of Britain and France. We were to inform them that we considered ourselves responsible for and guarantors of the public order and that we would protect the lives and properties of the Europeans. I went with my above-mentioned good friend to visit the Consuls General and we reported to them as we had been ordered to do; this report of ours nevertheless did represent the true nature of our thoughts, on which all our actions had been based. With this, then, ended the difficulties of early February, 1881.<sup>18</sup>

That meeting took place on January 30, 1881 and on 31 we received instructions from the Minister of War to make our way to the *dīwān* at *Qaṣr al-Nīl*<sup>10</sup> on the morning of February 1 to attend preparations for wedding celebrations<sup>11</sup> for the sister of His Highness the Khedive. At the appointed time we made our way to the palace; there we found assembled all the Pashas and regimental commanders, both serving and on the reserve.<sup>12</sup> At once the Khedive's order was read out to us, at that meeting; we were informed that we were dismissed from our posts and that other commanders were appointed in our place. Our swords were removed and we were conducted away to prison. As we passed them by, the younger Circassian officers drew their pistols at us.

When we were in our prison cell and the door was locked, we heard Khasru Pasha laughing and saying in Turkish 'zembilli herifler', a derogatory expression meaning 'lowly peasant fruit-pickers.' Previous to that, moreover, an order had been issued by the Minister of War to the Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Police at Cairo, *Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī*, to reinforce the troops at the police stations, to prevent any soldiers from trying to enter Cairo and to maintain ready for action on demand all remaining troops in the battalion. He was also to place under arrest all Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Senior Captains who were Arab, whether serving or on the reserve; those taken into custody were to be sent to jail in the Citadel. When all were under arrest, the Minister would promote him to full Colonel.

He then issued an order to the governmental Steamboat Authority to provide and bring a boat to the *Qaṣr al-Nīl* barracks. It was obviously going to be used to transport us away; it is said, moreover, that they had there three iron trunks with holes in them in which we were to be placed and later thrown into the water, as was the government's custom under the previous Khedive.

Just when all that was ready, the First Infantry Regiment<sup>13</sup> revolted and arrived at *Qaṣr al-Nīl*, setting us free from prison. I immediately went and stood in that raised area in front of the council chamber (*dīwān*) and shouted out loudly to the soldiers that they must maintain good conduct and that they should harm none of the Circassians or anyone else.<sup>14</sup> They were, I said, our brothers and I ordered the soldiers to refrain from any act contrary to their duty as human beings. Had I not stood there thus, anger would have made them act rashly.

I then ordered the soldiers back to their quarters and went with them myself to the barracks at *ʿAbdīn*. I sent a message setting out what had occurred as I have just explained, addressed to their Excellencies the Consuls - General of Britain and France as well as to the agents of the other states of Europe, seeking their help and asking them to view our situation correctly and justly. I stated that all Europeans were in our safe protection. I despatched this message to his Excellency Baron de Ring,<sup>15</sup> the French Consul, and requested him in it to inform the Consuls of the other nations of its contents. I also sent him the note I had received signed by the Minister of War, inviting me, by trickery, to the marriage of the Khedive's sister.

Meanwhile, the Khedive's top entourage had been meeting<sup>16</sup> at *ʿAbdīn* Palace and had decided to summon all the regiments, including the artillery.

## PART ONE—CHAPTER ONE

Concerning events that occurred before the war.

In 1880 the Egyptian army was composed of twelve infantry regiments. In 1881, during the Ministry of <sup>c</sup>Uthmān Pasha Rifqī, it was decided to reduce it to only six regiments. The practice in Egypt was to tend to discriminate by race. And so all the promotions, decorations and rewards went to those of the Circassian race, since they were from the Mamluks,<sup>1</sup> the paid retainers of either the Khedivial family, or of the aristocracy who were in turn also Mamluks of the Khedivial family. After this faction came that of the Turks and others who were not Egyptians, along with those of mixed origins.<sup>2</sup> Thereafter came those Egyptian by race; they were neither promoted nor indeed employed except by necessity, only when others were not available. That is why, up to that date, not a single man born and bred Egyptian had attained in the army the rank of Pasha,<sup>3</sup> or General that is, despite the undeniable suitability and competence of some.

The Minister of War began, then, reorganizing by filling the essential posts with Circassians and Turks, followed by those of mixed ancestry. The remaining posts were to be filled only where necessary by Egyptians. All this deeply troubled the Egyptian officers, some<sup>4</sup> of whom therefore gathered at my house. I was at the time attending a celebration marking a man's return from the Pilgrimage<sup>5</sup> and so they sent word to me there. I came home to find them in a state of great anger. I pacified them by suggesting they present a petition to the Prime Minister, Riād Pasha, requesting equal treatment for those in government service, the cessation of discrimination by race and the enactment of just laws that would ensure every man his rights; also that he would appoint as Minister of War a Nationalist<sup>6</sup> in accord with the laws of justice-oriented nations. The petition should be signed and sealed, I suggested moreover, by only two or three of the officers whom they chose to represent them. This was their decision and they appointed as their representatives the three Egyptian Colonels, myself Aḥmad<sup>c</sup> Urābī, Colonel 'Alī Fahmī, and Colonel 'Abd al-'Āl Hilmī.<sup>7</sup>

This petition so formulated was subsequently presented to the Prime Minister. Its sole purpose was to achieve a sense of sincere friendship and good will between all in government service—indeed between all those who lived in Egypt. It would seek to remove from their hearts those feelings of enmity growing from that lack of equality and that racial discrimination which were so harmful to the interests of all.

Consequently, a meeting of the government Ministers,<sup>8</sup> also attended by members of the Circassian court elite, with His Highness the Khedive presiding, was held. It concluded with the issuance of an edict from the Khedive to hold an inquiry<sup>9</sup> in the usual manner in Egypt. But the final outcome was obvious to any observer—for us to be punished by death in the usual Egyptian manner, that is, secretly. For the petition, a complaint against ill-treatment directed to the heads of the government, was without precedent.

This is my report about the events which occurred in Egypt from January 1881 up to October 1882. It is presented by me to my Attorney-at-Law, Mr. Broadley, so that he may use it to defend me before the Egyptian Court.

with the Egyptian leader for some time and had championed his cause vigorously in the London press as well as in his excellent personal contacts with the government and aristocracy, saw the dangers early and hired two English lawyers to defend 'Urābī in Egypt. The senior lawyer, A.M. Broadley, who had actively supported the Tunisian government in its hopeless struggle against the French occupation in the previous year, cleverly manoeuvred towards the best outcome he could expect for his client 'Urābī. The feeling, shared by the Khedivial elite in Egypt and important segments of public opinion in England, that the Nationalists must be "taught a lesson" by 'Urābī's execution, was frustrated. At 'Urābī's trial on December 3, 1882, an agreed plea of guilty to charges of rebellion against the Khedive was followed by a pro-forma sentence of death commuted to exile — thanks mainly to the moderate influence of Lord Dufferin, sent as interim administrator to Egypt from his post as Ambassador to the Sultan in Istanbul. 'Urābī, 'Abd al- 'Alī Ḥilmī, 'Alī Fahmī, Maḥmūd Sāmī al- Barūdī and several others left Egypt on December 26, 1882, along with their families. They lived in comfort and relative freedom in Ceylon until, as late as May 1901, the exile was lifted following a plea from the Prince of Wales, who met 'Urābī in Ceylon and later used his influence with the then Khedive, Abbas II.

Most of his colleagues died in exile but 'Urābī returned to a hero's welcome in Cairo. The jubilation was short lived, however, for 'Urābī soon made it obvious, through press interviews, articles and memoirs, that he was no longer a rebel against the established order in Egypt. His attitude cast doubt, indeed, on the view popularly held of him as a great public leader. He lived on comfortably and in relative obscurity in Cairo for ten more years, until his death on September 21, 1911.

reduced to rubble in a matter of hours . No British ships were lost though the navy did suffer casualties , including some fatalities and several dozen men wounded .

Following the cease - fire , Bedouins entered the city and began looting the shops , and by midnight Alexandria was ablaze . It is not clear exactly who started the fire , although it was probably a result of the shelling . It did , however , give °Urābī and his army a chance to retreat . Gradually °Urābī reestablished a fighting force and based his troops some miles outside Alexandria , near the sweet-water Maḥmūdiyya canal . Sending out requests for supplies and volunteers to all parts of the country , °Urābī was clearly determined to oppose the British in all ways possible . He assumed that the Khedive , whether a prisoner of the British or a turncoat to their side , was no longer ruler of Egypt ; his attitude was shared by delegates from all walks of life throughout the country , who came together to hold a great council meeting in Cairo . Their decision to continue the conflict with the Khedive and the British seems to have been overwhelmingly popular .

Administration , such as it was , continued from Cairo under the authority of Deputy - Ministers ; a system of martial law , under control of the army , was declared . The provinces remained generally quiet , supportive of °Urābī and the military preparations , although occasional disorders occurred in the countryside and small towns with loss of life involving Europeans and Copts . Orders issued from Alexandria , where the Khedive and his theoretical government remained , were generally ignored . The Khedive's proclamations dismissing °Urābī were , of course , disregarded and derided . A further military confrontation was inevitable .

By the end of August some 20,000 British troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley had landed and surprised °Urābī by advancing towards his defensive positions from the canal ; °Urābī had himself given assurances to Ferdinand de Lesseps , the canal's creator , that he would not violate the canal's internationally agreed neutrality and had been led to believe that no British attack would come from it . In a short series of fiercely fought engagements , culminating after several days in a major battle at Tell el-Kebir on September 13 , the Egyptian army was soundly defeated with heavy losses . °Urābī surrendered himself on September 15 to General Lowe , Wolseley's second-in-command , who had followed °Urābī into Cairo and ordered the city's garrisons to offer the British no resistance .

Soon the Khedive was back in Cairo and his new administration established ; Sharīf Pasha and Riāḍ Pasha , whom he had appointed in August , were named Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior respectively . The army was totally disbanded and the most prominent Nationalist leaders were imprisoned . °Urābī himself was soon removed from the custody of the British and placed along with his chief colleagues in a large administration building , the Dāirat al-Sanīyya , which had been converted into a jail . The main gates of the building were under guard of British soldiers , the inner premises being guarded by Circassians .

Luckily for Urābī his friends and supporters in England had not been idle in the past weeks . Wilfrid Scawen Blunt , who had known and corresponded



groups in Egypt and stressed their continued support for the Khedive, who soon took up residence in Alexandria where his safety could be better assured by the fleets.

On June 7 earlier suggestions made by the British and French representatives in Istanbul bore fruit in the arrival of an Ottoman commission headed by a notoriously brutal general, Darwīsh Pasha, author of a number of atrocities in the Balkans. It seems clear that the British — who, on June 8, had acknowledged the Sultan's sovereignty over Egypt and now seemed to place their hopes in an Ottoman intervention — had suggested his dispatch as a means of disposing of °Urābī once and for all. The second high member of the commission, however, As'ad Effendi, was instructed by the Sultan to make overtures to the °Urābī group, so that if the preferred policy of backing for the Khedive should fail, it would be easy to establish good relations with the then-victorious Nationalists. Soon after his arrival, Darwīsh made veiled threats against °Urābī and tried to persuade him to come aboard a Turkish ship in Alexandria harbor, the intention being to transport him to Istanbul. But °Urābī was strong enough to resist the threats and a bloody outbreak of violence against Europeans in Alexandria on June 11 — which °Urābī claims was planned several days beforehand by the Court party with the express purpose of discrediting him just after he had made a pledge to preserve order — actually made his position more dominant: at the head of the army, he was the one figure who could restrain the masses and thus assure that there would be no further violence. In an attempt to reconcile the Court party and the Nationalists, the Khedive, after much deliberation, decided to form a new government with Rāgib Pasha, a loyal servant whom Ismā'īl had used in similar circumstances, as Prime Minister and °Urābī as Minister of War (June 17). Germany and Austria, who had influenced this move, failed to persuade Britain and France to approve the new ministry.

Despite the disclaimers °Urābī makes in the **Statement**, it seems abundantly clear from other sources that °Urābī and his army had for some time been building stronger defences for the forts overlooking the sea approaches to Alexandria. Such activity was cited by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the commander of the British fleet then lying off the city, as a military provocation, and he issued a series of demands that it be discontinued. In the meantime, on July 7, a conference of the powers met in Istanbul, where European attempts to persuade the Sultan to countenance military action in Egypt in support of the Khedive came to nothing.

Losing patience, the British government informed the Sultan that Britain would begin bombardment of Alexandria on July 11; the Sultan's mild reply, that any such shelling would meet with his protests, was taken as permission to proceed. Wishing to have no part in these engagements, the French government under de Freycinet, who had replaced Gambetta and favored policies more conciliatory to the Nationalists, ordered its fleet to sail. Shelling began early on the morning of July 11, a variety of ultimata from the admiral having been rejected by the Egyptian government. The battle, between armoured British warships and eight fairly well fortified and manned Egyptian forts, was fierce but the outcome never in doubt — the forts were

he presented them personally and spoke warmly to his former enemies. All seemed secure and serene at the highest levels of government in Egypt. The Nationalists were supreme at last and 'Urābī instituted those promotions and pay increases for which the Egyptian officers in the army had for so long agitated. But the excitement and scandal in April 1882 of an attempt discovered against the life of 'Urābī, plotted by some forty Circassian officers, broke the calm. A general, 'Uthmān Pasha Rifqī, who as Minister of War had instigated 'Urābī's arrest with 'Alī Fahmī and 'Abd al- 'Āl the previous year, was the most prominent officer charged, and an important representative of the Circassian elite. Tried and convicted by court martial, the officers were sentenced to permanent exile from Egypt. The Khedive's attempts to avoid punishing Rifqī, by insisting that only the Sultan could order the execution of a sentence upon a Pasha, further antagonized the Nationalist officers. As 'Urābī's Defence Statement shows, the Khedive himself was directly charged with having originated the plot, which received prominent exposure in the European press as well as in Egypt.

The delicate fabric of affairs in Egypt was clearly coming apart, in the army Egyptians and Circassians feared and mistrusted one another and discipline suffered, with disorders going unchecked in various provinces. Relations between the Khedive, the Chamber of Delegates, and 'Urābī deteriorated once again because of mutual suspicion.

It was at this point that Britain and France took a further step that was to lead directly to the crisis that followed. They informed the Khedive that they were about to send warships to Egypt, their stated purpose being to emphasize their support for him and their determination to permit no change in "the order of things established in Egypt." Public reaction to this overt threat was immediate and overwhelmingly adverse throughout the country, but an important grouping of the Chamber of Delegates under Abu Sulṭān Pasha accepted assurances from the European representatives and allied themselves with the Khedive; the stalemate therefore continued. By May 20 the fleets had arrived and on May 25 the British and French Consuls General, Malet and Sinkiewicz, presented a second official Joint Note. It informed the Egyptian government of the two powers' intention to send their fleets into Alexandria, allegedly to ensure the safety of Europeans and the continued stability of Egypt's internal affairs, and demanded the exile of 'Urābī, the rustication of 'Alī Fahmī and 'Abd al- 'Āl, and the resignation of the government.

In protest against this attempt at overt interference in Egypt's internal affairs and against the Khedive's apparent acceptance of the Note, the entire cabinet now joined Maḥmūd Sāmī in resignation (May 26). The public outcry was so great that Sharīf Pasha declined to form a new government and the Khedive was obliged to appoint deputy ministers to continue the administration of the country. By May 27 pressures from the Chamber of Delegates, the army, and the aroused public forced the Khedive to reinstate 'Urābī as Minister of War. The British and French representatives again sought "guarantees" for the protection of Europeans and the minority

Khedive; and °Urābī and °Abd al-°Āl Pasha, still colonels, acquiesced to being posted outside Cairo, the former to Ras al-Wady, the latter to Damietta. Britain and France agreed that their ships would not threaten within Egyptian waters.

Sharīf Pasha, the respected moderate, was able to proceed with the formation and convocation in January 1882 of a Chamber of Notables with 150 members under the presidency of the octogenarian Abu Sulṭān Pasha. In forming the new government he was careful to provide some satisfaction to all sides; the Nationalist grouping of the army now saw their hero Aḥmad °Urābī installed as Deputy - Minister of War. But negotiations held between the British and French in December resulted on January 8 in their presentation of a Joint Note that reaffirmed, in unmistakeably threatening language, the absolute opposition of the two nations to any move in a constitutional or parliamentary direction. It warned of their "resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external" that might "menace the order of things established in Egypt." and of their intention that the Note should give to the Khedive "the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people."

When coupled with the French occupation of Tunisia, this Note, so unexpected, so crude in its intentions, was clear proof to all that the European nations were prepared to intervene, despite opposition from any quarter, including even the Ottoman Sultan.

Meanwhile a parliamentary crisis arose with the presentation of the Budget. The first part of the Budget, concerned with monies set aside for payment of the Public Debt, remained outside dispute. The Chamber of Notables insisted, however, that it had a right to vote on the disposition of monies in the second part of the Budget, which was devoted to governmental expenses, while Sharīf Pasha and his Ministers, under strong pressure from Britain and France, refused any change in established procedures whereby the Khedive's government of Ministers (with its French and British Comptrollers) maintained sole authority over these monies. The Chamber, supported by the °Urābī Nationalists, resolutely insisted that their rights over the expenditure of public funds should have precedence over those of the representatives of foreign powers, and they demanded a change of government. The Khedive was forced to comply and on February 3, 1882 a new government was formed with Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Prime Minister and Aḥmad °Urābī as Minister of War. Within five days a revised set of regulations defining the prerogatives of the Chamber, including its authority over the Budget, was signed into law, and the Prime Minister presented a program for development of the educational, commercial, and agricultural resources of the country that was widely applauded.

For some weeks affairs in Egypt ran smoothly and peacefully. The Khedive recommended to the Sultan that the title of Pasha be awarded to °Urābī, °Abd al-°Āl, and °Alī Fahmī as well as to several other officers prominently allied with them. When the decorations arrived from Istanbul.

men, as permitted by the Sultan's **firmān** of September 1879. The Khedive replied that it was his prerogative to decide such matters; after a short discussion, he withdrew inside the palace. 'Urābī stood waiting and soon Cookson came out with an interpreter to carry out negotiations. Cookson went back and forth between the Khedive and 'Urābī a number of times before a general agreement was reached, which included the recall of Sharīf Pasha, a member of both the Constitutionalist grouping and the Turkish-Circassian aristocracy. Sharīf was only persuaded to accept the Prime Ministership after 'Urābī agreed that upon reinstatement of Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Minister of War and the expansion of the army, the army would recognize the government's authority over it as absolute.

The successful outcome of this dramatic and dangerous confrontation gave 'Urābī and his fellow officers even greater prestige within the country. Reaction in Europe, however, was distinctly unfavorable. The London press paid particular attention to 'Urābī, giving prominence to reports from Egypt that strongly criticized him. Concurrent attempts, by Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and others, to persuade English readers and the British government that Urābī represented a genuine and laudable Egyptian national movement were generally unsuccessful. The idea that 'Urābī was a selfish dictator using and supported by Muslim fanatical elements gained dominance over European public opinion.

It is hardly surprising that 'Urābī's success was viewed with apprehension from abroad, since he had forced the dismissal and retirement to Europe of Riād Pasha, a favorite of European governments and financiers, a symbol of conservatism and of maintenance of the social, political, and financial **status quo** of Egypt. Moreover, the European powers could scarcely view with equanimity the prospect of the proposed increase in the size of the Egyptian army, with all the financial and military dangers that it would entail. In the weeks that followed, British, French, and Ottoman authorities held extensive discussions. The Sultan, eager to regain control over Egypt and wishing to diminish the influence of both Europe and the Constitutionals within the country, was prepared to send in troops; and the Khedive himself was prepared to accept an Ottoman military presence because he, too, sought to reduce European interference in his country's affairs and at the same time to keep the Egyptian army in check. But France, conscious of potential dangers for her newly established colony in Tunisia from any reassertion of the Sultan's authority in North Africa, resisted the idea strongly, and the French representative in Egypt, Baron de Ring, was in fact openly supportive of 'Urābī.

Britain, too, opposed the principle of Ottoman intervention, and on the arrival in Egypt in October 1881 of 'Alī Nizāmī Pasha and Fu'ād Bey, delegated by the Sultan as advisors to the Khedive, Britain and France decided to express the intensity of their interest in maintaining the **status quo** by threatening to send warships into Egyptian waters. When rumors of this threat circulated, the reaction inside Egypt was so vehement and the danger of civil disturbance so great that a compromise was immediately sought by all sides. New negotiations resulted in the Sultan withdrawing his advisors to the

by the arrest in February 1881 of ʿUrābī and his fellow officers ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Ḥilmī and ʿAlī Fahmī; following their presentation of a petition seeking reforms in the army and the government.

Dramatically rescued by their angry troops, ʿUrābī and his associates demanded the dismissal of Rifqī, the installation of Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Minister of War, and the administrative reform of both the government and the army. The Khedive and his advisers, including the Army High Command under General Charles P. Stone, one of the American Civil War veterans introduced into the Egyptian army by the Khedive Ismāʿīl, sought to bring the supposedly loyal Sudan regiment into Cairo to oppose ʿUrābī, but its senior officers had already been eliminated and it was clearly siding with the Egyptian rebels. The Khedive had no alternative other than to agree to ʿUrābī's immediate demand, the installation of Maḥmūd Sāmī as Minister of War.

A period of outward calm followed, with apparent reconciliation between the government and its Egyptian officers. In reality, however, the Khedive and his Prime Minister Riāḍ Pasha were constantly looking for ways to subvert ʿUrābī's position of growing popularity and power, and he grew more and more concerned for his own safety. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1881, when Maḥmūd Sāmī resisted pressures to have ʿUrābī and his leading military colleagues posted outside Cairo and was dismissed from office. The Khedive's brother-in-law, Daʿūd Pasha Yaken, was appointed the new Minister of War.

On September 8 Daʿūd Pasha issued the orders for ʿUrābī to proceed with his regiment to Alexandria; ʿAbd al-ʿĀl was to go with him to Damietta. The following morning the two colonels, seeing this move as a challenge to their position that they could not ignore, sent word to the Khedive—who was then at the Ismāʿīliya Palace, his private residence in a Nile-side suburb of Cairo—that they intended to present certain complaints and petitions to him that afternoon at ʿĀbdīn Palace, the official residence. The confrontation was dramatic indeed. The regiments of ʿUrābī and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl, later joined by the palace guard under Colonel Alī Fahmī, totalled some 3,000 fully armed soldiers with a score of field guns: a section of them surrounded the palace itself and the rest were ranged in formations around the great square before it. Upon his arrival, the Khedive entered the palace by the rear and emerged from the main door accompanied by Sir Auckland Colvin, the British Comptroller, Sir Charles Cookson, the Acting British Consul General, the Austrian Consul, and several of his Circassian and American generals in full uniform.

ʿUrābī, mounted on horseback and with his sword drawn, advanced slowly, at the head of a group of his officers, towards the Khedive. Tawfīq, apparently acting on Colvin's whispered advice, took the initiative and ordered ʿUrābī to dismount. ʿUrābī sheathed his sword and obeyed. He then presented three specific demands to the Khedive. First, that the entire ministry of Riāḍ Pasha be dismissed and a new government be appointed. Second, that a parliamentary Chamber of Delegates be convened. And third, that the strength of the army be raised to the maximum level of 18,000

rose to prominence. The basic facts of his early life may be easily told and in themselves present little controversy. He was born in 1840 in a small village near Zaḳāzīq in the province of Sharḳīyya in Lower Egypt. His father, who owned some ten acres of land, was the village head-man. Having received an elementary education at the local school, ʿUrābī was sent to al-Azhar, where he studied for two years before being inducted at the age of fourteen into the army, as it was the policy of the Khedive Saʿīd to introduce more native-born Egyptians. Accepted as a clerk in the army administration, ʿUrābī petitioned for service in the ranks, from which he rose rapidly through examination and special promotion, attaining the rank of 'Qāimaqām' (Lieutenant-Colonel) by his early twenties, when he was appointed aide-de-camp to Saʿīd and accompanied the Khedive on his trip to Medina the year before the latter's death in 1863.

Saʿīd's successor to the throne, Ismāʿīl, favored the Turkic-speaking Circassian elite and abandoned the policy of cultivating the Egyptian officers in the army. ʿUrābī was reduced to obscurity and served at the same rank for a dozen years, until the war with Ethiopia broke out. In that unsuccessful campaign he served without distinction as officer in charge of the transport service between Cairo and the base at Musawwaʿ in the Sudan. Allegations of misuse of funds, never substantiated, resulted in his being placed on half pay.

Several more years of service in obscurity with his regiment came to an end when he was implicated in the public confrontation and near-riot staged by Ismāʿīl against the Armenian Prime Minister Nubar Pasha and his British Finance Minister on February 18, 1879. ʿUrābī, Muḥammad Bey Nādī, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the same regiment, and ʿAlī Bey Rūbī, a third Egyptian officer and friend of ʿUrābī from Ethiopian days, were charged by court-martial with complicity in the affair — a false charge which was made to cover up the Khedive's own part in plotting the demonstration. Their protestations of innocence, based on the fact that they had only arrived from Rosetta that very night, were ignored, and the three officers were separated from their regiments and assigned to other duties in the provinces; ʿUrābī found himself acting as a tax-collection agent in Alexandria. It was only following the deposition and exile of Ismāʿīl and the accession of his son Tawfīq as Khedive that ʿUrābī and his associates were restored to their regiments.

The efforts of Sharīf Pasha, the new Khedive's Prime Minister, to institute a Constitution and democratic reforms were strongly opposed by the European powers and the resulting ministerial resignations were followed by the installation of a new government under Riād Pasha, described as a "Moslem of Jewish race belonging to the 'Turkish' party, who had the confidence of the British."<sup>2</sup> ʿUthmān Pasha Rifqī, a Circassian loyalist who had served on the panel of judges that had court-martialled ʿUrābī, was appointed Minister of War. Rumors spread of Rifqī's plans to reduce and curtail Egyptian native participation in the army and seemed substantiated

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2. Young, G. *Egypt*. (London, 1927), p. 104.

Nationalist resentment, not without encouragement from the Khedive. To provide more money for French and British creditors, for example, Nubar's government sent 2,500 army officers, already owed heavy arrears, into compulsory retirement on half pay, and on February 18, 1879, 400 discontented and impoverished officers and cadets demonstrated, manhandling Nubar and Rivers Wilson, the Minister of Finance, who was rescued only by the intervention of Ismā'īl in person. It is certain that this confrontation was connived at by the Khedive, who could thus demonstrate that he still retained popularity and prestige, if not real power. Certainly it achieved one of Ismā'īl's aims, for he was able to dismiss Nubar (February 19), on whom the Europeans were dependent, and replace him with Rāḡib Pasha, a trusted courtier. The British riposte, however, was to manipulate the exclusion of the Khedive from his own cabinet, and replace him as President with his son Tawfīq, the two foreign ministers being meanwhile given absolute veto powers—moves that, in light of the Rescript of the previous year, made them the virtual dictators of Egypt.

The increasing Nationalist agitation, however, provided the Khedive with at least one more shot in the locker by giving him an excuse to make the only move legally left to him—another change of government. In early April 1879, in response to written petitions and to widespread and obvious discontentment, Sharīf Pasha, a well-known moderate Constitutionalist, was named Prime Minister and the two European ministers were dismissed. Though officially warned that failure to reinstate the two ministers would be to renounce "all pretension of friendship to Britain and France," the Khedive, supported by Sharīf, refused to do so. At this point Bismarck intervened, declaring on behalf of his old friends the Rothschilds that Germany would champion the British and French creditors if Britain and France should show themselves weak. Stung by this challenge the latter made representations to the Sultan, Ismā'īl's suzerain, and on June 25, 1879, the Khedive was deposed, the news being brought to him by the acting British and French Consuls-General.

For months after Tawfīq's accession as Khedive, conflicting forces continued to jockey for power. The Sultan, having been encouraged to reassert his authority in the deposition of Ismā'īl, now sought to repeal the 1873 *firmān* under which Egypt had attained a high degree of autonomy. Britain and France, however, wishing to strengthen their hold on Tawfīq, succeeded in obliging the Ottoman ministers to modify the new *firmān*, retaining the privileges granted to Egypt in 1873. Although Britain and France had gained a strong foothold, and Tawfīq was too weak to curtail their intervention in the country's affairs, Sharīf Pasha and the Constitutionals he represented adamantly opposed any executive or ministerial powers for Europeans within an Egyptian national government. It was agreed, then, that the British and French Comptrollers would have only an advisory and consultative role over the country's financial affairs and that a newly reorganized Debt Commission would represent the interests of European creditors.

It was during this period of flux and reorganization that Ahmad<sup>c</sup> Urābī

soon translated into a booming economy. The Suez and Sweet Water canals were pushed to completion; roads, shipping and railway facilities were built; irrigation works were further developed, and agriculture, centered on the cotton trade, prospered as never before. If the Khedive's borrowings from European financiers at usurious rates meanwhile built an enormous burden of public debt, which his efforts to repay with fresh issues of Treasury bills made constantly heavier still, the burden for years was kept invisible, hidden behind a facade of apparent progress and prosperity.

Thus, at the same time and in the same spirit — if not on the same scale — as Paris, London, and New York, Cairo and Alexandria were given over to the planners and developers for modernization and each city began to assume the essential physical character it was to have for nearly the next hundred years. Fields and orchards became gardens where first Italianate palaces sprung up, then European style suburbs. European fashions were followed even in internal and external politics: Westernizing institutions closed under Sa'ïd were reopened and new ones were founded, including a Chamber of Delegates, and while the Khedive toyed with the idea of applying a parliamentary Constitution in Egypt, he financed imperialist adventures in Ethiopia and Sudan, exploring the waters of the Nile as far as the country of the Kabaka of Buganda, which seemed ripe for exploitation.

The Khedive is unlikely to have realized until too late that Europe regarded his own territory in much the same way he did the Kabaka's. His reign began in a small way with debts contracted to pay the debts of Sa'ïd, his predecessor; by the mid-1870's payments to creditors amounted to seventy per cent of total revenues, which were twice the total revenues of ten years earlier, having been expanded by ruthless and desperate means, including collection of taxes for years in advance. Mindful that it would be held responsible at home for default abroad, the British government sent out experts in 1875 and 1876 to assess the situation, and in 1877 an "unofficial" Anglo-French commission persuaded the Khedive to accept the so-called "Dual Control," a system by which Britain and France appointed two Comptrollers to receive and audit all state revenues and a Commission of Debt, with power to insure that European creditors were paid. In 1877 these creditors creamed off nearly three-quarters of the revenues of Egypt, leaving (once the tribute to the Sublime Porte and dividends to stockholders in the Suez Canal had been paid), slightly over a million pounds to cover all public expenses, including the army. In 1878 the Khedive was forced not only to allow the Commission to be temporarily expanded and given vastly enhanced powers as a Commission of Enquiry "into the whole financial situation of Egypt," but also to accept its recommendations, consenting to be stripped first of wealth and then of power: all his lands that had not been mortgaged to creditors directly were handed over to the Commission; and in August 1878 he signed a Rescript that pledged him never to act in opposition to his Ministry, the French and British Comptrollers meanwhile taking office as Ministers of Public Works and Finance, respectively.

The influence of these ministers in the government of Nubar Pasha, which took power in August 1878, was to become a major focus for growing



challenge to the Khedive directly into the very courtroom where he was to be tried. It is unfortunate that we have no record either of whether or not Broadley sought 'Urābī's permission before making excisions in the English translation, of whether or not 'Urābī knew about them, or of what his attitude towards them might have been. It is even possible that the Arabic original from which the translators worked was only a draft and therefore incomplete.

The copy Sabry used, however, seems to have been identical with the Blunt manuscript, with the exception of one small paragraph, a passage (see the translated text page 19, and note 45 below) that makes reference to 'Urābī's relationship with Aḥmad As'ad, whom the Sultan had sent to Cairo to establish a friendly relationship with the Egyptian Nationalist leader.

Sabry's French translation, included as an Appendix (pp. 249-288) to his excellent *La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien* (Paris 1924), is more faithful by far to the complete original than the *Nineteenth Century Review* version. Though there are certain omissions, usually indicated by lines of dots across the page, and some passages were edited for stylistic reasons, it otherwise accurately reflects the wording of the Blunt manuscript. Sabry likewise effectively captures the emotional tone of parts of the original, although the prevailing plain, direct and soldierly quality of 'Urābī's writing is somehow lost in the French. The notes here below make reference to those passages where Sabry's version seems defective or incomplete.

## INTRODUCTION II — THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The following brief sketch does not pretend to do justice to a period in which not merely the interpretation of events, but the events themselves, i. e. . . what actually happened, are still the subject of controversy.<sup>1</sup> Suffice it to say that the 1870's were a period of dramatic change and turmoil on every level of life in Egypt. The death in 1863 of the Viceroy Sa'īd, third in succession from the dynasty's Albanian founder, Muḥammad 'Alī, gave power to Ismā'īl, who was created Khedive ("prince") in 1867 when the title was also made hereditary in his line. Educated in Europe and eager to see his country's adoption of its civilization, Ismā'īl brought with him a sudden release of those energies active both within and from abroad that his predecessors had suppressed: while demands for societal and governmental reform in Egypt began to receive vocal expression, European industrialists and financiers were able to begin in earnest the exploitation of the country's resources they had long desired.

Irresistibly impressive plans for rapid development flooded in upon the eager ruler and investment money borrowed from European speculators was

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1. For a full discussion of the background of Urabi's Statement, the reader is referred to Alexander Schöchl's study *Ägypten den Ägypten: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Krise der Jahre 1878-1882 in Ägypten, Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Unerseesgeschichte Band 9* (Zurich and Freiburg: Atlantis, n.d.). As Albert Hourani remarks in his Preface, "It is unlikely that Mr. Schöchl's work will be superceded or his main conclusions overturned."

stressed in 'Urābī's account of the so-called "Circassian plot." The manuscript insists that during the official investigation "the magnitude of the plot became clear, and also the fact that it originated with the Khedive," and points out that the Khedive tried to balk even the execution of sentences that amounted to no more than pleasant exile in Istanbul. Later, 'Urābī continues, after the outbreak of war and the arrival of the British, "the Khedive sent for them to come to Alexandria; this he did precisely because he knew himself to be the cause for what had happened to them and that they would not have entered into that conspiracy except in accord with his wishes."

Similarly, 'Urābī charges in the manuscript that the unusual presence of large numbers of bedouin in Cairo during the troubled weeks of early 1882 were the result of deliberate policy on the part of the Khedive. Noting that the bedouin's presence made the civilian population, both Egyptian and European, apprehensive, he explains that "His Highness the Khedive had brought them in. He showed them so much favor that visitors imagined that the Ismā'īliya palace was a meeting place for bedouins, a very strange circumstance. The purpose of all this was that they would provide a counterforce to the army — quite unnecessarily." News of such acts of bad faith had even reached the Sultan, 'Urābī declares, adducing the letters to himself from the Sultan's agents, later published by both Broadley and Blunt (see note 45 below), to show that "the evil intentions of the Khedive had become quite clear to His Majesty."

In one involved, emotional, and somewhat confused passage, 'Urābī openly blames the Khedive for destruction of Egypt's good relations with Britain and for the riots and warfare that followed the arrival of the foreign fleets. Describing him as "the ruler who did not love his country," he charges that Tawfīq sought to discredit his own government, that he "hated the cabinet of Ministers and especially the Prime Minister: he often stated that he did not want and found no pleasure in seeing Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī."

There is reason to believe that every one of 'Urābī's allegations is well-founded, yet all these passages were omitted, possibly at Broadley's instigation, from the published English translation, along with other passages whose sheer emotionality, it might have been feared, would further alienate the sympathies of an already largely hostile British reading public.

These omissions are particularly interesting in light of questionable judgments made both at the time of his trial and later against 'Urābī's character. British writers have almost uniformly, as if by conspiracy, depicted 'Urābī as a spineless coward only too eager to flee from the British army, to surrender himself and his entire force without a fight in Cairo, and then to sue for and accept comfortable exile, rather than death, by cooperatively pleading guilty at a trial whose outcome was prearranged. D.M. Cameron, for but one example, was content to dismiss him out of hand as a "ridiculous creature."<sup>7</sup> The reader of the Arabic original, however, feels quite otherwise: that 'Urābī was determined to carry his

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7 *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century* (London 1898), p. 267.

difficult to decipher. Broadley refers to one of these mistranslations in **How We Defended Araby**, which quotes extensively from the **Nineteenth Century Review** translation, observing in a footnote how “an extraordinary mistake in punctuation” made one sentence “read very differently in its original publication.” Note 31 below discusses the error in translation in the passage in question.

The errors and omissions are more varied and more significant, however, than mere errors of punctuation. The translator does not seem to have had a good grasp, for example, of either Egyptian politics or Egyptian military structure, both of which are central to one of the more serious omissions, a passage that concerns the ʿĀbdīn palace confrontation of September 1881 and the demands for restitution of the seventeen million Egyptian pounds taken by the government as **muqabala** tax, a motivating factor in public insistence on a new ministry under Sharif Pasha. Certain small omissions and obvious misreadings suggest similar failures of comprehension on the part of the translator.

Unfortunately, we have no indication of who undertook the translation for Broadley. He recounts in his book how in Cairo he initially hired a Welshman, Edward Evans, as an interpreter, then engaged two Armenian clerks, Najib Abcarius and Joseph Kanawaty, as translators and copyists. As his dealings with Egyptian officialdom became more complicated, however, he felt the need for a more expert Arabist and so telegraphed to Rome for David Santillana, whom he described as one of the most accomplished Arabic scholars of the time and whom he had earlier known as secretary to the Tunisian government and a strong supporter, like himself, of the Nationalists’ struggle there against occupation by the French. By the time ʿUrābī came to trial, Broadley was employing a translation staff of no fewer than ten; and we do not know which of these men, if any, translated ʿUrābī’s Statement.

The most significant differences between ʿUrābī’s original and this first English translation, however, concern areas where the motives and attitudes of the Khedive are brought into question and are possibly not due to the translator alone, but to Broadley, acting as his legal counsel: though it is quite clear from the Blunt manuscript that ʿUrābī intended his Statement to be a deeply felt, powerful refutation of the charge that he had rebelled against his ruler and his ruler’s suzerain, the Sultan, his remarks about the Khedive Tawfīq are often so openly derogatory and accusing that they might well have damaged any case that hinged upon such a plea. Prudence may have suggested to Broadley that if ʿUrābī’s charges against his sovereign were ignored, his client’s chances would be considerably improved. In several specific instances, whatever the reason, ʿUrābī’s criticisms and accusations of the Khedive appear to have been muted or excised.

ʿUrābī’s original emphasizes the various plots against himself and his colleagues, underlining the role of the Khedive in each. We are told, for example, that within hours after the attempt to poison ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Hilmī documents surfaced showing that the assassination had been contrived “at the Khedive’s palace.” The Khedive’s personal involvement is likewise

disgust at the behavior of the British or his treatment in jail, are excised. To this deliberate censorship must be added such occasional errors as, for example, that of giving on page six the name **Fahmī** instead of the correct 'Abd al- 'Al Bey **Hilmī**. All in all, the **Taqrīr** printing gives quite false and misleading impressions of important aspects of 'Urābī's character and of his purposes in writing his deposition. It is, however, the only Arabic version published to date.

The history of the translation of 'Urābī's manuscript into other languages has been decidedly checkered: two versions have appeared, one in English and the other in French, but the English version is neither full nor accurate and the French version is not easily available. The Statement has consequently received remarkably little attention from Western students of 'Urābī and his times. This is particularly unfortunate since 'Urābī's forceful presentation of facts and first-hand impression give a keener sense of the drama and high emotion of that turbulent period than is available from any other written text.

Broadley immediately recognized not only the usefulness of the Egyptian Nationalist's "written instructions" in preparing 'Urābī's case, but also its value in helping to create a favorable climate of opinion in England, whence the real pressure emanated that would decide 'Urābī's fate. Though it appeared only after a compromise had already been reached, 'Urābī had stood his **pro forma** trial, and had received his sentence, the English version of the Statement that Broadley sent for publication to the **Nineteenth Century Review** had clearly been rushed into print for this purpose. Republishing large portions of it two years later in the twelfth chapter of **How We Defended Araby**, Broadley remarked that it "forms an excellent answer to those who insist on treating him as a wholly illiterate military adventurer."<sup>5</sup>

Published at Blunt's instance, **How We Defended Araby** was an apologia not merely for 'Urābī, but for the whole Nationalist movement itself, to which Blunt remained actively attached for many years and with which he was sympathetic to the end of his life. Since 'Urābī was the movement's fallen hero, its most obvious martyr, a defense of his actions and character was important, and the Statement could be regarded as one of its central documents. Blunt referred to it twenty-five years later as "a general history of the whole of the political affairs in which he had been mixed, in a form which was frank and convincing."<sup>6</sup>

It is particularly interesting then, to compare 'Urābī's complete original as represented in the Blunt manuscript with the English version Broadley sent to the **Nineteenth Century Review**. The frequent lapses in the accuracy of the translation are immediately apparent and are clearly due in the main to error and not to design. The cramped twenty-eight pages and additional notes of the Arabic version from which Broadley's staff worked must have been very

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5. **How We Defended Araby and His Friends: A Story of Egypt and the Egyptians** (London 1884), p. 114.

6. **Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, Being a Personal Narrative of Events** (London 1907), p. 452.

would have in any case as belonging to Blunt, 'Urābī's greatest champion, the man to whom he owed his life.

There were, of course, still further copies. M. Sabry mentions one found in the archives of the Ministry of Justice in Cairo as having been the source for his French translation; and still another is referred to in a forty-six-page pamphlet entitled **Taqrīr Ahmed 'Urābī Basha al Misrī**, which appeared in Cairo apparently soon after the crisis of 1882 and which includes the only published Arabic version of the Statement.

References to this work in Khayr al-Din al-Zarkali's biographical compendium **Mu 'jam al-Matbū'āt al-'Arabiyya** p. 1317 are brief and confusing. The work itself is clearly rare and lack of access to it has previously prevented its proper examination and assessment. Geoffrey Schofield, in his comments introducing the S. O. A. S. manuscript, laments his failure to locate a copy in England; R. L. Tignor, in his **Middle East Journal** (Spring 1962, vol. 16 no. 2, p. 243) article "Some Materials for a History of the Arabi Revolution," mistakenly refers to this **Taqrīr** as "a report on the state of the Egyptian army." I myself, however, was fortunate in obtaining a photocopy of this work from a personal copy owned by Dr. Muhammad Alwan, presently of Harvard. It has thus been possible to establish, from examination of both, that the **Taqrīr** was drawn either from a copy of the Blunt manuscript or from a similar source. The title page of the **Taqrīr** informs the reader that it was made

« طبقا للنسخة التي وصلت ليدي منقولة عن نسخة بخط يده »

("from the copy in my possession taken from a copy in his own handwriting").

Although the opening page of the **Taqrīr** states that the document is being presented بالحرف الواحد (word for word) it is clear that someone, no doubt the Salim Habalin whose name appears on the work's final page below that of the publisher, the **Matba'at al-Jāmi'a** in Cairo, indulged in extensive editing. The printed version makes notable omissions from the original, a paragraph structure is provided, occasional words are changed, and grammatical errors are rectified. The omissions are of two kinds. On page twelve, for example, the editor states within parentheses: "Here 'Urābī makes reference to personal matters which he attributes to the Khedive; and since these are beyond the scope of the **Taqrīr** and it is inappropriate to mention them, as for example the affair of Mme 'Aisha Khānim, about whose exile to Sudan 'Urābī tells us, we have refrained from reporting them. We take up the account of the author of the **Taqrīr**, then, where he begins as follows: 'and then the British and French warships arrived. . . .'"

This major excision thus consists of the equivalent of three full pages of the Blunt manuscript. The other omissions from the **Taqrīr** printing, while frequent, are less extensive and fairly consistent: those passages in which 'Urābī makes overt charges against the Khedive of complicity, for example, in plots against the Nationalist army officers, or where he expresses his

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4. La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien (Paris, 1924), p. 242.

## INTRODUCTION I — THE MANUSCRIPT

In 1961 in the pages<sup>1</sup> of the **Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies** Geoffrey Schofield, Near East Bibliographer at the school, drew attention to his library's acquisition from the estate of Wilfred Scawen Blunt of a manuscript by the Egyptian Nationalist leader Ahmad 'Urābī. Catalogued under accession no. 141394, the manuscript is written in ink on one side only of sixty-two unnumbered folios in an inexpensive, unbound, faint-lined exercise book measuring eight by ten inches. Its script is a generally legible **ruq'ā**, clearly defined, still unfaded and offering few reading difficulties. At the base of the title page is a seal mark that appears identical with 'Urābī's mark as reproduced in **How We Defended Arabi**, an account of the Nationalist trials by A.M. Broadley, the lawyer-journalist hired by Blunt as 'Urābī's legal counsel. The colophon bears two more seals, the signature, "Ahmad 'Urābī the Egyptian," and is dated 29 October 1882 "in the town of Colombo on the Island of Ceylon." From comparison with other documents written by him,<sup>2</sup> the handwriting of the entire manuscript seems clearly to be that of 'Urābī himself.

The colophon needs explanation. In his article in the **Nineteenth Century Review**, "Instructions to My Counsel," which appeared just after 'Urābī's trial and which contains the only English version of the Statement, Broadley introduces the text of this version as follows:

During our first interview, on Sunday, the 22nd of October, Arabi proposed to give us his instructions in the shape of a written statement of his case. Unaided by any papers or memoranda, he began it the same day, and finished it on the following Sunday evening, signing it "Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian." It fills twenty-eight pages of close Arabic handwriting.

On 29 October 1882, the day the Statement was presumably finished, dated, signed, and first sealed,<sup>3</sup> 'Urābī was thus in jail awaiting his trial and possibly a death sentence. The reference to Colombo in the colophon therefore could not have been written at this time; and the fact that it appears to have been written with a different pen from the rest of the manuscript suggests that it was added, with a second seal, sometime after 'Urābī's arrival in Colombo as an exile in January 1883. Blunt visited 'Urābī in Ceylon in 1883, and it was probably then that he was presented with a copy of the Statement. Since the Broadley version described in his article consisted of "twenty-eight pages of close Arabic handwriting" and since Broadley later noted that this version was annotated, added to, and corrected, it is reasonable to assume that the sixty-two-page Blunt manuscript is a fair copy, one of two or more. Intended as a final version, it therefore has a special authority, which it

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1. B.S.O.A.S. Vol. 24 (1961) pp. 139-141.

2. Prof. Irene I. Gendzier of Boston College has kindly provided me with copies of letters 'Urābī wrote to Ya'qūb Sanū<sup>3</sup> that she acquired from the latter's heirs in Paris.

3. Vol. XII, no. 70 (December 1882), p. 971.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the University of Michigan Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies for its support in the publication of this work .

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*Cover design by Elizabeth Rodenbeck*

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**NAHDET MISR PRESS**

# **THE DEFENSE STATEMENT OF AHMAD<sup>c</sup> URABI THE EGYPTIAN**

**From the Blunt Manuscript  
at the School of Oriental  
and African Studies, London.**

**Translated, edited and with  
an Introduction by  
TREVOR LE GASSICK**

**THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO PRESS  
CAIRO, A.R.E.**



**the defense  
statement  
of  
AHMAD 'URABI**



*TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY*

**trevor le gassick**