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part of those who are rich in information resources (education, motivation, the means of being generally informed). The early development of democratic politics was accompanied by a necessary diffusion of basic political knowledge throughout a citizen body, newly enfranchised, aided by the mass newspaper press. The possibility has been canvassed that this process of levelling up (closing of the knowledge gap) has been halted or reversed as a result of several forces, but especially: the relative decline of the informational and political newspaper press in the face of the ever more popular and entertainment-oriented television medium and of the popular entertainment press; the increasing complexity of political information; and the decline in political participation (for instance low voting rates in US presidential elections) and in partisanship generally (for whatever reasons), leading to a detachment from the substance of politics. A minority of the population remains intensely involved and well informed, while a growing minority ceases to participate or to be easily reachable by mass political communication. In the light of such research evidence, there has been an increased interest in how well television news (now a principal source of political information) is understood and recalled by the mass audience (Robinson and Levy 1986). However, circumstances are continually changing, making assessment on such matters uncertain, particularly as television news becomes more oriented to entertainment, in response to sharper competition for the mass audience. Those developments in the range of formats available for political communication, noted above (pp. 473–7), are also relevant for assessment.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AS AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS

Research into the persuasive potential of political campaigns, although often inconclusive, has also established a number of generalizations about the probabilities and the conditions for the achievement of intended effects. Opinion and information changes are more likely to occur on 'distant' and newly emerging issues than on matters on which attitudes have already been informed. Monopoly control of the source or simply consonance and repetition of messages may also achieve results in a predictable direction. It is easier to reinforce existing support than to recruit new supporters by conversion. The status, attractiveness and credibility of the communicator do matter. Effects are easier to achieve in relation to separate facts and opinions than on deeper attitudes, outlooks, or world view. In general much more depends on the receivers–their dispositions, motivation, prior attitudes and knowledge–than on the message itself or the status of the source. As noted above, opinions are anchored in immediate social relationships, which to some degree 'protect' individuals from media influence.

An important development in political communication research was a closer attention to the motives of the audience, the possible uses and satisfactions of political communication and to the interactive nature of the process. Early models of persuasive communication, of the kind borrowed from advertising, identified the receiver as a passive target rather than as an active participant. This assumption was mistaken and especially misleading when applied to politics. It has become clear that actual and potential audiences for political communication vary considerably and have diverse motives and expectations, including the wish to be informed, re-activated, entertained, excited and advised (Blumler and McQuail 1968). Reception is also often accompanied by informal response and discussion. Audiences vary not only in the strength of motivation to engage in politics but also in their attitudes to politics itself, a minority being very negative to the whole process and resentful of 'propaganda'. Anticipating and taking account of such potential variations is largely beyond the ability of even the most astute and best-equipped campaigners, if only because the message can never be sufficiently controlled and diversified to reach the many possible target groups.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE 'SPIRAL OF SILENCE'

As noted above, much also depends on the social and group context of reception. In this connection, an interesting theory of opinion formation has been advanced to account for the apparent growth of a dominant political consensus, largely as a result of the working of mass media. It was named the 'spiral of silence' theory by its originator (Noelle-Neumann 1984). Its main foundation is the idea that most people have a psychological need to avoid the isolation and discomfort of disagreement. Thus, under conditions where certain views seem, because of the unanimity and frequency of their public repetition (especially by way of mass media), to represent what the great majority think, or ought to think, then those who hold different views remain silent, whatever the actual strength and extent of such dissident opinion. The more they remain silent, the more the impression of dominance increases, and the fewer are those prepared to speak out, hence the 'spiralling' effect referred to. Under conditions where media are monopolistically controlled, this seems a plausible theory, although it should not have much application in normal, open democratic political life with a diversity of political sources.

There has been a continuing debate since the 1950s about how 'powerful' the mass media are in politics, as in other areas of social life. The continuation of uncertainty on the matter stems in part from the intrinsic methodological difficulties of delivering clear empirical evidence of powerful effects, especially those which involve long-term changes.

POLITICAL LINGUISTICS

The study of political communication is represented by traditions other than that of research into campaigns and public opinion. An alternative route has been by way of the study of language and rhetoric, which has concentrated on the uses of political symbols, and on the texts and documents of politics, rather than on the effects of these messages (Edelman 1977). One of the routes does, however, also lie in the study of political propaganda which was concerned with the manipulation of language as well as people. George Orwell's *Animal Farm* is an early, imaginative reflection on the devices by which language was misused and distorted to reverse the truth. All political movements and ideologies have sought, consciously or not, to establish usages of words and symbols that suit their own purposes. As one student of political language has remarked, 'Politics is largely a word game' (Graber 1981:195).

Graber (1976) has made an inventory of the different 'functions' of political language, under five headings. Under the heading 'informational', she includes the giving of facts and also the invoking of connotations by the use of code words in such phrases as 'welfare state' or 'founding fathers'. Words and phrases in politics can carry inferences and symbolic meanings which help the purpose of the communicator. A second heading is that of 'agenda-setting', a process noted above (p. 478), in which a communicator tries to become identified with an issue. A third function of political language is that of 'interpretation and linkage', which refers to the construction and structuring of wider patterns of meaning and association. The two other categories are 'projection to past and future' (tradition and continuity) and 'action stimulation' (the 'mobilizing' and 'activating' function of language). Words (and pictures) can thus do many different things in politics—invoke associations, provide symbolic rewards, structure the context of debate, be a substitute for action as well as a means of action, and address themselves to numerous different receivers. This is a brief discussion of a complex field of enquiry which also includes the study of 'rhetoric'—or the art of speaking well, in the sense of effectively or persuasively.

CRITICAL THEORY

The study of political language has also been central in another tradition of political communication research, represented by critical or neo-Marxist theory and research. A left-critical version of the theory of mass society has viewed the mass media in general as (witting or unwitting) instruments of 'tolerant repression', spreading a conformist, consumerist ideology, culture and consciousness, which has stifled the growth of organized political opposition, especially amongst the working classes (Mills 1955: Marcuse 1964). This form

of political theory has several variants, but in the stronger neo-Marxist versions the mass media have been seen either as willing propaganda tools in the interests of the ruling class, which usually owns or controls them, or as an 'ideological state apparatus' (Louis Althusser's term) which serves to maintain control. The concept of 'hegemony' was also coined by the Italian communist, Gramsci, to refer to the exercise of dominance over ideas exercised by a ruling class, using all means of communication available to it.

Some empirical evidence for such views has been provided (and not only by the critical theorists themselves) by the extensive analysis of the content of mass media, especially of news. The news media, whether in private or public hands, have appeared, more often than not, to carry the message of the reigning social consensus and to support the established political and social order by various means: by giving legitimacy and attention to established authority; by silence about problems and alternative solutions; by directing attention to scapegoats; by labelling opponents as extremists who challenge established order and, with it, the democratic system. While such theories have many critics, it is quite plausible to suppose that the broad tendency of established mass media is likely to be in support of the established political system and of the dominant consensus, especially since the mass media are integrated into the same system.

This tradition of critical theory and research has had several beneficial effects. It has helped draw attention to the underlying historical processes of political change, rather than concentrate on short-term campaigns viewed from the point of view of political persuaders. It has obliged us to pay attention to the wider context of political communication and the alternative perspectives and meanings that are embodied in communication practices and rituals. We are reminded that messages are not necessarily received ('decoded') as they are sent. In particular, it has forced a recognition of the fact that the mass media cannot simply be regarded as neutral transmitters of political values, culture and information, as if guided by some unseen, benevolent hand. The media are also, and always have been, instruments of politics.

MEDIA POLICY

The general political significance attributed to the mass media is evident from the universality of systems of regulations and the continuing active debates about media policy, however much governments in liberal democracies are supposed to keep their distance from the media and to guarantee independence of the press. Media policies take a wide variety of forms, varying especially along a dimension of degree of state control. Previous Soviet and Eastern European regimes placed all media under state supervision. In Western Europe, regulatory frameworks have been legally established to maintain strong, although democratic,

supervision of radio and television, often by way of public monopolies. Even where these arrangements are being adapted in order to increase market freedom, policies have remained in force to guarantee some forms of public service. The most relevant political aims of regulation have usually been to secure diversity of expression and fair access to channels, to provide the means for governments and social institutions to reach citizens with information, and to protect national cultural and economic interests. These aims also often underlie policies of support for newspapers which are, otherwise, outside the public sector (Picard 1985). The growing economic significance of communication technology in national and global markets has added a new dimension to the politics of communication.

TRENDS IN RESEARCH

There have been a number of significant developments in political communication research since its early days, when it was largely a matter of studying propaganda, political campaigning and political socialization. First, there has been a move to recognize that political communication is not just one-way 'transportation' of information and beliefs, but a matter of interaction and transaction between sender and receiver. Second, there has gradually been less emphasis on the 'attitude' as object of influence or the key to understanding behaviour. Instead, there has been more attention to political 'cognitions' of several kinds–awareness of issues, formation of images based on information, connotations and associations. Third, there has been a trend to more 'holistic' investigations, looking at 'critical events' in the political life of a society which are played out over time and involve several different kinds of participant and not just the communicators and receivers (Chaffee 1977).

There has also been more appreciation of the 'ritual' aspects of public communication, such as election campaigns, which are not just rational means to some persuasive end, but symbolic expressions and celebrations of political beliefs and values. The ubiquity of political messages has also been more generally recognized. Initially, political communication was looked for almost exclusively in party or national propaganda. There has been a gradual recognition (by politicians themselves, as well as researchers) that one should look more to the *news* (especially on television) for potential political effects, because of its wide reach, high credibility and apparent impact. A further trend has been to look as well at fiction and drama (especially film and television) for the less overt, but no less potent, political messages of the day which reach the less politically involved.

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Currently changing conditions of public communication seem to call for yet further revision of ideas. The trends of the time (not least because of the economic-industrial imperatives noted) are towards a multiplication of channels of all kinds, more choice for the 'consumer', less regulation and control, more commercialization of media systems. These changes offer more opportunities to individuals to find the information and ideas they like, but they may offer less benefit to established political sources (parties and politicians), who may find it harder to gain access to their chosen targets. Politics has to compete, in the same 'audience market', with more popular communication goods. The result may be a less well-informed political mass, and a widening gap between the active, involved and resourced minority and the majority detached from political institutions. On the other hand, the sheer amount of political communication shows every sign of increasing.

The international dimension of political communication should also be firmly on the agenda of political communication research. In recent times, international politics has increasingly come to be played out on the public stage of television and other media, especially on issues of 'terrorism', of peace, war and disarmament and in relation to changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as in the affairs of the European Community. Global power relations are closely reflected in differential ownership of, and access to, the means of international communication. These trends are unlikely to be a passing phase, since they result from the globalization of many political issues and the larger economic significance of communication. These developments have increased the political and public salience of issues concerning the development, ownership, control and regulation of media technologies and systems.

The future of political communication and the issues for research are closely linked to wider trends in society. It has been argued that we are entering a new type of society—the Information Society—in which information of all kinds becomes the key economic resource and where information work is the central economic activity. If so, we will be more concerned than before with the politics of communication and information, rather than with political communication as such. Access to information goods will form an increasing part of welfare and thus provide a more salient political issue. Meanwhile, the most pressing concerns (as for some time past) are likely to remain the maintenance of widespread and informed involvement in political life. This will require continued attention to securing favourable conditions of access for political communicators and 'rights to communicate', in the widest sense, for citizens.

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RECRUITMENT OF ELITES

JOHN NAGLE

ELITE THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

The study of elite recruitment has had a long and chequered history. In part this derives from its association with modern elite theory as developed since the middle of the nineteenth century. Any theory of political elites immediately touches on a critical point in every system of government, namely the question: who rules? The focus on elites has often tended towards either justification of processes which select certain people for leadership, or challenge to the legitimacy of those same processes. The history of elite analysis is complicated by the fact that elite theory has largely been associated with Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. In their works on elite recruitment and elite circulation these authors sought to justify the authority of rulers and to question the basis for democratic government as it was developing in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century (Nye 1977). In their view, all societies are sharply divided into rulers and masses. Ruling elites are recruited in a self-perpetuating manner from the higher strata of society, are autonomous in their exercise of power, and control the masses through superior political skills and organization. While professing scientific grounding, their works were in fact driven by a political agenda which opposed the rise of the universal franchise, and which feared that extension of voting rights to the masses, to ordinary workers and peasants, would threaten the just authority of political leaders, and, worse still, would also open the door to socialism. Michels, a German disciple of Mosca and in his early years a syndicalist, later accepted a professorship at the University of Turin and ended his career as a scholarly supporter of Mussolini and Italian fascism. Pareto also judged fascism as a positive development in Italy. Mosca, a political liberal, none the less opposed the extension of voting rights to ordinary workers and peasants, which in his view would be lowering standards and dangerously flirting with the possibility of socialism through manipulation of the proletariat. While Sereno (1968:29) has argued that Mosca expressed opposition

to Mussolini's fascism, Nye (1977:20) points out that Mosca, like many other liberals of his time, was more fearful of the left, and thus accepted the fascist regime as necessary although not measuring up to preferred bourgeois standards. Mosca's commitment to liberalism, as was the case with many German, Italian and French liberals of the time, did not preclude opposition to parliamentary democracy with universal adult voting rights. Indeed, in the inter-war years, many liberal intellectuals turned their backs on embattled democratic parties and parliaments, and became supporters, perhaps reluctantly, of anti-democratic movements and governments. Common to these elite theorists is their opposition to the further evolution of parliament beyond middle-class participation, their distrust of ordinary workers and peasants as potential voters and citizens, and their abiding fear of socialism in any form. This orientation was part of the more general disdain, characteristic of both liberal and conservative intellectual thought, for notions of popular sovereignty. While this antipathy pre-dated the First World War and the Great Depression, it also linked the crisis of democracy with the need for a stronger, and more aggressively anti-socialist, political authority. This was, of course, a period in which parliamentary leaders, especially in Italy and Weimar Germany, but also in France and Great Britain, were often seen as failures, both in military and in economic affairs. The Weimar democracy was from the start saddled with the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty, and was later associated with the Great Depression. The Italian parliamentary system was blamed for Italy's humiliations both during and at the end of the First World War and was seen as riddled with corruption and political intrigue. It is this association of elite theory and the leading elite theorists with the fascist challenge to parliamentary democracy as the dominant political system-type of Western Europe which stigmatized this field and which has generated an ongoing conflict on the purposes of elite studies. On the left, there is suspicion that contemporary elite theorists have an unspoken agenda of minimizing or even thwarting popular democracy and effective citizen participation. On the right, there is the tendency to see critics of elite theory as proponents of social upheaval or as unscientific political activists. Much of this conflict has little to do with the theoretical potential of elite research, but has a close relationship with the actual political history of the field and its practitioners.

With the rise of fascism and bolshevism in Europe in the inter-war period, some scholars committed to the values of liberalism *and* democracy began to search for ways to combine the insights of elite theory with the basic requirements of democratic theory. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) was one of the leading pioneers in attempting to create a more realistic, or empirical, theory of democracy which could utilize the lessons of elite theory without abandoning political democracy as either impossible or ineffectual. Schumpeter's work borrows from elite theory the notion that even in a democracy elites must rule;

the question is how to structure the selection of political leadership according to democratic procedures that result in an effective and stable governing elite. A main problem for Schumpeter is the avoidance of mass movements led by anti-system elites (fascists or communists) in societies which are increasingly 'mass societies'. The concept of 'mass society' in the development of realist democratic theory is heavily influenced by the notions of elite theory, in which the popular masses are seen as basically unreliable supports for democratic values, and in critical situations prone to anti-system mobilization by extremist movements of the right or left. Kornhauser (1959), Riesman *et al.,* (1950), and Adorno *et al.* (1950) stress the authoritarianism of the working and lower middle classes, the mass dependence on leaders, and the manipulability of mass psychology for political upheaval. A realistic democratic theory must depend on 'responsible' political elites to constrain popular choice to system-supportive competition among contending leadership groupings. There must be an overarching elite consensus on upholding the democratic framework which implies a self-imposed limitation on mobilizing popular masses for political gain, and filtering out popular demagogues who threaten to utilize mass 'prejudices' in the political process. As classic elite theory argued, elites must uphold the proper standards and must insulate elite recruitment from mass influences. Only in this way can democratic elites survive crisis points and ensure their own survival as leaders of democratic systems. A 'realistic' theory of democracy must revise the classic ideals of citizen participation in political decision making by limiting the roles of ordinary citizens and expanding the roles to be played by elites (Burnham 1941:202; Schumpeter 1942:263). By borrowing from elite theory, the 'realists' hoped to rescue democratic theory from itself and from its own too lofty ideals which did not correspond to empirical reality. Elite theorists, especially Mosca (Pareto and Michels somewhat less so), were rehabilitated from 'misconceptions' about their antidemocratic intentions; therefore those, such as Harold Lasswell *et al.* (1952), who borrowed from their assumptions and theories should not be seen as compromising democratic theory (Shils 1982:13–14; Eulau 1976:18–19). Sometimes with sadness (Friedrich 1950), often with more enthusiasm for modern functional elites (Keller 1963), the realists gave up on the ethical and educative goals of democracy, and abandoned the notion of meaningful citizen participation as the critical means to such goals. Dahl's 'polyarchy' (Dahl 1956), perhaps the most popular version of realist democratic theory, requires a certain level of apathy for the health of the system, and the classic *Civic Culture* study (Almond and Verba 1963:474–9) treats non-participation by large numbers of citizens as a positive feature, avoiding system overload on demands and permitting elites more leeway. Lipset (1964:lxiii) utilizes Ostrogorski's pioneering work on elite control in British and American party machines in the nineteenth century to argue that party oligarchies contribute positively to the

operations of mass democracy. While there was some scholarly resistance to this realist revision of democratic theory (Nye 1977:40–2), the emphasis on stability and effectiveness predominated in the theory of democratic elites for a generation after the turmoil of the depression and two world wars.

With the rise of 'new social movements' representing values of participation, civil rights, peace, environment and feminism, a challenge was mounted against the realist, or 'elitist' theory of democracy (Kariel 1970). The challengers argued that realist theory had incorporated so many assumptions from elite theory that it had become a fearful opponent to the further evolution of democratic societies. Realist democratic theory had reduced democracy to democratic elitism, with regular elections to choose among competing establishment elites, and precious little role for citizen initiative and the incorporation of new issues on the political agenda through institutional procedures. Realist democratic theory had narrowed democracy down to the expectations of elite theory, with democracy as Mosca's 'political formula' of elite consensus. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) pointed to the ability of established elites to agree not to compete on key issues, to keep certain choices off the political agenda, and to ignore problems that elites felt were too difficult or too divisive to allow for public debate and choice. Walker (1966) argued that democratic elites, even in a multi-party system with regular elections, had found ways to sanitize or formalize democracy, while becoming increasingly suspicious of and hostile to independent citizen participation in politics. In West Germany, an undoubted success in reconstructing parliamentary democracy in the first post-war decades, younger generations of citizens in particular were becoming alienated from the consensus politics of the major party elites (Narr 1977; Mayer-Tasch 1985). Unless democracy went beyond formalities to encourage and then accept greater citizen participation, it would atrophy and lose its moral/ethical advantage over non-democratic systems.

This challenge highlighted anew the difficult relationship between elite theory and democratic theory. The realists had correctly recognized the importance of elite theory as a basic caution to democratic theory; in attempting to construct a permanent framework of elite consensus in which to isolate some core of democratic practice, they had surrendered much of its dynamic idealism and legitimacy (Bottomore 1964:148–9). It appears that in any given organization, as Michels argued, there is a trend towards elite rule and rank-and-file marginalization, and this includes the organization of realist democratic systems. However, Michels, Mosca and Pareto downplay the recurrence of popular demands for meaningful accountability arising in reaction to elitist control, which is just as much a part of political history as is the emergence and circulation of elites. The 'participatory democracy' theorists have rightly noted these trends, yet they often attempt to construct systems in which 'co-option' of new leaderships

into establishment politics will be blocked, 'bureaucratization' and 'professionalization' of the 'new politics' will be somehow avoided. The Greens in Germany, and many of the new 'green' or 'alternative' parties and citizen coalitions in Europe and North America, attempt to build formal rules and structures (rotation in office, no re-election, modest compensation for office-holders, policy making by party base mandate, open and endless debate on policy) to maintain control of leaders by the rank and file (Hase 1984). Yet it seems likely that the emerging leaders in these 'new social movements' will in various ways structure their own behaviour and careers to undermine the goals of effective control of leaders by ordinary members. Hence the ongoing struggle between the Realos (realists) and the Fundis (fundamentalists) within the German Greens.

The dialectic of democracy and elitism generates an ongoing search for new modes of participation, new practices of citizen expression, giving rise to new forms of elite control and manipulation. Whether this democratization/elitism dialectic is merely cyclical or results in higher-level syntheses is debatable. The long-term expansion of literacy, mobility and satisfaction of basic needs might seem to strengthen the belief that higher levels of leader-citizen interaction emerge as more citizens demand political voice, yet the increasing complexity and anonymity of productive relations also make informed and effective citizen input more problematic as well (Burnheim 1985). The study of elites itself is not at question; it is the classic theory of elites which is at odds with democratic theory and with the historical process of democratization.

APPROACHES AND FINDINGS IN RECRUITMENT RESEARCH: WHO RULES?

Putnam, in his comprehensive review of comparative elite analysis, finds that political elites are always recruited disproportionately from higher-status backgrounds and privileged families (Putnam 1976:22), that non-elected administrative elites are even more exclusive, and that economic elites are the most privileged. In virtually every system, particularly over time, a process of 'agglutination' orients the selection processes to screen out most, though never all, lower status citizens. Putnam then poses a question to this type of analysis: 'agglutination: so what?' (ibid.: 41–4). Putnam mentions research implications for elite self-interest, elite socialization, the social seismology of power structures and elite integration, but all are subsidiary to the issue of elite legitimacy. Elite recruitment is a fundamental function of every political system, perhaps the one which most visibly touches the critical issue of system legitimacy.

Researchers have studied political elite recruitment from two qualitatively different approaches: processes and outcomes. A research focus on both formal and informal processes of leadership training and promotion will pick up on the

pluralism of aspirants, the competition for both elected and appointive offices, the uncertainty of outcomes, the responsiveness to actual or anticipated constituent demands, and the unplanned or chance aspects of elite recruitment. Studies of political ambition and career-building (Schlesinger 1966:195–8; Herzog 1975:225–7), for example, draw attention to the inexact course for a political career and the openness of the recruitment filtering process from the perspective of the individual. Studies of internal gatekeepers or selectorates (Putnam 1976:52–65) within elite hierarchies reveal the roles of skills and credentials which are most valued at different times among possible contenders for office. A degree from Oxford or Cambridge in the United Kingdom, from the École National d'Administration in France, from the National Autonomous University in Mexico City, or from a Soviet polytechnical institute has been an important filtering device, but still leaves degrees of openness and competition for elite advancement.

Studies which focus on the composition of elites, on the background characteristics of elite groupings relative to the general population, on common ties among elites, on elite groupings rather than individual leaders, draw attention to pervasive and systemic inequalities. These studies tend to illustrate that beyond the indeterminacy at the individual level, and regardless of process or institutional setting, in either formal or informal ways, the social hierarchy has a great deal of power to reproduce itself in elite recruitment outcomes (Matthews 1954; Miliband 1969; Jaeggi 1969). Social revolutions, such as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China, have initially opened up elite recruitment to younger workers and some peasants and have eroded former privileges, but over time the new social order develops its own status hierarchy (Nagle 1977:65–7, 89–92; Barton *et al.* 1973:25, 125).

Institutional, reputational and decision-making definitions have been used to identify political elites for research, and there has been debate, most notably in studies of community power structures, over whether the method significantly affects the findings (Parry 1969:114–19; Putnam 1976:15–19; Marger 1987:184–9). No one approach will serve to answer all questions, and each leaves something to be desired. Method choice can make a greater difference at the local level, where informal power structures may diverge more from formal institutions. This may, however, also apply at the national level for many developing nations, where formal institutions are weak and penetrated by strong outside elites. Here research context and purpose must be used to avoid misleading definitions, and multi-approach techniques can check for divergencies. Most elite studies have been one-time snapshots of a single political elite; individual studies of this type, though often interesting as case studies, have been less useful to generalization and theory building than comparative and longitudinal or time-series studies. Cross-national aggregate

analyses of elite characteristics (Quandt 1970:179–84) need to be reinforced by individual-level analysis and by seminal-case longitudinal research (Nagle 1977:5–13). In general, issues of research methods are no longer so central to the field.

If the basic approaches to research on elite recruitment are now less controversial, the characterization of research results is anything but straightforward, and evinces the most divergent evaluations. Elite recruitment studies have been used to characterize regimes through examinations of three key questions: 'How open is elite recruitment?'; 'How unified is the resulting elite?'; 'Is some transformation taking place?' One of the key assumptions of much elite recruitment analysis, and one of its sources of recurring interest, is that the political regime may be typed according to its system of elite recruitment, both processes and results.

Marger (1987:141–63) notes that analyses of elites in the United States have led to judgements that the United States is dominated either by a ruling class, or by a 'power elite', or by multiple, pluralist, competing elites. Marger concludes that the United States:

> seems closest to a power elite since (1) elite differences do not represent basic disagreements on essential issues of the political economy; (2) the corporate elite may not decide all issues, but it is able to set the agenda and boundaries of political debate; (3) the necessary overlapping of government and corporation gives rise to a natural elite cohesiveness, though not a conspiring group.
>
> (Marger 1987:163)

While elite recruitment is not entirely closed to the lower strata, and indeed there will always be some penetration of lower-class individuals into top positions, '[t]he outstanding fact of elite recruitment in the United States and other Western industrial societies is that leaders are chosen overwhelmingly from socially dominant groups, and have been for many generations' (Marger 1987:180). On the other hand, Keller (1963:273) has argued that all modern societies give rise to a pluralism of 'strategic elites', each with specialized functions and limited to a particular sphere of social activity. These elites, Keller finds, have relative autonomy and independence, are functionally vital to the society, but cannot dominate the entire system. The trend is towards recruitment on individual merit rather than social inheritance, and the pluralism of strategic elites provides a defence against dictatorship and abuse of power. From a Marxist perspective, Miliband (1969) and Domhoff (1967, 1971) have characterized the United States as a ruling class system, in which the state is dominated by the class which owns and controls the productive assets of the society. The economic power of the capitalist class is sufficient to manipulate the state, and to use it broadly to safeguard its overall interests. Domhoff and Miliband show that elite posts are held by wealthy capitalists far beyond their proportion in the society, and that

most other leading positions go to those managers, lawyers, and other professionals closely tied to the ruling class.

> In an epoch when so much is made of democracy, equality, social mobility, classlessness and the rest, it has remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist countries that the vast majority of men and women in these countries have been governed, represented, administered, judged, and commanded in war by people drawn from other, economically and socially superior and relatively distant classes.
>
> (Miliband 1969:66–7)

The debate over the origins and nature of the Soviet system has been closely related to the evaluation of the Leninist party's concept and practice of elite recruitment. This debate has its roots in Lenin's organizational thesis of his 'party of a new type' presented in *What is to be Done?* (Lenin 1902). From Marxist perspectives, Martov, Trotsky and Luxemburg presented characterizations of the future Soviet regime based primarily on Lenin's new 'bolshevik' culture of revolutionary leadership (Tucker 1987:12–71), pinpointing principally the tensions between socialist democracy and the vanguardist elitism of Lenin's centralist organizational innovations. The evolution of the Leninist culture into Stalinist dictatorship provoked further Marxist recharacterizations of the regime by Trotsky (1957) and then by Djilas (1957). For Marxist analysts the key problem has been to evaluate the ruling elite's control over the means of production, and then to identify the class nature of that ruling elite according to Marxist categories of exploitation of surplus value, inheritability of elite privilege and class consciousness. A central feature in all these critiques is the evaluation of the processes and results of elite recruitment for the overall judgement of the Soviet system. This debate emphasizes once again the theoretical tension between elitism and democracy, in this case within the socialist ideological tradition.

In the early post-war years, much scholarship on elite recruitment focused on totalitarian elites of both communist and fascist varieties, the better to combat the threat to democracy. Lasswell and Lerner argued that:

> until recently the spokesmen of liberal capitalism were riding the tide of success, confident that the business revolution was carrying all before it. The sobering impact of recent events has done more than to undermine faith in business, science and technology. It has brought about a revival of man's distrust in himself.
>
> (Lasswell and Lerner 1965:29–30)

Lasswell and Lerner's rather apocalyptic essay mirrored the uncertainties which the communist revolutions in Russia and China, and fascist victories in Germany, Italy and Japan, had provoked, justifying increased attention to those characteristics which distinguish communist and fascist elites both from the general population and from established elites.

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The closely-held communist *nomenklatura* system of party appointments to full-time functions in party, government and other organizations has been a clear example of a consciously self-recruited political class. It has been closely watched to discern changes in the nature of the Soviet system. In the post-Stalin years, Fleron (1969) and Fischer (1968) noted trends towards recruitment of managerial-technical specialists into top party positions, replacing those with lower educational attainment and with lesser professional experience. This trend towards co-optation of managerial-technical elites into top party positions seemed to foreshadow a declining ideological orientation and a growing regard for those skills needed to administer an increasingly urban and industrial Soviet economy. However, this trend declined in the 1970s, and the implication that the elites of the party apparatus would soon give way to functional elites of the scientific-technological revolution was shelved.

Much attention has been given to the question of elite succession in the Soviet system, especially the succession of elite generations. Scholars have identified elite age cohorts whose formative experiences in politics and in the party, it is argued, make their perspective broadly similar (Nagle 1977:187–94). The earliest generation of 'revolutionary theorists', who formed the small cadre party and its Leninist revolutionary ideology, gave way to the 'revolution managers' who joined the party during the revolution and civil war and rose within the expanding party apparatus. This nascent apparatus elite formed the backbone for Stalin's consolidation of power, but was composed of men with poor educational backgrounds. In the era of the purges of the 1930s, Stalin promoted a very young 'managerial modernizer' cohort, from proletarian-peasant backgrounds but with some higher technical qualifications, to oversee the industrial revolution of the first Five-Year Plans (Unger 1969; Nagle 1975). The managerial modernizer generation, which included Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Andropov, Chernenko, Ustinov and Gromyko, had an extraordinarily long run of dominance in the Soviet system. The members of this elite cohort, whose careers were launched during Stalin's purges and whose lives at the same time were threatened by Stalin's tyranny, were able, after 1953, to make the Soviet system safe for themselves. Some (Rush 1965) predicted that the Soviet system required a single dictator at the top, with the power to purge incumbents, and predicted that one contender would eliminate all rivals. Yet a collective leadership avoided a return to Stalinist purge mechanisms for elite rejuvenation, and this generational bloc was able to prevent younger aspirants from dislodging them (Hough 1967, 1972, 1981). Only the advent of Gorbachev in the latter 1980s ended this 'petrification' and brought a new pluralism of generational representation into the Soviet Central Committee.

A contentious theme of elite research on communist systems has been control by a single, unified elite versus a trend towards a 'pluralism' of elites. With the

rise of specialist elites, some researchers began to describe the Soviet system in terms of interest-group politics (Lodge 1969) with some influence by sub-elites over policy-making decisions. This trend towards more visible interest-group activity, both inside and outside the party, has produced recharacterizations of the Soviet and East German regimes as 'consultative authoritarian', or of the Yugoslav regime as 'democratizing and pluralistic authoritarian' (Skilling 1971:222–8; Ludz 1972) rather than totalitarian.

In the early post-war Hoover Institute studies on fascist elites, Lerner (1951) introduced the concept of 'marginality' to describe the Nazi elite; Lerner defined marginality as deviation from the common attributes of the larger society, and it was this outsider mentality which linked various Nazi sub-elites such as propagandists, administrators, police and military. For Lerner, the Nazi elite was a group of social misfits, disproportionately from 'plebeian' or lower middle-class origins, an anti-modernist counter-elite which once in power would revolutionize ruling elites. Kater (1983:182–9) has shown how influential this early study has been in judgements on the Nazi elite and moreover the Nazi regime. Yet later research by Kater (1983), Fischer (1979) and Nagle (1983), as well as Knight's (1952) earlier but often overlooked work, have demonstrated that the Nazi elite was neither so marginal to Weimar society, nor revolutionary, nor clearly divorced from established elites. Kater judges that between the Nazi elite and the establishment, 'there were too many elements of accommodation, of fusion, or absorption. In social composition alone, the pattern of mutual interactions and interlockings between the two groups was nearer to collusion than to collision' (Kater 1983:232–233). Nagle has shown that the Nazi Reichstag faction, in comparison to the other parties, represented not a plebeian counter-elite but a broad coalition including modern professionals, new middle-class elements, big business, military and working-class representatives (Nagle 1983:88). After the Nazis gained power in 1933, it was in fact the older middle-class elements, mainly smallholders, which declined in importance while newer white-collar employees and professionals in engineering, medicine and teaching continued to increase. More recent research has argued that the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party) was a pragmatic and modern catch-all party (Hamilton 1982; Childers 1983) with specific appeals to very diverse elements of the German electorate. This catch-all strategy was as volatile and unstable as it was successful, and showed signs in late 1932 of decline; ultimately anti-democratic coalition-building projects led by established conservative elites including Papen and Hugenberg (Kühnl 1985) were needed in January 1933 to bring the Nazis to power and to destroy the Weimar Republic. New research has intensified the debate over responsibility of established industrial, military and party elites for the triumph of Nazism and over the nature of their collaboration with the Nazi regime (Turner 1985; Abraham 1986).

The agenda for elite recruitment research in the developing nations has been less well-defined and less productive. Much of the research has been focused on Latin American which has a longer period of independence and, at the end of the Second World War, was more highly developed than other regions. An important focus has been the relation between elite recruitment and the prospects for democratic development (Smith 1974; Burns and Skidmore 1979). The Lipset and Solari (1967) volume presented analyses of various elites as non-revolutionary modernizing forces in the era of the US-sponsored Alliance for Progress. But even here, weak governments and parties, penetrated by stronger social and economic elites, made the initial search for a democratic political elite problematic. Scott (1967:117–19) concentrates on the transition from a unified ruling class of traditional elites of landowners, military and church to a system led by middle-class modernizing elites from business and the professions. But these modern elites are still too weak to dominate or to lead, and often have themselves become dependent on traditional and external elites to maintain their own interests from periodic popular discontent and desperation. This 'crisis of elites' (Scott 1967:140) may then lead to challenges from revolutionary elites. A strong state system has emerged in only a few states, notably in Mexico, where political elite recruitment could be studied within the framework of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The PRI has been able to reduce the role of the military, church and landowners to provide for relatively smooth generational succession (Nagle 1977:81–7), and to develop a clear political elite recruitment system (Smith 1979). Camp (1980) has outlined the roles of education, political skills and personal ties within the PRI recruitment system, evolving in the 1980s into more strained relations between financial-managerial *tecnicos* and party apparatus *politicos*.

The rise of military-dominated regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s gave rise to the characterization of many regimes as 'corporatist' (Wiarda 1978), representing a modernizing 'new authoritarianism' (Collier 1979). This new corporatism is an alliance among major established elites but aimed now at modernization rather than maintaining traditional economic structures. This perspective, developed primarily with reference to Latin American experiences, has also been extended to regimes in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, where economic successes have been greater and more durable. Though overly elastic, corporatism as a concept reflected the dimming prospects of democratic party and parliamentary elites as leading forces in the modernization process, and elevated the military (Stepan 1978) as a potent anti-communist state elite.

In many newly independent nations, attention has been drawn to the rise and expansion of the state elite. Nafziger describes the new statist bourgeoisie in Africa as a ruling class which uses taxes, government spending, indigenization,

currency exchange rates and control of public employment to both accumulate personal wealth and maintain power, at the cost of slowing growth and increasing inequality (Nafziger 1988:108–9). Even in 'socialist' states like Tanzania, Nafziger finds that access to superior education for the children of elites is the mechanism to transmit high status (ibid.: 138–9). But the attempt at a state-led economic development project has failed, and has created mainly a parasitic and corrupt ruling elite, clinging to power and fearful of mass participation.

FUTURE RESEARCH IN ELITE RECRUITMENT

The potential for elite studies is closely related to major political transformations observable in different systems. After a post-war era of growing state power (Migdal 1988) in liberal welfare democracy, in Leninist one-party communism, in Latin American corporatism, and in the great variety of newly independent Third World states, there is a perception that state size and responsibility has outrun either leadership capacity or legitimacy, or both, resulting in new challenges to basic processes of elite recruitment. This trend is associated with the rise of social movements and new elites outside the mainstream or establishment institutions of leadership recruitment. A time for special attention to research on anti-statist counter-elites may have arrived.

In the liberal democracies, the 'new social movements' have blossomed suddenly into new 'green' and 'alternative' parties in most of Europe. Eldersveld in 1981 still judged the established party's recruitment of new leaders in Germany as 'dynamic, open to social renewal, vote-maximizing, and providing incentives for activists to join and to work and to move upward in the organization' (Eldersveld 1982:88). Future research needs to address questions of how emerging patterns of elite recruitment through alternative/green movements will affect citizen-elite relations, how the new leaders will be able to affect the political agenda, and how established party recruitment will respond over the longer run to the alternative/green challenge, especially in recruitment opportunities for women (Nagle 1989:148–55). One may note the erosion of the post-war elite consensus, and a variety of attempts to rework the political landscape with new party formations, including, on the far right, the National Front in France, the Republicans in Germany, and the National Front in Britain. The 1990s may well be a more severe test of the political centre. Research may also focus on whether the welfare state democracies are 'governable' (Crozier *et al.* 1975) in the sense of permitting elites to perform their roles effectively; Shils (1982) worries that in modern Western society 'collectivistic liberalism' has emasculated political leadership, destroyed any semblance of a political class in Mosca's sense, and made it nearly impossible to govern effectively.

The communist party monopoly on political elite recruitment and the *nomenklatura* system of recruitment within the party was swept away in Eastern Europe in the revolutions of 1989–90, and is being dismantled in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, communist parties have been removed from power, and have been replaced by a variety of democratic, nationalist, populist and in a few cases 'reform socialist' parties and movements. In this 'post-communist' era, elite analysis has an opportunity to describe and clarify the new inter-elite struggle between liberal democratic, reform socialist and nationalist leaderships to shape the new emerging polity. Solidarity, once the uniting opposition and then suddenly in 1989 the governing party in Poland, is beginning to splinter into more liberal democratic and national-populist parties. In Bulgaria, the Communist Party (now renamed Socialist Party) was able to win in multi-party elections in 1990 after deposing the old Zhivkov leadership, but now is strongly challenged by a diverse umbrella of opposition elites. In Czechoslovakia, the liberal intellectuals of Civic Forum who led the 'velvet revolution' of 1989 also won the first free multi-party elections, but are confronted with both an unreformed communist party in opposition and new forces of Slovak nationalism. In Yugoslavia, multi-party elections in some republics (Slovenia and Croatia), and the rise of ethnic nationalist elites in virtually all republics and Kosovo have put the survival of Yugoslavia, not just the role of Yugoslav communist elites, in question. The rise of new elites from the urban professional middle class displacing older elites from worker backgrounds marked the revolutions of 1989–90, but the modern intelligentsia may not retain its new-found leadership role. In a period of extraordinary fluidity, a wide variety of outcomes may emerge from this new elite competition to give substance to 'post-communism'.

In the Soviet Union, the democratization process, beginning with Gorbachev's elite-initiated reforms and later accelerated through mass-based popular movements, undermined the legitimacy and power of the party apparatus over the nomination and selection processes for political office. In the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, nominations were initiated at the grassroots level, competing candidates from a wide range of issue and ideological orientations were presented to voters, and apparatus candidates were soundly defeated in many contests. Even in districts where the apparatus was able to impose a single candidate (party boss Solovev in Leningrad, for example), the voters were able to defeat him, forcing a second round of multi-candidate elections. Newly elected members of the Congress of People's Deputies, in nationally televised debates, broke with the pattern of docile rubber-stamp parliaments and criticized nearly every aspect of the Soviet system, including such previous taboo areas as the KGB, the military, Lenin and Gorbachev himself. The Supreme Soviet selected from the Congress membership, the first sitting parliament in Soviet history, likewise

surprised observers by rejecting numerous nominees for ministerial posts, developing legislative initiatives on its own, and developing a pattern of factional voting and pointed debate. The growth of unofficial local political clubs and broader movements of environmentalists, peace activists, ethnic popular fronts, reactionary groups such as Pamyat, and religious and labour activists, now offers a rich and realistic agenda for elite recruitment research, which will help answer questions about the character of a future Soviet system. Finally, ethnic nationalist movements in 1990 gained control of most Soviet republic-level parliaments in local elections and were able to set the agenda of those parliaments, which announced their 'sovereignty' or 'independence' from the central Soviet government. The building of new inter-ethnic elite relations, and the intra-ethnic elite conflicts between more radical and more moderate nationalists, may well determine the future constitutional system of the component Soviet republics, whether federal, confederal, or independent state.

The June 1989 crackdown by the Deng regime in China against the democracy movement reminds us that renewed repression is yet possible in the short term, and regime dissidents may well have to await the passing of the octagenarian elite to renew their challenge to the party monopoly. The transformation of communist systems in the 1990s will be closely related to the nature and outcomes of these challenges, and will define the character of a new political system.

In most developing nations, the failure of ruling elites, civilian and military, democratic and authoritarian, to fashion and to lead a development project which provides for the general welfare has given rise to new leadership aspirants, but not to any single pattern of elite transformation. Putnam's comprehensive synthesis of findings on political elites contains some evaluations of elite transformation trends in Western democracies and the communist systems (Putnam 1976:205–14), but no section on trends in Third World nations. The 'crisis of elites' which commonly characterized Latin American systems in the 1960s can now be extended to most of the Third World. In a few cases, as with the New People's Army in the Philippines, the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) in El Salvador, or Sendero Luminoso in Peru, revolutionary leadership poses a serious alternative to the entire array of existing elites. A small number of basically nationalist elites, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the African National Congress in South Africa, and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in Eritrea, also represent strong challenges to currently dominant political elites, but do not clearly threaten the existing economic and social elites. Integralist Muslim religious leaderships, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, now pose a serious threat to existing political and social elites in the Middle East, in South-West Asia and across northern Africa. Growing labour movements in Korea, Brazil and South Africa also show signs of producing more influential leaders, though not

revolutionary challengers for state power. In Mexico, India, Taiwan and South Korea, new and viable opposition parties may be developing from the shadow of hegemonic one-party or military-led regimes. Can any of these challenges develop the broad social integration and value consensus which existing elite recruitment has failed to provide?

Finally, future elite research must begin to treat non-national elite recruitment, and to investigate interaction of non-national and national elite recruitment, in a systematic way. The emergence of a more unified European Community is one obvious case. The study of international finance elites from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank should be integrated into research agendas on political elite recruitment for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina or the Philippines. Religious leadership recruitment from papal appointments of bishops and cardinals, new leaders arising from transnational Islamic fundamentalism, and multinational corporate elites may be systematically treated, regardless of formal citizenship.

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PART VII

CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN THE NATION-STATE

31

POLITICAL CULTURES

MICHAEL THOMPSON, RICHARD ELLIS AND AARON WILDAVSKY

Political culture entered the lexicon of political science in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Intimately linked with the so-called 'behavioural revolution', the term signalled a move away from the study of formal institutions to the informal behaviour which breathed life into them. Political culture was heralded as a concept capable of unifying the discipline. By relating the behaviour of individuals to the system of which the individual was a part, it promised to 'bridge the "micro-macro" gap in political theory' (Almond and Powell 1966:51–2; see also Almond and Verba 1963:32–6; and Pye 1965:9). In recent decades, however, the concept of political culture has fallen out of academic fashion amidst criticisms that it is tautological, that it is unable to explain change, that it ignores power relations, and that its definition is fuzzy.

We have no intention of bombarding the reader with the myriad definitions of political culture that have been tried and discarded only to reappear without agreement among scholars. One study counted no less than 164 definitions of the term 'culture' (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). Among students of political culture, the most widely accepted definition views culture as composed of values, beliefs, norms and assumptions, i.e. mental products (see for example Pye 1968:218). This 'mental' definition of culture has the virtue of clearly separating the behaviour to be explained from the values and beliefs that are doing the explaining. On the other hand, a definition of culture that separates the mental from the social has the unfortunate tendency of encouraging a view of culture as a mysterious and unexplained prime mover.

This disembodied view of political culture leads to it being treated as a residual variable, an explanation of last resort dragged in to fill the void when more conventional explanations fail. A recent study appearing in a pre-eminent political science journal typifies this usage of culture. The authors show that standard demographic variables (income, education, religion, race, age, gender) cannot explain intrastate variation in party and ideological identification, and then attribute this unexplained variance to political culture

(Erikson *et al.* 1987). Invoking political culture in this way is no better than saying 'I don't know'.

The most common criticism levied against the political culture literature is that it takes values as a given. Culture, critics insist, is a consequence, not (or at least not only) a cause, of institutional structures. Typical is Barry's argument (Barry 1970) that a democratic political culture is a learned response to living under democratic institutions rather than, as he claims Almond and Verba (1963) argue in their influential work on *The Civic Culture,* a pre-rational commitment exerting a causal force upon those institutions. Similarly, Pizzorno (1966) criticizes Banfield's classic study of *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Banfield 1958) for explaining the absence of collective action in southern Italy as a product of an irrational 'ethos' rather than as a rational response to their 'marginalized' position in the economic and political structure.

To deny that political culture is shaped by institutional structure, critics continue, makes the concept of culture deeply mysterious and unfathomable. As Hall points out, 'unless cultural theories can account for the origins of… attitudes by reference to the institutions that generate and reproduce them, they do little more than summon up a *deus ex machina* that is itself unexplainable' (Hall 1986:34). We agree that political culture must not be treated as an uncaused cause purportedly explaining why people behave as they do yet incapable of itself being explained. To do so is to posit a world in which values are disembodied, unattached to human subjects. The continued adherence of people to certain doctrines and habits must be explained. One way to do this, we believe, is to conceive of culture not only as mental products (ideas, values, beliefs), as is commonly done, or as patterns of social relations, but as values justifying relationships indissolubly bound together.

Political culture is transmitted from generation to generation, but it is not transmitted unchanged, nor is it transmitted without question. Cultural transmission is not a game of pass-the-parcel. Political culture is a lively and responsive thing that is continually being negotiated by individuals. A plausible theory of political culture must not turn the individual into an automaton passively receiving and internalizing societal norms.

A first step in this direction is to allow for the importance of adult, rather than only childhood, experience in shaping individual orientations. Experience with institutions counts. Throughout the course of their lives, human beings use their reasoning powers in order to scrutinize their social relationships and to compare the performance of these relationships with alternative arrangements. For example, a quarter century of dictatorships in Burma has led the Burmese towards a favourable view of capitalism and democracy.

A second step in avoiding cultural determinism is to allow for competing political cultures within a society. Political cultures are like scientific theories in

that they may predict outcomes that prove false, create blind spots that lead to disaster, or generate expectations that go unfulfilled. When one culture falters, others are available to fill in the vacuum. Justifications or beliefs that once seemed powerful gradually (or perhaps even suddenly) seem to lose their hold. Witness, for instance, the significant increase in cynicism about government in the United States in the decades since publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). To stay as we were requires vast energy. Conceived as ways of life that are continually being negotiated, tested and probed by individuals, there is no reason why theories of political culture cannot make sense of change, long considered as the Achilles heel of cultural theories.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

A notion of political culture has existed as long as people have speculated about observable differences among countries or groups. Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Tocqueville are among the more prominent political philosophers who have tried to account for differences in government in terms of variations in a people's mores and temperament (Almond 1980:1–6). While these classic works in political theory provide the deep intellectual background for the concept of political culture, a more immediate impetus was provided by the anthropological studies of 'national character' pioneered by Ruth Benedict (1934, 1946), Margaret Mead (1942, 1953), and Geoffrey Gorer (1948, 1955).

This anthropological literature focused upon the unique configuration of values, beliefs and practices that constituted a nation's culture. Russian culture was different from Japanese culture was different from Chinese culture was different from French culture was different from American culture and so on. Comparison seemed beyond hope. Anyone who sought to draw parallels between one national culture and another (or, even more grandly, to formulate a universal generalization about human behaviour) was liable to have those whose stock-in-trade is the deep-seated particularities of a society immediately step in with their anthropologist's veto: 'Not in my tribe'.

If the concept of culture was to be of utility to political scientists, some classification of cultures was necessary. Perhaps the most influential was the typology of parochial, subject and participatory orientations presented by Almond and Verba (1963), who addressed themselves to one of the great questions of post-war social science: why, in the period between the First and Second World Wars, did democracy survive in Britain and the United States while collapsing on the European continent? A stable democratic policy, Almond and Verba suggest, requires a balanced political culture (the civic culture) that combines both a participatory and subject (or deferential) orientation to politics. Were everyone to participate in every decision, they argue, the political system