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Edited by
Mary Hawkesworth
and
Maurice Kogan



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the need to accumulate capital for investment and the need to build legitimacy for regimes.

My preference is to express that as a tension between political logic and economic logic; a contradiction or trade-off that is particularly severe in less developed countries. Political logic pushes for governments to build support for themselves and the regimes that frame them by, among other things, meeting the concrete bread-and-butter demands of individuals and groups, which often means to increase general levels of consumption. Economic logic however, especially in capital-short countries, demands that an investable surplus be accumulated primarily by restricting consumption. The reality is that any accumulation strategy entails a cost (restrict consumption) that falls unequally on the populace as a whole. Often groups targeted to bear the costs (workers, peasants, popular sectors, middle-class groups) resist, either through political means if available or direct confrontation if not. Thus, periodically countries can become politically immobilized around these issues—open competitive or even semi-competitive democracies are particularly vulnerable—provoking the formation of an authoritarian regime with enough concentrated power to impose the cost allocations inherent in any model of development or stabilization strategy.

Purely political explanations come in a variety of forms. Huntington, again, sees the ‘crisis of transition’ as a source of the ‘political decay’ of traditional institutions and thereby a ‘praetorian situation’ in which social conflict is unmediated by institutions (Huntington 1968). This Hobbesian situation creates an inclination to pull the military into power and create a regime oriented to impose order by force. This explanation is particularly apt for the more underdeveloped countries of Latin America and regions like Africa where the kinds of authoritarian regimes that emerge are highly personalized versions of neo-patrimonialism. A variation on this type of institutional argument would point to moments of crucial transition such as decolonization or economic restructuring as rendering societies particularly vulnerable to a praetorian situation. It is noteworthy that the patterns of highly personalized and factionalized authoritarianism in contemporary Africa bear marked resemblance to the personal dictatorships of nineteenth-century Latin America, often called the age of the *caudillos* (leaders). In both cases sovereignty, owing to the need to convert the administrative fragments of previous imperial systems into modern nation-states, was the central problem confronting governments. Not unlike Europe in the age of the centralizing monarchs, the problems of state and nation building have called to the fore strong and often charismatic leaders in the less developed world.

One might advance the argument, albeit with some hesitation, that in the developing world extreme praetorian situations tend to produce highly personalized authoritarian regimes of the neo-patrimonial type while issues of

economic development and problems of political stalemate in relatively more complex societies produce more organized and technocratically focused types of authoritarian regimes. When these issues are played out in countries with some type of capitalist economy the question of costs of development tend particularly to produce regimes that lean toward the bureaucratic-authoritarian type in contexts as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan. Indeed these cases call into question any facile attempt to state an invariant and positive relationship between capitalism and democracy in the less developed world.

Other types of political explanations focus mainly on issues of why democratic or quasi-democratic regimes 'break down' into authoritarian regimes. In this vein Linz and Stepan have argued for the need to focus on the particular choices made or not made by politically relevant individuals and groups in moments of crisis or severe difficulty (Linz and Stepan 1978). A recent variation on this argument, aimed particularly at Latin America, sees the propensity towards extra-legal changes of government of an authoritarian nature as a product of presidential systems which in that environment have a marked tendency to be stalemated by recalcitrant legislatures. This argument has called for a shift to parliamentary systems as a way out.

In terms of the internal organization and functioning of contemporary authoritarian regimes we again confront a complex and confusing landscape. To simplify matters we might argue that the internal structure and dynamics of authoritarian regimes are shaped by the way they cope with two crucial functions, control and policy making. In broad terms, control in authoritarian regimes is based on a mix of coercion and co-optation. When coercion, either as suppression or mobilization, is preponderant the political salience of the military, police and paramilitary organizations is increased. Coercion can occur as the organized and systematic state terror of the secret police or paramilitary death squads as in Stalin's Soviet Union or Argentina under the military, or the much less-organized, episodic and personalized terror of regimes like El Salvador or Haiti.

Most authoritarian regimes, however, like other regimes, seek to legitimate themselves and control the populace by at least quasi-voluntary means. The main voluntary mechanism is co-optation in which individuals and groups in return for particularized substantive privileges (contract concessions, favourable wages, social security benefits) give to the regime generalized political support and/or acquiescence. The key to co-optation is that the co-opted become dependent on the regime for the flow of particular privileges for which they trade their political rights; the surrender of political rights in turn removes a crucial form of check on governments.

In highly personalized neo-patrimonial regimes co-optation comes in the form of elaborating complex networks of patron-client relations; and therefore

the main dynamic of politics is intense factional competition to establish direct personalized ties to the patrimonial centre which is the lodestone of patronage. In this regime form rulers spend an inordinate amount of time seeking to cling to office by manipulating the web of clientelistic factions pivoting around them: factions that penetrate all classes and institutions, including the security forces. In more organized forms of authoritarianism co-optation is often elaborated in corporatist arrangements in which specific recognized groups (trade unions, professional associations, interest groups, etc.) are more or less formally linked into the regime's institutional structure. Often these corporatist arrangements are asymmetric (or what O'Donnell (1977) calls bi-frontal) in that they permit substantial access for some groups (often large national and international business interests) while limiting or blocking the access of others (labour, for example). Where co-optation is preponderant such regimes often take the form of single-party states like Mexico where the ruling party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI) is the main mechanism of co-optation and control. In practice most contemporary authoritarian regimes, such as Brazil between 1964 and 1983, blend clientelism and corporatist organizations, coercion and co-optation with a resulting mixed pattern of relationships between security organizations, party organizations, official interest organizations and informal factions. These patterns have to be sorted out on a case-by-case basis.

The policy style of personalistic-authoritarian regimes is driven and rather overwhelmed by the dynamics of intra-elite factional politics; intrigue seems to substitute for policy. In more highly organized bureaucratic-authoritarian type regimes the policy process is reflective of the instrumental challenges these regimes set for themselves around the questions of the cost and benefit allocations connected to the process of government-led economic development and/or crisis management. Aside from issues of control the key policy issue to such regimes is 'managing the economy'.

As noted earlier such 'modernizing authoritarian' regimes often seek to legitimize themselves with a *universitas* image of rule in which policy making is monopolized by an apolitical policy elite put in place by a strong executive. Such elites are often highly trained technocrats whose claim to policy dominance is based on their expertise or capacity to interpret and translate into policy packages esoteric technical knowledge such as economic theory. O'Donnell argues that such civilian technocrats form an alliance with military elites which is the crucial structural feature of decision making in the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (O'Donnell 1977). Policy making itself is often a process in which the executive uses control mechanisms to insulate policy elites from group pressures. Protected from societal pressures the executive-based policy elites, especially economic policy teams, can formulate programmes which are then 'given to

society' by executive decree and justified as being in the collective national interest as opposed to those of selfish pressure-groups.

This policy style is both the boon and the bane of contemporary authoritarian regimes. Boon because it allows governments to confront directly stalemate and crisis; bane because, particularly as a crisis recedes, many groups begin to clamour for access to the decision-making process. Indeed many groups, including those who ostensibly benefit from economic policy such as big business, discover that they value ongoing access to the policy process as much as, if not more than, policies designed exclusively by executive-based policy elites, even if they are theoretically in their interest. In short, these bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes often generate from within themselves a 'crisis of representation'. In Latin America at least this issue of representation in the policy process led many key early support groups to break with authoritarian regimes in the mid-1970s and to assume leadership positions in the broad social movements that demanded a return to procedurally defined representative democracy.

The movement toward 'redemocratization' during the 1980s in Latin America, the weakening of authoritarian control in some Asian states and the recent collapse of communist authoritarian regimes have led many to see an all but inevitable global trend toward democracy. This trend is often linked to a parallel drive to adopt more market-centred or 'capitalist' economies, leading many to restate the argument that capitalism and democracy are positively connected. An extreme version of this optimistic forecasting sees an 'end to history' as the world converges on themes of liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics.

There are many reasons to doubt the accuracy of this sanguine view. First, authoritarian regimes continue to exist in places as diverse as China, Africa and the Middle East. Second, the kinds of crisis situations that gave rise to modern authoritarian regimes continue to plague many parts of the globe. One of the major crises involves the need to redefine 'national state' organizations as the forces of regionalism and ethnic and religious-based sub-nationalism push forward to challenge existing state structures.

Just as importantly many countries in the less developed world still confront the myriad problems of fostering economic development. In regions such as Latin America, many countries confront the task of consolidating democratic structures even as they face the results of a decade of severe economic crisis, characterized above all by huge foreign debts. In all of these cases the tension between economic and political logic is more intense than ever, particularly as foreign lenders and organizations like the International Monetary Fund lean on governments to adopt severe austerity programmes which carry with them substantial cost allocations. The costs are particularly high and unevenly

distributed within the framework of neo-liberal stabilization and reorganization programmes.

Many have pointed out that these economic issues demand governments that can define, implement and sustain technically sound economic programmes which owing to the issue of costs are often extremely unpopular. To achieve this, governments often have to create a strong executive centre capable of insulating teams of technocratic policy makers from distributive pressures generated by interest groups. Many countries in fact are showing a marked tendency toward detached and authoritarian-like policy styles within formal democratic frameworks. Such styles are maintained either by strong executives managing the economy by decree or by multi-party pacts that convert legislatures into rubber stamps for executive policy packages.

To close we might note that the persistence of complex policy problems, particularly around issues of economic and political logic, will continue to generate the kinds of crisis situations which in the past gave rise to authoritarian regimes. Hence, one possibility might be a cyclical alternation between formal democratic regimes and various kinds of authoritarian 'regimes of exception'. Perhaps even more likely is that the problematic current scene will lead to the appearance of new kinds of regimes that go beyond our current vague categories of 'democratic' and 'authoritarian'. We may see new kinds of hybrid regimes that combine elements of liberal democracy, such as periodic elections, with a strong executive-focused capacity to interpret authoritatively and implement technically sound programmes of economic management. Such hybrids might be based on enduring party pacts or new kinds of civil-military alliances. Be that as it may, it would surely be a mistake to again relegate the concept of authoritarianism to the status of a conceptual museum piece.

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MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

TALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN

Oliver Cromwell is reported to have said, ‘Nine citizens out of ten hate me? What does it matter if that tenth alone is armed?’ (Fried 1966:87–8). This short statement by the first and the last military dictator in modern English history sums up much of the substance of military dictatorship. Military dictatorship means the rule by a military officer or a military junta who takes over the state power through a military *coup d’état* and rule without any accountability as long as the officer or the junta can retain the support of the armed forces.

Some scholars working on military rule argue that military governments usually have a large civilian component—bureaucrats, managers, politicians and technocrats. So the dichotomy between military and civilian rules can hardly be sustained. For example, Amos Perlmutter states, ‘modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civil regimes’ (Perlmutter 1981:97). Military dictators usually bring civilian technocrats and political renegades into their governing councils, but that does not blur the distinction between military and civilian regimes. The civilian counsellors joining the military government hold office on the sufferance of the military dictator. Moreover, under the military dictatorship it is the military ruler and his advisers from the armed forces who play the predominant role in all ‘decisions of decisive consequence’. Thus military dictatorship emerges as a distinct sub-type of authoritarianism. (To avoid excessive repetition we have used the phrases ‘military regime’, ‘military ruler’, ‘military politician’, ‘military leadership’, ‘soldier-ruler’ as synonyms for ‘military dictatorship’.)

Military dictatorship differs from other forms of authoritarianism in terms of origin or legitimacy or range of governmental penetration into the society or in combinations of all these factors. The present-day military dictatorship is often compared to the absolute monarchies of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, but the differences between the two types of governments are quite pronounced. First, as force does not automatically create right, any government

of military provenance suffers from innate sense of lack of legitimacy. On the other hand, the origin and rule of the European absolute monarchies were clothed in powerful traditional legitimacy. The European monarchs extended the direct control of the central government over the whole, more or less, of culturally homogeneous, state-territories by creating a civil administration, particularly through the apparatus of tax collection (Tilly 1985). Present-day military dictators in the Third World usually resort to repressive measures to manage the problem of national integration of states divided on primordial loyalties. As we shall see later, military leaders only aggravate the problems of nation building after taking over power from the civilian political leaders.

Military dictators also differ from the *caudillos* who flourished in the institutionally decomposed societies of post-independence Latin America. The *caudillos* were not professional soldiers. They were adventurers and warriors utilizing violence for political ends, but they lacked institutionalized armed forces to support their regimes (Rouqui 1987:39–71).

Military dictators are different from the civilian autocrats in their sources of legitimacy. The civilian dictators in the Third World derive their legitimacy from their leadership in the independence struggle or from the leadership of the single parties founded by them or from some rigged election. They retain their power by maintaining 'a vertical network of personal and patron-client relations' (Jackson and Rosberg 1984:421–42), a strategy of rulership, as we shall see below (pp. 252–4), also resorted to by military dictators.

Lastly, military dictatorship differs from totalitarian dictatorship on three counts. First, totalitarian dictators claim legitimacy on the basis of their ideologies which, they state, are higher and nobler forms of democracy. Military dictators do not generally espouse elaborate and guiding ideologies, they have only, to use the phrase of Juan Linz, 'distinctive orientations and mentalities' (Linz 1975:264). Second, unlike military dictators, totalitarian dictators seize power by organizing armed political parties. Once in power, totalitarian dictators establish the supremacy of their parties over all organizations, including the armed forces. Third, while military dictators allow 'a limited, not responsible, pluralism' (ibid.: 264), totalitarian dictators try to control the whole society through the single-party system and widespread use of terror.

The word dictator is derived from the early Roman constitution. This constitution provided for the election of a magistrate as dictator for six months with extraordinary powers to handle some unforeseen crises. This constitutional dictatorship degenerated into military dictatorship when the post-constitutional rulers of the Roman empire used the Praetorian guards as the main base of their power. More recently a few European states—Spain (1920s and 1930s), Portugal (1920s and 1970s) and Greece (late 1960s and mid-1970s) underwent military dictatorships. However, it is in the post-Second World War states belonging to the

Third World that military dictatorship has emerged as ‘a distinctly and analytically new phenomenon, restricted to the developing and modernizing world’ (Perlmutter 1981:96). The wide prevalence of military dictatorship in the Third World states can be gauged from the fact that between 1946 and 1984 about 56 per cent of Third World states (excluding the communist states and mini-states with a population below one million) had undergone at least one military *coup d’état*. That 57 per cent of the military coup-affected states in the Third World have been under military rule for half, or more than half, of the last four decades gives us some idea about the depth and intensity of military dictatorship in the *coup*-prone states in the developing areas (Maniruzzaman 1987:17–18).

GROWTH OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Several schools of thought have evolved to explain military intervention and growth of military dictatorship in developing states. The first school, the organizationalists, focus on the special characteristics that are generally attributed to professional Western military organizations—such as centralized command, hierarchy, discipline and cohesion—to explain military intervention. As Morris Janowitz writes, ‘the organizational format designed to carry out the military functions as well as experience in the “management of violence” is at the root of these armies’ ability to intervene politically’ (Janowitz 1964:32). However, it is not the organizational strength of the military but rather the military’s organizational decay that often creates conditions for various factions within the military to launch sudden and swift raids on the government (Decalo 1976:14–15).

The organizationalists, whether they speak of the military’s organizational strength or decay, place more emphasis on the organizational dynamics within the army than on forces outside the barracks to explain the political behaviour of soldiers. After studying African *coups* since 1967, Clause Welch argues that ‘organizational variables are far better predictors of success than are sociopolitical or environmental variables’ (see Kelleher 1974:ix).

A second group of scholars places more emphasis on society as a whole to analyse the reasons for military rule. According to S.E.Finer, military intervention results from the ‘low or minimal political culture of the society concerned’ (Finer 1969:110–39). Samuel P.Huntington argues that: ‘Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in under-developed societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions’. (Huntington 1969:194).

The third group are the sceptical behaviouralists, who stress the internal dynamics of military hierarchies, cliques within the army, corporate interests,

personal ambitions, and idiosyncracies of particular military men in explaining the political behaviour of the army (Decalo 1976:7–22).

Some of the very prominent Latin American scholars, particularly Guillermo O'Donnell, have tried to explain the rise of military ('bureaucratic-authoritarian') dictatorship in Latin America from the 1960s to the mid-1980s in terms of interactions between world economic forces and the indigenous economic trends of relatively more developed countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. O'Donnell (1978:19) argues that these bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes arose at 'a particularly diaphanous moment of dependence' of the countries concerned. This 'historical moment' was created by the 'exhaustion' of import-substitution industries as a means of expanding the domestic economy and by the weakening of the international market for Latin American primary exports. The result was economic crisis marked by rising inflation, declining GNP and investment rates, flight of capital, balance of payment deficits, and the like. This crisis in turn activated the popular sector in Latin American countries. This was perceived as a threat by other social classes. Military officers, as we shall discuss later, already indoctrinated in the ideas of 'national security' and afraid of Cuban-style revolution that would mean the end of the army as an institution, stepped in to create bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in collaboration with civilian technocrats.

Some scholars argue that one of the basic reasons for military intervention in the developing countries is that, unlike the soldiers in the formative phase of the growth of the standing armies in Europe, the soldiers in developing countries face a situation of 'military structural unemployment' (Barros and Coelho 1981:341–9). The European states developed standing armies between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. This was also the period when Europe was a constant theatre of interstate wars. Where are the wars today in the Third World? Our research shows that the median length of wars in Europe during the period 1415–1815 was four years, while the median length of wars during the period 1946–84 was less than two months. Even if we multiply the median length of wars in the Third World countries by nine to make the time span of comparison similar for both areas, the median length of Third World wars comes to one and a half years, about one-third of the length of European wars (Maniruzzaman 1987:113–15).

While the European armies between 1495 and 1815 were almost continuously engaged in war, the armies in the Third World are only engaged in 'barrack sittings'. Third World armies easily become alienated from society because these organizations, having a monopoly on the instruments of violence, fail to find a meaningful role in society due to the absence or infrequency of war and lack of facilities for proper training. This estrangement from society predisposes them to role expansion. Because of the endemic and 'cumulative

crisis' in Third World states, alienated armies easily find opportunities to intervene. As a former chief justice of Pakistan stated sometime after the military take-over in Pakistan in 1958, the valiant armed forces of Pakistan had nothing to do and therefore subjugated their own people (Razzak 1981:17).

EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MILITARY INTERVENTION

Present-day social scientists would reject any single master paradigm and argue that no single method of approach can by itself provide a comprehensive understanding of a complex social and political phenomenon (Needler 1978). It is the confluence and interaction of several of the variables discussed above (p. 250) that explains the occurrence of the military *coup d'état* and growth of military dictatorship in any particular country. The crucial question is the relative weight of each variable in the process of interaction.

Statistical tools can be used to understand the particular 'mix' of the variables involved in the process of military take-over of powers of the state.

Of the several empirical studies done on military interventions, two stand out—Jackman's 'The predictability of *coups d'état*: a model with African data' (Jackman 1978) and Londregan and Poole's 'Poverty, the *coup* trap, and the seizure of executive power' (Londregan and Poole 1990). These two studies are well-grounded in theoretical structure and use sophisticated statistical models to explain military *coups d'état*. Jackman's study shows that military *coups d'état* are the function of structural factors (social mobilization, cultural pluralism, party dominance and electoral turn-out) almost in a deterministic pattern, and idiosyncratic factors emphasized by Zolberg (1968:7) and Decalo (1976:22) account for only one-fifth of the variance in *coups d'état* (Jackman 1978:1273).

In their recent study covering 121 countries for the period 1960–82, Londregan and Poole construct a statistical model enabling them to use income level, economic growth rate, past history of *coups*, and interdependence of *coups* and economic growth as independent variables, and the military *coup d'état* as the dependent variable. They find that both high level of income and high level of economic growth as separate factors inhibit *coups d'état*. According to their study, incidence of *coups d'état* is twenty-one times more likely in the poorest countries than among the wealthiest. More interesting is their 'compelling evidence of a "coup-trap"; once a country has experienced a *coup d'état*, it has a much harder time avoiding further *coups*... *Coups* spawn countercoups' (Londregan and Poole 1990:175, 178).

Although no grand theory has yet emerged, the theoretical and empirical studies discussed above have greatly increased our understanding of the occurrence of the military *coup d'état*. This understanding, however, is not enough. The way that military dictators rule and the policies they pursue

condition much of later social, economic and political development of *coup*-affected states. Let us now discuss the methods generally used by military dictators to perpetuate their rule.

STRATEGIES OF RULERSHIP BY MILITARY DICTATORS

The first strategy of rulership by military dictators is to manage their 'constituency', i.e. to keep their hold on the armed forces. In countries with non-professional armies divided on ethnic or religious lines, this strategy often means the establishment of dominance over the whole army by the group led by the military dictator. The establishment of this dominance often requires the use of crude and ruthless violence to suppress the opposition factions within armed forces and to terrorize the civilian population to total submission.

One of the most notorious military dictators in this regard is Mengistu of Ethiopia, who physically liquidated his rivals among the officer corps and used 'red terror' against civil revolutionaries on such a massive scale that even the initial supporters of the military *coup* were not only disenchanted but appalled (Halliday and Molyneux 1983:122-7). Idi Amin, Bokassa and Mobutu were no less ruthless 'in eliminating and annihilating opposition within the military and outside it' (Perlmutter 1981:16).

The sub-Saharan military dictators are not the only ones to use violence to keep their hold on the army. In Syria (between 1946 and 1970), officers drawn from two minority communities, the Alawis and the Druze, eliminated officers drawn from the Sunnis (the majority community) through successive *coups* and counter-*coups*. Finally, the Alawis purged the Druze officers through a *coup* in 1970. Hafiz al-Assad, an Alawi, seized power and has ruled Syria to date. Paralleling the Alawis in Syria, Iraqi officers belonging to the Sunni minority community drawn from the small town of Takrit gradually eliminated their opponents, and through the *coup d'état* in 1968 established their absolute control over the armed forces (Maniruzzaman 1987:32-41).

Developments in the Bangladeshi army followed the common pattern. The army was divided into two groups—those who participated in the liberation war of 1971 and those who had been in West Pakistan and later joined the Bangladeshi army. After several *coups* and counter-*coups* the 'repatriates' from Pakistan established their dominance over the armed forces through the *coup* of 1982 and ruled until 1990 (Maniruzzaman 1989:216-21).

In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and Peru with professional and disciplined armies, military *coups d'état* become more or less systematic and disciplined operations. This is because unlike the soldier in non-professional armies who is loyal only to himself or at best to his faction, the professional soldier is amenable to the discipline of the army as an institution. Professional armies tend

to factionalize at the highest echelon at the time of intervention. The senior officers soon develop a formula for sharing power among themselves and close their differences. Because the power struggle remains limited to upper levels of the hierarchy, discipline among the officers and rank and file remains unaffected.

However, the difference between military dictators coming to power through successive *coups* and counter-*coups* and military dictators seizing power with the help of professional armies is one of degree rather than kind. In Brazil between 1964 and 1985 torture became 'an intrinsic part of the governing process' (Stepan 1971:262). In Argentina between 1976 and 1983 the military rulers killed between 6,000 and 30,000 Argentines in their 'dirty war' against the leftists (Schumacher 1984:1076). In Pakistan, the military government of Zia-ul-Huq physically eliminated the nation's first elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on the basis of a judgement given by what has been called 'rigged benches' of the High Court in Lahore and the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Quereshi 1979:920).

As repression becomes a part of the strategy of rulership, military dictators develop an elaborate network of intelligence services. In his latest work, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Alfred Stepan (1988) points out how the military intelligence services in Brazil became a formidable threat to the ruling junta itself. As Stepan argues, it was the need for civilian support against the intelligence community that led the Brazilian military to start the process of liberalization which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the military from power. General Zia-ul-Huq of Pakistan, to give another example, developed an Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate with 100,000 employees as one of the most influential military and internal security agencies in the Third World for surveillance of politicians as well as officers.

Violence and intelligence surveillance are, however, negative strategies of rulership. A more positive way of keeping the armed forces satisfied is the raising of salaries and other allowances and perquisites of the members of the armed forces. Military rulers almost invariably increase the defence budgets soon after a take-over. Once raised, defence allocations usually remain at high levels in subsequent years. For the decade of the 1960s, the average annual expenditure on defence compared with total state budgets in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America was almost double for military governments compared with non-military governments (Kennedy 1974:163). The rate of growth for defence expenditure in developing countries is surpassing the growth rate in the developed nations (Janowitz 1977:48). As most of the defence budget in developing countries is spent on buying sophisticated weapons in hard currency from developed countries, such expenditures do not have multiplier effects on national economies.

Another strategy of rulership adopted by military dictators is to depoliticize and control the participation of the masses. To this end, the Latin American

military dictators usually resort to the system of corporatism. Under this system the military regimes try 'to eliminate spontaneous interest articulation and establish a limited number of authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the government apparatus in defined and regularized ways' (Malloy 1977:4). Some military dictators—especially those in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa—established one-party systems as the structural mechanism of organizing and controlling participation. In Syria the Ba'ath Party has been subjugated by the army wing of the party since 1966. In Iraq, however, the military and the Ba'ath Party seem to have a symbiotic relationship. The parties created from above by military dictators such as Mobutu in Zaire, Eyadema in Togo and Kerekou in Benin do not seem to have much influence on the policy-making process and are not likely to decide the succession of the present military dictators. These parties are merely appendages of the military regime. Writing in 1966, Aristide R. Zolberg asserted that single parties founded in West Africa are usually paper organizations (Zolberg 1966:25, 33–34, 128–150). Bienen seems more to the point when he argues that the single-party system is more like US political machines as far as distribution of patronage is concerned (Bienen 1970:99–127). Indeed, the African one-party system, often headed by the military dictator himself, is part of an overall strategy of ruling through patrimonialism. Mobutu in Zaire provides the most typical example in this regard. In November 1973 Mobutu took over about 2,000 foreign-owned enterprises and distributed these as 'free goods' among the politico-commercial class. Mobutu himself and the members of the politburo of the single party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement, partook of this largesse (Young and Turner 1984:714–49).

MODERNIZATION AND THE ROLE OF MILITARY REGIMES: SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

It seems that in order to make their studies of policy relevant, political scientists in the West, particularly the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, tried to over-estimate the role of the military in the modernization of Third World countries. As armed communist cadres threatened the countries of South-East Asia, Guy Pauker (1959:325–45) wrote an article in *World Politics* advocating the use of the military to fight and defeat the onward march of the armed communists. Soon a number of respected scholars developed theoretical models depicting the military as a highly modern force, capable of transferring its organizational and technical skills to fields of government and administration (see for example, Pye 1962:69–89; Halpern 1962:227–313; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1964).

These theoretical formulations were, to use the facetious phrase of Henry Bienen, 'unencumbered by empirical evidence', but later empirical research on

the actual performance of military regimes has largely belied these early theoretical expectations. Indeed, a study by Eric A. Nordlinger (1970:1131–48), drawing on an analysis of cross-national data from seventy-four non-Western and non-communist countries, found negative and zero-order correlations between the political strength of the military and social and economic modernizations. In another cross-national aggregate study of all independent, non-communist countries with a population greater than one million, covering the period from 1951 to 1970, R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan concluded that ‘there is no profound effect on economic performance produced by military regime when MR (Military Regime) and CMR (period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military regimes) are compared with CR (low income countries who have experienced only civilian rule)’ (McKinlay and Cohan 1975:1–30). Another study based on data covering the period from 1960 to 1970 for seventy-seven independent countries of the Third World reported that, ‘In short military intervention in politics of the Third World has no unique effect on social change, regardless of either the level of economic development or geographic region’ (Jackman 1976:1096). In the latest empirical study already quoted above (p. 251), Londregan and Poole conclude:

‘Despite the dramatic effect of economic performance on the probability of *coups*, the reverse is not true: a country’s past *coup* history has little discernible effect on its economy. We find no evidence that either the recent history of *coups* or the current propensity for a *coup d’état* significantly affect the growth rate’.

(Londregan and Poole 1990:153).

MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND THE CIRCLE OF POLITICAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The performance of military regimes has been even more disappointing in the sphere of political development than in the sphere of economic development. It is often argued that since most of the new nations are divided on ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional lines, the military alone can bring about the national integration that is a prerequisite for political development.

The performance of military rulers to date does not support this hypothesis. It was the military dictators Ayub Khan and his successor Yahiya Khan who, following a ‘policy of blood and iron’ in Pakistan, produced the first successful secessionist movement in the Third World. In a similar fashion the process of Nigerian disintegration started after the *coup* of 15 January 1966, when Nzeogwu and his cohorts launched a ruthless attack on prominent military and political figures. The military leadership presided over the civil war in Nigeria for two years with combat deaths running into hundreds of thousands. Likewise, the

Sudanese military rulers have been fighting the guerrillas in the southern part of the country from 1958 up until the present day.

As a matter of fact, in most cases military intervention creates a vicious circle that perpetuates the conditions of political underdevelopment which initially brought about the imposition of military rule. As Huntington has argued (Huntington 1965:421-7), the key factor in political development is the growth of durable political institutions. The primary resources for developing political institutions in any country are the political skills of its politicians. The political skills needed for developing a viable and self-sustaining political system involve, among others, ideological commitment, the capacity to respond to new challenges, and the arts of administration, negotiation, representation and bargaining. These skills can be acquired only in the hard school of public life. (See Morris-Jones 1957:49, 57, 71; 1978:131-43; Weiner 1967:11-16; Kochanek 1968:xix-xxv.)

Because of their 'military minds' and perspectives, soldier-rulers, from Ayub Khan in Pakistan to Acheampong in Ghana or Castello Branco in Brazil, fail to see the functional aspects of the great game of politics. They severely restrict the free flow of the political process and force would-be politicians into a long period of hibernation. The period of military rule is usually a total waste as far as the development of political skills is concerned. Because about two-thirds of civil and military governments fall victim to military *coups d'état*, the opportunity for people once under a military regime to gain political skills is likely to be continually postponed with the arrival of every new military regime.

Only one-third of the military governments that have existed in the Third World have been succeeded by civilian governments. In some cases of civilian restoration, newly incumbent civilian leaders soon demonstrate their inability to match their official performance with the expectation of the people. This is not unnatural: first, because of general intractability of the problems faced by the developing nations; and second (and more important), because of the lack of political skills in the civilian leaders resulting from the preceding period of military rule. Military officers waiting in the wings then depose the civilian regime in response to even a modest manifestation of public discontent against the civilian government and assert the vindication of their self-fulfilling prophecy of the 'inevitable failure of the self-seeking politicians. Thus the period of waste for political growth begins anew' (Maniruzzaman 1987:6-7).

ROLE EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY AND DEFENCE VULNERABILITY

As the army begins to 'patrol the society', the frontiers of state remain utterly vulnerable. In the past two decades several armies have been compromised by their political role expansion and suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of

other armies encouraged only to excel in professionalism. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Syrian army's performance suffered immeasurably because of fratricidal feuds among its officers, which resulted in an inability to mount a serious offensive against the Israeli army. The Iraqi army was similarly debilitated by internal political strife (Brown 1967:269-71).

Egypt's total fiasco in the 1967 war is also attributed to the political role expansion of the Egyptian armed forces. The Egyptian air commanders committed 'monumental neglect of the most elementary rules of protecting aircraft on the ground'. The result was that a large part of the Egyptian air force was completely incapacitated by an Israeli pre-emptive attack on the first day of the war. The Egyptian army disintegrated in less than a week (Brown 1967:269-71).

Thirteen years of political involvement similarly impaired the fighting edge of the Pakistan armed forces in the 1971 war with India. One could reasonably argue that the Pakistan forces in former East Pakistan, denied all logistic support from West Pakistan because of an Indian blockade, were not in a position to give stiff resistance to the Indians. But the failure of the Pakistani forces to mount a significant challenge to Indian forces on the western front can not be explained by any other terms than inadequate morale and fighting skills of the Pakistanis (Morris-Jones 1972:188-9).

Another example of how the political role of the armed forces corrodes military vitality is provided by Idi Amin's armed forces in Uganda, which first acted as an instrument of Idi Amin's terror and brutality and then simply disintegrated when faced with poorly equipped Tanzanian troops and a Ugandan exile force in April 1979. More recently an Argentine military spoiled by politics was easily defeated by Great Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas War.

FAILURE OF THE 'NEW PROFESSIONALS'

Nowhere has the claim of superior rule by the military leaders over the politicians been more dramatically and poignantly disproved than in Latin America. Military leaders seized power in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1976), Peru (1968) and Chile (1973) for unlimited periods to effect fundamental transformation in social, economic and political structures. They developed the 'doctrine of national security' to justify their rule (Stepan 1976:240-60; O'Donnell 1976:208-13). According to this doctrine, the governments in Latin America were engaged in an internal war with the communist revolutionaries. The days of the 'old professional' soldier who fought conventional wars with external enemies were almost over. The 'new professional soldier', trained in fighting a 'total war' with the internal enemy on military, social, economic and political fronts, was the prime need. Because civilian leaders did not have requisite skills and organizations to fight the new war, it became the manifest

destiny of the 'new professional soldiers' to establish control over all aspects of society, bring about rapid socio-economic development, and win the glory of defeating the great threat to Western civilization.

Brazil was the test case for implementation of the doctrine of national security and national development; Brazil had the best soldiers and materials in the whole of Latin America, and the 'new professionals' of Brazil held power for two decades to show their mettle. Yet the economic and political reforms effected by the new professional soldiers proved illusory. The military regimes were bedevilled by the growth of factionalism within the armed forces and conflicts between military governments and military institutions. The result was frequent instability (changes in government personnel, including the president of the nation) and policy incoherence. The strategy of growth followed by the soldier-rulers not only accentuated social and regional cleavages but also led to a debt burden of over US\$90 billion by the early 1980s. Popular discontent mounted, and the military governments 'deepened the revolution' by resorting to more and more terror and torture (Maniruzzaman 1987:11).

The developments in Argentina (1976–83) under the new professionals followed closely the pattern in Brazil (1964–1985). The Argentine economy plunged into deep recession, and foreign debt increased fourfold from US\$9.8 billion in 1978 to US\$38 billion in 1982. As resistance to government increased, the Argentine military rulers used terror and torture on a scale much larger than those applied by their Brazilian counterparts (Sanders 1983:2–3).

It was Peru's 'armed intellectuals' who tried to play the most revolutionary role. They nationalized petroleum, fishing and other natural resources, introduced the system of worker participation in industrial plants, decreed new land reforms, enacted new education policy, and organized mass participation in national interest group associations. The 'revolution from above', however, aborted; Peruvians showed an utter disinterest in the soldier-rulers' reforms. The military-sponsored, radical reform measures, on the other hand, dislocated the national economy further (Sanders 1981:77; Malloy 1982:4). It was ironic that the Peruvian voters in 1980 forced the ruling army elite to hand power back to the very civilian politician (Fernando Belaúnde) from whom the officers snatched political power in 1968 (Handelman 1981:132–5).

From the discussion so far certain conclusions emerge. Soldier-politicians seem incapable of furthering major socio-economic development in the countries they rule. The military's performance in the field of political development has been even more dismal. Military regimes accentuate the problems of political development with which the civilian regimes were initially faced, and they deprive the civilian politicians of the opportunity to acquire much-needed political skills, thus perpetuating the chain of political underdevelopment. Finally, role expansion of the military creates both internal and external security

vulnerabilities. The study of military withdrawal from politics thus seems imperative.

MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS

The nature and duration of military withdrawal from politics are, in part, a function of organizational aspects of the armed forces. As we have seen earlier (pp. 252–3), factionalism within non-professional armies creates the syndrome of abrupt intervention-withdrawal-reintervention until one faction comes to dominate the whole army and impose a longer period of military rule.

Military dictators—Ayub Khan (1958–69), Zia-ul Huq (1977–88), military juntas in Brazil (1964–85), Argentina (1966–73) and Peru (1968–80), to mention only a few—who were supported by professional armies usually ruled for longer periods relative to a short duration of rule of the officers leading non-professional armies. Some of the officers coming to power with the support of professional armies withdrew from politics because of sheer exhaustion of ruling the problem-ridden Third World countries (Brazil, Argentina and Peru). Some military dictators are forced to withdraw by spontaneous mass upheavals—for example Bolivia (1946), Sudan (1964), Pakistan (1969), Thailand (1973) and El Salvador (1979). These multi-class upheavals, however, can not install stable civilian governments and usually military juntas resume control (Maniruzzaman 1987:80–2, 164–5).

One way of preventing the growth of military dictatorship is to create a consensus among the political parties against military rule. This deprives the military juntas of the ‘civilian constituency’ which according to some scholars is often a prerequisite for a military *coup d'état*. In Venezuela (1958) and Colombia (1957) the leading political parties entered into a political pact for sharing power among themselves for twenty years, eliminating support for army intervention. This coalition of dominant political parties against army rule has enabled these two countries to maintain civilian rule for nearly three decades (Karl 1981; Kline 1979).

The methods of military withdrawal from politics discussed above belong to superstructural architectonic levels and cannot break the cycle of intervention-withdrawal-intervention. Durable and long-term military withdrawal is the function of social revolution: the process of replacing one social class by another as the ruling class, and the cataclysmic social structural transformation wrought in the process. The two archetypical social revolutions—bourgeois and proletarian—consolidated the class rule of bourgeoisie and the proletariat, respectively, and brought the armed forces under the control of the hegemonic classes.

The few cases of long-term withdrawal that have taken place in the Third World states point to the same conclusion. Whether it is a revolution of the

Jeffersonian farmers and the middle classes as in Costa Rica in 1948, or a revolution under a coalition of classes—professional middle class and peasant class—as in Mexico (1911–17), or a socialist revolution led by the scions of upper and middle classes in Cuba (1959) and Nicaragua (1979), or peasant-supported revolution in Venezuela (1958), or reactivated upper classes in Columbia (1957), the cathartic effect is the same—‘politics in command’. Revolution is primarily an intellectual event and only secondarily a military phenomenon. The revolution defines the role of the armed forces in the new society. The fresh political formula with a new scheme of distributing power sanctified by the revolution gives precedence to the role of ideas over arms, to policy over instruments and to politics over guns. In this respect the aftermath of contemporary social revolution is the same as that of the two archetypical social revolutions—bourgeois and proletarian (Maniruzzaman 1987:212).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Social revolutions are rare, as are permanent military withdrawals from politics. It seems that Third World states now under military dictatorship will remain so as they approach the year 2000, although the personnel of the military regime may change. The great pro-democratic changes taking place in the East European states are not likely to affect the Third World states much. This is because of differences between the states of Eastern Europe and the Third World in national history and social, economic and political development. Even if there are popular upheavals in some military-ruled states, the armies which have been in power for a long time may not easily surrender power to civilian leadership, as Burma’s army has shown recently. Most military dictators will continue to ‘pay respect to democracy’ by organizing rigged elections and plebiscites.

The developments in some of the Latin American states might be different from those in other regions of the world. The poor economic performance and extremely repressive nature of recent military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay seem to have united all the political parties in those countries against further military intervention. In Argentina, at least, the anti-army feelings have sustained civilian rule since 1983 despite the economic sufferings of the Argentine people. The present democratic ‘cycle’ in Latin America might be longer than it has been in the past.

A few remarks about the impact of the international political system on the military regimes are in order. As stated earlier (p. 253), military regimes usually increase the defence budget and continue to bring in larger and larger amounts of arms from abroad, which helps the military dictators to lengthen their rule. Moreover, the World Bank and organizations related to it prefer military regimes to civilian regimes in disbursing loans and aid (Petras 1981:81).

Because of the present relaxation of the Cold War between East and West, the superpowers may be less interested in creating situations of 'proxy wars' and may limit the transfer of arms to Third World states: development in this direction will be conducive to the growth of civilian regimes. Similarly, if the international banks in the West change their strategy of bringing about economic development in the Third World states through authoritarian regimes, the occurrence of military *coups d'état* would decline and civilian regimes could be strengthened. However, the basic structural changes needed for the long-term withdrawal of the military from politics are wrought only through a social revolution from within, and not through a revolution imposed from above or outside. Intrastate social forces rather than interstate politics are the crucial variables in permanent military exit from the political arena.

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PART V

**POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS**

EXECUTIVES

JEAN BLONDEL

National executives are universal. Every country has an executive, a 'government' in the strict sense of the word, as indeed does every other social organization, from the most simple to the most complex. In all these cases there is always a body, normally relatively small, which has the task of running that organization. Indeed, since the third quarter of the twentieth century, independent governments have come to rule practically the whole of the planet: as a result, the number of national executives has more than doubled since the 1940s. The executive is manifestly a focal point, if not *the* focal point of political life. This remains true even if doubts are sometimes expressed about the ability of executives to affect markedly the course of events, let alone alter drastically the social and economic structure of their country. At least they have, more than any other body, an opportunity to shape society; it is indeed their function to do so.

National governments are at the centre of political life; they are also rather compact bodies, whose views and pronouncements are usually well-publicized. Parties and even legislatures are more amorphous; their 'will' is less clear. Because national governments are relatively small and very visible, it is easier to think of them as groups that have a common goal and indeed act as teams, although they may be disunited and their differences may even come out into the open.

Governments do differ markedly from each other, however. They vary in composition, in internal organization, in selection mechanisms, in duration, in powers—both formal and informal. There are autocratic governments, and governments which emanate from the people or from their representatives; there are egalitarian governments and hierarchical governments; there are governments which seem to last indefinitely and ephemeral governments; finally, there are strong and weak governments.

It is difficult to define governments as their boundaries are somewhat unclear. For instance, they often include under-secretaries or junior ministers —

regarded as members of the government as they are appointed by ministers and leave office at the same time as them—but others also fulfil the same conditions, such as the personal staff of ministers. Thus one may have to take junior ministers into account, as well as the personal staff of leaders, since they may play an important part in decision making. This is the case with many of the advisers of the American president or with the members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While governments may have a clear nucleus, composed of the leaders and at least many ministers, a ‘grey zone’ whose boundaries are not precise forms, so to speak, the ‘tail’ of these governments.

It might seem easier to define a national executive by the functions that it fulfils. Yet these, too, are somewhat unclear. Governments are expected to ‘run the affairs of the nation’, but they do so only up to a point, since they are ‘helped’ or ‘advised’ by groups, by parties, by the legislature, and, above all, by the very large bureaucracy that all states have now developed. One can distinguish three functions that governments have to fulfil. First, they have to elaborate policies, and to elaborate policies that are realistic in the sense that they can both be implemented and be politically acceptable (if necessary by using compulsion). An agricultural, industrial or social policy will be elaborated on the basis of the perceived ‘needs’ of the country as well as on the basis of the impression of what the citizens are prepared to ‘live with’. There is thus a function of *conception*. Second, governments have a function of *implementation*, at least in so far as they must find the means by which policies can become reality: they must therefore appoint and supervise a bureaucracy that is able to put the policies in operation. This twofold function can create tensions, as there are profound differences between those who ‘dream’ and those who ‘manage’; this means that members of the government must have a combination of different skills. Yet there is also a third function which may be viewed as intermediate, that of *co-ordination*. An important element of the process of policy elaboration consists in ensuring that the policies do not go against each other and that they, ideally, develop harmoniously. Moreover, policy elaboration entails making choices or at least establishing priorities, both for financial reasons and because of constraints in human resources. As not all can be done at the same time, a timetable has to be drawn up; but such a timetable must take into account the interrelationships between policies and the internal logic of policy development.

Conception, co-ordination and direction of implementation are therefore the three elements of governmental action. These elements are analytically distinct: it is the government’s duty to combine them. But this combination inevitably raises problems: depending on circumstances, conception, co-ordination and implementation will be given a different emphasis. It is not surprising that the development of governmental structures in the contemporary world should have

been the result of a variety of *ad hoc* experiments which have been more or less successful; not surprisingly, too, the conflict between the three goals or functions of government has been solved only to a rather limited extent.

THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS

Contemporary governmental arrangements reflect the diversity and increasing complexity of the tasks that are being undertaken by executives. The variations in the structure of these executives are not a new phenomenon: the oligarchical arrangements of the Italian republican cities of the Renaissance were at great variance from those of the absolute monarchies which began to emerge during the sixteenth century, and even more from those of the theocratic and despotic governments which existed in the Muslim world at the same time.

Nineteenth-century developments have endeavoured to 'domesticate' governmental arrangements and give them a less haphazard and more rational character. Two constitutional systems have dominated the European and North American scene for a century. On the one hand, the *cabinet system*, which originated in England and in Sweden, is based on the notion that the head of the government, the prime minister, has to operate in the context of a collegial system, in which a group of ministers fully participates in the decision-making process, while also being in charge of the implementation of the decisions in a particular sector. Cabinet government extended gradually to western European countries. In central and eastern Europe, meanwhile, the remnants of absolutism were gradually undermined, to the extent that the cabinet system seemed likely at one point to replace old absolutist and authoritarian governmental structures everywhere.

In contrast to the cabinet system, the *constitutional presidential system* was first established in the United States and then extended gradually to the whole of Latin America. In this model, the executive is hierarchical and not collective: ministers (often named secretaries in this system) are subordinates of the president and responsible only to him or her. Although this formula is closer to that of the monarchical government than that of the cabinet system, it does imply some demotion for both the head of state (who is elected for a period and often not permitted to be re-elected indefinitely) and for the ministers (as these typically have to be 'confirmed' by the legislature). The formula has proved rather unsuccessful in Latin America, however, as many presidents have been uncomfortable with the limitations to their position, leading to *coups* and the installation of authoritarian and even 'absolute' presidential governments.

At least one of the two constitutional formulas had already encountered difficulties prior to 1914. The problems multiplied after the First World War,