

Norman Schofield · Gonzalo Caballero · Daniel Kselman *Editors*

Advances in Political Economy

Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis

This book presents latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The focus is on innovative topics such as an institutional analysis based on case studies; the influence of activists on political decisions; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods.

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Social Sciences / Political Science

ISBN 978-3-642-35238-6



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 Springer

277	Table 1 Descriptive	Correlation (Age, Score):	-0.461
278	correlations with scores.		
279	Sample: Top 100 most-cited	Correlation (# Cites, Score):	0.496
280	cases since 1946	Correlation (# Cite/Year, Score):	0.787

281
282 of the 100 most-cited opinions since 1946 with the ranking of those cases when all
283 opinions that have been cited at least as many times as these 100 are considered.
284

285 286 287 **3.1 Top 100 Opinions Since 1946** 288

289 Table 2 presents the opinions with the top 36 estimated latent quality scores for this
290 period. This is the set of opinions for which the estimated quality score is greater
291 than 1, which is by construction the average estimated quality score for the 100
292 cases.
293

294 This ranking is interesting in a number of ways. The top two majority opinions
295 score significantly higher than all of the others.¹³ The top-scoring opinion, *Chevron*,
296 is a well-known case in administrative law with broad implications for the judicial
297 review of bureaucratic decision-making. The second-ranked opinion, *Gregg*, clarified
298 the constitutionality of the death penalty in the United States. Of course, the
299 third highest scoring opinion is the famous *Miranda* decision in which the Court
300 clarified the procedural rights of detained individuals.

301 Space prevents us from a full-throated treatment of the scores, but a few simple
302 correlations are of interest. Table 1 presents three Pearson correlation coefficients
303 relating the opinions' scores with, respectively, the age of the opinion, the number
304 of subsequent opinions citing the opinion, and the number of subsequent opinions
305 citing the opinion divided by the age of the opinion.

306 The negative correlation between the age of an opinion and its score is broadly
307 in line with previous work on the depreciation of the precedential value (or, at least,
308 usage) of judicial opinions.¹⁴ It is important to note, however, that this effect is
309 *potentially* at odds with the IIA axiom on which the scoring algorithm is based. We
310 partially return to this question below when we expand the sample of opinions.

311 That the correlation between the opinions' scores and the number of times each
312 opinion has been cited by a subsequent Supreme Court majority opinion is positive
313 is not surprising: the score of an opinion is obviously positively responsive to
314 the number of times that an opinion has been cited, *ceteris paribus*. Accordingly,
315 the interesting aspect of the correlation is not that it is positive but, rather, that it
316 is not closer to 1. Indeed, inspection of Table 2 indicates, *a fortiori*, that the rank-
317

318 ¹³Note that the estimated scores for the top 100 opinions sum to 100, so these two opinions account
319 for over 1/8th of the sum of the estimated scores. In other words, any opinion that cites exactly
320 one of these 100 cases is predicted to cite either *Chevron* or *Gregg* almost 13 % of the time.

321 ¹⁴See, for example, Black and Spriggs II (2010).
322

Table 2 The 36 highest scoring opinions. Sample: Top 100 most-cited cases since 1946

Rank	Name	Year	Score	# Cites	Cites/Year
1	Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.	1984	7.52	129	6.8
2	Gregg v. Georgia	1976	5.14	266	9.9
3	Miranda v. Arizona	1966	2.72	225	6.1
4	Cannon v. University of Chicago	1979	2.62	73	3
5	Younger v. Harris	1971	1.89	129	4
6	Strickland v. Wash.	1984	1.74	68	3.6
7	Edelman v. Jordan	1974	1.65	92	3.2
8	Reynolds v. Sims	1964	1.62	144	3.7
9	Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.	1978	1.58	78	3.1
10	Dandridge v. Williams	1970	1.5	132	4
11	Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.	1977	1.5	74	2.8
12	Mathews v. Eldridge	1976	1.49	100	3.7
13	Buckley v. Valeo	1976	1.49	100	3.7
14	In re Winship	1970	1.47	131	4
15	Eddings v. Okla.	1982	1.4	91	4.3
16	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	1964	1.38	161	4.1
17	Baker v. Carr	1962	1.34	149	3.6
18	Gideon v. Wainwright	1963	1.28	207	5.2
19	Miller v. California	1973	1.27	131	4.4
20	Lockett v. Ohio	1978	1.26	104	4.2
21	Brown v. Board of Education	1954	1.25	155	3.2
22	Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents...	1971	1.21	96	3
23	Monroe v. Pape	1961	1.18	134	3.2
24	Craig v. Boren	1976	1.17	70	2.6
25	S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon	1959	1.15	89	2
26	Furman v. Georgia	1972	1.12	118	3.8
27	Terry v. Ohio	1968	1.1	97	2.8
28	Warth v. Seldin	1975	1.1	72	2.6
29	Roe v. Wade	1973	1.08	91	3
30	Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills	1957	1.08	80	1.7
31	Wainwright v. Sykes	1977	1.07	71	2.7
32	Katz v. United States	1967	1.06	127	3.5
33	Roth v. United States	1957	1.05	155	3.4
34	Benton v. Maryland	1969	1.04	75	2.2
35	Stone v. Powell	1976	1.01	80	3
36	Woodson v. North Carolina	1976	1.01	97	3.6

ings of the opinions with respect to the number of citations they have received and with respect to their scores are not identical. Put another way: the scores are measuring something different than the opinions' citation counts or, as it is commonly known in network analysis, the *degree centralities* of the opinions in the citation network.

Finally, the correlation between the score and the average number of times per year the opinion has been cited since it was handed down is strongly positive. This highlights the fact that the scores control for the fact that an opinion cannot cite an opinion that is rendered subsequently. Again, though, it is important to note that the ranking of the opinions generated by our scores differs from that generated by the number of citations per year. It is useful to consider the origins of this difference. Specifically, the distinction arises because of the fact that the IIA axiom on which the method is based implies that an opinion's "reward" (or score) for being cited by a subsequent opinion is inversely proportional to the number of other opinions cited by that opinion. At the extreme, for example, a hypothetical opinion that cited every previous opinion would compress the scores of the opinions in the sense that the scores of all opinions that initially had lower than average scores would increase as a result of the citation by the hypothetical opinion, whereas the scores of all of those opinions with above average scores prior to the hypothetical opinion would decrease.¹⁵

3.2 Top 100 Opinions Since 1800

We now present our results for the top 100 most-cited opinions rendered between 1800 and 2002. Table 3 presents the opinions with the top 38 estimated latent quality scores for this period. As with the previous analysis for the period between 1946 and 2002, this is the set of opinions for which the estimated quality score is greater than 1.

Comparing these scores with those in Table 2, it is perhaps surprising how similar the two sets of scores are. In particular, the top three majority opinions are identical and have very similar scores in the two analyses. Things get interesting at the fourth highest-scoring position. First, the majority opinion ranked fourth-highest in the 1946–2002 analysis reported in Table 2, *Cannon v. University of Chicago*, is not among the top 100 most-cited majority opinions since 1819.¹⁶ The fourth highest-scoring opinion among the 100 most-cited majority opinions since 1819 is *Miller v. California*, in which the Court affirmed and clarified the power of state and local governments to place limits on obscenity. This opinion is, of course, among the top

¹⁵Recall that the scores are identified only up to multiplication by a positive scalar, implying that they inherently relative scores.

¹⁶In that case, the majority opinion affirmed an individual's right to sue recipients of federal financial support for gender discrimination under Title IX, which calls for gender equity in higher education.

Table 3 The 38 most influential cases among the top 100 most-cited cases since 1800

Rank	Name	Year	Score	# Cites	Cites/Year
1	Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.	1984	7.21	129	6.8
2	Gregg v. Georgia	1976	5.82	266	9.9
3	Miranda v. Arizona	1966	3.28	225	6.1
4	Miller v. California	1973	2.04	131	4.4
5	Younger v. Harris	1971	2.03	129	4
6	Erie R.R. v. Tompkins	1938	1.92	189	2.9
7	Reynolds v. Sims	1964	1.89	144	3.7
8	Mathews v. Eldridge	1976	1.84	100	3.7
9	In re Winship	1970	1.78	131	4
10	Dandridge v. Williams	1970	1.76	132	4
11	Baker v. Carr	1962	1.73	149	3.6
12	Buckley v. Valeo	1976	1.58	100	3.7
13	Monroe v. Pape	1961	1.57	134	3.2
14	Brown v. Board of Education	1954	1.54	155	3.2
15	Edelman v. Jordan	1974	1.51	92	3.2
16	Gideon v. Wainwright	1963	1.5	207	5.2
17	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	1964	1.48	161	4.1
18	Eddings v. Okla.	1982	1.44	91	4.3
19	Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents...	1971	1.41	96	3
20	Chapman v. California	1967	1.39	130	3.6
21	Lockett v. Ohio	1978	1.38	104	4.2
22	Furman v. Georgia	1972	1.36	118	3.8
23	Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton	1973	1.33	103	3.4
24	Morrissey v. Brewer	1972	1.32	94	3
25	San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon	1959	1.29	89	2
26	Duncan v. Louisiana	1968	1.26	107	3.1
27	Roth v. United States	1957	1.25	155	3.4
28	Katz v. United States	1967	1.25	127	3.5
29	Terry v. Ohio	1968	1.22	97	2.8
30	United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.	1940	1.2	113	1.8
31	Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC	1969	1.17	87	2.6
32	Roe v. Wade	1973	1.16	91	3
33	Goldberg v. Kelly	1970	1.14	97	2.9
34	Woodson v. North Carolina	1976	1.13	97	3.6
35	Johnson v. Zerbst	1938	1.07	159	2.4
36	NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson	1958	1.05	153	3.4
37	Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority	1936	1.03	180	2.7
38	Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB	1941	1.02	88	1.4

Table 4 Descriptive correlations with scores.	Correlation (Age, Score):	-0.466
Sample: Top 100 most-cited cases since 1800	Correlation (# Cites, Score):	0.425
	Correlation (# Cite/Year, Score):	0.849

Table 5 Intersample correlations of scores.	Spearman's Rank Correlation:	0.981
Sample: Top 100 most-cited cases since 1946	Pearson's Correlation Coefficient:	0.995

100 most-cited rendered since 1946, yet ranks only 19th in the scores reported in Table 2. This point highlights a feature of the scores in both tables: after the top 3 or 4, there is a relatively large “plateau” of scores.

Beyond visual inspection, it is useful to reconsider the correlations analogous to those reported in Table 1. These are displayed in Table 4 and closely conform to the conclusions drawn in the discussion of the correlations reported in Table 1: older opinions tend to have lower scores, and scores are positively associated with both number of subsequent citations as well as the average annual rate of subsequent citation.

3.3 Probing IIA: Top 204 Opinions Since 1800

We calculated the scores for the top 204 most-cited majority opinions since 1819. This is the smallest set of most-cited opinions for the entire time period that contains the top 100 most-cited opinions rendered since 1946. Each opinion rendered after 1946 is accompanied by two scores and two ranks: the “Post ’46” values are identical to those reported in Table 2. The “Full” values, presented in Table 6, correspond to the rank of that opinion’s score from the analysis of the 204 most-cited opinions since 1800 *relative to the analogous scores for the opinions rendered after 1946*. The IIA axiom underpinning the scoring method implies that the relative ranking of the opinions should be invariant to including additional opinions, as the scoring of the 204 most-cited opinions does. Inspection indicates a strong similarity between the two rankings. Most telling are the following two correlations between, respectively, the (relative) ranks of the 100 post-1946 opinions in the two samples and the scores of these cases in the two samples in Table 5.

Each of these correlations indicate a *very* strong agreement between the (relative) ranks and scores, respectively, for the top 100 most-cited opinions since 1946. This agreement provides support for the supposition of IIA that identifies the method.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter we score all Supreme Court majority opinions since 1800 on the basis of their “quality” (measured as influence or citability), using network citation data.

Table 6 Comparing scores of post 1946 cases (full sample: 204 most-cited opinions since 1800)

Rank	Name		Year	Score	
	Full	Post'46		Full	Post'46
1	1	Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.	1984	5.67	7.52
2	2	Gregg v. Georgia	1976	4.23	5.14
3	4	Cannon v. University of Chicago	1979	2.04	2.62
4	3	Miranda v. Arizona	1966	2.03	2.72
5	8	Reynolds v. Sims	1964	1.34	1.62
6	5	Younger v. Harris	1971	1.31	1.89
...	...	Erie R.R. v. Tompkins	1938	1.29	...
7	6	Strickland v. Wash.	1984	1.19	1.74
8	10	Dandridge v. Williams	1970	1.17	1.50
9	14	In re Winship	1970	1.14	1.47
10	9	Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.	1978	1.14	1.58
11	15	Eddings v. Okla.	1982	1.13	1.40
12	12	Mathews v. Eldridge	1976	1.13	1.49
13	11	Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.	1977	1.11	1.50
14	20	Lockett v. Ohio	1978	1.04	1.26
15	19	Miller v. California	1973	1.03	1.27
16	7	Edelman v. Jordan	1974	1.02	1.65
17	16	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	1964	1.00	1.38
18	17	Baker v. Carr	1962	0.99	1.34
19	13	Buckley v. Valeo	1976	0.98	1.49
20	26	Furman v. Georgia	1972	0.94	1.12
21	21	Brown v. Board of Educ.	1954	0.93	1.25
22	18	Gideon v. Wainwright	1963	0.90	1.28
23	34	Benton v. Maryland	1969	0.88	1.04
24	22	Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents...	1971	0.87	1.21
25	23	Monroe v. Pape	1961	0.86	1.18
26	25	San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon	1959	0.84	1.15
27	24	Craig v. Boren	1976	0.83	1.17
28	31	Wainwright v. Sykes	1977	0.82	1.07
29	36	Woodson v. North Carolina	1976	0.82	1.01
30	33	Roth v. United States	1957	0.82	1.05
31	39	North Carolina v. Pearce	1969	0.81	0.98
32	42	Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB	1951	0.80	0.95
33	27	Terry v. Ohio	1968	0.80	1.10
34	30	Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills	1957	0.79	1.08
35	32	Katz v. United States	1967	0.78	1.06
36	29	Roe v. Wade	1973	0.77	1.08

Table 6 (Continued)

Rank	Name		Year	Score	
	Full	Post'46		Full	Post'46
37	38	Morrissey v. Brewer	1972	0.77	0.98
38	43	Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton	1973	0.76	0.93
39	45	Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.	1949	0.75	0.91
40	28	Warth v. Seldin	1975	0.75	1.10
41	35	Stone v. Powell	1976	0.74	1.01

In placing all such opinions on a common scale we are faced with the problem that majority opinions cite heterogeneous numbers of other opinions and that an opinion cannot be cited by a different opinion that predates it—our network is necessarily incomplete. To deal with the incomplete nature of our data we utilize an axiomatic scoring method that is designed to compare objects that have never been directly compared in the data.

The scores calculated by this method are analogous to measures of network influence—specifically, it is a *vertex metric*. As such, it fundamentally differs from other centrality measures for partially connected networks such as eigenvector centrality and degree centrality. One difference is that our measure does not utilize the score of s in computing the contribution of link (s, v) to v 's score (as in eigenvector centrality); instead our score utilizes the scores of the other w that could have potentially influenced s , or $\{w : (s, w) \in \tilde{E}\}$. In generating estimates of the x_i using observed network and community data we impute “influence relationships” between vertices that did not have the potential to interact. This leads to the following interpretation of our scores: if there were a hypothetical vertex with a community equal to the set of all possible vertices, then our scores represent the expected influence of each vertex on that hypothetical vertex.

The analysis presented in this chapter is preliminary, with an obvious shortcoming being the fact that we assume that the community of a case i , or collection of cases that could potentially influence i , consists of all of the cases that predate it. In future work we intend to allow community structure to be determined not only by the year in which a case was considered but also by the topic of the case. Additionally, we hope to apply our scoring method to other types of incomplete network data as we believe it provides a useful new measure of node centrality that generalizes the concept of in-degree centrality.

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**Part III
Empirical Analysis**

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The Politics of Austerity: Modeling British Attitudes Towards Public Spending Cuts

Harold D. Clarke, Walter Borges, Marianne C. Stewart, David Sanders, and Paul Whiteley

Are there no prisons?... And the union workhouses, are they still in operation?

Ebenezer Scrooge to Charity Collector, 1851

Beginning in 2008 financial crises and ensuing economic turbulence have prompted acrimonious national debates in many Western democracies over the need for substantial budget cuts and debt reductions. Among economic and political elites there is broad agreement that substantial public sector budget cuts are necessary to address unsustainable sovereign debt loads and establish long-term fiscal integrity. Many ordinary citizens see things differently—proposed austerity measures threaten programs that aid the disadvantaged while challenging longstanding public commitments to education, health and personal security that constitute the foundation of the modern welfare state. Coming close on the heels of massive, widely publicized bailouts of major banks, investment firms and manufacturing companies, the pro-

H.D. Clarke (✉) · M.C. Stewart
School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas,
PO Box 830688, Richardson, TX 75083-0688, USA
e-mail: clarke475@msn.com

M.C. Stewart
e-mail: mcmstewart@gmail.com

W. Borges
Division of Liberal Arts and Life Sciences, University of North Texas-Dallas,
7300 University Blvd., Dallas, TX 75241, USA
e-mail: Walter.Borges@unt.edu

H.D. Clarke · D. Sanders · P. Whiteley
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester C043SQ, UK

D. Sanders
e-mail: sanders@essex.ac.uk

P. Whiteley
e-mail: whiteley@essex.ac.uk

N. Schofield et al. (eds.), *Advances in Political Economy*,
DOI [10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_13), © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

47 posed reductions in public sector spending threaten to overturn the distributional
48 policy consensus in contemporary mature democracies.

49 As of this writing, several countries—*inter alia*, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portu-
50 gal, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom—either have implemented
51 or are seriously contemplating large-scale budget cuts that will necessitate painful
52 reductions in public services and benefits. Perhaps the best known case is Greece
53 where the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have dictated dra-
54 conian financial policies to remedy the country's sovereign debt crisis. The result
55 has been widespread, oftentimes violent, public protests and ongoing political tur-
56 moil. In the United Kingdom, proposed public-sector cuts have prompted civil un-
57 rest and charges that the Conservative-led Coalition government accords higher pri-
58 ority to enacting a neo-Thatcherite ideological agenda of small government and re-
59 privatization than the provision of effective health care and education for its citizens.

60 This study focuses on the British experience. Confronted with a pernicious com-
61 bination of rising public debt and growing unemployment when his coalition gov-
62 ernment of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats assumed power in May 2010,
63 Prime Minister David Cameron and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Os-
64 borne, proposed to cut an average of 20 percent from government spending over
65 the next four years (Burns 2011). The plan was to reduce the budget by £83 billion
66 by eliminating 490,000 government jobs, curtailing benefits, and chopping a broad
67 range of “unnecessary” programs (BBC 2011). Public employee pay was frozen for
68 two years, with the prospect of one percent annual raises offered for the follow-
69 ing two years. Reductions in the government workforce would be mitigated by in-
70 creased participation by civic-minded volunteers who would provide public services
71 *pro bono*—a devolution-of-power and responsibility that Cameron and his advisors
72 termed “the Big Society”.

73 Progress towards these goals has been slow—by the end of 2011, the UK infla-
74 tion rate was nearly five percent and unemployment exceeded eight percent (Burns).
75 Economic growth has been less than projected and Chancellor George Osborne
76 now anticipates that the public sector cuts will take seven years to clear the deficit
77 (Werdigier 2011). The projected level of spending reductions is now fully £123 bil-
78 lion. A sense that the cuts are “too far, too fast” is increasingly widespread, being
79 enunciated both in the news media (Bloomberg 2011) and, as will be documented
80 below, in public opinion surveys.

81 Nothing has prompted more resistance than the Coalition Government's attempt
82 to devolve management and ownership of the National Health Service, its hospi-
83 tals and other facilities to physicians and private investors. Public skepticism about
84 the benefits of such moves has been compounded by criticism by medical profes-
85 sionals. Fearing the political repercussions of such negative reactions to his plans
86 for the NHS, Cameron and his Health Secretary, Andrew Lansley, have excluded
87 professional groups representing physicians, nurses and midwives from recent con-
88 ferences on how to implement the reforms.

89 Models incorporating demographic, attitudinal and evaluative variables are staples
90 in analyses of public support for political parties and their leaders, and here
91 we develop similar models for policy preferences. We first investigate the nature of
92