

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cyber-age has produced some particularly dramatic changes in the information-gathering tools available to government, with the near-universal ownership of cell phones giving government the opportunity to track the position of almost every cell-phone-using individual, and rapidly to put together information from different sources on any given individual. Indeed, Margetts (1999) has shown how information technology has significantly changed the way that government applies all its tools for gathering information and modifying behaviour.

However, this sort of technology-free approach to understanding government's policy tools is arguably more rather than less applicable to an age of fast-changing technology, for at least three reasons. One is that there are sharp limits to "virtualizing" government, particularly for those situations that most call for government action, where normal facilities or civilities have broken down, the chips are down, and the stakes are high. *Pace* Frissen and those who think like him, even in a world where much is digitized and "virtual," many of those virtual processes ultimately depend for their efficacy on processes that are unavoidably physical rather than virtual. That is not to deny that there are *some* wholly virtualized government services. For instance, one of the most unexpectedly popular uses of government-sourced information in recent years is the runaway growth of interest in searching for family history on the Internet through official records such as censuses, wills, tax records, registers of births, deaths, and marriages in a way that was much more difficult and costly for those would-be family historians in a pre-digital era. But only some of government's operations are like that. Sometimes the scope for virtuality is limited by the need to build non-virtual elements into administrative processes as a defence against online fraudsters, as applies to many commercial transactions. And the limits of virtuality show up sharply with those types of government operations that involve unavoidably physical operations, especially for disaster-relief activity or at the coercive end of government's relationship with citizens, when government faces principled or opportunistic recalcitrance. The tool kit of government always has to include instruments that are anything but virtual, and indeed too much of a focus on the virtual part will tend to take away from those ways in which government has to relate to citizens outside the cyber-world.

Indeed, a second reason why conventional technology-free analyses of the tools of government are still useful in a world of changing technology is that only analysis of such a kind can enable us to pinpoint what exactly changes in government's operations in the information age. For instance, in policy domains such as the handling of crime and public order, the collection of taxes, and the handling of contagious diseases—all part of government's "defining" policy operations (Rose 1976)—it is the "detector" or information-gathering part of those operations that have changed more as a result of information-age technology than the "effector" part of the operation. For crime and public order policing, dramatic new surveillance technology has developed, as already mentioned, and the information age in principle allows information to be put together from many different sources, such that the traditional instrument of the periodic census may be becoming outdated (though data protection laws often sharply limit the ability of governments to use the dramatic "joining-up" potential of information and communications technology across different information sources—see Raab 1995).

In tax collection, too, the information and communications technology age lends itself to new surveillance techniques, such as the cameras linked to computers that lie behind London's congestion charge system introduced in 2003, and direct tax filing and payment systems through the Internet are dramatically changing traditional tax administration. In contagious disease control, information and communications technology has also led to new kinds of detectors, for instance in new kinds of animal identification for control of animal-borne disease by microchips embedded in the flesh (a technique that was originally adopted to control "ringing" of racehorses and later spread to control of dogs and other animals (see Lodge and Hood 2002, 6)). But in all of those cases, the effecting end of the process—"boots on the ground" to tackle rioters, the physical tracking down of tax non-payers to haul them off to justice, the burning or burying of infected animals, or the enforcement of quarantine systems—depend on processes that have been decidedly less transformed by the information age—and indeed often turn out to be the weak points of information-age government.

Third, at the level of basic social resources, it is not clear that the advent of information-age technology brings fundamentally new instruments to government of the same order as nodality, authority, treasure, and organization, any more than the railroad age brought fundamentally new principles to the law (see Holmes 1920, 196). While the technology of the cyber-age dramatically changes the way that executive government is internally organized, and how information and control operates within it, at some level it does not alter the basic levers that are available to government to obtain information from or change the behaviour of citizens.

4. Conclusion

Information and communications technology developments have undoubtedly changed the way that government works and will continue to do so. But the advent of a new information age does not necessarily mean that we need completely new ways to analyze and understand the instruments of government. Conventional ways of analyzing those instruments can serve to identify what changes information and communications technology brings to institutional arrangements, to the politics of instrument choice, and to the forms of policy intervention available to government. We do not need to invent new analytic frameworks to explore such questions (for an analogous argument, see Barzelay 2000). Indeed, only by applying technology-neutral analytic frameworks can we identify what precisely alters when technology changes. Margetts (1999) has used precisely such a framework to show how information and communications technology has changed the way that government in the UK and USA applies all its detecting and effecting tools, produced new ways for

the resources of nodality, authority, treasure, and authority to be applied, and produced new ways of linking detecting and effecting tools.

Margetts's use of that kind of analysis is, however, unusual, and serious application of the conventional lines of analysis of government's tools to the information age has been relatively little developed up to now. Yet it is only by applying that sort of approach that we can test the claims of those who see e-technology as heralding a quantum transformation in the working of government against the claims of those who see it as another form of "conservative change." (Such debates throw up in an exaggerated form all the difficulties historians face in identifying and accounting for administrative revolutions in government (see McDonagh 1958).) And what that analysis shows is that while all of the tools of government as identified in conventional classificatory analysis have been, and are being reshaped by information and communications technology developments, those changes do not appear to have been all of the same order. Particularly dramatic changes have taken place in the application of information and communications technology to government's detection tool kit and especially to its active detectors. And within the set of government's effecting tools, information and communications technology developments have brought particularly dramatic changes to the way that government nodality works in information dissemination and in the way that government organization has been reconfigured. By comparison, information and communications technology developments for the tools of authority and treasure seem to have followed the path noted by Drucker, amounting to new ways of making existing products or instruments. And, as Margetts (2003) points out, developments up to now seem to have brought about neither the utopian nor dystopian visions of technological transformation in the way government relates to citizens.

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CHAPTER 23

POLICY ANALYSIS AS ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

BARRY L. FRIEDMAN

Organizational analysis has become a major concern of policy analysis. The interest in organizations emerged out of studies of implementation. As evaluations of policies began to show program failures, the question arose as to whether the failures were a result of flawed policy design or perhaps just good policies that were implemented poorly. The focus on implementation in turn led to an interest in the organizations implementing policy. It came to be recognized that policy analysts could not ignore implementation and the behavior of implementing organizations. But Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, xvii) in their pioneering study went a step further and warned that "the separation of policy design from implementation is fatal." For Pressman and Wildavsky they are linked, and in a way that highlights the importance of organizations. In the program they studied, the policy itself was complex and involved many organizations in the implementation, each with its own motivations. The complexity in policy created complexity in the interactions among the multiple organizations, which ultimately resulted in an ineffective policy. The link was that policy complexity created organizational complexity. Since their work, many more links have emerged between policy design and implementing agencies. The design determines or at least influences the constraints faced by implementing organizations and the opportunities or discretion they have within the constraints.

Linkages can also run from organizations to policy design. Some of the original implementation studies began with discrete legislative actions. When the analysis is

set up in this way, the causation necessarily starts with policy design and policy goals, which may then be subverted by organizations as part of the implementation process. However, Lipsky (1980, xii) argued that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out." More generally, public policies are determined by a combination of legislative actions and actions of implementing organizations and the street-level bureaucrats within them. Along with the policy initiatives that begin in government, there is feedback from agencies leading to modifications in policy and even initiatives by the agencies themselves. Through expanded purchases of service, government programs have come to use non-profit and for-profit organizations in addition to government agencies as implementing organizations. There are non-profits in particular that design services that go beyond governmental policy in order to fill social gaps that they perceive. With government in some countries trying to cut back on its social programs, it is essential for policy analysis to consider not only what government does but also what is done or not done outside of government. Taking this broader view, organizations may have substantial impacts both on the design of public programs and on the social policy environment outside of government.

The causal influences in both directions create the links that connect policy and implementing organizations. These links in turn depend on the behavior of the organizations. The stronger the links, the more intertwined policy analysis is with organizational analysis. Thus, organizational analysis is a useful, often essential component of policy analysis. This chapter focuses on organizational analysis and the insights it can provide into policy analysis.

1. From Implementation Studies to Organizational Analysis: A Review

Organizational elements emerged in studies of implementation, but have gradually been elaborated into a more complex and complete organizational analysis. The top-down approach was one of the first systematic forms of implementation analysis, and organizational issues play an important role here. It begins with policy formulated at the top so that it focuses primarily on one-way links from policy to implementing organizations. Beginning from the top, its approach to organizations tends to be hierarchical. An early study by Hood attempted to characterize perfect implementation as beginning with a unitary administrative system, operating with single-line authority and having perfect communication and obedience (1976, 6). More generally, the top-down approach was used to analyze implementation situations and to prescribe remedies for difficulties, knowing that the complete control described by Hood was impossible. Early top-down work included van Meter and van Horn

(1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), and Gunn (1978). The hierarchical view focused on structures such as channels of communication and mechanisms for controlling organizations. It was generally recognized that implementing organizations need appropriate forms of discretion, but that it should to be controlled (Younis and Davidson 1990, 8; Sabatier 1986, 22–3). Indeed, one of the links between policy and organizations comes from identifying necessary forms of discretion and building them into the organizational structure. It has been argued that implementation and organization may differ by policy type and that the relationship with relevant actors should be different in different policy types (Ripley and Franklin 1982, 198). On the other hand, critics have argued that discretion extends beyond that which is required programmatically (Burke 1990) and the undesired forms may be difficult to control (Rhodes and Marsh 1992).

There were attempts to be more explicit about the nature of the discretion in implementing organizations. The most notable was the focus within organizations on the discretion available to street-level bureaucrats, those who directly deliver the services to clients. To an extent, the discretion results from features of the policy being implemented. Lipsky (1980, 14–15) argues that many service needs are too complicated to be reduced to precise instructions. Depending on the service, street-level bureaucrats may be given discretion to respond to unique individual circumstances. On the other hand, he also argues that street-level officials may be subject to voluminous, contradictory rules, in effect leaving them with the discretion to decide which to follow. The first source of discretion may promote the goals of the policy, while the second may thwart them, but both result in opportunities for a degree of street-level independence. Lipsky and others (Prottas 1979) have explored how street-level bureaucrats use their discretion and how they relate to managers in implementing organizations. They generally conclude that the kinds of hierarchical controls envisioned in top-down models are likely not to work. However, managers at times do attempt to tighten controls, and the result may be a reduction in the quality of service (Lipsky 1984).

The bottom-up approach, including the work on street-level bureaucracies, enriched the understanding of relationships within organizations and in particular the importance of the level where services are actually provided. Elmore (1978) also rejected hierarchical models, but suggested several alternative models including street-level bureaucracy, an organizational development model, and a conflict bargaining model. Bottom-up models also rejected the view that policy design was the exclusive prerogative of the legislative process. Lipsky argued that street-level actions effectively determined important features of the policy. Elmore (1979) argued that policy should be formulated through a process of backward mapping in which the capabilities and resources of street-level officials are assessed first in order to design programs that will work. There was a normative element in these arguments, so they did not yet provide a fully developed view behaviorally of how organizations affect policy and the reverse, but they were a step toward articulating these relationships.

Later work considered different degrees of street-level discretion and differing capabilities to control it (Burke 1987; Thompson 1982). There was also interest in combining top-down and bottom-up approaches. Sabatier (1986) incorporated street-level elements into a top-down structure with feedbacks from below; Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989, 40) showed in a formal way many of the cross-influences between policy, organizations, and outcomes; while Elmore (1985) combined his bottom-up concept of backward mapping with forward mapping to accommodate the interests of central policy makers. Eclectic approaches became common. Later summaries synthesized the approaches in various ways.[1] From the point of view of organizational analysis, syntheses allow in one way or another for both hierarchical and bottom-up organizational structures and for varying mixes of the two in different situations.

While the street-level approach was important to understanding relationships within an organization, other studies emphasized interorganizational relationships. This approach began with the insight that many governmental programs are carried out by multiple organizations, each with limited tasks, carrying out a part of the implementation and each with different, possibly conflicting interests (Hanf 1978). Since conflicts are likely in the presence of multiple organizations, studies looked at interorganizational mechanisms for dealing with the conflicts and the implications of these mechanisms for policy. Stoker (1989) emphasized the importance of cooperation and identified implementation regimes based on how likely they would be to achieve cooperation. Goggin et al. (1990, 33) emphasized the role of the communications system linking the multiple organizations in a framework that combined top-down and bottom-up elements; Ostrom (1998, 13) elaborated further on how communications can affect implementation.

Network theory is one approach to interorganizational relationships that has received increased attention. The idea is not new (Hanf, Hjern, and Porter 1978). A network is the set of relationships among the multiple organizations involved in a program. Since the members may forge their own relationships, networks are sometimes presented as a bottom-up alternative to a hierarchical system in a multiple organization setting. O'Toole (1997) argued that networks have become more common in public administration. Within government, there are more interagency efforts; non-profits and for-profits have become implementers; and all may network with each other. Considine and Lewis (1999) sought to evaluate empirically whether networking behavior exists among organizations providing services. They studied organizations providing employment services to the unemployed in Australia, where many private agencies have contracts. They concluded that networked systems do exist among some agencies, but even in this homogeneous service area, it is not the only approach. Salamon (2002) also argued that government increasingly operates through other organizations including non-profits and for-profits to carry out its policies, and these organizations may network with each other even while each pursues its own interests and values. Traditional hierarchical command and control

[1] See Lester et al. 1987; Goggin et al. 1990; Ryan 1995.

structures are not likely to be effective in managing such networks, but central authorities still have an interest in accountability. Salamon proposed a new governance paradigm in which central authorities as well as managers within the networks need to rely on negotiation, persuasion, and tools such as incentives to achieve public goals. While traditional control mechanisms sought to prescribe particular actions, central authorities might seek indirect means to alter the behavior of the network and the organizations within it under the new governance paradigm. It opens the possibility that policy might affect organizational structure and not just specific procedures.

Along with the new governance paradigm and its focus on effective management, there has also been concern over accountability in the presence of networks and government contracting with the private sector. One concern is the accountability of private agencies to the democratically set goals of the public policies they implement. Another concern is the possibility that contracting might subject non-profits to political control and reduce their effectiveness in meeting their traditional goals related to individual and community needs. There have been explorations of the balance between these concerns (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Minow 2002; Goodin 2003). Considine (2002) studied accountability empirically in agencies providing employment services across four countries. He considered more than one kind of accountability including vertical accountability: top-down to superiors in the chain of command and bottom-up to the preferences of clients. He also considered horizontal accountability to other organizations and actors in a network. He found that one kind of accountability tends not to preclude another. Being in a network does not prevent attention to vertical accountability, but horizontal accountability was relatively more important in non-profits than in government agencies.

Although organizations have long been of interest in policy analysis, they were often viewed through the lens of implementation, sometimes as an obstacle to policy, sometimes as a force to be controlled in carrying out policy. Some studies had a hierarchical approach, but this was challenged first by the idea of street-level bureaucracy and then in a multi-organizational context by network theory. The bottom-up approaches opened the possibility that organizations may not only be an obstacle, but also could play a positive role in the design of policy. The next two sections explore further aspects of organizations that can make a contribution to policy analysis.

2. Innovation and the Influence of Organizations on Policy

There was a presumption particularly in the earlier top-down literature that public policy is the prerogative of government. Of course, studies recognized that there are feedbacks from organizations to policy. Organizations lobby, do research, and discover flaws in policies, all of which may result in modifications. But there is also a

normative argument that democratic accountability requires that democratic legislative processes should formulate policy. However, as a practical matter there are agencies outside of government that seek social change, that innovate and design policies in line with their own views, and in so doing affect the social policy environment.

In a democratic process, program adoption depends on majority rule. A minority can achieve some of its objectives by forming alliances, logrolling, or other political maneuvering, but it may not get all the programs it would like. A strictly democratic process serves the needs of minorities imperfectly, but pluralistic interests can be met if minorities can develop their own programs outside of government. Is it feasible for groups to organize outside of government? If not, the case for government action would be practical more than normative. Government has strong advantages as a provider of social programs, given its power of compulsion and especially taxation. Many public programs can be considered public goods or else services provided publicly because of positive externalities. A market would underproduce these services, and one response is public provision. The standard argument is that in the presence of positive externalities, a free-rider problem is likely, and individuals will not contribute to the service voluntarily. It would take the compulsion powers of government to make sure that the service is provided. This would suggest that government is needed as the provider. Of course, the government decision to provide the service and the level of support depend on a democratic decision.

In fact, however, the free-rider problem is not insurmountable. There is a long tradition of non-profit organizations successfully mobilizing resources to pursue a mission not funded by government. Religious and other affinity groups and cultural organizations may not win majority support and would not work in the market, but are able to organize as non-profits. There have long been charities that provided hospitals or orphanages without direct support from government. Many succeeded as non-profits in spite of potential free-rider problems. Although government has a clear advantage in organizing and funding social programs, experience suggests that it is not a necessity. Determined minorities can organize to get services they want. One factor strengthening the determination of organizations to develop programs has been the attempt by governments in some countries to cut back on the services they provide. In a time of government cutbacks, the minorities that succeed tend to be those that believe in a service even though it does not get a legislative majority. Normatively, it is not clear why the government should have a monopoly in deciding on social services. Practically, a government monopoly is not necessary as long as the free-rider problem is not important. Governments also have weaknesses as providers (Ostrom and Walker 1997, 36). However, for private organizers to succeed, they need good management skills. The design of overall social policy, public and private, depends on the behavior of the thousands of private organizations that initiate and provide their own services.

For the traditional charity, a key skill for survival is fundraising. This in turn depends on strategic management skills including the ability to define a mission that would appeal to donors. It also depends on the marketing skills to sell the concept to those who might contribute. The growth of government programs opened new