THE OXFORD
HANDBOOKS OF
POLITICAL
SCIENCE

GENERAL EDITOR
ROBERT E. GOODIN

EDITED BY

MICHAEL
MORAN

MARTIN
REIN

ROBERT E.
GOODIN

The Oxford Handbook *of*
PUBLIC POLICY

but crises also take the form of natural disasters, economic meltdowns, social unrests, and more. In major crises rulers usually are the ultimate decision makers, by action or default. But, unless they have a personal background of crisis coping, they are ill prepared for their lead roles and can easily do a lot of harm.

A major reason for being unprepared is the lack of readiness by senior politicians to take part in crisis exercises, as essential for preparing oneself for crisis coping. The formal reason they frequently give is that they do not want to reveal their hand prematurely, but the real reason is that experienced politicians will not volunteer to be tested. All the more essential in training is sensitizing of rulers to the need to prepare for crisis coping, including also unconventional uses of crises as opportunities to do what otherwise is impossible.

Participants can be introduced to crisis coping by short and long crises exercises dealing with hypothetical but realistic situations. Computer simulations and games can help. Crisis-coping exercises are not only important by themselves, but also provide opportunities to apply and absorb other main grand-policy thinking subjects in stimulating ways which will engage the full attention of participants.

There is plenty of literature available on crisis coping, in both security and civilian contexts, theoretic and applied (Rosenthal, Boin, and Camfort 2001). Good historical examples can serve as interest-evoking introductions (Frankel 2004; Lukacs 1999). Some of the ideas on crisis handling in business enterprises are in part applicable, but especially pertinent are the few books focusing on the role of leadership in crisis (Carrel 2004). Persons with experience in crisis coping can help as can visits to crisis management units and special demonstration runs to be evaluated later.

1.12 Holistic View

Rulers need to adopt holistic views of main policy spaces and of their policy cosmos as a whole, so as to set well-considered priorities for grand-policy crafting, understand cross-impacts, and try to achieve synergism.

The need for "holistic governance" is increasingly recognized, at least in theory (Perri 6 et al. 2003), but the best frame for comprehensive grand-policy thinking is provided by the systems approach. Its central ideas are quite clear: overall performance is not a simple additive function of the output of components. Therefore the interaction of components has to be carefully considered so as to prevent negative effects and achieve overall system improvement. Main implications are also clear, such as the advantages of self-managing systems, the need for overall systems understanding and management when self-management does not work, systems costing, and so on—all within appropriate timeframes.

Especially pertinent are implications for the mission of rulers: they are in charge of overall governmental and societal perspectives; and, when self-management does not work, of systems redesign, oversight, and management. Furthermore, it is up to them

to assure holistic governance and to achieve themselves an overall systems perspective of main grand policies as an interactive set.

Within this subject, attention should also be devoted to budgeting. Though most attempts to do so have failed, important lessons can be derived for innovative uses of revised policy-linked budgeting as an instrument for achieving some parts of a holistic view.

The systems approach is well developed in the literature (Checkland 1981; Jervis 1997) as well as in some policy-making practice. Explaining and demonstrating its principles to experienced participants is not difficult, but really to make holistic perspectives a part of their thinking exercises, case studies and projects serve best.

More difficult is the issue of a "national overall grand policy" which tries to set an integrated trajectory for most policy spaces. Illustrations include preparing a country for joining the European Union, moving from a Communist regime and command economy to a democratic regime and market economy, waging a life-or-death war, and some overall modernization directions, as in Singapore (Yew 2000). The question if and when having an overall grand policy is advisable, is central for training of rulers in countries engaging in radical but not revolutionary self-transformation. If answered positively, much of the grand-policy training should refer to crafting such an overall grand policy and its derivative policy-space-specific "sub-"grand policies.

There is nearly no relevant literature, other than outdated and often misleading "development policy" treatises. But treatments of "rise and decline" and some multinational documents, such as the "Lisbon Agenda" the European Union, can serve to introduce the subject.

1.13 Penetrating Complexities

Nearly all the curriculum subjects appear to add complexity which may well make the task of grand-policy crafting seem impossible and discourage participants. To overcome this barrier and help in dealing with real difficulties, a deeper look at complexity is necessary.

Let me start with what is quite useless for coping with the quandaries which rulers face. The so-called sciences of complexity (Waldrop 1992), however intellectually interesting and in part stimulating, are not really helpful. Chaos theory, catastrophe theory, and similar fashionable approaches supply some valuable concepts, such as the popularized and often exaggerated "butterfly effect," but applying them to real-life high-level policy issues does not yield much. Large-scale computer simulations do help with some aspects of important policy spaces, such as macroeconomy and environment, but are of limited help for most grand-policy issues (La Porte 1975).

However, it is often possible to cut through soaring complexity by seeking and identifying the kernel or cluster of kernels and thus making the situation more

comprehensible without falsification of its essence (Slobodkin 1992). Thus, in the Kyoto Agreement the core issue is readiness to pay economic prices for reducing a probabilistic danger. In the European Union core issues are striving for a federated Europe or an alliance of partly sovereign states; wishing to preserve some cultural homogeneity or taking Turkey in; and global standing and policy. And so on: in quite a number of very complex and multifaceted policy issues one of two hard kernels can be identified. Multiple factors have to be taken into account, but many quandaries are in essence less complex than appears before penetration to their kernel.

In seeking to distill the essence from complexity there is much danger of oversimplification, to which top politicians are prone. But, if done with care, complexity can often be handled better by getting to the kernels than by use of refined methods which either make complexity completely unmanageable or wrongly simplify it behind a veneer of advanced methodologies and abstruse calculations and simulations.

However, methods for doing so are scarce. No general approach to penetrate complexity is known and perhaps none is possible, with each policy space to be handled according to its unique characteristics. But examples can clarify the proposed approach and participants can try to penetrate complexity in closely monitored projects, with much care taken to avoid oversimplification.

1.14 Basic Deliberation Schema

Let me conclude the core curriculum with a basic deliberation and choice schema. In many training activities it might be good to start with this scheme so as to apply it throughout the activity. However, I present it here as an illustration of tools helping to get to the kernel of complex grand-policy choices.

The structure of the basic deliberation scheme is as follows:

values-goals
options outlook on expected impacts of options on values-goals

However rudimentary, this schema serves as a useful format for summing up options and presenting them for overall judgement. It also brings out and reiterates a number of important points (Dror 1983, part IV), such as:

- Avoidance of discussing choice in terms of "rationality" in its usual narrow meanings, because of the importance of extra-rational elements, especially values and innovative options. But more advanced notions of higher rationality, such as self-binding (Elster 2000), should be presented and applied.
- Division of labor within grand-policy crafting, with value and goal judgement being a prerogative and duty of the ruler; outlook being a matter for professionals; and options being open to innovators whoever they may be.

- Outlook must never to be put into a singular form, with at least optimistic and pessimistic outlooks being a must, and further refinements to be added such as dependence on events and surprise-proneness.
- All elements have to be phased in time to take into account different time horizons fitting the subject.

This schema, in different forms, is well known in policy analysis and related literature (Weimer and Vining 1998). Teaching it is not problematic, but rulers have to be habituated to demanding its use from their staffs and absorbing and also applying it into their own grand-policy thinking.

1.15 Integration and Absorption

It is essential to achieve at least some intellectual and behavioral integration of the various subjects, so as to upgrade grand-policy thinking as a whole and make it into "knowledge-in-action" (Schön 1983).

It is an open question whether the various aspects, approaches, and frames of grand-policy thinking, as in part presented in the curriculum, form a single paradigm or whether they constitute multiple perspectives sharing a world of discourse but different in groundings and nature. Whatever the ultimate answer to this question may be, as matters stand now there exists no unified prescriptive theory fitting grand-policy thinking as a whole, a fact which makes integration difficult. And the ideas, theories, and perspectives which are best suited to serve as a grounding for grand-policy thinking belong to the philosophy of practical reason starting with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, as receiving renewed attention in the philosophy of praxis (Bourdieu 1998; Bratman 1987; Velleman 2000), of reasoning (Gilbert 1986), and of judgement (Lycan et al. 1988), together with cognitive sciences (Robinson-Riegler et al. 2003).

I am of the opinion that parts of philosophy and of cognitive sciences can provide strong groundings for a unified prescriptive theory of choice on which much improved versions of grand-policy and policy analysis as a whole can be based (Dror 1988). However, this is not a ready basis for grand-policy training. Mainstream policy analysis literature (representative is Radin 2000) fully reflects the lack of a strong theoretic basis, a weakness which is epitomized by the inapplicability of most of it to grand-policy thinking. It is therefore not an accident that very little of that literature has been cited as providing knowledge relevant to the proposed curriculum. Thus, nearly completely ignored in mainstream policy analysis literature are thinking-in-history and alternative futures, value clarification, and "rise and decline" frames. And a number of crucial subjects are often mistreated, such as deep uncertainty. Most of the bulk of policy analysis literature fits some types of micro-decisions but not grand-policy crafting, though some books (Dunn 2004; Rosenhead 1989) include important relevant ideas and methods. And when that literature presumes to

suggest a dominant paradigm, such as an economic or "rational" one, it is a very narrow and largely misleading one when applied to complex choice.

The absence of an encompassing paradigm is in part compensated for by a number of core ideas and leitmotifs around which training can be structured, in particular thinking in terms of alternative futures and intervening in historic processes. But, at least in training activities, the main burden of integrating the material and applying it selectively to different policy spaces is one of "praxis:" participants have to integrate the material in their cognitive processes and develop the skill to apply different approaches selectively to a variety of grand-policy issues.

Some texts may help after critical discussion, such as writings on political judgement (parts of Steinberger 1993) and the documents of the strategy unit of the British Prime Minister (www.strategy.gov.uk) which, in addition to their intrinsic quality, are very credible to rulers as used in practice at a top policy level. But the main way to help participants integrate the material in ways conductive to their praxis is by case studies, exercises, and projects in which a variety of approaches are applied with the help of mentors and tutors having both extensive theoretic knowledge and high-level policy experience.

Another perspective helping with integration is that of creative professionalism. Professionalism involves applying general theories, abstract thinking, and comparative knowledge to concrete issues. Creative professionalism adds innovation, creativity, and "artistry," in line with the composer metaphor. It is up to the mentors to facilitate such thinking throughout the training.

Also useful is integration of the material on the level of "common errors to be avoided." During the presentation of the curriculum, error propensities specific to each subject will have been mentioned. Pulling them together and supplementing them with additional typical policy-making mistakes (Baron 1998: Bovens and 't Hart 1996) can assist participants in gaining an overview on an additional level. Examples added from other domains, such as technology (Perrow 1984) and medicine (Rosenthal and Sutcliffe 2002), can be very helpful.

However, as noted, in training of high-level policy makers integration is to be achieved on the level of praxis with the help of active learning and, especially, extensive group exercises and projects closely monitored by highly qualified mentors.

2. Training Requirements

In grand-policy training of rulers didactic methods and substantive contents are closely intertwined. To help participants improve both knowledge-based systematic but 'open' thinking and creative design (Schön 1987), extensive use of active learning methods, such as case studies, interactive computer programs and games, syndicate

discussions, individual and group exercises, and projects, is essential. Guided reading on one hand and individual tutoring and coaching are also essential.

Preparation of suitable texts, case studies, exercises, and projects is a main challenge facing the still very small epistemic community of policy scholars, policy analysis professionals, and governance practitioners eager to advance grand-policy training of rulers.

The demanding nature of grand-policy thinking together with the difficulties of telling senior participants "how to think" require highly qualified mentors who combine much theoretic and factual knowledge with high-level policy experience. Finding such mentors and getting them to devote sufficient time to prepare for grand-policy training of rulers is a major difficulty.

Selection of participants is very important, because not all will resonate with the proposed training. And needed are alternative training arrangements of different length, various categories of participants, and different foci so as to fit opportunities and demand.

Most difficult is getting senior policy makers to participate in the proposed type of activities. Directing training at junior policy makers on the way up is more feasible and a very useful endeavor in the longer run. But top-level politicians too can and should be motivated to participate in compact workshops. This requires at least some highly reputed mentors, attractive settings, and good presentation. And getting the support of at least a few rulers who will themselves participate in a training activity is critical.

However, all this is secondary to the need to recognize the imperative of upgrading the quality of top-level decision makers and the possibility to do so in part by grand-policy training.

References

Ansoff, H. I. 1979. *Strategic Management*. New York: Wiley.

Baron, J. 1998. *Judgment Misguided: Intuition and Error in Public Decision Making*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, R. J. 2002. *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1998. *Practical Reason*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Bovens, M. and 't Hart, P. 1996. *Understanding Policy Fiascoes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Boyce, W. D., and Jensen, L. C. 1978. *Moral Reasoning: A Psychological Philosophical Integration*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Bratman, M. E. 1987. *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Braudel, F. 1980. *On History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Calabresi, G. and Bobbit, P. 1979. *Tragic Choices*. New York: Norton.

Carrel, L. F. 2004. *Leadership in Krisen: Ein Handbuch für die Praxis*. Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

Checkland, P. 1981. *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice*. Chichester: John Wiley.

CIA 2004. *Mapping the Global Future*. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council. December. Available at: www.cia.gov/NIC globaltrend2020.html.

CODEVILLA, A. 1992. *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century*. New York: Free Press.

DENEMARK, R. A., FRIEDMAN, J., GILLS, B. K., and MODELSKI, G. 2000. *World System History: The Social Science of Long Term Change*. London: Routledge.

DEWAR, J. A. 2002. *Assumption Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DROR, Y. 1983. *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, enlarged edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

—— 1988. Notes towards a philosophy of policy reasoning. Pp. 117 71 in *Between Rationality and Cognition*, ed. M. Campanella. Turin: Albert Meynier.

—— 1999. Beyond uncertainty: facing the inconceivable. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 62 (1 2: Aug./Sept.): 151 3.

—— 2002. *The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome*. London: Frank Cass.

DUNN, W. N. 2004. *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction*, 3rd edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

ELSTER, J. 2000. *Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FERGUSON, N. (ed.) 1997. *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*. London: Picador.

FRANKEL, M. 2004. *High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Presidio.

GELERNTER, D. 2004. Review of "The Invisible Century by Richard Panek." *New York Times*, 11 Aug.; available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html/?res=9A04E7D71E3CF932 A2575BCOA9629

GERNET, J. 1996. *A History of Chinese Civilization*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GILBERT, H. 1986. *Change in View: Principles of Reasoning*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

GOLEMAN, D., BOYATZIS, R., and MCKEE, A. 2002. *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*. Boston: Harvard Business School.

GOODIN, R. E. (ed.) 1998. *The Theory of Institutional Design*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

HAMEL, G., and PRAHALAD, C. K. 1994. *Competing for the Future*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

HARMAN, G. 1986. *Change in View: Principles of Reasoning*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

HAWTHORN, G. 1991. *Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

JERVIS, R. 1997. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

JOUVENEL, B. DE. 1967. *The Art of Conjecture*. New York: Basic Books.

KANTER, R. M. 2004. *Confidence: How Winning Streaks and Losing Streaks Begin and End*. New York: Crown Business.

KATAEV, V. 2002. *If Only We Could Know! An Interpretation of Chekov*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.

KELLERMAN, B. 2004. *Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

KENNEDY, P. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House.

LA PORTE, T. R. (ed.) 1975. *Organized Social Complexity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

LEMPERT, R. J., POPPER, S. W., and BANKES, S. C. 2003. *Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, Long Term Policy Analysis*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

Levi, I. 1986. *Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lord, C. 2003. *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Lukacs, J. 1999. *Five Days in London: May 1940.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Lycan, W. G., Sosa, E., Dancy, J., Haldane, J., Harman, G., and Jackson, F. 1988. *Judgment and Justification.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCall, S. 1994. *A Model of the Universe: Space Time, Probability, and Decision.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

May, E. R. 1972. *Lessons of the Past: The Uses and Misuses of History in American Foreign Policy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Molitor, G. T. T. 2003. *Power to Change the World: The Art of Forecasting.* Washington, DC: World Future Society.

Nagel, T. 1986. *The View from Nowhere.* New York: Oxford University Press.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.* New York: Norton.

Neustadt, R. E., and May, E. R. 1986. *Thinking in Time.* New York: Free Press.

North, D. C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. 1995. *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Nye, J. S., Jr. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* New York: PublicAffairs.

Olson, M. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Panek, R. 2004. *The Invisible Century: Einstein, Freud and the Search.* New York: Viking.

Paulos, J. A. 1988. *Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences.* New York: Hill and Wang.

Pears, D. 1984. *Motivated Irrationality.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Perri 6 et al. 2003. *Towards Holistic Governance: The New Reform Agenda.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Perrow, C. 1984. *Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies.* New York: Basic Books.

Radin, A. B. 2000. *Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Ridley, M. 2003. *Nature Via Nurture: Genes, Experience, and What Makes Us Human.* New York: HarperCollins.

Robinson Riegler, G. L., Robinson Riegler, B., and Robinson Riegler, G. L. 2003. *Cognitive Psychology: Applying the Science of Mind.* London: Allyn & Bacon.

Rosenau, J. 2003. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Rosenhead, J. (ed.) 1989. *Rational Analysis for a Problematic World: Problem Structuring Methods for Complexity, Uncertainty and Conflict.* Chichester: Wiley.

Rosenthal, M., and Sutcliffe, K. M. (eds.) 2002. *Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do?* San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Rosenthal, U., Boin, U. A., and Comfort, L. K. (eds.) 2001. *Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas.

SCHÖN, D. A. 1983. *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action.* New York: Basic Books.

———— 1987. *Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Towards a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions.* San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

SCHULMAN, P. R. 1980. *Large Scale Policy Making.* New York: Elsevier.

SLOBODKIN, L. B. 1992. *Simplicity and Complexity in Games of the Intellect.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

SORENSEN, R. A. 1992. *Thought Experiments.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

STATMEN, D. (ed.) 1993. *Moral Luck.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

STEINBERGER, P. J. 1993. *The Concept of Political Judgment.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

STEINER, G. A. 1997. *Strategic Planning.* New York: Free Press.

STONE, D. 2001. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, rev. edn. New York: Norton.

TAINTER, J. A. 1988. *The Collapse of Complex Societies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

VELLEMAN, J. D. 2000. *The Possibility of Practical Reason.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

VERTZBERGER, Y. Y. I. 1990. *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

WALDROP, M. M. 1992. *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

WEIMER, D. L., and VINING, A. R. 1998. *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice*, 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

YEW, L. K. 2000. *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965 2000.* New York: HarperCollins.

MODES OF POLICY ANALYSIS