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wealthy glove manufacturer and former member of Congress, provided a gift of \$2 million—at that point the largest single contribution the University had received from an individual donor. The goal of the new school was to engage Harvard faculty members, primarily from the departments of Economics and Government, in training future civil servants. This concept was greeted with skepticism by many Harvard faculty and administrators, who saw this as a further threat to the University's intellectual standards, in their views compounding the mistake made in establishing the Business School (Roethlisberger 1977). In the early years of the GSPA, the School had no unique identity of its own, no set curriculum, and no faculty members dedicated solely to Littauer's vision of a school for "public service" (John F. Kennedy School of Government 1986, 19). Faculty from the Economics and Government departments enrolled students admitted to the School in their departmental courses, but the Law School and Business School were less hospitable to this questionable venture. Thus, when James Bryant Conant retired as president of Harvard in 1953, he identified the GSPA as his "greatest disappointment" (John F. Kennedy School of Government 1986, 36).

Conant's successor as Harvard president, Nathan Marsh Pusey, also recognized that the GSPA was an institution lacking in strategic vision, or sense of purpose. For a time, Pusey considered closing the School down. As Edith Stokey, a lecturer on public policy, former secretary of the Kennedy School from 1977 to 1993, described the GSPA in the early 1950s: "There was an institution, but it didn't have a curriculum of its own" (Lambert 2004, 5). Candidates for master's or doctorate degrees in public administration were left on their own in assembling a curriculum from the other parts of the University. Don K. Price, Jr., soon after becoming dean of the GSPA in 1966, received both an ultimatum and marching orders from Pusey: "Build it up or I will abolish it" (Lambert 2004, 5).

The GSPA's low status within the Harvard community was a major handicap. Thus, the desire of the Kennedy family to memorialize President John F. Kennedy after his assassination in 1963 played an essential part in the School's turnaround. In 1966 the GSPA was officially renamed the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and the Institute of Politics was created. Under that banner, Harvard recruited Richard Neustadt—a distinguished political scientist and author of *Presidential Power*—to become director of the new Institute of Politics within the new School. In time, Neustadt recruited an all-star cast of professors from faculty from across the University, including Francis Bator, Joseph Bower, Charles Christenson, Philip Heymann, Ernest May, Fredrick Mosteller, Howard Raiffa, and Thomas Schelling, to build a new curriculum for a new Public Policy Program.

Planning the new curriculum for KSG students involved a core of eight professors remarkable for their individual commitment and congeniality, and for their unimpeachable academic reputations. Five senior professors—Bator and Schelling in Political Economy, Mosteller in Statistics, Neustadt in Public Administration, Raiffa in Operations Research—and three junior faculty—Richard Zeckhauser and Henry Jacoby of Economics, and myself of Government—designed the core courses that have been the foundation of a KSG education to this day. That

core curriculum initially consisted of eight required core courses: two semesters of economic analysis, two semesters of statistical analysis, two semesters of operations research, and two semesters of what we described as political and institutional analysis. In addition, students were required to participate in a colloquium in which they were asked to apply these abstract techniques to real-world problems. Eventually, influenced by the powerful presence of Larry Lynn who had become the paragon of policy analysis and program evaluation, the relatively informal colloquium was replaced by a regular two-semester-length course called Workshop in which students were asked to perform the professional tasks the school was preparing them to do: namely, offer thoughtful analyses of whether and how the assets of government could be deployed to deal with problematic conditions in the society.

Obviously, the curriculum stressed teaching students the tools of social sciences—economics, statistics, and quantitative analysis. It did so for at least three reasons. First, it was these tools that were new to the practice of government, and to the field of public administration. Second, these tools provide the basis for students to participate in the compelling discussion about what the ends of government should be, and whether government was actually achieving those ends, rather than the more prosaic discussion of what form government organizations should take, and how they should design their administrative systems to ensure reliable bureaucratic control. Third, these tools came from demanding social science disciplines, and helped give the curriculum of the fledgling public policy schools a certain kind of legitimacy in the academic world in which they were struggling for academic respect.

What was relatively de-emphasized (to make room for teaching these new techniques) was courses focused on the leadership of public organizations. Of course, it was obvious that a curriculum that sought to train public sector (by which we meant government) officials could not focus on abstract techniques of social science alone. There had to be some attention given to the application of these techniques to the messy, real-world problems that the students would actually confront in their jobs. (This was the point of the Workshop course.) And there also had to be at least some familiarization of the students with the ways in which real governments actually made and implemented policy—if for no reason other than that individuals being trained to do policy analysis had to understand the context in which their proposals would be considered and enacted. (This was the focus of the courses that Richard Neustadt and I designed to go alongside the analytic courses. My own *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* served, in effect, as the text for the basic political and institutional analysis course, and has been adopted for analogous courses in other schools of public policy, business, and other professional training programs.) But the important unanswered question that remained was both how much effort should be devoted to helping students understand, predict, and intervene to change the policy-making processes of government, and from what positions in and outside of government itself we imagined them doing this work.

Eventually, we concluded that we had to train individuals to manage public organizations as well as to offer policy advice. This was, to some degree, forced on

us by the fact that the School had a mid-career program that attracted experienced public officials, and what they came expecting to learn was how to manage and lead their organizations—not simply how to analyze policies. It was also necessitated by the fact that, for important strategic reasons, we committed ourselves to offering executive programs in addition to our degree programs. The executives who came for these courses knew that there were lots of good ideas around, and that their problem was more often helping the government reach a choice about what to do, and effectively implement that choice, rather than developing a strong analytic case for a certain line of action. They wanted training in management and leadership, not in policy analysis.

In this setting, in 1977 President Bok asked me to become dean of the Kennedy School. I resisted on four grounds: I was too young—at thirty-seven I would be the youngest dean in Harvard's history; I hoped to join the newly elected Carter administration; I felt the next dean should be first and foremost a fundraiser; and I worried that the School lacked a coherent mission and strategy for the decades ahead. After months of perseverance and pressure from President Bok and fellow colleagues, I relented and accepted the job. But I did so with trepidation.

As a young faculty member, I had often cited George Bernard Shaw's quip about the doers and the teachers. Those who can, do; those who cannot, teach (about what those who can do). As someone who aspired to have a foot in the world of doers as well as teachers, I found this bifurcation uncomfortable. I must confess that while I spend most of my time teaching and writing about what others do, in the case where as a dean I was a doer, I never seriously wrote or thought about that. Thus what follows are reflections of one dean, organized around lessons learned, that, I hope, may be relevant for other deans and faculty members facing similar challenges.

As the historical records make plain, the goal of Mr Littauer and his associates in creating the School was to establish an independent professional school of government along the lines of other major professional schools. In fact, as has happened in other universities, the gift was immediately captured by the parent departments of Economics and Government in the faculty of Arts and Sciences. The funds were used first to build a building that was occupied by these departments, and then to fund faculty members in these departments. The trade-off was that a dean and one administrator enrolled a number of mid-career students who took seats in other courses otherwise offered in the departments of Economics and Government. On occasion, the dean's fund permitted him to provide small grants for research or other expenses of the faculty involved.

Thus, lesson 1: *Even in a university with powerful, independent professional schools like Harvard's schools of Business, Medicine, and Law, a new professional school is a foreign object in the mainstream of the academy.* As a consequence, it is likely to be regarded with suspicion and hostility. It may be rejected. If not, and especially if it comes with scarce resources, it will likely be captured. Thus, in a Harvard-like context during the 1930s—or even today—the most likely fate for what Mr Littauer imagined would be its capture by strong established departments, particularly Economics and Government.

A special feature of Harvard is that its most sacred and ancient principle maintains “ETOB:” every tub on its own bottom. According to this principle, deans of independent schools at Harvard are semi-autonomous barons—required to raise whatever funds they spend, but given wide authority to spend their school’s funds as they choose. This principle obviously has great disadvantages—without funds it is not possible to build a school, appoint faculty, or enroll students. Alternatively, the advantage of the system is independence.

From 1972 to 1977, the Kennedy School was part of a university-wide fundraising campaign headed by President Bok. The good news is that we were included as a party. The bad news was that the campaign failed to raise funds for the School. That fact is a strong reminder of the limits of the conception of the School at the time. The concept of that campaign was, as its title stated: the “campaign for public service.” It featured four schools of public service—the Education School, the School of Public Health, the Design School, and the new Kennedy School. It sought to raise funds for those concerned about public service as reflected in these four “serving professions.” But in part as a result of this concept, and in part because there was no real taste for fundraising at the School, after four years the campaign had raised only \$1 million. Because its accumulated reserves and Ford Foundation grant had been running down, the Kennedy School was in serious deficit. Its financial viability was uncertain.

In 1977, the Kennedy School was, in sum, long on promise (given the Harvard setting, name, and history), but short on performance—a largely unseized opportunity. One of my favorite quotations comes from the German philosopher Nietzsche: “The most common form of human stupidity is forgetting what one is trying to do.” As noted above, in my “inaugural” remarks to the Visiting Committee, I laid out my vision of what the Kennedy School could become:

- To become a *substantial professional school* that does for the public sector much of what Harvard’s Schools of Business, Law, and Medicine do for their respective private professions.
- To become the *hub* of a university-wide Program in Public Policy and Management, mobilizing the rich intellectual resources in all the faculties of the University and focusing them on critical issues of public policy.

Each word in this mission statement was carefully chosen. Each of the terms mattered significantly to the School, its faculty, the various Harvard constituencies, and over time the broader public. The term “*substantial professional school*” signaled two things: a school like Harvard’s major professional schools—of Business, Law, and Medicine—and not its minor schools of which there were considerably more. And a *professional school*, focused on serving the profession rather than part of the Arts and Sciences or academic tradition that forms the dominant culture at Harvard. The second part of the mission, namely the *hub* of the university-wide program, was our way of addressing and overcoming what had been a flawed concept of a four-legged stool for public service. It also reminded us that issues of public policy touch competences in many of the faculties of the

University. A new school should not aspire to duplicate these strengths but rather to mobilize and focus them on important questions of public policy.

The mission statement was repeated over and over, at the first faculty meeting each year and in all of our literature—to the point that most faculty members could recite it in unison. It helped to focus all our minds. Lesson 2, therefore, *underlines the importance of a vision and mission*.

In the Kennedy School's 1978–9 Official Register, which we used to recruit students and new faculty members, I developed the case for our vision under the banner "Excellence in Government:"

The challenge of the modern world is government. The dynamics of national politics, the realities of international affairs, and the increasing complexity of society all fuel a growing demand for government action on behalf of genuinely urgent and worthy causes. Government must act to ensure legitimate economic, social, and security objectives. But the dramatic growth of government and the often indiscriminate character of governmental action can threaten the very values government would guarantee. The urgent challenge, therefore, is to define a viable role for responsible, democratic government.

The authors of the American Constitution articulated the fundamental dilemma of responsible government. In the first instance, they instituted government as society's chief agent for the common good. Without government, who would:

- Establish justice?
- Ensure domestic tranquility?
- Provide for the common defense?
- Promote the general welfare?
- Secure the blessings of liberty?

The American Bicentennial provided a fitting occasion to pause and review the record. Measured by the yardstick of other human endeavors, this system of government, for all its current shortcomings, must be judged an extraordinary success. At the same time, the makers of the Constitution were acutely conscious that in establishing a government powerful enough to serve the commonwealth they were creating enormous risks of irresponsibility. Such a government might exercise authority capriciously, intrude unnecessarily, chose improper means, or simply fail to do its job effectively.

To cope with this fundamental dilemma, the men who met in Philadelphia fashioned something new. On the one hand, the American Constitution *makes* government responsible for defense, law, order, and liberty. On the other, it *holds* government responsible by limiting authority (the Bill of Rights shields civil liberties, including private property, from arbitrary governmental actions); sharing power among separated institutions (functions overlap, as does power, to provide checks and balances); and enthroning the people as the ultimate source of legitimacy (government derives its just power from the consent of the governed). The final guardian of government's responsibility both positive and negative was neither the Constitutions nor some higher authority. That duty rests squarely on the shoulders of the informed citizenry and requires their steady participation in the business of the nation.

The basic dilemma of responsible government persists. Twentieth century developments have only exaggerated its proportions. Events, both international and domestic, require more from government; rising expectations encourage citizens to demand *much* more. Modern governments must, of necessity, assume greater responsibilities than their eighteenth century predecessors. But a government that pledges to meet all aspirations must fail. And, it can fall

too easily into inept and abusive practices. How then, can we hope to develop more responsible government? Significant progress must be made on several related fronts:

#### **A Clearer Philosophy of the Aims and Limits of Government in a Mixed Enterprise Society.**

The expansion of the size and role of government over the last 60 years has not been informed by a coherent view of the strengths and weaknesses of government. Rather, government's growth has resulted from a combination of sharpened sensitivities and a political process in which problems, once formulated, readily attract advocates of government as a solution. As a result, with minimal appreciation of the limits of legal compulsion, and frequent neglect of the consequences when government oversteps itself, new government programs have arisen and old programs have expanded.

What we now require is harder thought about the role and size of government, and the impact of government's expanse on the balance between the public and private sectors. We need a clear contemporary philosophy of government that appreciates the genius of a mixed enterprise society committed to individual rights, concerned for the common good, and driven by private action determined by private initiative. Government's role in setting the ground rules, refereeing the game, and intervening for special purposes is essential. Still more important, however, are the actions of private individuals, business firms, associations, and even universities in creating products and jobs, wealth and capital, knowledge, inspiration and, ultimately, values.

#### **A New Profession of Elected, Appointed and Career Officials.**

The nation needs officials with stronger analytical skills, managerial competence, ethical sensitivity, and institutional sense. The complexity of national issues and the claims upon government have steadily outdistanced the capacity of Congress and the Executive Branch to respond. Although critics bemoan government's inability to cope more effectively with issues like inflation, unemployment, energy and economic growth, we must acknowledge the extraordinary difficulty of government's task. Because the problems are so unwieldy and the implications of government's actions so far reaching, no sector in our society can rival government in its need for the ablest and best trained minds. And yet, the training provided public servants has been clearly less adequate and more haphazard than that traditionally afforded businessmen, doctors, and lawyers.

Here, universities have a major responsibility. What is needed is nothing less than the education of a new profession. This profession should include persons elected to public office, individuals appointed to executive positions, and career civil servants promoted through the ranks. But whether they serve in legislatures, executive department, or nonprofit institutions, all should be distinguished for their analytic skills, managerial competence, ethical sensitivity, and institutional sense.

#### **A Deeper Understanding of Major Substantive Policy Issues**

Problems, portrayed as crises, attract advocates of governmental solutions. Health, welfare, cities, unemployment, energy—the list goes on. To act wisely on these issues, society must know more. We need first class centers of problem solving research dedicated to developing solid data bases, sorting the facts, analyzing the options, and raising the level of governmental and public discussion of major public choices. *Before* government acts, the informed public must be able to look to such centers of competence for intelligent presentations of the issues. Moreover, problem solving research centers should provide a much greater sensitivity to the ways in which the various private institutions in society operate and, thus, a more sophisticated appreciation of the likely effects of government's interventions. Leading universities have been reluctant to organize themselves seriously for public problem solving. Society can no longer afford this reluctance.

The story of government initiatives of the past decade has too often been one of unintended and unanticipated negative consequences swamping the positive results of programs whose intent may have been worthy, but whose intellectual underpinnings were regrettably weak. U.S. legislation regulating pensions to assure workers of a secure income at retirement is one obvious example: it has led many smaller companies to eliminate pension plans altogether. Avoiding traps like this will require major intellectual investments in improved understanding of both the substantive public policy issues and the operations of business, labor, and other major private institutions of society.

In meeting the challenge of government, Harvard should have a special contribution to make. From its origin in 1636, it has been at the forefront of American universities in its ready acceptance of the obligation to promote excellence in government. Eight signers of the Declaration of Independence—including three of the more prominent leaders of the American Revolution, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and John Adams—were educated at Harvard. In the last two centuries, Harvard graduates have served as President of the United States for more than one year in four.

The challenge posed by government today, however, is unprecedented. Government's present power, for good or for ill, is unparalleled. Informed citizens cannot escape the implication of Edmund Burke's timeless observation: "All that is required for the forces of evil to triumph in this world is for enough good men to do nothing." It is not only the right, it is the duty of concerned Americans to contribute in whatever measure they can to make government more responsible, competent, and effective.

In the future, as in the past, Harvard University's contribution will take various forms. But the University has concluded that "business as usual" will no longer suffice. Society requires excellence in government: a level of performance at least equal to that of the major private professions. To date, however, society has not been prepared to make an equivalent commitment to education for government. Over the past 70 years, we have invested in professional education for business managers—with handsome returns. If we want managerial competence in government equal to the most outstanding performance in business, we will have to mount a comparable effort to train government managers.

Harvard University has undertaken this major new commitment: to build a substantial professional School of Government that will attempt to serve the public sector in many of the ways Harvard's Schools of Business, Law, and Medicine serve their respective private professions. Specifically, the mission of the School is:

- To develop a clearer philosophy of government in a mixed enterprise society by giving prominence throughout the University to the central questions about government.
- To train a new profession of government leaders with the analytical skills, managerial competence, ethical sensitivities and institutional sense required for distinguished public service.
- To clarify major issues of public choice through sustained, problem solving research that mobilizes the intellectual resource of the entire University.
- To provide students who are training for other professions with some understanding of the problems of government.
- To serve as a focal point at which to bring together leaders from government, business and other parts of the private sector to work on major issues of national policy.

The strategy for building a school of public policy that reflected my "Excellence in Government" vision was detailed in a chart, first unveiled in 1978 and revised each year thereafter, where we presented the strategic vision of the school. This strategy organized activity in three major divisions: graduate degree programs, executive



programs, and problem-solving research centers. It is worth noting that when I first drew this chart, it was more in the realm of an aspiration than a description of the KSG as it then existed. In fact, I think it would be fair to say that much of the consciousness of the Faculty of the school was focused on one or two lines within the box that lumped degree programs together: namely, the newly created MPP program, and the associated Ph.D. in public policy program. The mid-career MPA program was languishing. And there were no problem-solving research centers or executive programs. Thus, to claim that these were to become important elements of the future Kennedy School was to challenge the KSG to innovate and develop along a path that no school of public administration and no school of public policy had yet followed.

Although there were clear risks in advancing down these paths, I was convinced that the School could not become a “substantial professional school” without developing the capacities suggested by these (then) empty boxes. The school needed to be exposed to the real, practical demands of the world it hoped to influence. And the challenge to give plausibly effective answers to urgent policy issues, and to find the means to help high-level officials who faced the problem of making the government work, was the kind of cold water bath the School needed. It also seemed clear to me that the development of these programs would help the School solve what otherwise seemed an insurmountable financial problem that stood between it, and becoming a school that had sufficient scale to cover many disciplines, many subject matters, and to invest in new ideas as well as to work with already established knowledge and pedagogy.

To move down this path of innovation, we created an organizational structure that ensured that each division, and each program within a division, had a mission, a strategy, and resources. Resources consisted of: core faculty, money to permit the appointment of faculty, space, and a central management team. Thus, lesson 3: *the necessity for a coherent strategy* that could meet the goals of mission impact, financial sustainability, and continued academic legitimacy all at the same time.

The MPP program was the flagship for which we developed a core curriculum. It focused on core skills in analytics, management, major challenges of public policy, and values. This program grew from twenty to over 200 pre-career students per year. The MPA program, with an average student age of thirty-five, was in effect a stepchild of the School. But over time, curricula developed for new public policy courses were adopted for MPAs. Indeed, the MPA program provided the arena within which a great deal of curriculum innovation could occur that focused not only on applied policy areas such as international relations, international development, energy and environment, poverty reduction, etc., but also on our emergent ideas about public management and leadership.

For the academic programs, the School’s objective was to provide teaching comparable to the best at Harvard. That meant Harvard’s Business School. Lesson 4 *recognizes the validity of the question about “value added.”* The Harvard Business School formula has been caricatured: recruit people so talented that nothing the faculty can do to them will so handicap them that they will achieve success—for

which the School can take credit. The Kennedy School took a page from that book and recruited the best students possible, while we also tried to remember, at least from time to time, the question of what value was being added. The value added lay primarily in the new curriculum we developed in various areas, and the new pedagogic strategies we taught ourselves or invented. We became the largest developer of cases in public policy and public management, and began using these materials to ensure that the process of applying the abstract ideas of our core courses happened in the core courses as well as in the courses that required students to make applications. We experimented with new pedagogies focusing on simulations and the use of the class as a “case in point” that helped to engage the students more deeply and more personally in the learning process.

Taking a clue from the Business School, Executive Programs became a necessary pillar of the strategy. The basic concept for the Executive Programs was to engage faculty in a process from which they were sure to learn as well as teach. In my management terms, I put the Executive Programs under faculty education. When faculty taught adults who were doing important jobs and whose opinions they valued, they had to learn about the jobs these people did. Thus, the Executive Programs became the major anchor to the profession for the faculty. Most of the demand for executive programs was for help in public management, including the politics of policy making and the management of government organizations. Unfortunately, many of the faculty members, especially those trained in economics, were unable or unwilling to teach in these programs and thus missed this magnetic pole. On the other hand, those faculty who accepted this challenge developed important ideas that helped answer the questions about how appointed and career managers in government could appropriately engage their political authorizers, and offer the kind of leadership that created significant innovations in government. Lesson 5: *Executive Programs provide a visible and essential relationship with the market—and the surest way continually to educate the faculty about the market a professional school is meant to serve.*

As dean, I often cited a remark made by the dean of Harvard’s Medical School on the occasion of its hundredth birthday in 1884. That acting dean was none other than Oliver Wendell Holmes, father of the famous jurist who bore the same name with a “junior.” At the celebration, he commented: if the entire medical establishment (by which he meant the Harvard Medical School and its affiliated hospitals in Boston) were put onto a ship, taken out into Boston Harbor, and sunk, it would be better for the health of the citizens of the Commonwealth—and worse for the fishes. It is interesting to consider whether Holmes’s quip was essentially correct. There is a branch of the history of science that poses a question of various medical diseases: when did the prevailing treatment for such diseases become therapeutic? That is, at what point was a patient more likely to be helped than harmed by submitting to a prevailing medical practice. Recall George Washington’s experience when he once had a fever and called a doctor to Mount Vernon. The doctor came, put the leeches upon him, and he died. As it turns out, for a substantial number of diseases, prevailing practice was in fact harmful or at least neutral for most of history. Only

in the twentieth century, with the discovery of penicillin, were great leaps forward made.

What relevance could this have for schools of public policy? I believe that we should ask Holmes's question: when, in the treatment of various maladies suffered by the body politic, did the prevailing treatment become therapeutic? Or, when might it do so? If one asks about the treatment prescribed and administered after the Second World War, it is clearly not unrelated to the long peace and ultimate victory in the cold war—a period more than three times as long as the intermission between the First and Second World Wars. In other arenas, however, we are clearly doing less well.

The Kennedy School's problem-solving research centers assemble a critical mass of researchers, senior and junior, and challenge them to advance policy-relevant knowledge. In some cases such research can identify emerging threats or opportunities, for example, terrorism. In others, it analyzes the dynamics of trends in an arena. But in every case, a distinctive feature of problem-relevant research is seriousness about disciplined prescriptions as well as diagnosis.

Lesson 6: *taking practice seriously and capturing lessons learned.* If schools of public policy observe practice over a broad number of cases, they will find that some people are skinning cats more effectively than others. By the "look-see" method, we should then be able to identify successes and failures, begin to extract at least some elements of the recipe, and pass that on. That should be one foundation of our research. Thus we established the Kennedy School Case Program that quickly grew to become the largest collection of public policy and management cases in the world. Moreover, beyond that, as Howard Raiffa has argued, "frontiers of application" should spur inventive theoretical applications.

Lesson 7: *core faculty is essential.* A small number of quality people can set the tone. Commitment is contagious. The School had the good fortune of the outstanding "founding fathers" mentioned above, who were assembled in 1969. That group, led by Raiffa, established the standards for faculty appointments, which moved beyond the metric used by faculty of Arts and Sciences departments. The five criteria adopted by the faculty and applied today in Kennedy School hiring decisions are: (1) quality of mind; (2) research and written product; (3) teaching; (4) demonstrated attainments in public policy and management; and (5) institutional citizenship. Finding individuals who achieve the requisite distinction on all five dimensions has remained a great challenge.

Lesson 8: *fundraising is mostly a matter of hard work.* I often thought of it in terms of dollars per hour. I started off earning about \$100 an hour. As I got better, I got to the rate of \$1,000 an hour. By the end I was earning about \$10,000 an hour. But that means that raising \$1 million takes one hundred hours, \$10 million a thousand hours, or roughly half a year. Over my twelve years as dean, I spent approximately half my time fundraising as the School's endowment grew from \$20 million to \$150 million.

Lesson 9: *most academics fail to appreciate the ways in which space shapes activity.* The Kennedy School had the good fortune to build a number of new buildings, thanks to our success in fundraising. This helped us deliberately shape our identity. Central to this effort was the creation of the Kennedy School Forum, a multistoried atrium that serves as our town square and food court by day, but becomes the

University's premier location for public debates each evening. Seating 750, in a cross between a New England town meeting hall and the Greek *agora*, the Forum provides for the Kennedy School and other University students what has been called an "extra course." A regular visitor to the Forum will encounter, and often have an opportunity to question, scores of heads of state and former presidents and prime ministers, political candidates, and policy advocates of all stripes.

Lesson 10: *the centrality of the management team cannot be overemphasized*. To the extent that people can become part of such a team, they multiply the effects of any dean. The temptation is to imagine that one can do it oneself or do better than one's colleagues. But even if one's performance was consistently better than other members of one's team in any specific task, the multiplication that comes from a second person and third and fourth far exceeds what any single person can do him- or herself.

Lesson 11: *in any ambitious pursuit, mistakes are inevitable*. We can think of Type 1 and Type 2 errors—sins of omission and commission. I think the sins of omission are more common in academic administration and that we should worry less about the mistakes of commission. I certainly tried to err on the side of commission—and committed my share.

Lesson 12: *on the press, I never truly figured out how to deal with it*. Over time, we created a Center for Press, Politics, and Public Policy, in order better to understand the role of the press in government. Its role in the building of a school of public policy could also be much better understood. A popular song advises: "Don't piss into the wind." Few of those engaged in trying to build schools of government have taken that advice. Obviously, this has been a hostile environment for government from Nixon and Watergate to Carter, who was perhaps the most viscerally anti-government of recent presidents, and Reagan. As was so often the case, Ronald Reagan said it best in his inaugural address: "Government is not the solution to the problem; government is the problem."

The Kennedy School never effectively targeted this hostility or found any way to deal with it. Nor, unfortunately, has the profession.

Finally, lesson 13 is *the satisfaction of institution building*. Most deans complain a lot. I certainly did. But through that experience, and looking back, one has to be grateful for the satisfactions provided by the opportunity to build and shape an institution whose impact extends beyond one's own reach and perhaps even beyond one's own time.

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