Reading Humanitarian Intervention

Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law

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Christopher Columbus, largely in the realm of the Imaginary.[127] The barbaric, primitive, innocent New World of early internationalist texts can be understood as Europe's double – essential to the self-image of Europeans and European states as rational, scientific, developed and civilised. In the texts of international administration that I have discussed in this chapter, it is Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor that are the doubles around which the constitution of the international community takes place. The relationship of the subjects of international law to these doubles is defined by a movement between the 'affirmation of wholeness/similarity' and 'the anxiety associated with lack and difference'.[128] International law recognises the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor as equal subjects (all peoples have the right of self-determination), while at the same time treating them as different and lacking (some peoples are not yet capable of exercising the right of self-determination). As we will see in Chapter 5, the ambivalence of this response gives the narrative of humanitarian intervention its productivity.

To conclude, how then might the work of reimagining the subjects of international administration be approached? One answer is suggested by those feminist theorists who understand the Imaginary as the scene of the recognition and disavowal of gender difference. For Elizabeth Grosz, the relationship of the child's identity to its specular image can be understood as prefiguring the form of phallocentrism:

The child identifies with an image that is manifestly different from itself, though it also clearly resembles it in many respects. It takes as its own an image which is other, an image which remains out of the ego's control. The subject, in other words, recognizes itself at the moment it loses itself in/as the other. This other is the foundation and support of its identity, as well as what destabilizes or annihilates it. The subject's 'identity' is based on a (false) recognition of an other as the same. (Is this the 'origin' of phallocentrism?)[129]

Moira Gatens also suggests that a mechanism similar to that of doubling is at work in the relations between genders. 'Each gender is at once the antithesis of, and the complement to, the other...Each is deeply complicit in maintaining not only her or his *own* body image, but also that which it assumes: the body image *of the other*.'[130]

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[127] Jennifer Beard, 'The Art of Development: Law and Ordering in the First World' (2002, unpublished doctoral thesis, copy on file with author).
[128] Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, p. 75.   [129] Grosz, *Jacques Lacan*, p. 41.
[130] Gatens, *Imaginary Bodies*, p. 36 (emphasis in original).

It is the implications of this insight for rewriting the relations between self and other that I want to develop here. Gatens argues that any change in body image calls for a corresponding change in the body image of others, as 'our bodies are lived and constituted as part of a *network of bodies*'.[131] As a result, a woman who does not perform her sexuality in the authorised way is a challenge to patriarchal men – the masculine body image depends upon not being confronted by women who refuse the feminine position: 'the full, phallic, masculine body *necessarily assumes* its antithesis: the lacking, castrated feminine body, which is its complement, its body double'.[132]

Any change to the writing of the feminine body is therefore a threat, because 'no change can take place in any part of this web of intersexuality without reverberations being felt throughout the whole web'.[133] So the problem, and the promise, remains that feminists must address the morphology of the male body. As Gatens writes:

The feminist project of articulating, constructing or 'inventing' a full female form cannot amount to a 'separatist strategy'. Those who understand the positing of this full female morphology as working toward an *autonomous* feminine sexuality or feminine subjectivity are clearly mistaken. This would involve a regression to the mirror-phase child's fantasy of autonomy, which can only be maintained by disavowal of one's counterpart ... To posit a full female morphology inevitably involves *addressing* the phallic morphology of the male form.[134]

The two bodies we imagine 'are in fact one body and its lack or complement'.[135] The act of determining the self can thus never be a separatist project, because the mapping or determination of our selves and our bodies is always a project we undertake in concert with the bodies of others. To return to Irigaray's image, once Alice passes to the other side of the looking-glass, she can no longer remember who she was when she was facing her reflection (despite her determination to do so). The mirror, and all our imaginary doubles, are essential to the constitution of our selves.

The strategic questions discussed by Gatens have strategic implications if we read the texts of international law as involving a similar staging of the autonomous, sovereign, Western state against the lacking, castrated, femininised Third World state – a staging which grounds the constitution of the international community in the post-Cold War era. It is not possible simply to rewrite Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Timor as

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[131] *Ibid*., p. 41 (emphasis in original).   [132] *Ibid*., p. 38 (emphasis in original).
[133] *Ibid*.   [134] *Ibid*. (emphasis in original).   [135] *Ibid*.

autonomous subjects of international law, without addressing the morphology of the body of the Western state (as impermeable and bounded) and the related self-image of the international community. This suggests limits to the uses of the law of self-determination in the aftermath of intervention. The criticism that East Timor or Bosnia-Herzegovina have not yet achieved self-determination in substance can simply be used to shore up the self-image of the international community and found a call for further design projects on the part of international actors. Without more, the international community will simply take the failure to achieve self-determination in post-intervention territories as yet another problem for it to solve. The 'problem' of the failure of intervention to achieve its goals becomes the engine for a new set of legal design projects. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari comment with respect to the social machine more generally, 'it is in order to function that a social machine must not function well'.[136] International society 'is always destined to reconstitute itself on its own ruins'.[137]

The case of East Timor illustrates this well. On the eve of independence, IMF official Stephen Schwartz stated that 'the toughest challenges of nation-building and economic management are still to come' in East Timor, thus explaining the need for continued IMF management of the East Timorese economy.[138] The UN Secretary-General reported that independence brings new problems to be solved by the international community.[139] While the people of East Timor 'are now in a position to determine their own fate', they are 'desperately poor', and their self-government and independence 'are at risk if they are not reinforced through a continued international presence and commitment'.[140] The failure of UNTAET to develop an East Timorese public service, to recruit and train personnel in the justice sector, to establish an effective administrative support structure in that sector, to establish a fully functioning East Timorese police service or defence force, or to fill teaching posts, is not a failure of self-determination. Rather, it is a reason for the international community to remain in East Timor with the aim of

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[136] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis, 1983), p. 151.

[137] *Ibid.*

[138] Donors' Meeting on East Timor, Staff Statement by Stephen Schwartz, Deputy Division Chief, IMF Asia and Pacific Department, Dili, 14–15 May 2002, http://www. imf.org/external/np/dm/2002/051402.htm (accessed 28 June 2002).

[139] Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, S/2002/432.

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

eventually contributing to self-sufficiency in these areas.[141] The UN must stay in East Timor after independence 'to ensure the security and stability of the nascent State', and to support the post-independence administration, moving towards 'ownership by the East Timorese government' of the civilian administration 'while taking into account the need for accountability by the United Nations for the use of assessed funds'.[142] In each case, the involvement of the international community is represented as a response to the problems of an absence of readiness for self-government and independence.

Without taking on the sense of self of the international community, and its intimate relationship with its representation of law's others, it is not possible to address the effects of intervention and reconstruction projects. Instead, the very act of critique simply fuels the fantasies of modernist law. At stake in any representation of the 'self' of Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Timor is the self-image of the Western state, and now the international community. In the next chapter, I want to tease out the relationship between these two opposed images of self and other/double as they are imagined in the narratives of humanitarian intervention.

[141] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–10.   [142] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

5 The constitution of the international community: colonial stereotypes and humanitarian narratives

In his discussion of the relationship between law and narrative, Robert Cover argues that 'no set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning'.[1] Once law is located within the context of such narratives, it can be understood as 'not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live'.[2] This chapter suggests that humanitarian intervention is located firmly within a familiar heroic narrative. The world created by the narrative of humanitarian intervention is one in which international institutions are the bearers of progressive human rights and democratic values to local peoples in need of those rights and values in the post-Cold War era. As I will show, the characters and plot of this narrative serve to make plausible a conservative ending to the serial humanitarian and security crises for which military intervention is proposed as a solution. Yet the figure of the human rights victim around which this narrative turns promises to unsettle the conservative ends of intervention that are named as the law.

This book has so far focused on the meanings that are made about the causes and effects of intervention. I have suggested that internationalist accounts of military intervention and post-conflict reconstruction too often serve to obscure the power relations that intervention produces, and the exploitation that it enables. As a result, such accounts limit the opportunity to make use of the radical potential of human rights. This chapter builds on that argument, to suggest that the heroic narratives of humanitarian intervention make it possible for practices of economic

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[1] Robert M. Cover, 'Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' (1983) 97 *Harvard Law Review* 4, at 4–5.
[2] *Ibid*.

exploitation to take place alongside military intervention, and for both to be coded as humanitarian on the part of the international community. The narratives of humanitarian intervention play a part in obscuring the relationship between militarism, governance and exploitation. Legal texts make sense of the relations between military intervention and developing states in terms of a deeper narrative and flow of meaning within which intervention stories are inserted. Whether through arguments about the need to control state aggression and increasing disorder, or through appeals to the need to protect human rights, democracy and humanitarianism, international lawyers justifying the use of force paint a picture of a world in which increased military intervention by international organisations is desirable. The legal stories that explain international intervention have increasingly informed everyday language through media reports and political soundbites. As a result, these highly technical, strategic accounts of the world become more and more a part of 'the stories that we are all inside, that we live daily'.[3] These stories create worlds inhabited by characters such as states, foreign capital and international organisations, with whom the readers of these stories are invited to identify.[4]

The first part of this chapter draws on feminist, Marxist and postcolonial theories of subjectivity and identification to explore the appeal of intervention narratives. I argue that legal texts about intervention create a powerful sense of self for those who identify with the hero of the story, be that the international community, the Security Council, the UN, NATO or the USA.[5] Intervention narratives operate not only or even principally in the realm of state systems, rationality and facts, but also in the realm of identification, imagination, subjectivity and emotion. The second part of the chapter explores the possibility for rejecting or resisting the forms of identification and closure that the heroic narrative offers.

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[3] Terry Threadgold, 'Introduction' in Terry Threadgold and Anne Cranny-Francis (eds.), *Feminine, Masculine and Representation* (Sydney, 1990), pp. 1–35 at p. 27.

[4] Judith Grbich, 'Taxation Narratives of Economic Gain: Reading Bodies Transgressively' (1997) 5 *Feminist Legal Studies* 131 (arguing that narratives of taxation law create worlds inhabited by characters such as Capital).

[5] For a reading of the equally productive and horrific narratives that operated within Serbian political discourse to justify ethnic cleansing and war see Renata Salecl, *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism after the Fall of Socialism* (London, 1994), pp. 58–73.

Reading heroic narratives

While feminist and critical work in areas such as film theory, literary theory and cultural studies has developed sophisticated analyses of the nature of identification,[6] less work has been done by feminists and critical scholars to explore the ways in which a process of identification operates as part of international relations.[7] In turn, those mainstream scholars writing within the disciplines of international relations and international law have tended to focus on a public sphere of states, corporations and international organisations, avoiding any analysis of the relationship of issues of fantasy, desire and identity to internationalism.[8] Yet a focus on such questions is essential to a consideration of the power of intervention narratives.

In particular, the work of feminist, Marxist and postcolonial theorists interested in questions of subjectivity and identification provides useful tools for exploring the force of intervention stories. According to theorists writing in those traditions, our sense of self, or subjectivity, is not fixed, but is 'constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak'.[9] Many such theories of subjectivity build on Louis Althusser's thesis that the individual becomes a subject of ideology through the process of interpellation.[10] For Althusser, interpellation refers to the role played by ideology or cultural representation in the creation of subjects. Ideology functions by 'interpellating' or 'hailing'

[6] See, for example, Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York, 1990); Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers* (New York, 1995); E. Ann Kaplan, *Looking for the Other: Feminism, Film, and the Imperial Gaze* (New York, 1997); Kaja Silverman, *The Subject of Semiotics* (New York, 1983).

[7] For some exceptions, see Lynda Boose, 'Techno-Muscularity and the "Boy Eternal": from the Quagmire to the Gulf' in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (eds.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham and London, 1993), pp. 581–616; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Durham, 1992); David Kennedy, 'Spring Break' (1985) 63 *Texas Law Review* 1377; Michael Rogin, ' "Make My Day!": Spectacle as Amnesia in Imperial Politics [and] the Sequel' in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (eds.), *Cultures*, p. 499; Salecl, *Spoils of Freedom*.

[8] V. Spike Peterson, 'The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism' in Laura Neack, Patrick J. Haney and Jeanne A. K. Hey (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis in its Second Generation: Continuity and Change* (New Jersey, 1995), pp. 167–186 at p. 183 (arguing that the 'gendered dichotomy of public–private structures the study and practice of international relations and foreign policy' and that one result is the 'discipline's neglect of activities associated with the private sphere').

[9] Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 33.

[10] Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (trans. Ben Brewster, London, 1971), p. 127.

the individual.[11] Through the process of interpellation, individuals recognise themselves as the subjects of cultural representations.[12] Such an approach provides a starting point for thinking about the relationship between particular representations, such as legal texts about international intervention, and the sense of self of those individuals who engage with such stories. Stories such as those told by international lawyers can be understood as one of the means by which a reader of such stories gains a sense of self and a way of understanding his or her relation to the world.

Feminist and postcolonial theorists suggest that this process of interpellation is an ongoing one, and that central to its success is the operation of narrative. For example, Kaja Silverman argues that the ways in which narrative operates to shape the subjectivity of the members of the audience is at the heart of the appeal of mainstream films.[13] The subjectivity of viewers is produced through the process of identification with characters within the narrative, an identification which is organised along gendered lines, producing a sexually differentiated subject.[14] This operation of narrative, and the invitation to identify with particular characters in a film, serve to reinforce an individual's interpellation into ideology, or insertion into the symbolic order.[15]

Postcolonial scholars have shown that the production of subjectivity through narrative is dependent not only upon sexual differentiation, but also upon racial differentiation. The deployment of heroic narratives governed encounters between Europe, later the 'West' or the 'international community', and those colonised or enslaved by Europeans. According to Edward Said:

The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course: but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative . . . The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them.[16]

Law in general, and international law in particular, is one site for the forming, and blocking, of such narratives about property, personality

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 162. In Althusser's formulation, ideology 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence'.
[12] Silverman, *The Subject*, p. 220.   [13] *Ibid.*, pp. 215–36.   [14] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[16] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1993), p. xiii.

and power. Law operates not only in the realm of sovereignty, but also in the realm of subjectivity, where meanings are created and where we are invited to see ourselves and the world in certain ways. Intervention stories become part of lived experience through the practices of those reading these texts. The reader provides the links of subjectivity between particular narratives and the experience of the gendered and racialised metaphors upon which they depend as 'aspects of a private and sexualized sense of one's self'.[17] Models of the relationship between narrative, cultural representations and subjectivity developed in film and postcolonial theory enable an exploration of the pleasures, and the forms of identification, offered by post-Cold War intervention narratives. The elements of narrative that have been outlined by feminist and postcolonial theorists can be traced through stories about the need for humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era.

Disruption of the established order

Kaja Silverman points out that a classic narrative begins by disrupting the established symbolic order, 'dislocating the subject-positions within it, and challenging its ideals of coherence and fullness only in order subsequently to re-affirm that order, those positions, and those ideals'.[18] The narrative operates to 're-interpellate' the subject into the same subject positions with which they had already identified, thus 'giving that subject the illusion of a stable and continuous identity'.[19] Although the crisis to the symbolic order has the potential to be disruptive, the narrative operates to reaffirm that order in 'ideologically orthodox ways'.[20] As a result, it has a profoundly conservative effect on the subject.

The narrative of most intervention stories follows such a pattern. The call to arms is signalled by a crisis to the international order, whether that be an armed conflict or civil war that requires military intervention, or an economic crisis that requires monetary intervention. Intervention narratives create a sense of crisis by describing an increased likelihood of violence and disorder in the post-Cold War era. In the early 1990s, the power vacuum caused by the two superpowers ceasing to order and discipline destabilising forces in 'Third World' states began to be portrayed

[17] Grbich, 'Taxation Narratives', 134.   [18] Silverman, *The Subject*, p. 221.
[19] *Ibid*.   [20] *Ibid*.

as the cause of the crisis facing the new world order.[21] The apocalyptic vision with which such narratives begin is well illustrated in the following passage by Brian Urquhart:

The world is entering a period of great instability, characterised by long-standing international rivalries and resentments, intense ethnic and religious turmoil, a vast flow of arms and military technology, domestic disintegration, poverty and deep economic inequalities, instantaneous communication throughout the world, population pressures, natural and ecological disasters, the scarcity of vital resources, and huge movements of population.[22]

Similar images of crises or threats to security are used as justifications for particular interventions. The Gulf War, for example, is used to demonstrate 'the already conventional wisdom that the disappearance of the inhibiting shadow of potential nuclear war between the superpowers will permit bloodier and more intractable international disputes to emerge'.[23] The crisis in the former Yugoslavia illustrates the premodern ethnic tension that erupted in the post-Cold War era. The 'grim story of Yugoslavia's breakup and the ensuing ethnic conflict seems all the more disturbing because it has shattered the hope that the Cold War's end might herald a new era of peace'.[24] The ruins of the former Yugoslavia represent 'the crumpled dreams of a new cooperative security order in Europe'.[25] The cause of such crises is systematically linked to the political destabilisation resulting from the ending of the Cold War.[26]

The picture of the post-Cold War world that emerges from security texts is one in which 'struggles for national identity and self-determination have disintegrated into ethnic, religious, and political

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[21] Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics' in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder and London, 1993), pp. 3–18 at p. 14.

[22] Brian Urquhart, 'Learning from the Gulf' in Mara R. Bustelo and Philip Alston (eds.), *Whose New World Order? What Role for the United Nations?* (Leichhardt, 1991), p. 11 at p. 17.

[23] Abram Chayes, 'The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf' in Lori F. Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (eds.), *Law and Force in the New International Order* (Boulder, 1991), p. 4 at p. 11.

[24] James B. Steinberg, 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict' in Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York, 1993), p. 27.

[25] *Ibid*.

[26] See, for example, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, 'Collective Security and US Interests' in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security*, p. 189 at p. 200, arguing that: 'Murderous civil war in the Balkans, the overthrow of democracy in Haiti, and spreading battles in parts of central Eurasia long smothered under the stabilizing blanket of Soviet imperial rule have all exposed a dangerous vacuum in Western decision centers.'

fragmentation'.[27] Far from leading to global peace, 'the passing of the Cold War has led to a new generation of conflicts: internal rather than international, driven by ethnic and communal differences rather than by political ideology, and of unprecedented levels of brutality'.[28] Despite initial optimism, it now appears that 'the conclusion of the Cold War does not mean an end to savagery and violence in international politics . . . that yearned-for day of beating swords into plowshares must be deferred once again'.[29]

These narratives present rogue states, ruthless dictators and ethnic tensions as threats to the established liberal international order. The argument made by those in favour of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s was that the use of force is necessary to address the problems of racist and ruthless dictators, tribalism, ethnic tension, civil war and religious fundamentalism thrown up in the post-Cold War era.[30] The need to halt the horrors of genocide or ethnic cleansing, or to address the effects of internal armed conflict on civilians, is sufficient justification for military intervention. A commitment to humanitarian ideals demands military action from the international community, increasingly in the form of aerial bombardment. The failure to take such action amounts to 'abstention from the foreign policy debate',[31] and any challenge to interventionism 'rewards tyrants' and 'betrays the very purposes of the international order'.[32]

In the case of Kosovo, legal commentators argue that intervention was required in order to promote justice and morality, despite the illegality of such intervention. According to Bruno Simma: 'The lesson which can be drawn from [the use of force by NATO] is that unfortunately there do occur "hard cases" in which terrible dilemmas must be faced, and imperative political and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to act outside the law.'[33]

[27] Thomas G. Weiss, 'On the Brink of a New Era? Humanitarian Interventions, 1991–94' in Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds.), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York, 1995), pp. 3–19.

[28] Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris, 1996), p. 17.

[29] W. Michael Reisman, 'Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics' (1991) 16 *Yale Journal of International Law* 203 at 213.

[30] Arguments to that effect are explored in detail in Anne Orford, 'The Politics of Collective Security' (1996) 17 *Michigan Journal of International Law* 373.

[31] Weiss, 'On the Brink', p. 8.

[32] Fernando R. Tesón, 'Collective Humanitarian Intervention' (1996) 17 *Michigan Journal of International Law* 323 at 342.

[33] Bruno Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects' (1999) 10 *European Journal of International Law* 1 at 22.

This view is also adopted by Michael Glennon. While acknowledging that the NATO air strikes against Serbia were not 'technically legal under the old regime', Glennon suggests that the 'death of the restrictive old rules on peacekeeping and peacemaking...should not be mourned'.[34] According to Glennon, 'in Kosovo, justice (as it is now understood) and the UN Charter seemed to collide'.[35] In this narrative, the international order, which represents values such as humanitarianism and justice, is threatened by states and leaders who have no commitment to human rights or peace.[36]

The implication of these arguments is that the international community is the guarantor of core values such as peace, security, human rights, justice and freedom. The constant representation of the international community as the guarantor of progressive values operates to perform the narrative function described by Silverman – 'to re-articulate the existing symbolic order in ideologically orthodox ways'.[37] As I have shown in earlier chapters, this ignores the ways in which domination and exploitation are maintained through military and economic intervention. Intervention discourse ignores almost completely the current historical context of rapid and massive global economic change within which security and humanitarian crises emerge and security actions take place. It constructs the identity of the international community as an active, humane saviour intervening to help people in trouble spots, obscuring other sets of relations between those who identify with the international community and those targeted for intervention.

'Knights in White Armour'[38]

According to feminist film theory, both male and female viewers are invited to identify with a masculine character associated with qualities such as potency and authority.[39] The narrative is structured around the actions of that main controlling figure with whom the spectator is invited to identify.[40] As Laura Mulvey argues, identification with the

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[34] Michael J. Glennon, 'The New Interventionism: the Search for a Just International Law' (1999) 78 *Foreign Affairs* 2.

[35] *Ibid*.   [36] *Ibid*., 4.   [37] Silverman, *The Subject*, p. 221.

[38] 'Knights in White Armour' is the title of a celebratory analysis of the role of UN peace-keepers in the new world order. See Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour: the New Art of War and Peace* (London, 1997).

[39] Silverman, *The Subject*, p. 223.

[40] Laura Mulvey, *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington, 1989), p. 14. Mulvey argues that this invitation to identify is structured by 'ways of seeing and pleasure in looking' (*Visual and Other Pleasures*, p. 15). A visual economy governs the sexual differentiation

masculine character leads to the ''"masculinisation'" of the spectator position, regardless of the actual sex (or possible deviance) of any real live movie-goer'.[41] The female spectator may not be able to identify with the masculinity of the subject position on offer. On the other hand, Laura Mulvey points out, 'she may find herself secretly, unconsciously almost, enjoying the freedom of action and control over the . . . world that identification with a hero provides'.[42]

Postcolonial theorists have argued that in the narratives produced in colonial or imperial contexts, the hero with whom the reader or spectator is invited to identify is not only masculine, but also 'white'.[43] Colonial narratives produce a racially differentiated subject, through the same processes of identification and subjectivity discussed by feminist film theorists.[44] In cinematic terms, the imperial gaze, like the male gaze, invites the viewer's identification with the powerful, white character.[45] That imperialist character is associated with attributes including freedom, creativity, authority, civilisation, power, democracy, sovereignty and wealth. The world of the colonies, or of developing states in the post-World War II context, is a space in which the white man is imagined as having an enormous freedom to act and to create ideal worlds.

Intervention stories invite the reader to identify with a central figure with whom the qualities of agency and potency are associated. The characters given agency, and with whom identification is invited, include the UN, the Security Council, the 'international community', NATO and the USA. Those largely interchangeable characters are portrayed as the heroic agents of progress, democratic values, peace and security, who shape target states through their interventions. The images of new threats of violence and instability serve to announce the attractiveness of such heroes as guarantors of stability, bearers of democracy and protectors of human rights and of the oppressed.

While those heroes are not human, they are nevertheless imagined as having the characteristics attributed to white men. A series of related images of masculinity dominate the narratives of the new interventionism.

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produced by watching films. This book does not explore the ways in which identification with characters in narratives of intervention is structured by a similar visual economy, but that process is clearly part of the CNN effect produced by filming on location in (always Third World) trouble-spots.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 29.   [42] *Ibid.*

[43] Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (London, 1992), p. 38.

[44] Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers*, p. 141.   [45] See generally Kaplan, *Looking for the Other*.

Stories about the need for the Security Council to restore order in the post-Cold War era, for example, draw on the image of white masculinity as tough, aggressive and decisive. When still US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright used the notion of new threats and conflicts in the post-Cold War era to justify increased military intervention under Security Council auspices.

We are privileged to live at a time when the enforcement of international standards of behaviour through the actions of the Security Council is more possible, widespread, and varied than it has ever been. It is also perhaps more necessary than it has ever been. Although we are opposed by no superpower, threats and conflicts continue to arise that engage our interests, even when they do not endanger directly our territory or citizens. We live in an unsettled age, beset by squabbles, wars, unsatisfied ambitions, and weapons that are more deadly and more widely available than ever in history.[46]

Such paternalistic descriptions of the need for international intervention have relied upon images of the Security Council as a benevolent patriarch. Jeffrey Clark argues that the 'vision of a pacified Somalia capable of again feeding its population is now possible' due to actions of the international military forces.[47] Similarly, Tom Farer paints a picture of the Security Council as a tough but fair figure, intervening in 'defense of humanitarian values or, less grandly, a modest degree of law and order'.[48] Farer suggests that the need for intervention in Somalia 'arose from the tribal wars unleashed by the collapse of public authority'. To create order in 'such places', 'the cops may first have to occupy them'.[49] The role of the international community, represented by its 'cops', is to bring calm professionalism, order, peace and security to emotional, fearful and hysterical peoples.

In order to create order in 'such places', a certain amount of pragmatic leadership is necessary. Many legal commentators suggest that such leadership must be provided by the actions of the USA, and where necessary by tough military leaders. 'Everyone likes to criticize US pretensions to being the constable of the world. But when people need the

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[46] Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, 'International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: a US Perspective on Enforcement' (1995) 18 *Fordham International Law Journal* 1595 at 1597.

[47] Jeffrey Clark, 'Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response' in Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint*, p. 231.

[48] Tom J. Farer, 'Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase' (1996) 18 *Human Rights Quarterly* 1.

[49] *Ibid*., p. 16.

cops, guess who they call? The international security system depends centrally on the United States.'[50]

The narration of international intervention also draws upon a less militaristic and more family-oriented version of masculinity. Cultural theorists have commented that in films of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the white male hero began to be portrayed as a 'sensitive family man', an 'emotional domestic hero', able to signify a new model of masculine strength and power, derived from a commitment to personal and family-oriented values.[51] While that later version of masculinity appears to offer a critique of the earlier, more violent and militaristic version, in fact it is based upon many of the same images and assumptions. Militarism, dominance, nationalism, individualism and violence continue to be at the heart of this image of masculinity.[52] In the second model, however, violence is resorted to in the service of family, home and nation, or to guard against abusive fathers, rather than more overtly in the interests of competition and machismo.[53]

Using similar images, texts about humanitarian intervention represent the international community as the guarantor of the values of human rights and democracy, and as the protector of suffering peoples. The Gulf War, we are told, 'finally consummated the marriage between the UN and the one power whose backing is a precondition for any collective security system'.[54] Through that image of the USA and the UN as man and wife, the USA is portrayed as a sensitive family man, willing to defend the international values of humanitarianism, human rights, democracy and security. Representations of military interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Somalia portray the UN as the figure capable of ensuring that the peoples of failed states or corrupt regimes receive aid and are guaranteed survival.[55]

Through such images, the international community is systematically allied with the values of human rights and democracy. Intervention by the international community is justified by reference to a history beginning with the framers of the UN Charter of 1945, who 'understood the linkage between the protection of basic human dignity and the preservation of peace and security'.[56] The international community is the source

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[50] Reisman, 'Some Lessons', 206.
[51] Susan Jeffords, *Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era* (New Brunswick, 1994), p. 118.
[52] *Ibid*., pp. 91–2.   [53] *Ibid*., pp. 42–3.   [54] Bloomfield, 'Collective Security', p. 190.
[55] See, for example, Gordenker and Weiss, 'Collective Security Idea', p. 15; Clark, 'Debacle', p. 205.
[56] Max M. Kampelman, 'Foreword' in Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint*, p. vii.